2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
253 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
254 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
255 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
258 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
260 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
261 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
262 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
263 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
264 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
265 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
266 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
267 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
269 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
270 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
271 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
272 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
273 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
274 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
275 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
276 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
277 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
278 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
279 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
280 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
281 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
282 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
283 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
284 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
287 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
289 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
290 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
293 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
295 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
296 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
297 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
299 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
302 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
304 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
307 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
309 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
311 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
313 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
315 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
317 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
319 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
321 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
323 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
325 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
327 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
329 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
331 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
333 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
335 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
337 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
339 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
341 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
343 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
345 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
347 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
349 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
351 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
353 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
355 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
361 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
364 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
365 const unsigned char **pcurves,
370 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
371 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
374 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
375 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
377 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
378 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
379 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
382 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
383 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
387 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
388 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
392 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
393 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
397 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
398 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
401 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
402 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
404 const unsigned char *curves;
406 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
407 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
409 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
412 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
415 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
420 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
422 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
425 else /* Should never happen */
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
429 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
431 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
437 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
438 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
442 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
444 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
445 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
447 /* Can't do anything on client side */
454 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
455 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
458 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
459 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
460 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
461 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
463 /* Should never happen */
466 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
469 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
471 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
476 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
478 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
479 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
481 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
485 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
486 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
497 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
498 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
500 unsigned char *clist, *p;
502 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
503 * while curve ids < 32
505 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
506 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
509 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
511 unsigned long idmask;
513 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
515 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
526 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
530 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
535 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
538 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
540 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
544 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
546 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
548 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
550 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
551 if (nid == NID_undef)
552 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
553 if (nid == NID_undef)
554 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
555 if (nid == NID_undef)
557 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
558 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
560 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
563 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
564 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
569 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
573 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
575 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
576 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
582 const EC_METHOD *meth;
585 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
586 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
587 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
590 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
593 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
597 /* Determine curve ID */
598 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
599 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
600 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
604 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
616 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
619 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
621 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
624 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
628 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
629 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
630 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
632 const unsigned char *p;
635 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
636 * is supported (see RFC4492).
638 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
640 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
641 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
642 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
652 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
653 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
655 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
656 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
658 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
663 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
670 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
673 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
675 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
677 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
678 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
682 *pformats = ecformats_default;
683 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
685 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
687 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
691 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
692 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
694 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
696 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
699 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
702 /* If not EC nothing to do */
703 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
708 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
712 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
713 * supported curves extension.
715 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
718 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
719 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
721 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
728 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
729 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
730 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
731 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
732 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
734 return 0; /* Should never happen */
735 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
736 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
738 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
742 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
743 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
745 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
750 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
751 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
753 unsigned char curve_id[2];
754 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
755 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
756 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
757 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
760 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
761 * no other curves permitted.
765 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
766 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
767 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
768 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
769 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
773 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
774 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
776 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
777 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
779 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
782 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
785 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
787 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
793 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
795 /* Need a shared curve */
796 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
802 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
807 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
809 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
813 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
817 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
821 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
822 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
825 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
826 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
828 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
831 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
832 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
834 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
837 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
838 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
840 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
843 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
844 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
845 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
846 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
848 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
850 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
851 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
854 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
855 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
858 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
861 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
865 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
866 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
867 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
870 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
872 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
875 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
877 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
878 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
879 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
881 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
882 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
885 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
886 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
890 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
891 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
893 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
894 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
896 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
898 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
899 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
903 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
905 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
907 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
910 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
913 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
914 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
916 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
917 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
919 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
920 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
921 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
922 /* Should never happen */
925 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
926 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
931 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
933 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
934 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
935 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
937 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
942 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
947 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
949 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
952 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
956 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
958 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
961 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
969 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
972 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
973 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
974 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
976 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
979 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
980 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
985 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
991 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
994 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
995 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
998 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
999 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1000 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1001 * session and not global settings.
1004 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1007 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1008 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1009 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1012 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1013 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1014 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1017 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1018 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1021 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1022 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1026 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1027 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1031 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1032 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1037 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1043 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1044 * signature algorithms.
1048 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1049 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1053 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1054 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1058 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1059 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1062 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1064 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1065 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1069 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1070 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1072 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1075 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1079 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1080 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1082 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1083 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1092 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1095 unsigned char *ret = p;
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1097 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1099 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1102 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1103 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1105 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1107 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1109 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1110 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1111 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1112 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1121 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1122 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1123 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1128 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1130 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1132 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1133 unsigned long size_str;
1136 /* check for enough space.
1137 4 for the servername type and entension length
1138 2 for servernamelist length
1139 1 for the hostname type
1140 2 for hostname length
1144 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1145 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1148 /* extension type and length */
1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1150 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1152 /* length of servername list */
1153 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1155 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1156 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1158 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1162 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1167 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1175 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1178 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1188 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1189 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1190 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1192 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1193 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 /* check for enough space.
1200 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1201 1 for the srp user identity
1202 + srp user identity length
1204 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1206 /* fill in the extension */
1207 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1208 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1209 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1210 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1218 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1220 const unsigned char *plist;
1223 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1225 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1226 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1234 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1235 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1236 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1239 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1240 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1241 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1243 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1244 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > 65532)
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1252 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1254 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1255 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1256 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1257 * resolves this to two bytes.
1260 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1263 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1265 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1268 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1269 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1270 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1271 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1273 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1274 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1275 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1277 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1278 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1280 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1284 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1285 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1287 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1290 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1291 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1295 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1301 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1304 const unsigned char *salg;
1305 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1306 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1308 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1309 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1311 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1315 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1316 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1318 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1320 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1322 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1328 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1336 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1340 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1342 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1343 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1349 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1351 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1358 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1360 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1362 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1363 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1365 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1367 /* save position of id len */
1368 unsigned char *q = ret;
1369 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1370 /* skip over id len */
1372 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1378 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1382 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1383 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1386 * 1: peer may send requests
1387 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1389 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1390 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1392 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1396 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1398 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1399 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1400 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1407 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1409 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1411 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1412 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1413 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1414 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1415 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1416 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1419 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1423 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1425 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1427 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1430 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1438 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1439 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1440 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1441 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1442 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1443 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1445 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1446 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1448 if (limit < ret + 6)
1451 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1452 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1454 *(ret++) = list_len;
1455 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1458 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1459 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1462 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1464 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1466 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1467 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1469 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1470 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1471 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1475 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1479 return NULL; /* error */
1480 if (cb_retval == -1)
1481 continue; /* skip this extension */
1483 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1485 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1487 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1492 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1499 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1502 unsigned char *ret = p;
1503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1504 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1506 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1507 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1508 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1509 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1511 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1512 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1516 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1518 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1520 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1522 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1526 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1530 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1536 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1538 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1541 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1553 const unsigned char *plist;
1555 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1558 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1560 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1561 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1568 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1569 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1570 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1571 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1575 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1576 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1578 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1579 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1581 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1582 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1586 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1588 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1589 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1593 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1594 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1596 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1598 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1600 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1603 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1606 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1615 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1617 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1619 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1622 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1630 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1631 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1632 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1633 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1634 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1635 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1636 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1637 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1638 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1639 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1640 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1646 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1647 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1649 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1652 * 1: peer may send requests
1653 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1655 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1656 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1658 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1664 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1665 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1666 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1668 const unsigned char *npa;
1669 unsigned int npalen;
1672 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1673 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1675 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1676 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1678 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1680 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1685 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1687 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1689 size_t authz_length;
1690 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1691 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1692 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1693 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1694 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1696 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1698 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1699 * uint8_t authz_type
1701 * uint8_t data[length]
1703 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1704 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1706 unsigned short length;
1710 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1712 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1716 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1724 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1725 * 2 bytes for extension type
1726 * 2 bytes for extension length
1727 * 1 byte for the list length
1728 * n bytes for the list */
1729 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1731 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1732 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1734 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1735 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1739 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1741 unsigned short length;
1746 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1748 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1751 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1758 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1759 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1763 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1766 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1768 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1770 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1771 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1773 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1774 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1777 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1780 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1784 return NULL; /* error */
1785 if (cb_retval == -1)
1786 break; /* skip this extension */
1787 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1789 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1791 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1799 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1801 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1802 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1804 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1806 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1810 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1814 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1821 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1823 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1824 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1825 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1828 * returns: 0 on success. */
1829 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1830 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1834 const unsigned char *selected;
1835 unsigned char selected_len;
1838 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1844 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1845 * length-prefixed strings. */
1846 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1847 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1856 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1858 proto_len = data[i];
1864 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1870 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1871 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1872 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1873 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1874 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1875 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1876 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1878 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1881 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1882 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1887 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1891 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1893 unsigned short type;
1894 unsigned short size;
1896 unsigned char *data = *p;
1897 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1900 s->servername_done = 0;
1901 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1903 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1906 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1908 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1909 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1912 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1913 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1914 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1916 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
1917 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1921 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1922 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1924 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1925 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1927 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1928 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1930 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1931 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1933 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1934 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1936 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1937 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1939 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1940 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1943 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1947 if (data > (d+n-len))
1950 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1955 if (data+size > (d+n))
1958 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1960 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1961 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1962 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1963 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1965 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1966 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1967 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1968 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1969 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1970 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1971 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1972 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1973 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1974 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1975 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1976 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1977 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1978 the value of the Host: field.
1979 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1980 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1981 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1982 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1986 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1988 unsigned char *sdata;
1994 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2001 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2008 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2014 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2017 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2018 switch (servname_type)
2020 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2023 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2025 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2028 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2030 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2033 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2035 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2038 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2039 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2040 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2041 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2042 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2043 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2046 s->servername_done = 1;
2050 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2051 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2052 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2064 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2070 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2072 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2074 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2077 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2079 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2082 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2084 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2085 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2087 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2089 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2095 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2096 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2098 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2099 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2101 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2102 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2104 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2109 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2111 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2112 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2114 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2115 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2117 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2120 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2121 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2124 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2125 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2126 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2127 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2128 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2131 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2133 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2134 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2135 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2137 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2138 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2140 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2145 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2147 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2150 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2151 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2153 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2156 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2157 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2160 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2161 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2162 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2163 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2164 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2167 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2168 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2169 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2171 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2175 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2178 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2179 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2181 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2185 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2186 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2187 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2188 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2190 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2191 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2193 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2198 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2200 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2201 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2203 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2207 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2209 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2211 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2213 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2216 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2218 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2223 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2225 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2228 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2230 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2233 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2236 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2239 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2240 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2244 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2245 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2250 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2254 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2256 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2258 const unsigned char *sdata;
2260 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2265 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2274 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2278 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2282 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2287 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2291 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2296 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2297 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2300 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2301 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2302 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2304 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2305 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2308 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2309 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2311 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2312 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2317 /* Read in request_extensions */
2320 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2327 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2333 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2335 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2336 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2339 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2340 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2342 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2343 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2345 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2350 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2354 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2357 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2361 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2362 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2364 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2365 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2366 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2368 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2374 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2375 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2376 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2378 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2381 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2382 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2383 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2384 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2385 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2386 * anything like that, but this might change).
2388 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2389 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2390 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2391 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2392 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2393 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2397 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2398 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2399 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2401 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2403 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2404 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2407 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2408 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2410 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2415 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2417 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2418 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2422 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2426 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2428 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2430 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2434 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2435 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2436 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2439 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2440 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2441 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2442 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2443 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2445 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2449 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2450 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2451 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2453 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2455 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2456 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2457 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2458 1 /* element size */,
2461 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2464 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2465 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2467 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2474 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2475 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2476 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2477 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2478 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2480 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2482 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2484 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2486 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2487 if (type == record->ext_type)
2491 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2492 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2494 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2496 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2501 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2502 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2505 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2506 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2507 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2508 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2509 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2510 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2512 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2513 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2516 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2517 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2529 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2531 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2532 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2534 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2536 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2539 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2540 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2541 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2546 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2549 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2551 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2555 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2564 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2565 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2566 * the length of the block. */
2567 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2569 unsigned int off = 0;
2583 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2585 unsigned short length;
2586 unsigned short type;
2587 unsigned short size;
2588 unsigned char *data = *p;
2589 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2590 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2593 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2596 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2598 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2599 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2603 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2604 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2607 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2611 if (data+length != d+n)
2613 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2617 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2622 if (data+size > (d+n))
2625 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2626 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2627 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2629 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2631 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2633 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2636 tlsext_servername = 1;
2639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2640 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2642 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2643 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2645 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2647 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2650 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2651 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2652 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2654 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2657 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2658 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2660 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2661 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2662 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2663 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2664 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2667 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2669 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2671 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2672 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2674 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2677 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2680 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2683 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2685 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2686 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2688 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2692 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2695 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2696 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2698 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2702 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2703 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2704 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2705 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2707 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2709 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2711 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2716 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2718 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2719 * a status request message.
2721 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2723 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2726 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2727 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2730 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2731 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2733 unsigned char *selected;
2734 unsigned char selected_len;
2736 /* We must have requested it. */
2737 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2739 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2742 /* The data must be valid */
2743 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2745 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2748 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2750 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2753 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2754 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2756 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2759 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2760 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2761 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2765 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2769 /* We must have requested it. */
2770 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2772 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2777 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2780 /* The extension data consists of:
2781 * uint16 list_length
2782 * uint8 proto_length;
2783 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2787 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2789 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2793 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2795 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2798 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2799 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2800 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2801 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2803 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2806 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2807 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2810 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2812 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2814 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2817 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2821 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2822 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2824 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2825 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2826 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2828 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2833 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2835 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2840 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2842 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2843 * an authz hello extension if the client
2844 * didn't request a proof. */
2845 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2846 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2848 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2850 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2856 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2860 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2861 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2863 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2867 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2868 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2869 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2870 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2872 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2876 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2879 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2880 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2882 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2885 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2887 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2889 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2890 if (record->ext_type == type)
2892 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2904 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2908 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2910 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2912 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2914 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2915 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2917 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2923 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2933 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2934 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2935 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2936 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2937 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2938 * absence on initial connect only.
2940 if (!renegotiate_seen
2941 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2942 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2944 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2946 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2954 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2957 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2961 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2963 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2968 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2970 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2971 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2973 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2974 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2976 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2977 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2982 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2986 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2987 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2994 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2999 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
3001 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3002 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3005 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
3006 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3008 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
3009 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3013 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3014 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3015 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3016 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3018 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3020 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
3021 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
3022 * so this has to happen here in
3023 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
3027 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
3029 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3032 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3033 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3038 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3039 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3040 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3042 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3044 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3045 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3047 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3048 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3050 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3051 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3053 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3054 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3056 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3057 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3060 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3064 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3066 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3067 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3068 * abort the handshake.
3070 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3071 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3079 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3080 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3083 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3084 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3087 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3088 s->servername_done=0;
3094 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3096 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3099 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3100 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3101 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3102 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3104 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3107 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3108 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3109 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3110 if (certpkey == NULL)
3112 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3115 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3116 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3118 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3119 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3122 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3123 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3124 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3126 /* status request response should be sent */
3127 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3128 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3129 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3131 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3133 /* something bad happened */
3134 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3135 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3136 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3141 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3146 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3147 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3150 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3151 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3159 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3161 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3162 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3165 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3166 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3167 * it must contain uncompressed.
3169 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3170 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3171 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3172 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3173 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3175 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3177 unsigned char *list;
3178 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3179 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3180 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3182 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3184 found_uncompressed = 1;
3188 if (!found_uncompressed)
3190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3194 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3195 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3197 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3198 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3199 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3200 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3202 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3203 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3205 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3206 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3208 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3210 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3211 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3214 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3215 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3216 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3217 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3219 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3220 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3225 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3228 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3229 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3232 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3233 * there is no response.
3235 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3237 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3238 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3240 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3241 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3244 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3245 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3249 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3250 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3256 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3257 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3260 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3261 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3264 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3265 s->servername_done=0;
3271 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3274 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3276 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3278 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3282 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3290 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3291 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3292 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3294 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3295 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3296 * extension, if any.
3297 * len: the length of the session ID.
3298 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3299 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3300 * point to the resulting session.
3302 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3303 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3304 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3307 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3308 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3309 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3310 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3311 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3312 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3313 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3316 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3317 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3318 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3319 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3320 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3321 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3323 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3324 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3326 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3327 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3331 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3333 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3334 * to permit stateful resumption.
3336 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3338 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3342 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3350 /* Skip past cipher list */
3355 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3360 /* Now at start of extensions */
3361 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3364 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3366 unsigned short type, size;
3369 if (p + size > limit)
3371 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3376 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3377 * currently have one. */
3378 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3381 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3383 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3384 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3385 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3386 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3387 * calculate the master secret later. */
3390 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3393 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3394 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3396 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3398 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3399 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3401 default: /* fatal error */
3410 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3412 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3413 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3414 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3415 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3416 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3417 * point to the resulting session.
3420 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3421 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3422 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3423 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3425 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3426 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3427 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3430 unsigned char *sdec;
3431 const unsigned char *p;
3432 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3433 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3436 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3437 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3440 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3441 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3442 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3443 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3445 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3446 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3457 /* Check key name matches */
3458 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3460 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3461 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3462 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3463 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3465 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3466 * integrity checks on ticket.
3468 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3471 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3475 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3476 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3477 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3478 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3479 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3481 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3482 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3483 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3484 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3485 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3488 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3491 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3492 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3495 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3498 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3502 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3503 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3504 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3505 * as required by standard.
3508 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3509 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3517 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3522 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3530 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3531 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3532 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3533 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3534 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3535 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3536 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3539 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3540 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3541 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3542 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3545 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3548 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3550 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3556 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3559 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3561 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3562 return table[i].nid;
3567 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3572 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3573 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3576 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3579 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3580 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3584 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3586 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3587 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3590 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3595 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3603 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3607 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3608 return EVP_sha224();
3610 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3611 return EVP_sha256();
3613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3614 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3615 return EVP_sha384();
3617 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3618 return EVP_sha512();
3626 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3631 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3632 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3635 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3636 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3639 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3640 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3646 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3647 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3648 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3650 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3651 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3653 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3655 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3656 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3658 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3660 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3662 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3663 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3665 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3669 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3670 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3671 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3673 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3676 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3677 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3678 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3679 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3681 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3682 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3683 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3685 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3686 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3688 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3690 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3692 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3697 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3698 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3699 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3701 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3712 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3713 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3715 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3716 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3718 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3720 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3721 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3722 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3724 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3725 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3727 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3729 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3730 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3733 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3734 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3738 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3739 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3745 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3746 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3748 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3751 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3754 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3755 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3756 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3761 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3763 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3769 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3770 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3771 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3773 /* Should never happen */
3777 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3778 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3780 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3781 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3783 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3785 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3786 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3788 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3789 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3791 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3793 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3795 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3798 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3799 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3800 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3801 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3802 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3804 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3805 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3811 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3812 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3814 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3815 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3817 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3818 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3819 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3820 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3822 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3823 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3828 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3829 * use the certificate for signing.
3831 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3833 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3834 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3837 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3838 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3841 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3843 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3844 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3848 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3849 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3856 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3857 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3858 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3860 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3866 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3873 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3875 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3878 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3879 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3880 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3882 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3883 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3887 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3889 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3891 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3893 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3895 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3896 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3902 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3904 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3905 unsigned short hbtype;
3906 unsigned int payload;
3907 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3909 /* Read type and payload length first */
3914 if (s->msg_callback)
3915 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3916 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3917 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3919 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3921 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3924 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3925 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3926 * payload, plus padding
3928 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3931 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3932 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3934 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3936 /* Random padding */
3937 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3939 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3941 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3942 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3943 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3944 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3946 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3951 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3955 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3956 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3957 * sequence number */
3960 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3963 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3971 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3973 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3975 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3976 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3978 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3979 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3980 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3986 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3987 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3993 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3994 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4000 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4001 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4003 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4005 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4006 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4007 * some random stuff.
4008 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4009 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4010 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4011 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4014 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4017 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4018 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4020 /* Sequence number */
4021 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4022 /* 16 random bytes */
4023 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4025 /* Random padding */
4026 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4028 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4031 if (s->msg_callback)
4032 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4033 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4034 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4036 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4045 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4050 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4053 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4055 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4058 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4059 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4061 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4063 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4065 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4073 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4074 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4075 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4076 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4077 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4078 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4081 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4082 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4083 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4084 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4087 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4089 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4090 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4093 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4094 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4098 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4099 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4100 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4104 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4108 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4111 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4113 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4118 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4119 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4121 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4123 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4124 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4125 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4126 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4128 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4136 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4137 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4138 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4139 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4143 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4144 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4145 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4146 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4152 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4156 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4160 if (default_nid == -1)
4162 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4164 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4165 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4166 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4170 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4171 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4175 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4176 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4178 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4184 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4185 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4186 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4187 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4190 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4192 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4193 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4194 /* Strict mode flags */
4195 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4196 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4197 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4199 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4204 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4205 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4207 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4208 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4211 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4215 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4218 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4220 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4222 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4223 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4226 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4227 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4228 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4230 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4231 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4240 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4243 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4244 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4245 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4247 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4255 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4256 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4257 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4260 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4266 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4267 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4270 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4273 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4274 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4276 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4281 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4282 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4283 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4284 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4285 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4288 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4289 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4290 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4291 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4295 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4296 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4304 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4305 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4308 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4311 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4312 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4314 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4317 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4325 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4326 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4328 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4331 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4332 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4333 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4335 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4340 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4348 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4349 else if(check_flags)
4350 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4352 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4353 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4354 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4355 else if (!check_flags)
4358 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4359 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4360 else if (strict_mode)
4362 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4363 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4365 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4366 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4370 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4378 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4380 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4385 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4388 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4391 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4396 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4397 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4398 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4399 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4400 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4405 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4410 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4414 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4415 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4417 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4419 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4421 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4425 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4429 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4432 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4434 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4435 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4437 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4439 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4440 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4442 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4444 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4446 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4447 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4449 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4454 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4458 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4460 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4461 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4465 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4467 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4468 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4469 else if (cpk->digest)
4470 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4473 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4475 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4476 * if the chain is invalid.
4480 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4481 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4484 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4485 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4492 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4493 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4495 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4496 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4497 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4498 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4499 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4500 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4502 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4503 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4505 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);