2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] =
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
246 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
247 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
250 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
252 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
253 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
254 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
256 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
259 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
261 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
264 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
266 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
268 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
270 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
272 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
274 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
276 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
278 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
280 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
288 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
290 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
292 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
294 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
296 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
298 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
300 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
302 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
306 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
308 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
310 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
312 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
318 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
321 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
322 const unsigned char **pcurves,
327 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
328 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
331 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
332 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
334 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
335 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
336 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
340 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
345 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
349 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
350 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
354 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
355 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
358 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
359 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
361 const unsigned char *curves;
363 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
364 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
366 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
369 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
372 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
374 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
377 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
379 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
382 else /* Should never happen */
385 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
386 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
388 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
394 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
395 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
399 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
401 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
402 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
404 /* Can't do anything on client side */
411 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
412 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
415 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
416 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
418 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
419 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
420 /* Should never happen */
423 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
426 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
433 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
435 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
436 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
438 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
442 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
443 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
454 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
455 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
457 unsigned char *clist, *p;
459 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
460 * while curve ids < 32
462 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
463 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
466 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
468 unsigned long idmask;
470 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
472 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
483 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
487 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
492 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
495 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
497 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
501 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
503 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
505 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
507 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
508 if (nid == NID_undef)
509 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
510 if (nid == NID_undef)
511 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
512 if (nid == NID_undef)
514 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
515 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
517 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
520 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
521 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
526 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
530 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
532 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
533 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
539 const EC_METHOD *meth;
542 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
543 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
544 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
547 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
550 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
554 /* Determine curve ID */
555 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
556 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
557 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
561 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
573 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
576 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
578 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
581 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
585 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
586 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
587 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
589 const unsigned char *p;
592 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
593 * is supported (see RFC4492).
595 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
597 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
598 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
599 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
609 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
610 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
612 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
613 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
615 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
620 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
627 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
630 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
632 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
634 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
635 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
639 *pformats = ecformats_default;
640 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
642 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
644 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
648 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
649 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
651 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
653 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
656 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
659 /* If not EC nothing to do */
660 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
665 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
669 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
670 * supported curves extension.
672 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
675 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
676 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
678 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
685 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
686 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
687 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
688 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
689 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
691 return 0; /* Should never happen */
692 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
693 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
695 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
699 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
700 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
702 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
707 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
708 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
710 unsigned char curve_id[2];
711 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
712 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
713 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
714 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
717 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
718 * no other curves permitted.
722 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
723 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
724 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
725 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
726 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
730 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
731 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
733 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
734 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
736 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
739 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
742 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
744 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
750 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
752 /* Need a shared curve */
753 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
759 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
764 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
766 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
770 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
774 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
778 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
779 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
782 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
783 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
785 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
788 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
789 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
791 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
794 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
795 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
797 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
800 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
801 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
802 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
803 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
805 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
807 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
808 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
811 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
812 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
815 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
818 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
822 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
823 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
824 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
827 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
829 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
832 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
834 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
835 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
836 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
838 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
839 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
842 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
843 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
847 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
848 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
850 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
851 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
853 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
855 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
856 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
860 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
862 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
864 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
867 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
870 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
871 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
873 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
874 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
876 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
877 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
878 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
879 /* Should never happen */
882 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
883 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
885 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
888 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
890 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
891 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
892 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
894 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
899 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
904 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
906 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
908 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
909 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
913 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
915 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
917 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
918 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
926 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
929 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
930 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
931 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
933 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
936 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
937 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
948 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
951 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
952 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
955 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
956 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
957 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
958 * session and not global settings.
961 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
964 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
965 size_t i, sigalgslen;
966 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
969 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
970 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
971 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
974 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
975 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
978 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
979 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
983 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
984 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
989 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
994 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1000 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1001 * signature algorithms.
1005 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1006 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1010 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1011 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1015 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1016 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1019 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1021 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1022 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1025 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1026 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1027 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1029 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1030 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1032 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1036 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1037 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1039 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1040 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1049 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1052 unsigned char *ret = p;
1053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1054 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1056 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1059 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1060 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1062 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1064 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1066 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1067 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1068 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1069 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1078 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1079 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1080 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1085 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1087 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1089 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1090 unsigned long size_str;
1093 /* check for enough space.
1094 4 for the servername type and entension length
1095 2 for servernamelist length
1096 1 for the hostname type
1097 2 for hostname length
1101 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1102 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1105 /* extension type and length */
1106 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1107 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1109 /* length of servername list */
1110 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1112 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1113 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1115 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1119 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1124 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1130 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1132 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1135 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1145 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1146 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1147 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1149 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1150 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1156 /* check for enough space.
1157 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1158 1 for the srp user identity
1159 + srp user identity length
1161 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1163 /* fill in the extension */
1164 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1165 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1166 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1167 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1175 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1177 const unsigned char *plist;
1180 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1182 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1183 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1190 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1191 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1192 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1193 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1196 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1197 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1198 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1200 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1201 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1202 if (plistlen > 65532)
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1208 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1209 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1211 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1212 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1213 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1214 * resolves this to two bytes.
1217 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1220 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1222 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1225 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1226 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1227 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1228 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1230 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1231 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1232 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1234 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1235 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1237 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1241 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1242 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1244 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1247 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1248 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1252 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1258 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1261 const unsigned char *salg;
1262 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1263 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1265 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1266 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1268 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1272 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1273 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1274 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1276 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1278 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1280 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1283 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1286 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1291 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1292 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1295 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1299 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1301 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1302 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1308 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1310 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1317 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1318 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1319 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1321 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1322 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1324 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1326 /* save position of id len */
1327 unsigned char *q = ret;
1328 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1329 /* skip over id len */
1331 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1337 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1341 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1342 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1345 * 1: peer may send requests
1346 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1348 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1349 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1351 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1355 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1357 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1358 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1359 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1361 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1366 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1370 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1372 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1374 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1377 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1385 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1386 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1387 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1388 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1389 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1390 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1393 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1394 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1396 if (limit < ret + 6)
1398 lenmax = limit - ret - 6;
1400 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1401 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1403 *(ret++) = list_len;
1404 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1407 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1414 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1417 unsigned char *ret = p;
1418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1419 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1421 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1422 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1423 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1424 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1426 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1427 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1431 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1433 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1435 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1437 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1441 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1445 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1451 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1453 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1456 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1465 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1466 if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1468 const unsigned char *plist;
1470 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1473 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1475 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1476 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1483 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1484 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1485 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1486 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1490 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1491 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1493 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1494 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1496 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1501 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1503 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1504 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1508 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1509 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1510 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1512 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1514 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1516 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1519 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1522 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1531 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1533 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1535 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1538 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1546 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1547 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1548 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1549 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1550 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1551 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1552 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1553 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1554 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1555 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1556 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1562 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1563 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1565 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1568 * 1: peer may send requests
1569 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1571 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1572 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1574 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1580 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1581 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1582 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1584 const unsigned char *npa;
1585 unsigned int npalen;
1588 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1589 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1591 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1592 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1594 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1596 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1601 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1603 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1605 size_t authz_length;
1606 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1607 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1608 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1609 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1610 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1612 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1614 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1615 * uint8_t authz_type
1617 * uint8_t data[length]
1619 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1620 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1622 unsigned short length;
1626 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1628 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1632 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1640 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1641 * 2 bytes for extension type
1642 * 2 bytes for extension length
1643 * 1 byte for the list length
1644 * n bytes for the list */
1645 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1647 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1648 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1650 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1651 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1655 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1657 unsigned short length;
1662 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1664 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1667 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1674 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1681 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1683 unsigned short type;
1684 unsigned short size;
1686 unsigned char *data = *p;
1687 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1690 s->servername_done = 0;
1691 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1693 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1697 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1698 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1700 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1701 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1703 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1704 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1706 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1707 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1709 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1710 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1712 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1713 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1715 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1716 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1719 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1723 if (data > (d+n-len))
1726 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1731 if (data+size > (d+n))
1734 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1736 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1737 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1738 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1739 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1741 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1742 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1743 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1744 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1745 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1746 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1747 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1748 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1749 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1750 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1751 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1752 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1753 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1754 the value of the Host: field.
1755 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1756 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1757 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1758 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1762 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1764 unsigned char *sdata;
1770 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1777 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1784 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1790 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1793 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1794 switch (servname_type)
1796 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1799 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1801 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1804 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1806 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1809 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1811 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1814 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1815 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1816 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1817 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1818 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1819 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1822 s->servername_done = 1;
1826 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1827 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1828 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1840 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1846 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1848 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1850 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1853 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1855 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1858 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1860 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1861 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1863 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1865 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1872 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1873 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1875 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1876 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1878 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1879 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1881 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1886 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1888 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1889 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1891 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1892 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1894 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1897 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1898 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1901 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1902 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1903 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1904 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1905 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1908 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1909 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1911 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1912 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1913 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1915 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1916 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1918 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1923 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1925 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1928 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1929 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1931 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1934 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1935 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1938 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1939 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1940 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1941 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1942 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1945 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1946 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1947 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1948 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1950 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1954 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1957 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1958 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1960 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1964 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1965 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1966 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1967 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1969 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1970 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1972 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1977 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1979 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1980 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1982 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1986 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1988 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1990 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1992 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1995 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
1997 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2002 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2004 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2007 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2009 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2012 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2015 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2018 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2019 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2023 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2024 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2029 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2033 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2035 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2037 const unsigned char *sdata;
2039 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2044 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2053 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2057 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2061 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2066 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2070 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2075 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2076 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2079 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2080 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2081 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2083 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2084 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2087 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2088 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2090 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2091 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2096 /* Read in request_extensions */
2099 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2106 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2112 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2114 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2115 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2118 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2119 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2121 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2122 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2124 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2129 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2133 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2136 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2140 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2141 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2143 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2144 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2145 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2147 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2152 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2153 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2154 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2156 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2159 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2160 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2161 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2162 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2163 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2164 * anything like that, but this might change).
2166 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2167 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2168 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2169 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2170 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2171 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2175 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2176 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2178 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2183 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2185 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2186 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2190 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2194 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2196 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2198 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2202 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2203 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2204 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2207 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2208 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2209 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2210 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2211 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2213 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2217 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2218 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2219 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2221 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2223 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2224 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2225 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2226 1 /* element size */,
2229 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2232 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2233 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2235 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2249 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2251 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2252 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2254 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2256 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2259 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2260 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2261 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2266 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2269 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2271 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2275 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2284 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2285 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2286 * the length of the block. */
2287 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2289 unsigned int off = 0;
2303 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2305 unsigned short length;
2306 unsigned short type;
2307 unsigned short size;
2308 unsigned char *data = *p;
2309 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2310 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2313 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2317 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2318 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2321 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2325 if (data+length != d+n)
2327 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2331 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2336 if (data+size > (d+n))
2339 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2340 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2341 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2343 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2345 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2347 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2350 tlsext_servername = 1;
2353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2354 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2355 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2357 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2358 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2360 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2362 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2365 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2366 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2367 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2369 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2372 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2373 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2375 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2376 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2377 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2378 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2379 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2382 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2384 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2386 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2387 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2389 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2392 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2395 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2398 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2400 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2401 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2402 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2404 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2408 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2411 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2412 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2414 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2418 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2419 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2420 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2421 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2423 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2425 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2427 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2432 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2433 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2435 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2436 * a status request message.
2438 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2440 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2443 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2444 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2447 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2448 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2450 unsigned char *selected;
2451 unsigned char selected_len;
2453 /* We must have requested it. */
2454 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2456 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2459 /* The data must be valid */
2460 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2462 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2465 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2467 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2470 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2471 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2473 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2476 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2477 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2478 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2481 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2483 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2485 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2488 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2492 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2493 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2495 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2496 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2497 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2499 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2504 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2506 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2511 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2513 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2514 * an authz hello extension if the client
2515 * didn't request a proof. */
2516 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2517 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2519 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2521 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2527 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2531 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2532 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2534 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2538 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2539 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2540 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2541 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2543 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2547 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2555 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2559 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2561 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2563 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2565 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2566 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2568 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2574 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2584 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2585 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2586 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2587 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2588 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2589 * absence on initial connect only.
2591 if (!renegotiate_seen
2592 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2593 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2595 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2597 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2605 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2608 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2612 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2614 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2619 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2621 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2622 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2624 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2625 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2627 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2628 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2633 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2637 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2638 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2645 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2650 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2652 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2653 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2656 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2657 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2659 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2660 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2664 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2665 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2666 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2667 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2669 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2671 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2672 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2673 * so this has to happen here in
2674 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2678 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2680 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2683 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2684 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2689 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2690 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2691 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2693 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2695 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2696 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2698 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2699 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2701 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2702 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2704 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2705 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2707 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2708 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2711 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2715 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2717 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2718 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2719 * abort the handshake.
2721 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2722 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2730 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2731 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2734 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2735 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2738 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2739 s->servername_done=0;
2745 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2747 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2750 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2751 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2752 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2753 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2755 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2758 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2759 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2760 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2761 if (certpkey == NULL)
2763 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2766 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2767 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2769 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2770 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2773 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2774 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2775 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2777 /* status request response should be sent */
2778 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2779 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2780 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2782 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2784 /* something bad happened */
2785 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2786 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2787 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2792 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2797 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2798 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2801 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2802 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2810 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2812 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2813 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2816 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2817 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2818 * it must contain uncompressed.
2820 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2821 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2822 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2823 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2824 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2826 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2828 unsigned char *list;
2829 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2830 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2831 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2833 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2835 found_uncompressed = 1;
2839 if (!found_uncompressed)
2841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2845 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2846 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2848 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2849 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2850 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2851 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2853 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2854 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2856 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2857 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2859 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2861 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2862 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2865 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2866 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2867 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2868 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2870 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2871 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2876 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2879 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2880 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2883 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2884 * there is no response.
2886 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2888 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2889 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2891 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2892 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2895 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2896 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2900 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2901 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2907 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2908 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2911 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2912 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2915 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2916 s->servername_done=0;
2922 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2925 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2927 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2929 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2933 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2941 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2942 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2943 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2945 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2946 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2947 * extension, if any.
2948 * len: the length of the session ID.
2949 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2950 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2951 * point to the resulting session.
2953 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2954 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2955 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2958 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2959 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2960 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2961 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2962 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2963 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2964 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2967 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2968 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2969 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2970 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2971 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2972 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2974 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2975 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2977 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2978 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2982 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2984 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2985 * to permit stateful resumption.
2987 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2989 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2993 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2994 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
3001 /* Skip past cipher list */
3006 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3011 /* Now at start of extensions */
3012 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3015 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3017 unsigned short type, size;
3020 if (p + size > limit)
3022 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3027 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3028 * currently have one. */
3029 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3032 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3034 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3035 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3036 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3037 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3038 * calculate the master secret later. */
3041 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3044 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3045 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3047 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3049 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3050 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3052 default: /* fatal error */
3061 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3063 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3064 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3065 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3066 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3067 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3068 * point to the resulting session.
3071 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3072 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3073 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3074 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3076 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3077 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3078 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3081 unsigned char *sdec;
3082 const unsigned char *p;
3083 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3084 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3087 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3088 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3091 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3092 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3093 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3094 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3096 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3097 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3108 /* Check key name matches */
3109 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3111 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3112 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3113 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3114 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3116 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3117 * integrity checks on ticket.
3119 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3122 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3126 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3127 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3128 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3129 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3130 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3132 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3133 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3134 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3135 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3136 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3139 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3142 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3143 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3146 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3149 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3153 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3154 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3155 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3156 * as required by standard.
3159 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3160 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3168 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3173 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3181 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3182 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3183 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3184 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3185 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3186 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3187 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3190 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3191 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3192 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3193 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3196 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3199 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3201 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3207 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3210 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3212 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3213 return table[i].nid;
3218 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3223 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3224 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3227 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3230 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3231 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3235 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3237 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3238 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3241 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3246 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3254 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3258 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3259 return EVP_sha224();
3261 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3262 return EVP_sha256();
3264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3265 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3266 return EVP_sha384();
3268 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3269 return EVP_sha512();
3277 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3282 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3283 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3286 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3287 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3290 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3291 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3297 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3298 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3299 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3301 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3302 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3304 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3306 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3307 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3309 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3311 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3313 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3314 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3316 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3320 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3321 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3322 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3324 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3327 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3328 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3329 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3330 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3332 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3333 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3334 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3336 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3337 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3339 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3341 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3343 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3348 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3349 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3350 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3352 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3363 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3364 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3366 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3367 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3369 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3371 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3372 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3373 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3375 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3376 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3378 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3380 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3381 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3384 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3385 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3389 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3390 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3396 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3397 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3399 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3402 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3405 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3406 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3407 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3412 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3414 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3420 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3421 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3422 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3424 /* Should never happen */
3428 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3429 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3431 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3432 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3434 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3436 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3437 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3439 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3440 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3442 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3444 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3446 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3449 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3450 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3451 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3452 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3453 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3455 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3456 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3462 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3463 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3465 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3466 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3468 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3469 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3470 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3471 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3473 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3474 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3479 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3480 * use the certificate for signing.
3482 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3484 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3485 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3488 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3489 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3492 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3494 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3495 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3499 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3500 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3507 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3508 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3509 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3511 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3517 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3524 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3526 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3529 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3530 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3531 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3533 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3534 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3538 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3540 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3542 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3544 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3546 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3547 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3553 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3555 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3556 unsigned short hbtype;
3557 unsigned int payload;
3558 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3560 /* Read type and payload length first */
3565 if (s->msg_callback)
3566 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3567 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3568 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3570 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3572 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3575 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3576 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3577 * payload, plus padding
3579 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3582 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3583 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3585 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3587 /* Random padding */
3588 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3590 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3592 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3593 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3594 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3595 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3597 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3602 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3606 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3607 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3608 * sequence number */
3611 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3614 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3622 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3624 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3626 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3627 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3629 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3630 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3631 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3633 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3637 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3638 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3640 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3644 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3645 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3647 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3651 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3652 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3654 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3656 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3657 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3658 * some random stuff.
3659 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3660 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3661 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3662 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3665 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3668 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3669 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3671 /* Sequence number */
3672 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3673 /* 16 random bytes */
3674 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3676 /* Random padding */
3677 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3679 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3682 if (s->msg_callback)
3683 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3684 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3685 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3687 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3696 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3701 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3704 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3706 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3709 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3710 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3712 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3714 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3716 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3724 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3725 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3726 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3727 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3728 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3729 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3732 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3733 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3734 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3735 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3738 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3740 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3741 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3744 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3745 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3749 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3750 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3751 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3755 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3759 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3762 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3764 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3769 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3770 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3772 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3774 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3775 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3776 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3777 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3779 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3787 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3788 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3789 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3790 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3794 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3795 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3796 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3797 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3803 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3807 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3811 if (default_nid == -1)
3813 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3815 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3816 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3817 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3821 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3822 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3826 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3827 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3829 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3835 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3836 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3837 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3838 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3841 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3843 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3844 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3845 /* Strict mode flags */
3846 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3847 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3848 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3850 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3855 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3856 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3858 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3859 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3862 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3866 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3869 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3871 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3873 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3874 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3877 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3878 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3879 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3881 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3882 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3891 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3894 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3895 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3896 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3898 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3906 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3907 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3908 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
3911 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3917 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
3918 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
3921 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
3924 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3925 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3927 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3932 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3933 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3934 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3935 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3936 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3939 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3940 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3941 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3942 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3946 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3947 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3955 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
3956 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
3959 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
3962 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3963 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
3965 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3968 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
3976 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3977 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
3979 if (!check_flags) goto end;
3982 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3983 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3984 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3986 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
3991 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3999 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4000 else if(check_flags)
4001 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4003 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4004 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4005 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4006 else if (!check_flags)
4009 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4010 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4011 else if (strict_mode)
4013 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4014 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4016 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4017 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4021 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4029 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4031 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4036 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4039 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4042 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4047 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4048 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4049 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4050 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4051 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4056 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4061 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4065 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4066 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4068 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4070 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4072 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4076 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4080 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4083 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4085 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4086 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4088 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4090 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4091 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4093 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4095 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4097 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4098 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4100 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4105 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4109 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4111 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4112 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4116 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4118 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4119 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4120 else if (cpk->digest)
4121 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4124 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4126 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4127 * if the chain is invalid.
4131 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4132 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4135 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4136 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4143 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4144 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4146 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4147 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4148 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4149 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4150 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4151 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4153 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4154 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4156 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);