2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
225 static int nid_list[] =
227 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
228 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
229 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
230 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
231 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
232 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
233 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
234 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
235 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
236 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
237 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
238 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
239 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
240 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
241 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
242 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
243 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
246 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
247 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
248 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
249 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
250 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
251 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
252 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
253 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
254 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
258 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
265 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
267 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
268 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
269 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
270 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
271 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
272 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
273 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
274 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
275 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
276 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
277 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
278 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
279 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
280 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
281 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
282 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
283 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
284 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
285 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
286 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
287 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
288 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
289 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
290 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
291 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
292 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
293 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
294 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
297 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
299 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
300 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
303 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
305 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
306 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
307 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
309 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
312 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
314 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
317 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
319 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
321 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
323 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
325 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
327 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
329 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
331 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
333 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
335 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
337 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
339 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
341 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
343 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
345 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
347 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
349 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
351 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
353 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
355 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
357 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
359 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
361 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
363 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
365 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
367 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
369 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
371 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
377 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
380 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
381 const unsigned char **pcurves,
386 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
387 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
390 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
391 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
393 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
394 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
395 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
398 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
399 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
408 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
409 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
413 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
414 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
417 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
418 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
420 const unsigned char *curves;
422 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
423 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
425 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
428 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
431 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
433 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
436 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
438 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
441 else /* Should never happen */
444 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
445 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
447 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
453 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
454 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
458 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
460 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
461 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
463 /* Can't do anything on client side */
470 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
471 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
474 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
475 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
476 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
477 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
478 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
479 /* Should never happen */
482 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
485 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
487 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
492 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
494 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
495 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
497 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
501 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
502 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
513 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
514 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
516 unsigned char *clist, *p;
518 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
519 * while curve ids < 32
521 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
522 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
525 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
527 unsigned long idmask;
529 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
531 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
542 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
546 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
551 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
554 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
556 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
560 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
562 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
564 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
566 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
568 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
569 if (nid == NID_undef)
570 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
571 if (nid == NID_undef)
573 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
574 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
576 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
579 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
580 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
585 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
589 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
591 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
592 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
597 const EC_METHOD *meth;
600 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
601 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
604 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
607 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
611 /* Determine curve ID */
612 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
613 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
614 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
618 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
630 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
632 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
635 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
637 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
640 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
644 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
645 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
646 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
648 const unsigned char *p;
651 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
652 * is supported (see RFC4492).
654 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
656 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
657 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
658 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
668 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
669 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
671 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
672 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
674 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
679 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
686 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
689 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
691 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
693 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
694 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
698 *pformats = ecformats_default;
699 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
701 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
703 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
707 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
708 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
710 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
712 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
715 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
718 /* If not EC nothing to do */
719 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
724 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
728 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
729 * supported curves extension.
731 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
734 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
735 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
737 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
744 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
745 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
746 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
747 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
748 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
750 return 0; /* Should never happen */
751 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
752 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
754 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
758 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
759 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
761 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
766 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
767 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
769 unsigned char curve_id[2];
770 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
771 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
772 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
773 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
776 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
777 * no other curves permitted.
781 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
782 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
783 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
784 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
785 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
789 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
790 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
792 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
793 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
795 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
798 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
801 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
803 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
809 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
811 /* Need a shared curve */
812 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
818 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
823 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
825 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
829 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
835 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
840 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
844 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
845 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
848 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
849 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
854 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
855 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
860 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
861 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
863 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
866 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
867 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
868 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
869 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
871 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
878 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
881 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
884 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
885 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
886 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
887 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
890 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
892 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
896 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
900 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
906 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
907 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
911 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
912 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
914 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
915 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
917 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
919 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
920 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
924 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
925 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
928 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
929 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
931 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
932 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
934 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
935 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
936 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
937 /* Should never happen */
940 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
941 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
947 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
949 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
950 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
951 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
953 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
958 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
963 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
965 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
967 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
968 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
972 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
974 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
976 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
977 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
985 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
989 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
990 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
991 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
993 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
996 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
997 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1002 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1008 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1011 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1012 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1015 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1016 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1017 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1018 * session and not global settings.
1021 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1024 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1025 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1026 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1029 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1030 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1031 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1034 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1035 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1038 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1039 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1044 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1049 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1054 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1060 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1061 * signature algorithms.
1065 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1066 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1070 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1075 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1076 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1078 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1079 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1081 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1082 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1086 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1087 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1089 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1090 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1092 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1096 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1099 unsigned char *ret = p;
1100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1101 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1103 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1106 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1107 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1109 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1111 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1113 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1114 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1115 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1116 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1125 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1126 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1127 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1132 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1134 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1136 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1137 unsigned long size_str;
1140 /* check for enough space.
1141 4 for the servername type and entension length
1142 2 for servernamelist length
1143 1 for the hostname type
1144 2 for hostname length
1148 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1149 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1152 /* extension type and length */
1153 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1154 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1156 /* length of servername list */
1157 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1159 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1160 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1162 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1166 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1171 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1177 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1179 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1182 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1192 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1193 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1194 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1196 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1197 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1203 /* check for enough space.
1204 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1205 1 for the srp user identity
1206 + srp user identity length
1208 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1210 /* fill in the extension */
1211 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1212 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1213 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1214 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1222 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1224 const unsigned char *plist;
1227 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1229 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1230 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1237 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1238 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1239 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1240 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1243 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1244 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1245 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1247 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1248 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1249 if (plistlen > 65532)
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1255 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1256 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1258 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1259 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1260 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1261 * resolves this to two bytes.
1264 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1267 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1269 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1272 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1273 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1274 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1275 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1277 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1278 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1279 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1281 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1282 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1284 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1288 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1289 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1291 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1294 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1295 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1299 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1305 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1308 const unsigned char *salg;
1309 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1310 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1312 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1313 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1315 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1319 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1320 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1322 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1324 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1326 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1329 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1332 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1337 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1340 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1344 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1346 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1347 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1353 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1355 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1362 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1363 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1364 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1366 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1367 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1369 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1371 /* save position of id len */
1372 unsigned char *q = ret;
1373 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1374 /* skip over id len */
1376 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1382 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1386 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1387 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1390 * 1: peer may send requests
1391 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1393 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1394 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1396 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1400 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1402 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1403 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1404 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1406 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1411 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1413 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1416 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1417 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1418 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1419 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1420 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1423 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1427 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1429 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1431 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1434 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1442 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1443 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1446 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1448 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1450 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1451 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1453 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1454 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1455 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1459 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1463 return NULL; /* error */
1464 if (cb_retval == -1)
1465 continue; /* skip this extension */
1467 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1469 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1471 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1475 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1476 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1479 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
1480 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1481 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02
1483 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1484 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1487 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1488 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1489 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
1491 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1493 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1495 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1501 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1503 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1509 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1516 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1519 unsigned char *ret = p;
1521 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1523 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1526 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1527 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1528 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1529 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1531 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1532 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1536 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1538 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1540 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1542 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1546 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1550 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1556 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1558 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1561 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1573 const unsigned char *plist;
1575 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1578 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1580 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1581 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1588 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1589 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1590 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1591 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1595 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1596 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1598 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1599 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1601 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1602 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1606 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1608 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1609 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1613 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1614 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1616 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1618 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1620 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1623 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1626 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1635 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1637 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1639 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1642 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1650 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1651 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1652 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1653 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1654 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1655 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1656 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1657 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1658 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1659 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1660 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1666 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1667 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1669 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1672 * 1: peer may send requests
1673 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1675 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1676 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1678 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1684 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1685 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1686 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1688 const unsigned char *npa;
1689 unsigned int npalen;
1692 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1693 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1695 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1696 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1698 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1700 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1705 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
1707 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1708 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1711 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
1713 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1716 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1720 return NULL; /* error */
1721 if (cb_retval == -1)
1722 continue; /* skip this extension */
1723 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1725 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1727 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1730 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1731 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1733 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1734 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1736 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1737 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1740 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1746 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1748 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1749 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1751 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1753 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1757 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1761 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1768 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1770 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1771 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1772 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1775 * returns: 0 on success. */
1776 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1777 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1781 const unsigned char *selected;
1782 unsigned char selected_len;
1785 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1791 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1792 * length-prefixed strings. */
1793 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1794 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1803 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1805 proto_len = data[i];
1811 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1817 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1818 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1819 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1820 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1821 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1822 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1823 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1825 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1828 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1829 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1834 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1839 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1840 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1841 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1846 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1847 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1848 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1849 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1851 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1852 unsigned short type, size;
1853 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1854 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1855 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1856 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1857 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1858 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1859 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1861 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1862 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1863 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1864 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1867 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1868 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1869 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1870 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1871 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1872 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1873 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1874 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1875 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1876 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1879 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1888 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1891 if (data+size > d+n)
1895 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1897 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1898 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1900 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1902 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1904 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1909 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1911 if (data + len != d+n)
1913 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1917 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1919 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1921 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1923 unsigned short type;
1924 unsigned short size;
1926 unsigned char *data = *p;
1927 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1930 s->servername_done = 0;
1931 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1932 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1933 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1936 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1938 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1939 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1942 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1943 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1944 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1946 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1947 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1951 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1952 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1956 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1957 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1958 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1960 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1961 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1963 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1964 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1966 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1967 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1969 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1970 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1972 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1973 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1975 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1976 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1979 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1980 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1983 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1987 if (data > (d+n-len))
1990 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1995 if (data+size > (d+n))
1998 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2000 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2001 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2002 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2003 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2005 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2006 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2007 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2008 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2009 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2010 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2011 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2012 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2013 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2014 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2015 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2016 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2017 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2018 the value of the Host: field.
2019 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2020 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2021 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2022 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2026 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2028 unsigned char *sdata;
2034 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2041 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2048 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2054 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2057 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2058 switch (servname_type)
2060 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2063 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2065 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2068 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2070 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2073 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2075 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2078 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2079 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2080 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2081 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2082 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2083 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2086 s->servername_done = 1;
2090 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2091 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2092 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2104 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2110 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2112 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2114 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2117 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2119 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2122 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2124 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2125 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2127 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2129 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2136 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2138 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2139 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2141 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2142 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2144 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2149 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2151 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2152 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2154 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2155 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2157 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2160 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2161 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2164 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2165 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2166 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2167 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2168 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2171 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2173 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2174 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2175 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2177 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2178 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2180 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2185 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2187 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2190 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2191 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2193 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2196 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2197 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2200 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2201 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2202 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2203 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2204 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2207 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2208 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2209 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2211 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2215 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2218 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2219 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2221 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2225 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2226 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2227 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2228 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2230 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2231 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2233 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2238 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2240 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2241 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2243 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2247 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2249 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2251 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2253 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2256 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2258 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2263 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2265 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2268 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2270 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2273 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2276 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2279 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2280 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2284 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2289 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2293 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2295 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2297 const unsigned char *sdata;
2299 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2304 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2313 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2317 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2321 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2326 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2330 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2335 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2336 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2339 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2340 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2341 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2343 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2344 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2347 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2348 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2350 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2351 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2356 /* Read in request_extensions */
2359 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2366 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2372 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2374 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2375 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2378 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2379 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2381 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2382 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2384 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2389 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2393 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2396 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2400 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2401 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2403 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2404 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2405 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2407 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2413 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2414 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2415 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2417 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2420 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2421 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2422 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2423 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2424 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2425 * anything like that, but this might change).
2427 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2428 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2429 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2430 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2431 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2432 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2436 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2437 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2438 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2440 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2442 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2443 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2444 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2448 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2449 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2451 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2455 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2456 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2457 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2458 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2459 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2461 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2463 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2465 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2467 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2468 if (type == record->ext_type)
2470 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2475 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2476 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2477 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2487 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2489 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2490 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2492 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2494 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2497 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2498 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2499 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2504 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2507 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2509 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2513 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2522 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2523 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2524 * the length of the block. */
2525 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2527 unsigned int off = 0;
2541 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2543 unsigned short length;
2544 unsigned short type;
2545 unsigned short size;
2546 unsigned char *data = *p;
2547 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2548 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2551 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2554 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2556 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2557 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2561 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2562 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2565 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2566 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2569 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2573 if (data+length != d+n)
2575 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2579 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2584 if (data+size > (d+n))
2587 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2588 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2589 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2591 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2593 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2595 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2598 tlsext_servername = 1;
2601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2602 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2604 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2605 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2607 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2609 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2612 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2613 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2614 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2616 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2619 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2620 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2622 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2623 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2624 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2625 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2626 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2629 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2631 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2633 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2634 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2636 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2639 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2642 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2645 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2647 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2648 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2650 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2654 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2657 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2658 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2660 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2664 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2665 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2666 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2667 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2669 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2671 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2673 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2678 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2680 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2681 * a status request message.
2683 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2685 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2688 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2689 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2692 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2693 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2695 unsigned char *selected;
2696 unsigned char selected_len;
2698 /* We must have requested it. */
2699 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2701 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2704 /* The data must be valid */
2705 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2707 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2710 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2712 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2715 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2716 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2718 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2721 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2722 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2723 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2727 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2731 /* We must have requested it. */
2732 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2734 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2739 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2742 /* The extension data consists of:
2743 * uint16 list_length
2744 * uint8 proto_length;
2745 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2749 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2751 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2755 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2757 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2760 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2761 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2762 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2763 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2765 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2768 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2769 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2772 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2774 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2776 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2779 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2783 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2784 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2786 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2787 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2788 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2790 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2795 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2797 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2801 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2802 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2804 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2807 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2809 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2811 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2812 if (record->ext_type == type)
2814 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2820 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2821 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2823 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2824 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2825 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2834 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2838 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2840 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2842 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2844 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2845 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2847 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2853 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2863 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2864 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2865 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2866 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2867 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2868 * absence on initial connect only.
2870 if (!renegotiate_seen
2871 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2872 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2874 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2876 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2884 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2887 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2891 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2893 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2898 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2900 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2901 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2903 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2904 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2906 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2907 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2912 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2916 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2917 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2924 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2929 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2931 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2932 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2935 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2936 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2938 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2939 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2943 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2944 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2945 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2946 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2948 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2950 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2951 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2952 * so this has to happen here in
2953 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2957 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2959 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2962 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2963 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2968 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2969 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2970 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2972 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2974 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2975 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2977 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2978 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2980 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2981 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2983 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2984 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2986 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2987 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2990 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2994 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2996 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2997 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2998 * abort the handshake.
3000 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3001 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3009 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3010 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3013 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3014 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3017 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3018 s->servername_done=0;
3024 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3026 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3029 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3030 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3031 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3032 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3034 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3037 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3038 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3039 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3040 if (certpkey == NULL)
3042 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3045 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3046 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3048 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3049 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3052 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3053 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3054 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3056 /* status request response should be sent */
3057 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3058 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3059 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3061 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3063 /* something bad happened */
3064 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3065 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3066 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3071 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3076 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3077 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3080 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3081 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3089 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3091 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3092 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3095 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3096 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3097 * it must contain uncompressed.
3099 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3100 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3101 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3102 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3103 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3105 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3107 unsigned char *list;
3108 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3109 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3110 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3112 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3114 found_uncompressed = 1;
3118 if (!found_uncompressed)
3120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3124 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3125 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3127 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3128 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3129 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3130 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3132 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3133 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3135 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3136 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3138 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3140 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3141 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3144 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3145 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3146 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3147 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3149 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3150 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3155 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3158 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3159 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3162 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3163 * there is no response.
3165 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3167 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3168 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3170 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3171 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3174 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3175 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3179 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3180 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3186 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3187 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3190 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3191 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3194 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3195 s->servername_done=0;
3201 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3204 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3206 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3208 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3212 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3220 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3221 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3222 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3224 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3225 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3226 * extension, if any.
3227 * len: the length of the session ID.
3228 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3229 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3230 * point to the resulting session.
3232 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3233 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3234 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3237 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3238 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3239 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3240 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3241 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3242 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3243 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3246 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3247 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3248 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3249 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3250 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3251 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3253 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3254 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3256 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3257 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3261 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3263 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3264 * to permit stateful resumption.
3266 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3268 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3272 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3280 /* Skip past cipher list */
3285 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3290 /* Now at start of extensions */
3291 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3294 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3296 unsigned short type, size;
3299 if (p + size > limit)
3301 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3306 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3307 * currently have one. */
3308 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3311 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3313 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3314 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3315 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3316 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3317 * calculate the master secret later. */
3320 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3323 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3324 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3326 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3328 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3329 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3331 default: /* fatal error */
3340 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3342 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3343 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3344 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3345 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3346 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3347 * point to the resulting session.
3350 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3351 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3352 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3353 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3355 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3356 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3357 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3360 unsigned char *sdec;
3361 const unsigned char *p;
3362 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3363 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3366 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3367 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3370 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3371 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3372 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3373 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3375 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3376 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3387 /* Check key name matches */
3388 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3390 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3391 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3392 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3393 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3395 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3396 * integrity checks on ticket.
3398 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3401 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3405 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3406 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3407 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3408 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3409 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3411 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3412 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3413 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3414 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3415 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3418 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3421 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3422 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3425 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3428 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3432 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3433 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3434 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3435 * as required by standard.
3438 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3439 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3447 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3452 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3460 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3461 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3462 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3463 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3464 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3465 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3466 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3469 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3470 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3471 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3472 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3475 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3478 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3480 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3486 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3489 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3491 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3492 return table[i].nid;
3497 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3502 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3503 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3506 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3509 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3510 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3514 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3516 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3517 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3520 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3525 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3533 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3537 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3538 return EVP_sha224();
3540 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3541 return EVP_sha256();
3543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3544 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3545 return EVP_sha384();
3547 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3548 return EVP_sha512();
3556 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3561 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3562 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3565 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3566 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3569 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3570 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3576 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3577 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3578 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3580 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3581 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3583 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3585 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3586 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3588 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3590 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3592 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3593 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3595 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3599 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3600 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3601 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3603 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3606 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3607 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3608 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3609 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3611 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3612 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3613 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3615 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3616 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3618 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3620 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3622 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3627 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3628 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3629 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3631 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3642 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3643 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3645 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3646 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3648 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3650 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3651 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3653 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3654 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3656 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3657 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3659 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3660 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3662 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3664 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3665 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3668 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3669 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3673 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3674 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3680 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3681 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3683 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3686 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3689 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3690 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3691 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3696 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3698 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3704 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3705 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3706 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3708 /* Should never happen */
3712 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3713 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3714 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3715 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3717 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3718 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3720 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3722 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3723 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3725 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3726 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3728 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3730 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3732 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3735 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3736 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3737 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3738 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3739 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3741 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3742 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3748 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3749 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3751 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3752 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3754 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3755 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3756 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3757 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3759 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3760 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3765 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3766 * use the certificate for signing.
3768 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3770 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3771 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3774 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3775 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3778 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3780 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3781 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3785 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3786 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3793 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3794 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3795 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3797 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3803 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3810 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3812 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3815 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3816 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3817 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3819 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3820 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3824 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3826 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3828 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3830 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3832 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3833 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3839 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3841 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3842 unsigned short hbtype;
3843 unsigned int payload;
3844 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3846 /* Read type and payload length first */
3851 if (s->msg_callback)
3852 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3853 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3854 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3856 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3858 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3861 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3862 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3863 * payload, plus padding
3865 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3868 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3869 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3871 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3873 /* Random padding */
3874 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3876 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3878 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3879 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3880 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3881 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3883 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3888 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3892 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3893 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3894 * sequence number */
3897 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3900 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3908 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3910 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3912 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3913 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3915 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3916 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3917 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3919 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3923 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3924 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3930 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3931 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3937 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3938 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3940 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3942 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3943 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3944 * some random stuff.
3945 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3946 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3947 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3948 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3951 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3954 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3955 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3957 /* Sequence number */
3958 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3959 /* 16 random bytes */
3960 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3962 /* Random padding */
3963 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3965 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3968 if (s->msg_callback)
3969 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3970 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3971 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3973 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3982 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3987 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3990 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3992 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3995 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3996 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3998 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4000 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4002 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4010 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4011 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4012 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4013 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4014 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4015 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4018 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4019 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4020 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4021 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4024 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4026 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4027 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4030 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4031 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4035 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4036 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4037 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4041 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4045 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4048 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4050 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4055 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4056 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4058 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4060 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4061 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4062 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4063 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4065 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4073 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4074 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4075 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4076 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4080 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4081 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4082 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4083 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4089 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4093 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4097 if (default_nid == -1)
4099 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4101 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4102 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4103 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4107 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4108 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4112 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4113 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4115 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4121 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4122 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4123 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4124 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4127 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4129 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4130 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4131 /* Strict mode flags */
4132 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4133 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4134 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4136 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4141 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4142 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4144 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4145 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4148 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4152 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4155 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4157 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4159 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4160 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4163 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4164 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4165 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4167 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4168 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4177 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4180 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4181 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4182 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4184 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4192 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4193 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4194 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4197 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4203 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4204 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4207 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4210 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4211 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4213 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4218 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4219 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4220 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4221 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4222 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4225 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4226 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4227 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4228 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4232 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4233 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4241 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4242 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4245 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4248 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4249 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4251 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4254 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4262 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4263 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4265 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4268 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4269 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4270 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4272 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4277 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4285 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4286 else if(check_flags)
4287 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4289 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4290 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4291 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4292 else if (!check_flags)
4295 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4296 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4297 else if (strict_mode)
4299 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4300 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4302 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4303 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4307 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4315 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4317 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4322 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4325 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4328 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4333 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4334 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4335 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4336 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4337 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4342 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4347 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4351 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4352 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4354 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4356 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4358 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4362 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4366 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4369 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4371 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4372 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4374 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4376 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4377 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4379 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4381 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4383 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4384 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4386 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4391 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4395 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4397 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4398 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4402 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4404 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4405 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4406 else if (cpk->digest)
4407 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4410 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4412 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4413 * if the chain is invalid.
4417 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4418 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4421 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4422 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4429 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4430 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4432 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4433 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4434 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4435 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4436 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4437 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4439 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4440 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4442 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4448 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4450 int dh_secbits = 80;
4451 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4452 return DH_get_1024_160();
4453 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4455 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4462 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4463 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4466 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4473 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4474 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4475 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4477 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4478 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4485 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4486 return DH_get_2048_224();
4487 return DH_get_1024_160();