2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
299 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
301 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
302 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
303 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
305 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
308 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
310 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
313 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
315 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
319 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
321 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
325 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
327 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
329 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
331 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
333 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
335 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
337 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
339 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
341 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
343 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
345 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
347 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
349 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
351 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
353 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
355 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
357 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
359 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
361 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
363 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
365 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
367 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
373 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
376 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
377 const unsigned char **pcurves,
382 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
383 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
386 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
387 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
389 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
390 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
391 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
394 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
395 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
399 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
400 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
404 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
405 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
409 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
410 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
413 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
414 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
416 const unsigned char *curves;
418 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
419 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
421 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
424 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
427 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
429 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
432 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
434 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
437 else /* Should never happen */
440 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
441 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
443 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
449 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
450 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
454 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
456 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
457 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
459 /* Can't do anything on client side */
466 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
467 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
470 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
472 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
473 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
475 /* Should never happen */
478 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
481 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
483 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
488 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
490 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
491 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
493 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
497 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
498 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
509 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
510 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
512 unsigned char *clist, *p;
514 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
515 * while curve ids < 32
517 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
518 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
521 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
523 unsigned long idmask;
525 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
527 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
538 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
542 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
547 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
550 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
552 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
556 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
558 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
560 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
562 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
563 if (nid == NID_undef)
564 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
565 if (nid == NID_undef)
566 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
569 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
570 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
572 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
575 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
576 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
581 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
585 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
587 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
588 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
593 const EC_METHOD *meth;
596 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
597 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
600 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
603 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
607 /* Determine curve ID */
608 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
610 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
614 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
626 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
628 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
631 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
633 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
640 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
641 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
642 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
644 const unsigned char *p;
647 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
648 * is supported (see RFC4492).
650 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
652 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
653 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
654 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
664 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
665 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
667 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
668 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
670 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
675 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
682 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
685 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
687 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
689 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
694 *pformats = ecformats_default;
695 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
697 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
699 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
703 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
704 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
708 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
711 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
714 /* If not EC nothing to do */
715 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
720 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
724 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
725 * supported curves extension.
727 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
730 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
731 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
733 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
740 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
741 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
742 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
743 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
744 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
746 return 0; /* Should never happen */
747 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
748 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
750 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
754 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
762 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
763 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
765 unsigned char curve_id[2];
766 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
767 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
768 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
769 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
772 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
773 * no other curves permitted.
777 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
778 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
779 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
780 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
781 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
785 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
786 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
788 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
789 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
791 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
794 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
797 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
799 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
805 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
807 /* Need a shared curve */
808 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
814 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
821 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
825 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
831 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
840 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
841 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
853 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
856 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
859 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
862 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
863 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
864 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
867 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
869 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
870 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
881 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
882 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
883 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
886 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
888 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
892 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
894 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
895 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
896 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
907 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
908 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
910 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
911 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
913 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
915 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
916 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
920 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
921 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
924 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
925 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
927 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
928 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
930 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
931 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
932 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
933 /* Should never happen */
936 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
937 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
943 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
945 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
946 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
947 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
949 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
954 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
959 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
961 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
964 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
968 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
970 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
973 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
981 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
985 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
986 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
989 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
992 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
993 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
998 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1004 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1007 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1008 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1011 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1012 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1013 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1014 * session and not global settings.
1017 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1020 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1021 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1022 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1025 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1026 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1027 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1030 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1031 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1034 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1040 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1045 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1050 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1056 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1057 * signature algorithms.
1061 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1066 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1067 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1075 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1077 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1078 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1082 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1083 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1085 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1086 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1088 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1092 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1095 unsigned char *ret = p;
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1097 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1099 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1102 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1103 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1105 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1107 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1109 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1110 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1111 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1112 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1121 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1122 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1123 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1128 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1130 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1132 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1133 unsigned long size_str;
1136 /* check for enough space.
1137 4 for the servername type and entension length
1138 2 for servernamelist length
1139 1 for the hostname type
1140 2 for hostname length
1144 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1145 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1148 /* extension type and length */
1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1150 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1152 /* length of servername list */
1153 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1155 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1156 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1158 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1162 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1167 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1175 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1178 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1188 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1189 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1190 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1192 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1193 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 /* check for enough space.
1200 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1201 1 for the srp user identity
1202 + srp user identity length
1204 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1206 /* fill in the extension */
1207 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1208 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1209 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1210 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1218 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1220 const unsigned char *plist;
1223 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1225 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1226 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1234 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1235 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1236 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1239 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1240 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1241 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1243 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1244 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > 65532)
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1252 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1254 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1255 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1256 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1257 * resolves this to two bytes.
1260 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1263 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1265 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1268 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1269 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1270 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1271 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1273 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1274 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1275 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1277 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1278 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1280 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1284 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1285 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1287 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1290 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1291 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1295 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1301 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1304 const unsigned char *salg;
1305 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1306 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1308 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1309 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1311 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1315 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1316 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1318 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1320 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1322 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1328 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1336 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1340 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1342 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1343 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1349 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1351 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1358 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1360 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1362 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1363 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1365 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1367 /* save position of id len */
1368 unsigned char *q = ret;
1369 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1370 /* skip over id len */
1372 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1378 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1382 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1383 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1386 * 1: peer may send requests
1387 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1389 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1390 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1392 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1396 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1398 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1399 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1400 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1407 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1409 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1411 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1412 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1413 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1414 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1415 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1416 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1419 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1423 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1425 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1427 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1430 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1438 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1439 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1442 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1444 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1446 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1447 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1449 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1450 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1451 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1455 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1459 return NULL; /* error */
1460 if (cb_retval == -1)
1461 continue; /* skip this extension */
1463 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1465 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1467 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1471 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1472 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1475 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
1476 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1477 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02
1479 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1480 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1483 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1484 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1485 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
1487 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1489 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1491 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1499 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1505 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1512 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1515 unsigned char *ret = p;
1517 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1518 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1519 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1522 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1523 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1524 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1525 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1527 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1528 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1532 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1534 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1536 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1538 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1542 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1546 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1552 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1554 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1557 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1569 const unsigned char *plist;
1571 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1574 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1576 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1577 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1584 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1585 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1586 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1587 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1591 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1592 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1594 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1595 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1597 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1598 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1602 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1604 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1605 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1609 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1610 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1612 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1614 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1616 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1619 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1622 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1631 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1633 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1635 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1638 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1646 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1647 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1648 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1649 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1650 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1651 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1652 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1653 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1654 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1655 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1656 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1662 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1663 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1665 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1668 * 1: peer may send requests
1669 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1671 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1672 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1674 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1680 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1681 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1682 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1684 const unsigned char *npa;
1685 unsigned int npalen;
1688 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1689 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1691 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1692 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1694 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1696 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1701 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
1703 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1704 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1707 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
1709 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1712 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1716 return NULL; /* error */
1717 if (cb_retval == -1)
1718 break; /* skip this extension */
1719 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1721 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1723 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1726 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1727 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1729 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1730 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1732 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1733 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1736 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1742 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1744 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1745 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1747 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1749 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1753 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1757 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1764 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1766 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1767 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1768 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1771 * returns: 0 on success. */
1772 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1773 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1777 const unsigned char *selected;
1778 unsigned char selected_len;
1781 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1787 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1788 * length-prefixed strings. */
1789 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1790 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1799 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1801 proto_len = data[i];
1807 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1813 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1814 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1815 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1816 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1817 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1818 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1819 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1821 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1824 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1825 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1830 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1835 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1836 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1837 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1842 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1843 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1844 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1845 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1847 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1848 unsigned short type, size;
1849 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1850 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1851 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1852 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1853 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1854 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1855 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1857 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1858 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1859 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1860 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1863 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1864 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1865 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1866 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1867 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1868 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1869 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1870 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1871 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1872 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1875 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1884 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1887 if (data+size > d+n)
1891 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1893 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1894 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1896 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1898 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1900 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1905 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1907 if (data + len != d+n)
1909 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1913 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1915 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1917 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1919 unsigned short type;
1920 unsigned short size;
1922 unsigned char *data = *p;
1923 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1926 s->servername_done = 0;
1927 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1929 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1932 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1934 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1935 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1938 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1939 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1940 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1942 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1943 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1947 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1948 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1952 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1953 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1954 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1956 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1957 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1959 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1960 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1962 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1963 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1965 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1966 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1968 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1969 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1971 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1972 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1975 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1976 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1979 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1983 if (data > (d+n-len))
1986 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1991 if (data+size > (d+n))
1994 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1996 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1997 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1998 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1999 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2001 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2002 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2003 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2004 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2005 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2006 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2007 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2008 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2009 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2010 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2011 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2012 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2013 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2014 the value of the Host: field.
2015 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2016 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2017 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2018 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2022 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2024 unsigned char *sdata;
2030 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2037 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2044 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2050 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2053 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2054 switch (servname_type)
2056 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2059 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2061 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2064 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2066 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2069 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2071 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2074 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2075 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2076 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2077 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2078 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2079 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2082 s->servername_done = 1;
2086 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2087 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2088 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2100 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2105 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2106 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2108 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2110 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2113 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2115 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2118 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2120 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2121 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2123 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2125 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2132 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2134 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2135 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2137 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2138 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2140 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2145 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2147 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2148 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2150 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2151 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2153 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2156 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2157 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2160 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2161 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2162 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2163 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2164 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2167 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2169 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2170 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2171 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2173 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2174 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2176 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2181 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2183 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2186 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2187 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2189 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2192 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2193 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2196 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2197 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2198 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2199 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2200 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2203 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2204 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2205 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2207 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2211 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2214 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2215 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2217 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2221 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2222 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2223 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2224 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2226 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2227 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2229 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2234 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2236 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2237 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2239 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2243 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2245 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2247 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2249 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2252 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2254 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2259 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2261 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2264 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2266 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2269 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2272 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2275 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2276 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2280 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2285 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2289 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2291 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2293 const unsigned char *sdata;
2295 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2300 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2309 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2313 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2317 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2322 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2326 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2331 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2332 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2335 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2336 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2337 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2339 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2340 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2343 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2344 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2346 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2347 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2352 /* Read in request_extensions */
2355 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2362 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2368 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2370 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2371 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2374 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2375 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2377 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2378 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2380 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2385 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2389 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2392 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2396 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2397 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2399 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2400 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2401 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2403 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2409 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2410 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2411 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2413 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2416 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2417 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2418 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2419 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2420 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2421 * anything like that, but this might change).
2423 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2424 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2425 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2426 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2427 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2428 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2432 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2433 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2434 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2436 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2439 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2440 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2444 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2445 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2447 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2451 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2452 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2453 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2454 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2455 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2457 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2459 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2461 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2463 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2464 if (type == record->ext_type)
2466 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2471 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2472 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2473 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2483 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2485 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2486 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2488 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2490 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2493 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2494 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2495 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2500 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2503 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2505 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2509 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2517 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2518 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2519 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2520 * the length of the block. */
2521 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2523 unsigned int off = 0;
2537 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2539 unsigned short length;
2540 unsigned short type;
2541 unsigned short size;
2542 unsigned char *data = *p;
2543 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2544 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2547 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2550 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2552 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2553 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2557 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2558 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2561 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2562 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2565 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2569 if (data+length != d+n)
2571 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2575 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2580 if (data+size > (d+n))
2583 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2584 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2585 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2587 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2589 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2591 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2594 tlsext_servername = 1;
2597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2598 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2600 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2601 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2603 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2605 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2608 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2609 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2610 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2612 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2615 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2616 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2618 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2619 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2620 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2621 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2622 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2625 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2627 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2629 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2630 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2632 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2635 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2638 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2641 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2643 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2644 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2646 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2650 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2653 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2654 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2656 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2660 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2661 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2662 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2663 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2665 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2667 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2669 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2674 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2676 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2677 * a status request message.
2679 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2681 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2684 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2685 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2688 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2689 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2691 unsigned char *selected;
2692 unsigned char selected_len;
2694 /* We must have requested it. */
2695 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2697 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2700 /* The data must be valid */
2701 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2703 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2706 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2708 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2711 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2712 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2714 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2717 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2718 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2719 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2723 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2727 /* We must have requested it. */
2728 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2730 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2735 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2738 /* The extension data consists of:
2739 * uint16 list_length
2740 * uint8 proto_length;
2741 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2745 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2747 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2751 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2753 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2756 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2757 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2758 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2759 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2761 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2764 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2765 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2768 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2770 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2772 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2775 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2779 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2780 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2782 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2783 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2784 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2786 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2791 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2793 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2797 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2798 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2800 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2803 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2805 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2807 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2808 if (record->ext_type == type)
2810 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2816 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2817 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2819 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2820 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2821 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2830 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2834 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2836 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2838 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2840 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2841 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2843 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2849 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2859 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2860 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2861 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2862 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2863 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2864 * absence on initial connect only.
2866 if (!renegotiate_seen
2867 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2868 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2870 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2872 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2880 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2883 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2887 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2889 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2894 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2896 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2897 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2899 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2900 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2902 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2903 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2908 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2912 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2913 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2920 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2925 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2927 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2928 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2931 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2932 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2934 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2935 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2939 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2940 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2941 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2942 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2944 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2946 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2947 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2948 * so this has to happen here in
2949 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2953 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2955 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2958 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2959 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2964 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2965 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2966 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2968 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2970 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2971 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2973 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2974 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2976 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2977 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2979 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2980 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2982 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2983 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2986 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2990 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2992 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2993 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2994 * abort the handshake.
2996 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2997 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3005 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3006 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3009 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3010 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3013 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3014 s->servername_done=0;
3020 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3022 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3025 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3026 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3027 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3028 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3030 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3033 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3034 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3035 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3036 if (certpkey == NULL)
3038 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3041 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3042 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3044 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3045 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3048 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3049 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3050 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3052 /* status request response should be sent */
3053 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3054 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3055 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3057 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3059 /* something bad happened */
3060 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3061 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3062 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3067 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3072 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3073 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3076 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3077 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3085 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3087 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3088 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3091 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3092 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3093 * it must contain uncompressed.
3095 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3096 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3097 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3098 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3099 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3101 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3103 unsigned char *list;
3104 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3105 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3106 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3108 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3110 found_uncompressed = 1;
3114 if (!found_uncompressed)
3116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3120 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3121 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3123 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3124 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3125 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3126 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3128 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3129 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3131 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3132 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3134 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3136 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3137 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3140 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3141 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3142 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3143 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3145 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3146 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3151 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3154 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3155 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3158 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3159 * there is no response.
3161 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3163 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3164 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3166 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3167 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3170 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3171 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3175 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3176 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3182 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3183 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3186 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3187 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3190 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3191 s->servername_done=0;
3197 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3200 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3202 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3204 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3208 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3216 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3217 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3218 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3220 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3221 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3222 * extension, if any.
3223 * len: the length of the session ID.
3224 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3225 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3226 * point to the resulting session.
3228 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3229 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3230 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3233 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3234 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3235 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3236 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3237 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3238 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3239 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3242 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3243 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3244 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3245 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3246 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3247 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3249 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3250 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3252 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3253 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3257 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3259 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3260 * to permit stateful resumption.
3262 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3264 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3268 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3276 /* Skip past cipher list */
3281 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3286 /* Now at start of extensions */
3287 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3290 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3292 unsigned short type, size;
3295 if (p + size > limit)
3297 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3302 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3303 * currently have one. */
3304 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3307 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3309 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3310 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3311 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3312 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3313 * calculate the master secret later. */
3316 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3319 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3320 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3322 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3324 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3325 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3327 default: /* fatal error */
3336 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3338 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3339 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3340 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3341 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3342 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3343 * point to the resulting session.
3346 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3347 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3348 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3349 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3351 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3352 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3353 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3356 unsigned char *sdec;
3357 const unsigned char *p;
3358 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3359 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3362 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3363 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3366 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3367 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3368 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3369 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3371 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3372 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3383 /* Check key name matches */
3384 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3386 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3387 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3388 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3389 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3391 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3392 * integrity checks on ticket.
3394 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3397 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3401 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3402 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3403 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3404 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3405 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3407 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3408 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3409 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3410 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3411 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3414 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3417 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3418 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3421 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3424 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3428 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3429 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3430 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3431 * as required by standard.
3434 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3435 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3443 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3448 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3456 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3457 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3458 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3459 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3460 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3461 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3462 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3465 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3466 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3467 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3468 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3471 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3474 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3476 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3482 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3485 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3487 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3488 return table[i].nid;
3493 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3498 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3499 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3502 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3505 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3506 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3510 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3512 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3513 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3516 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3521 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3528 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3529 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3533 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3534 return EVP_sha224();
3536 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3537 return EVP_sha256();
3539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3540 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3541 return EVP_sha384();
3543 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3544 return EVP_sha512();
3552 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3557 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3558 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3561 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3562 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3565 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3566 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3572 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3573 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3574 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3576 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3577 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3579 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3581 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3582 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3584 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3586 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3588 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3589 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3591 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3595 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3596 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3597 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3599 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3602 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3603 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3604 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3605 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3607 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3608 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3609 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3611 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3612 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3614 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3616 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3618 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3623 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3624 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3625 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3627 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3638 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3639 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3641 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3642 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3644 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3646 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3647 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3648 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3650 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3651 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3653 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3655 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3656 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3659 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3660 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3664 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3665 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3671 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3672 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3674 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3677 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3680 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3681 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3682 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3687 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3689 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3695 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3696 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3697 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3699 /* Should never happen */
3703 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3704 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3706 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3707 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3709 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3711 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3712 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3714 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3715 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3717 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3719 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3721 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3724 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3725 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3726 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3727 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3728 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3730 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3731 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3737 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3738 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3740 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3741 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3743 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3744 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3745 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3746 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3748 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3749 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3754 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3755 * use the certificate for signing.
3757 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3759 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3760 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3763 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3764 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3767 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3769 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3770 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3774 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3775 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3782 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3783 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3784 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3786 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3792 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3799 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3801 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3804 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3805 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3806 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3808 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3809 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3813 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3815 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3817 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3819 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3821 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3822 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3828 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3830 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3831 unsigned short hbtype;
3832 unsigned int payload;
3833 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3835 /* Read type and payload length first */
3840 if (s->msg_callback)
3841 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3842 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3843 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3845 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3847 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3850 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3851 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3852 * payload, plus padding
3854 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3857 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3858 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3860 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3862 /* Random padding */
3863 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3865 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3867 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3868 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3869 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3870 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3872 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3877 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3881 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3882 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3883 * sequence number */
3886 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3889 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3897 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3899 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3901 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3902 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3904 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3905 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3906 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3908 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3912 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3913 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3919 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3920 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3926 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3927 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3929 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3931 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3932 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3933 * some random stuff.
3934 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3935 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3936 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3937 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3940 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3943 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3944 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3946 /* Sequence number */
3947 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3948 /* 16 random bytes */
3949 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3951 /* Random padding */
3952 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3954 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3957 if (s->msg_callback)
3958 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3959 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3960 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3962 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3971 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3976 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3979 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3981 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3984 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3985 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3987 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3989 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3991 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3999 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4000 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4001 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4002 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4003 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4004 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4007 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4008 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4009 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4010 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4013 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4015 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4016 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4019 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4020 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4024 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4025 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4026 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4030 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4034 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4037 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4039 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4044 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4045 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4047 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4049 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4050 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4051 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4052 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4054 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4062 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4063 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4064 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4065 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4069 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4070 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4071 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4072 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4078 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4082 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4086 if (default_nid == -1)
4088 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4090 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4091 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4092 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4096 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4097 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4101 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4102 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4104 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4110 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4111 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4112 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4113 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4116 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4118 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4119 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4120 /* Strict mode flags */
4121 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4122 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4123 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4125 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4130 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4131 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4133 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4134 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4137 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4141 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4144 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4146 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4148 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4149 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4152 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4153 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4154 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4156 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4157 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4166 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4169 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4170 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4171 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4173 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4181 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4182 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4183 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4186 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4192 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4193 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4196 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4199 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4200 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4202 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4207 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4208 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4209 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4210 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4211 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4214 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4215 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4216 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4217 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4221 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4222 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4230 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4231 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4234 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4237 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4238 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4240 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4243 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4251 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4252 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4254 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4257 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4258 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4259 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4261 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4266 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4274 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4275 else if(check_flags)
4276 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4278 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4279 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4280 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4281 else if (!check_flags)
4284 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4285 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4286 else if (strict_mode)
4288 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4289 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4291 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4292 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4296 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4304 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4306 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4311 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4314 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4317 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4322 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4323 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4324 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4325 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4326 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4331 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4336 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4340 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4341 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4343 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4345 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4347 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4351 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4355 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4358 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4360 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4361 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4363 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4365 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4366 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4368 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4370 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4372 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4373 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4375 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4380 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4384 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4386 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4387 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4391 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4393 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4394 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4395 else if (cpk->digest)
4396 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4399 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4401 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4402 * if the chain is invalid.
4406 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4407 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4410 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4411 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4418 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4419 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4421 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4422 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4423 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4424 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4425 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4426 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4428 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4429 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4431 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);