2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
42 tls_close_construct_packet,
46 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
59 tls_close_construct_packet,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
77 tls_close_construct_packet,
81 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
85 tls1_generate_master_secret,
86 tls1_change_cipher_state,
87 tls1_final_finish_mac,
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
94 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
95 tls_close_construct_packet,
99 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
116 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
118 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
122 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
128 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
140 * Table of curve information.
141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
144 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
176 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
182 /* The default curves */
183 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
190 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
227 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
232 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
234 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
238 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
240 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
244 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
247 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
248 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
266 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
267 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
269 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
271 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
272 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
278 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
282 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
287 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
291 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
292 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
295 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
296 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
306 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
311 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
314 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
317 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
319 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
320 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
324 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
327 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
330 const unsigned char *curves;
331 size_t num_curves, i;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
333 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
343 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
344 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
346 } else /* Should never happen */
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
351 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
352 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
365 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
367 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
368 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
379 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
383 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
400 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
401 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
407 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
409 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
411 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
413 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
417 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
419 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
420 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
424 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
437 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
438 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
440 unsigned char *clist, *p;
443 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
446 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
447 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
450 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
451 unsigned long idmask;
453 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
455 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
464 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
468 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
472 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
475 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
477 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
483 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
485 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
487 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
489 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
490 if (nid == NID_undef)
491 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
492 if (nid == NID_undef)
493 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
494 if (nid == NID_undef)
496 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
497 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
499 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
503 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
504 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
508 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
512 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
515 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
516 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
523 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
524 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
527 /* Determine curve ID */
528 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
529 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
530 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
534 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
536 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
538 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
539 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
541 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
542 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
544 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
550 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
551 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
552 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
554 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
555 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
558 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
559 * supported (see RFC4492).
561 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
562 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
563 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
564 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
565 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
568 if (i == num_formats)
573 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
574 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
575 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
577 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
579 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
580 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
581 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
582 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
583 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
587 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
588 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
593 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
600 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
604 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
606 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
607 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
608 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
610 *pformats = ecformats_default;
611 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
613 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
615 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
620 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
621 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
623 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
625 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
628 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
631 /* If not EC nothing to do */
632 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
634 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
638 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
641 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
645 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
646 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
648 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
654 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
655 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
656 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
657 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
658 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
660 return 0; /* Should never happen */
661 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
662 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
664 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
666 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
667 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
668 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
670 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
676 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
678 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
680 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
682 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
683 * is compatible with the client extensions.
685 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
687 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
690 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
693 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
694 unsigned char curve_id[2];
695 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
696 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
697 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
698 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
699 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
703 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
704 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
708 /* Need a shared curve */
709 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
713 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
717 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
722 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
725 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
726 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
729 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
730 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
732 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
735 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
736 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
738 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
742 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
744 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
747 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
748 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
752 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
753 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
759 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
766 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
767 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
771 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
774 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
778 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
779 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
780 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
781 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
783 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
784 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
787 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
788 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
792 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
793 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
794 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
795 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
796 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
797 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
798 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
800 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
801 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
806 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
807 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
809 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
810 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
812 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
813 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
814 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
815 /* Should never happen */
818 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
819 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
824 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
825 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
826 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
829 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
833 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
834 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
837 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
838 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
840 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
843 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
844 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
846 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
852 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
856 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
857 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
858 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
859 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
862 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
863 if (i == sent_sigslen
864 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
865 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
869 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
874 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
875 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
876 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
881 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
883 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
888 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
889 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
890 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
892 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
895 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
897 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
899 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
901 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
902 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
904 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
905 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
906 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
909 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
911 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
912 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
913 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
919 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
920 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
921 * @c: cipher to check
922 * @op: Security check that you want to do
924 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
926 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
928 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
929 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
931 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
933 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
934 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
936 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
937 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
940 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
943 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
945 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
947 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
950 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
952 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
953 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
963 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
964 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
965 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
966 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
967 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
970 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
972 PACKET extensions = *packet;
973 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
974 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
977 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
978 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
981 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
982 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
988 if (num_extensions <= 1)
991 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
992 if (extension_types == NULL) {
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
997 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
998 extensions = *packet;
999 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1001 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1002 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1003 /* This should not happen. */
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1009 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1013 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1014 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1015 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1016 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1021 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1025 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1028 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1030 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1032 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1033 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1036 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1038 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1039 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1040 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1041 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1049 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1050 if (s->renegotiate) {
1051 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1052 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1053 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1054 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1055 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1060 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1061 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1064 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1065 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1066 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1067 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1068 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1069 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1070 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1071 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1072 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1073 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1074 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1075 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1081 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1082 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1083 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1084 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1085 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1086 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1087 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1088 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1089 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1090 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1091 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1092 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1099 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1102 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1104 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1105 size_t num_curves, num_formats;
1108 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1110 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1111 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1112 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1113 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1114 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1120 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1122 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1123 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1128 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1129 /* Sub-packet for curves extension */
1130 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1131 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1135 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1136 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1137 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1138 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[0])
1139 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[1])) {
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1141 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1146 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1151 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1153 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1155 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1156 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1157 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1158 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1159 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1160 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1161 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1166 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1167 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1170 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1171 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1174 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1175 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1183 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1185 const unsigned char *salg;
1187 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1190 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1191 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1192 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1193 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1194 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1195 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1196 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1202 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1205 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1206 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1207 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1208 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1209 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1210 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1214 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1215 unsigned char *idbytes;
1219 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1220 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1222 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1223 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1224 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1229 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1230 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1234 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1235 unsigned char *extbytes;
1236 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1242 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1243 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1249 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1256 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1261 * 1: peer may send requests
1262 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1264 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1265 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1267 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1269 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1270 /* Sub-packet for Hearbeat extension */
1271 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1272 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1273 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1281 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1283 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1284 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1286 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1287 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1295 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1296 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1297 * (see longer comment below)
1299 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1300 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1301 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1302 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1303 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1304 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1305 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1306 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1310 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1313 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1314 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1315 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1318 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1319 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1320 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1321 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1322 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1326 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1327 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1328 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1329 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1334 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1335 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1336 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1337 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1343 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1344 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1345 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1350 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1351 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1352 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1359 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1360 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1361 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1368 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1369 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1375 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1376 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1377 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1380 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1381 unsigned char *padbytes;
1384 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1389 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1390 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1396 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1397 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1401 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1409 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1412 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1415 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1416 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1417 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1418 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1421 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1422 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1427 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1428 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1433 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1434 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1437 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1438 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1439 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1440 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1447 const unsigned char *plist;
1450 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1452 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1454 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1455 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1456 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1457 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1463 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1466 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1468 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1469 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1470 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1476 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1479 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1482 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1483 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1484 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1490 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1491 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1492 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1493 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1494 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1495 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1496 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1503 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1504 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1505 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1506 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1507 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1508 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1509 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1510 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1511 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1512 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1514 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1520 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1521 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1525 * 1: peer may send requests
1526 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1528 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1529 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1531 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1533 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1534 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1535 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1536 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1545 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1546 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1547 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1548 const unsigned char *npa;
1549 unsigned int npalen;
1552 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1554 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1555 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1556 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1557 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1561 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1565 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1570 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1572 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1573 * for other cases too.
1575 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1576 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1577 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1578 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1579 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1581 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1582 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1588 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1589 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1590 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1596 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1597 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1598 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1599 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1600 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1601 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1602 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1603 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1604 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1611 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1619 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1620 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1621 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1622 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1624 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1626 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1628 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1630 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1631 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1635 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1637 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1638 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1639 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1642 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1644 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1645 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1646 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1654 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1655 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1656 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1658 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1660 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1661 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1663 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1664 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1665 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1666 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1667 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1669 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1670 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1671 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1672 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1673 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1676 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1678 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1679 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1682 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1692 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1693 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1694 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1699 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1700 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1701 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1702 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1704 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1710 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1711 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1712 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1713 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1714 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1715 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1716 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1718 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1719 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1720 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1721 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1722 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1723 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1724 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1725 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1726 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1727 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1728 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1729 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1730 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1733 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1734 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1736 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1738 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1739 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1740 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1744 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1747 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1748 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1750 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1753 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1756 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1757 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1759 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1760 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1763 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1764 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1766 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
1769 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1771 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1772 s->servername_done = 0;
1773 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1775 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1778 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1779 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1780 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1781 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1782 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1783 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1785 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1786 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1790 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1791 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
1792 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1794 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1795 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1796 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1797 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1800 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1801 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1804 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1807 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1808 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1811 for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
1812 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1813 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].type,
1814 PACKET_data(&hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data),
1815 PACKET_remaining(&hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data),
1816 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1818 if (hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1819 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
1820 &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data, al))
1822 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1823 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1826 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1828 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1829 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1830 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1831 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1832 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1833 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1834 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1835 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1836 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1837 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1838 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1839 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1840 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1841 * the value of the Host: field.
1842 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1843 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1844 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1846 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1850 else if (hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1851 unsigned int servname_type;
1852 PACKET sni, hostname;
1854 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data,
1856 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1857 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1862 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1863 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1864 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1866 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1867 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1868 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1870 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1871 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1873 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1874 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1875 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1880 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1881 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1885 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1886 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1890 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1891 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1895 s->servername_done = 1;
1898 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1899 * fall back to a full handshake.
1901 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1902 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1903 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1907 else if (hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1910 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data,
1914 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1918 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1919 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1921 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1922 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1929 else if (hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].type
1930 == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1931 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1933 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data,
1934 &ec_point_format_list)
1935 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1940 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1941 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1943 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1944 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1948 } else if (hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].type
1949 == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1950 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1952 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1953 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data,
1954 &elliptic_curve_list)
1955 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1956 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1961 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1962 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
1964 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
1965 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1970 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1971 else if (hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].type
1972 == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1973 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1974 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
1975 PACKET_data(&hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data),
1976 PACKET_remaining(&hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data),
1977 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
1978 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1981 } else if (hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].type
1982 == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
1983 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
1985 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data,
1986 &supported_sig_algs)
1987 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
1988 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
1993 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
1994 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
1998 } else if (hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].type
1999 == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2000 if (!PACKET_get_1(&hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data,
2001 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2005 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2006 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2007 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2008 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2009 (&hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data, &responder_id_list))
2013 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2014 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2016 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2018 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2019 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2020 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2021 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2025 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2028 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2030 PACKET responder_id;
2031 const unsigned char *id_data;
2033 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2035 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2039 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2040 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
2041 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2042 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2046 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2047 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2051 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2052 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2053 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2058 /* Read in request_extensions */
2059 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
2060 &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data, &exts))
2063 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2064 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2065 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2066 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2067 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2068 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2069 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2070 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2071 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2079 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2081 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2085 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
2086 && hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2087 unsigned int hbtype;
2089 if (!PACKET_get_1(&hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data, &hbtype)
2090 || PACKET_remaining(&hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data)) {
2091 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2095 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2096 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2098 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2099 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2100 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2103 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2108 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2109 else if (hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
2110 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2112 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2115 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2116 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2117 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2118 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2119 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2120 * anything like that, but this might change).
2122 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2123 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2124 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2125 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2126 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2128 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2132 else if (hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].type
2133 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2134 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2135 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
2136 &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data, al))
2140 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2142 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2143 && hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2144 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
2145 &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data, al))
2149 else if (hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2150 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
2151 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2153 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2154 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
2158 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2159 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2160 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2161 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2162 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2165 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].type,
2166 PACKET_data(&hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data),
2167 PACKET_remaining(&hello->pre_proc_exts[loop].data), al) <= 0)
2172 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2174 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2175 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2176 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2178 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2183 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2184 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2185 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2186 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2191 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2194 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2195 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
2196 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2199 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2208 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2209 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2210 * fill the length of the block.
2212 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2214 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2216 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2217 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2218 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2226 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2228 unsigned int length, type, size;
2229 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2230 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2233 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2235 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2237 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2238 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2240 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2241 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2244 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2246 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2248 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2251 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2252 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2256 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2257 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2261 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2262 const unsigned char *data;
2265 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2266 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2269 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2270 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2272 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2273 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2275 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2276 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2277 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2278 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2279 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2282 tlsext_servername = 1;
2284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2285 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2286 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2287 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2288 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2289 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2293 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2294 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2295 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2296 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2297 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2300 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2301 ecpointformatlist_length;
2302 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2303 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2304 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2305 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2311 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2313 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2314 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2315 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2316 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2318 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2321 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2322 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2325 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2326 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2328 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2331 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2332 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2335 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2336 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2340 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2341 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2342 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2344 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2345 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2346 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2347 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2348 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2349 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2351 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2353 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2354 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2355 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2358 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2363 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2364 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2365 unsigned char *selected;
2366 unsigned char selected_len;
2367 /* We must have requested it. */
2368 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2369 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2372 /* The data must be valid */
2373 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2374 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2377 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2380 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2381 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2382 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2386 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2387 * a single Serverhello
2389 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2390 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2391 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2392 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2395 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2396 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2397 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2401 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2403 /* We must have requested it. */
2404 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2405 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2409 * The extension data consists of:
2410 * uint16 list_length
2411 * uint8 proto_length;
2412 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2414 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2415 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2416 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2417 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2420 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2421 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2422 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2423 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2426 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2427 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2430 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2433 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2434 unsigned int hbtype;
2435 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2436 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2440 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2441 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2443 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2444 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2445 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2448 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2454 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2455 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2459 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2460 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2461 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2462 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2463 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2464 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2465 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2466 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2468 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2471 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2472 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2474 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2478 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2479 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2483 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2484 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2485 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2486 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2487 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2488 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2489 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2493 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2502 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2503 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2504 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2505 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2506 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2508 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2509 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2510 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2512 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2518 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2521 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2522 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2523 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2532 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2534 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2538 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2543 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2545 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2546 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2550 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2551 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2554 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2555 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2559 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2561 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2562 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2563 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2564 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2566 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2568 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2571 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2572 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2575 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2576 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2579 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2580 s->servername_done = 0;
2586 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2587 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2589 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2591 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2594 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2595 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2597 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2598 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2601 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2604 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2605 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2606 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2610 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2615 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2616 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2617 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2618 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2619 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2620 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2621 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2622 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2625 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2626 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2627 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2629 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2632 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2633 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2635 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2636 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2640 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2644 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2649 * Upon success, returns 1.
2650 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2652 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2654 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2657 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2658 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2659 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2660 * influence which certificate is sent
2662 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2664 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2665 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2666 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2667 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2669 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2670 * et al can pick it up.
2672 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2673 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2675 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2676 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2677 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2679 /* status request response should be sent */
2680 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2681 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2682 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2684 /* something bad happened */
2685 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2687 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2693 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2700 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2702 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2703 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2707 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2708 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2709 * must contain uncompressed.
2711 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2712 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2713 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2714 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2715 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2716 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2717 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2718 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2720 unsigned char *list;
2721 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2722 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2723 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2724 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2725 found_uncompressed = 1;
2729 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2731 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2735 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2736 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2738 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2740 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2741 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2742 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2743 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2745 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2747 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2750 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2751 * that we don't receive a status message
2753 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2754 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2755 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
2758 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2759 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2762 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2763 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2766 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2767 s->servername_done = 0;
2773 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2776 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2778 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2779 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2783 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2790 static RAW_EXTENSION *get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
2795 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
2796 if (exts[loop].type == type)
2804 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
2806 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
2807 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2808 * point to the resulting session.
2810 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2811 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2812 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2815 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2816 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2817 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2818 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2819 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2820 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2821 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2824 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2825 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2826 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2827 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2828 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2829 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2831 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
2835 const unsigned char *etick;
2837 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
2840 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2843 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2846 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
2849 ticketext = get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
2850 hello->num_extensions,
2851 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
2852 if (ticketext == NULL)
2855 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
2858 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2861 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2864 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2866 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2867 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2868 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2869 * calculate the master secret later.
2873 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
2874 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2877 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
2878 hello->session_id_len, ret);
2880 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2881 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2884 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2887 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2888 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2891 default: /* fatal error */
2897 * Sets the extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present
2898 * in the ClientHello
2900 int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2902 RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
2904 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2906 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION)
2909 emsext = get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts, hello->num_extensions,
2910 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
2913 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
2914 * client doesn't support EMS.
2919 /* The extensions must always be empty */
2920 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
2923 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2929 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2931 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2932 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2933 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2934 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2935 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2936 * point to the resulting session.
2939 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2940 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2941 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2942 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2943 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2945 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2946 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2947 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2950 unsigned char *sdec;
2951 const unsigned char *p;
2952 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
2954 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2955 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2956 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2957 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2959 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2960 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2963 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2968 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2969 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2970 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2981 /* Check key name matches */
2982 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
2983 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
2987 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2988 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
2989 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
2990 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
2991 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
2992 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
2998 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3001 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3005 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3007 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3012 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3013 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3014 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3017 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3018 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3019 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3022 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3023 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3024 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3025 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3026 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3027 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
3028 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
3029 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3033 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
3034 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3039 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3043 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3047 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3048 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3049 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3053 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3054 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3063 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3067 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3068 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3072 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3079 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3080 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3081 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3082 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3083 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3084 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3085 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3086 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3087 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3088 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3091 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3092 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3093 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3094 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3095 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3096 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3097 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3100 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3103 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3104 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3110 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3113 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3114 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3115 return table[i].nid;
3120 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3126 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3129 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3132 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3138 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3140 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3147 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3150 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3151 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3152 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3153 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3154 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3155 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3156 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3157 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3158 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3159 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3160 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3161 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3164 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3170 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3171 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3172 return tls12_md_info + i;
3178 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3180 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3181 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3183 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3186 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3189 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3193 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3194 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3197 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3198 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3201 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3202 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3205 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3206 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3208 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3209 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3211 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3212 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3218 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3219 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3220 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3222 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3223 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3225 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3226 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3228 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3230 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3231 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3233 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3235 if (psignhash_nid) {
3236 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3237 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3238 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3242 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3243 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3245 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3246 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3247 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3249 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3250 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3252 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3253 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3257 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3258 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3262 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3264 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3265 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3266 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3268 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3269 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3270 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3272 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3273 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3274 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3276 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3277 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3282 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3283 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3288 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3289 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3296 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3298 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3300 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3303 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3304 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3308 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3309 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3310 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3311 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3318 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3319 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3320 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3321 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3323 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3324 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3325 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3326 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3327 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3329 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3330 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3333 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3334 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3335 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3337 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3347 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3348 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3350 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3351 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3353 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3355 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3357 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3358 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3359 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3360 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3361 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3362 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3363 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3364 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3365 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3366 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3368 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3369 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3372 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3373 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3377 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3378 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3380 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3382 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3385 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3389 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3390 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3394 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3396 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
3399 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3400 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3402 /* Should never happen */
3406 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3407 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3408 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3410 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3411 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3415 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3420 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3421 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3423 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3424 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3427 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3428 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3429 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3430 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3431 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3433 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3434 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3435 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3436 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3442 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3443 * the certificate for signing.
3445 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3447 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3448 * supported it stays as NULL.
3450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3451 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3452 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3455 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3456 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3457 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3461 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3462 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3465 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3466 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3467 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3468 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3469 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3470 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3471 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3472 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3478 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3479 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3480 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3482 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3483 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3484 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
3488 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3495 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3497 return (int)numsigalgs;
3500 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3501 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3502 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3504 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3505 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
3506 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
3510 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3512 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3514 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3516 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3518 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3519 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3522 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3526 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3529 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3531 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3532 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3533 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3534 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3535 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3536 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3538 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3539 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3540 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3544 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3546 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3549 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3552 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3554 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3556 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3558 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3566 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3567 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3569 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3572 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3573 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3576 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3577 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3582 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3583 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3585 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3589 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3593 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3596 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3598 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3603 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3604 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3606 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3607 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3608 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3610 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3617 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3618 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3619 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3621 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3622 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3623 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3629 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3633 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3637 if (default_nid == -1)
3639 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3641 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3642 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3643 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3648 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3649 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3653 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3654 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3655 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3662 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3663 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3664 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3665 * attempting to use them.
3668 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3670 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3671 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3672 /* Strict mode flags */
3673 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3674 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3675 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3677 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3682 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3683 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3686 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3687 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3689 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3692 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
3694 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3695 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3697 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3699 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3700 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3706 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3709 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3711 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3712 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3714 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3721 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3722 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3723 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3724 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3725 else if (!check_flags)
3730 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3731 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3733 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3735 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3736 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3738 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3741 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3742 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3743 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3744 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3747 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3748 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3749 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3753 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3754 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3757 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3758 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3759 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3762 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3763 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3764 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3767 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3768 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3769 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3778 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3779 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3781 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3783 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3784 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3785 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3788 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3795 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3796 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3800 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3801 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3802 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3803 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3805 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3812 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3813 else if (check_flags)
3814 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3816 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3817 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3818 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3819 else if (!check_flags)
3822 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3823 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3824 else if (strict_mode) {
3825 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3826 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3827 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3828 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3830 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3837 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3838 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3840 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3842 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3845 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3848 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3852 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3856 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3858 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3859 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3861 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3862 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3863 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3867 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3870 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3872 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3874 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3875 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3877 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3878 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3879 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3881 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3882 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3883 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3884 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3885 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3890 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3893 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3895 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3896 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3900 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3901 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3902 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3903 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3904 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3906 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3909 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3913 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3916 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3917 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3924 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3925 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3927 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3928 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3929 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3930 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3931 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3932 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3933 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3936 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3937 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3939 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3943 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3945 int dh_secbits = 80;
3946 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3947 return DH_get_1024_160();
3948 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3949 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3954 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3955 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3958 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
3966 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3967 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3969 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3970 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
3978 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
3979 return DH_get_2048_224();
3980 return DH_get_1024_160();
3984 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3987 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
3990 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3991 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3992 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3993 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3995 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
3998 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4000 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4003 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4005 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4006 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4007 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4008 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4010 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4011 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4013 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4014 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4017 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4019 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4022 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4025 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4027 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4028 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4030 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4031 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4033 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4034 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4039 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4040 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4041 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4044 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4046 int rv, start_idx, i;
4048 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4053 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4057 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4058 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4059 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);