2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
299 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
301 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
302 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
303 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
305 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
308 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
310 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
313 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
315 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
319 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
321 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
325 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
327 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
329 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
331 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
333 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
335 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
337 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
339 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
341 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
343 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
345 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
347 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
349 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
351 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
353 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
355 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
357 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
359 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
361 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
363 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
365 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
367 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
373 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
376 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
377 const unsigned char **pcurves,
382 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
383 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
386 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
387 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
389 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
390 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
391 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
394 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
395 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
399 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
400 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
404 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
405 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
409 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
410 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
413 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
414 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
416 const unsigned char *curves;
418 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
419 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
421 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
424 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
427 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
429 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
432 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
434 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
437 else /* Should never happen */
440 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
441 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
443 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
449 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
450 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
454 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
456 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
457 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
459 /* Can't do anything on client side */
466 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
467 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
470 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
472 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
473 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
475 /* Should never happen */
478 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
481 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
483 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
488 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
490 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
491 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
493 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
497 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
498 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
509 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
510 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
512 unsigned char *clist, *p;
514 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
515 * while curve ids < 32
517 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
518 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
521 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
523 unsigned long idmask;
525 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
527 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
538 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
542 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
547 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
550 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
552 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
556 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
558 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
560 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
562 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
563 if (nid == NID_undef)
564 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
565 if (nid == NID_undef)
566 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
569 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
570 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
572 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
575 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
576 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
581 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
585 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
587 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
588 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
593 const EC_METHOD *meth;
596 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
597 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
600 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
603 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
607 /* Determine curve ID */
608 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
610 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
614 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
626 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
628 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
631 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
633 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
640 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
641 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
642 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
644 const unsigned char *p;
647 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
648 * is supported (see RFC4492).
650 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
652 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
653 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
654 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
664 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
665 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
667 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
668 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
670 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
675 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
682 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
685 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
687 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
689 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
694 *pformats = ecformats_default;
695 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
697 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
699 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
703 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
704 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
708 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
711 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
714 /* If not EC nothing to do */
715 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
720 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
724 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
725 * supported curves extension.
727 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
730 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
731 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
733 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
740 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
741 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
742 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
743 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
744 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
746 return 0; /* Should never happen */
747 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
748 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
750 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
754 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
762 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
763 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
765 unsigned char curve_id[2];
766 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
767 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
768 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
769 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
772 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
773 * no other curves permitted.
777 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
778 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
779 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
780 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
781 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
785 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
786 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
788 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
789 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
791 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
794 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
797 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
799 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
805 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
807 /* Need a shared curve */
808 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
814 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
821 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
825 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
831 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
840 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
841 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
853 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
856 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
859 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
862 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
863 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
864 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
867 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
869 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
870 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
881 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
882 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
883 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
886 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
888 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
892 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
894 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
895 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
896 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
907 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
908 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
910 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
911 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
913 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
915 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
916 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
920 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
921 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
924 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
925 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
927 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
928 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
930 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
931 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
932 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
933 /* Should never happen */
936 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
937 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
943 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
945 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
946 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
947 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
949 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
954 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
959 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
961 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
964 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
968 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
970 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
973 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
981 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
985 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
986 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
989 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
992 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
993 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
998 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1004 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1007 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1008 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1011 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1012 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1013 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1014 * session and not global settings.
1017 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1020 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1021 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1022 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1025 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1026 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1027 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1030 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1031 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1034 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1040 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1045 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1050 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1056 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1057 * signature algorithms.
1061 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1066 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1067 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1075 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1077 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1078 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1082 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1083 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1085 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1086 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1088 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1092 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1095 unsigned char *ret = p;
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1097 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1099 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1102 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1103 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1105 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1107 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1109 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1110 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1111 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1112 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1121 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1122 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1123 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1128 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1130 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1132 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1133 unsigned long size_str;
1136 /* check for enough space.
1137 4 for the servername type and entension length
1138 2 for servernamelist length
1139 1 for the hostname type
1140 2 for hostname length
1144 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1145 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1148 /* extension type and length */
1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1150 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1152 /* length of servername list */
1153 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1155 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1156 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1158 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1162 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1167 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1175 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1178 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1188 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1189 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1190 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1192 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1193 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 /* check for enough space.
1200 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1201 1 for the srp user identity
1202 + srp user identity length
1204 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1206 /* fill in the extension */
1207 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1208 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1209 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1210 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1218 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1220 const unsigned char *plist;
1223 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1225 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1226 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1234 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1235 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1236 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1239 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1240 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1241 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1243 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1244 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > 65532)
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1252 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1254 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1255 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1256 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1257 * resolves this to two bytes.
1260 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1263 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1265 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1268 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1269 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1270 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1271 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1273 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1274 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1275 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1277 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1278 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1280 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1284 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1285 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1287 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1290 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1291 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1295 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1301 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1304 const unsigned char *salg;
1305 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1306 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1308 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1309 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1311 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1315 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1316 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1318 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1320 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1322 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1328 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1336 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1340 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1342 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1343 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1349 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1351 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1358 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1360 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1362 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1363 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1365 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1367 /* save position of id len */
1368 unsigned char *q = ret;
1369 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1370 /* skip over id len */
1372 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1378 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1382 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1383 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1386 * 1: peer may send requests
1387 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1389 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1390 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1392 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1396 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1398 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1399 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1400 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1407 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1409 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1411 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1412 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1413 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1414 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1415 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1416 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1419 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1423 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1425 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1427 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1430 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1438 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1439 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1442 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1444 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1446 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1447 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1449 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1450 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1451 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1455 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1459 return NULL; /* error */
1460 if (cb_retval == -1)
1461 continue; /* skip this extension */
1463 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1465 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1467 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1471 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1472 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1475 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_wtf
1477 /* Work out length which would be used in the TLS record:
1478 * NB this should ALWAYS appear after all other extensions.
1480 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data - 3;
1481 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1483 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1484 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_wtf,ret);
1486 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1492 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1499 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1502 unsigned char *ret = p;
1503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1504 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1507 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1508 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1509 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1510 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1512 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1513 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1517 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1519 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1521 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1523 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1527 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1531 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1537 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1539 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1542 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1554 const unsigned char *plist;
1556 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1559 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1561 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1562 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1569 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1570 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1571 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1572 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1576 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1577 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1579 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1580 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1582 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1583 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1587 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1589 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1590 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1594 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1595 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1597 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1599 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1601 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1604 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1607 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1616 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1618 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1620 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1623 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1631 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1632 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1633 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1634 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1635 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1636 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1637 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1638 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1639 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1640 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1641 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1647 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1648 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1650 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1653 * 1: peer may send requests
1654 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1656 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1657 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1659 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1665 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1666 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1667 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1669 const unsigned char *npa;
1670 unsigned int npalen;
1673 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1674 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1676 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1677 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1679 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1681 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1686 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1687 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1691 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1694 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1696 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1698 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1699 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1701 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1702 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1705 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1708 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1712 return NULL; /* error */
1713 if (cb_retval == -1)
1714 break; /* skip this extension */
1715 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1717 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1719 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1726 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1727 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1729 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1730 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1732 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1733 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1736 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1742 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1744 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1745 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1747 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1749 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1753 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1757 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1764 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1766 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1767 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1768 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1771 * returns: 0 on success. */
1772 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1773 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1777 const unsigned char *selected;
1778 unsigned char selected_len;
1781 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1787 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1788 * length-prefixed strings. */
1789 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1790 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1799 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1801 proto_len = data[i];
1807 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1813 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1814 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1815 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1816 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1817 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1818 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1819 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1821 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1824 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1825 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1830 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1835 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1836 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1837 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1842 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1843 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1844 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1845 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1847 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1848 unsigned short type, size;
1849 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1850 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1851 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1852 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1853 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1854 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1855 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1857 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1858 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1859 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1860 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1863 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1864 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1865 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1866 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1867 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1868 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1869 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1870 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1871 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1872 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1875 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1884 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1887 if (data+size > d+n)
1891 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1893 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1894 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1896 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1898 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1900 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1905 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1907 if (data + len != d+n)
1909 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1913 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1915 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1917 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1919 unsigned short type;
1920 unsigned short size;
1922 unsigned char *data = *p;
1923 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1926 s->servername_done = 0;
1927 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1929 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1932 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1934 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1935 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1938 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1939 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1940 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1942 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
1943 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1947 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1948 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1952 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1953 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1954 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1956 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1957 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1959 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1960 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1962 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1963 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1965 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1966 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1968 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1969 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1971 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1972 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1975 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1976 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1979 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1983 if (data > (d+n-len))
1986 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1991 if (data+size > (d+n))
1994 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1996 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1997 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1998 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1999 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2001 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2002 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2003 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2004 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2005 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2006 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2007 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2008 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2009 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2010 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2011 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2012 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2013 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2014 the value of the Host: field.
2015 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2016 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2017 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2018 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2022 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2024 unsigned char *sdata;
2030 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2037 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2044 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2050 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2053 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2054 switch (servname_type)
2056 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2059 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2061 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2064 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2066 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2069 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2071 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2074 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2075 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2076 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2077 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2078 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2079 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2082 s->servername_done = 1;
2086 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2087 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2088 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2100 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2105 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2106 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2108 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2110 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2113 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2115 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2118 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2120 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2121 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2123 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2125 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2132 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2134 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2135 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2137 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2138 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2140 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2145 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2147 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2148 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2150 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2151 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2153 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2156 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2157 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2160 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2161 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2162 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2163 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2164 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2167 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2169 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2170 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2171 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2173 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2174 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2176 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2181 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2183 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2186 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2187 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2189 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2192 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2193 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2196 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2197 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2198 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2199 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2200 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2203 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2204 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2205 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2207 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2211 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2214 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2215 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2217 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2221 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2222 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2223 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2224 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2226 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2227 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2229 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2234 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2236 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2237 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2239 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2243 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2245 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2247 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2249 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2252 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2254 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2259 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2261 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2264 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2266 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2269 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2272 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2275 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2276 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2280 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2281 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2286 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2290 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2292 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2294 const unsigned char *sdata;
2296 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2301 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2310 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2314 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2318 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2323 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2327 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2332 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2333 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2336 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2337 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2338 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2340 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2341 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2344 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2345 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2347 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2348 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2353 /* Read in request_extensions */
2356 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2363 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2369 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2371 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2372 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2375 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2376 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2378 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2379 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2381 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2386 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2390 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2393 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2397 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2398 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2400 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2401 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2402 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2404 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2410 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2411 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2412 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2414 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2417 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2418 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2419 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2420 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2421 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2422 * anything like that, but this might change).
2424 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2425 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2426 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2427 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2428 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2429 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2433 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2434 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2435 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2437 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2439 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2440 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2443 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2444 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2446 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2450 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2451 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2452 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2453 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2454 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2456 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2458 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2460 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2462 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2463 if (type == record->ext_type)
2467 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2468 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2470 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2472 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2477 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2478 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2481 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2482 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2483 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2484 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2485 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2486 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2488 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2489 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2492 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2493 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2497 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2498 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2499 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2509 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2511 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2512 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2514 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2516 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2519 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2520 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2521 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2526 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2529 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2531 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2535 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2544 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2545 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2546 * the length of the block. */
2547 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2549 unsigned int off = 0;
2563 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2565 unsigned short length;
2566 unsigned short type;
2567 unsigned short size;
2568 unsigned char *data = *p;
2569 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2570 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2573 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2576 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2578 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2579 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2583 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2584 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2587 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2588 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2591 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2595 if (data+length != d+n)
2597 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2601 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2606 if (data+size > (d+n))
2609 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2610 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2611 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2613 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2615 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2617 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2620 tlsext_servername = 1;
2623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2624 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2626 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2627 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2629 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2631 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2634 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2635 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2636 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2638 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2641 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2642 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2644 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2645 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2646 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2647 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2648 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2651 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2653 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2655 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2656 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2658 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2661 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2664 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2667 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2669 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2670 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2672 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2676 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2679 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2680 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2682 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2686 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2687 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2688 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2689 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2691 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2693 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2695 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2700 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2702 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2703 * a status request message.
2705 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2707 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2710 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2711 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2714 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2715 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2717 unsigned char *selected;
2718 unsigned char selected_len;
2720 /* We must have requested it. */
2721 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2723 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2726 /* The data must be valid */
2727 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2729 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2732 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2734 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2737 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2738 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2740 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2743 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2744 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2745 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2749 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2753 /* We must have requested it. */
2754 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2756 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2761 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2764 /* The extension data consists of:
2765 * uint16 list_length
2766 * uint8 proto_length;
2767 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2771 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2773 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2777 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2779 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2782 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2783 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2784 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2785 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2787 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2790 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2791 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2794 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2796 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2798 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2800 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2801 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2805 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2806 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2808 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2809 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2810 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2812 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2817 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2819 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2823 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2824 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2826 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2829 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2831 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2833 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2834 if (record->ext_type == type)
2836 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2842 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2843 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2845 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2846 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2847 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2856 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2860 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2862 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2864 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2866 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2867 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2869 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2875 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2885 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2886 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2887 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2888 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2889 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2890 * absence on initial connect only.
2892 if (!renegotiate_seen
2893 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2894 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2896 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2898 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2906 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2909 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2913 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2915 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2920 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2922 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2923 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2925 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2926 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2928 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2929 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2934 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2938 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2939 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2946 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2951 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2953 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2954 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2957 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2958 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2960 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2961 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2965 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2966 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2967 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2968 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2970 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2972 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2973 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2974 * so this has to happen here in
2975 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2979 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2981 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2984 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2985 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2990 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2991 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2992 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2994 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2996 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2997 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2999 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3000 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3002 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3003 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3005 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3006 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3008 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3009 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3012 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3016 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3018 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3019 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3020 * abort the handshake.
3022 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3023 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3031 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3032 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3035 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3036 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3039 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3040 s->servername_done=0;
3046 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3048 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3051 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3052 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3053 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3054 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3056 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3059 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3060 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3061 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3062 if (certpkey == NULL)
3064 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3067 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3068 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3070 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3071 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3074 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3075 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3076 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3078 /* status request response should be sent */
3079 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3080 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3081 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3083 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3085 /* something bad happened */
3086 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3087 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3088 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3093 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3098 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3099 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3102 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3103 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3111 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3113 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3114 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3117 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3118 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3119 * it must contain uncompressed.
3121 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3122 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3123 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3124 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3125 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3127 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3129 unsigned char *list;
3130 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3131 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3132 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3134 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3136 found_uncompressed = 1;
3140 if (!found_uncompressed)
3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3146 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3147 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3149 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3150 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3151 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3152 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3154 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3155 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3157 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3158 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3160 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3162 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3163 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3166 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3167 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3168 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3169 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3171 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3172 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3177 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3180 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3181 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3184 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3185 * there is no response.
3187 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3189 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3190 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3192 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3193 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3196 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3197 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3201 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3202 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3208 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3209 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3212 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3213 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3216 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3217 s->servername_done=0;
3223 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3226 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3228 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3230 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3234 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3242 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3243 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3244 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3246 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3247 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3248 * extension, if any.
3249 * len: the length of the session ID.
3250 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3251 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3252 * point to the resulting session.
3254 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3255 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3256 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3259 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3260 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3261 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3262 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3263 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3264 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3265 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3268 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3269 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3270 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3271 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3272 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3273 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3275 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3276 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3278 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3279 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3283 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3285 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3286 * to permit stateful resumption.
3288 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3290 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3294 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3302 /* Skip past cipher list */
3307 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3312 /* Now at start of extensions */
3313 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3316 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3318 unsigned short type, size;
3321 if (p + size > limit)
3323 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3328 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3329 * currently have one. */
3330 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3333 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3335 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3336 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3337 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3338 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3339 * calculate the master secret later. */
3342 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3345 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3346 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3348 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3350 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3351 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3353 default: /* fatal error */
3362 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3364 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3365 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3366 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3367 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3368 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3369 * point to the resulting session.
3372 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3373 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3374 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3375 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3377 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3378 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3379 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3382 unsigned char *sdec;
3383 const unsigned char *p;
3384 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3385 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3388 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3389 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3392 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3393 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3394 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3395 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3397 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3398 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3409 /* Check key name matches */
3410 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3412 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3413 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3414 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3415 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3417 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3418 * integrity checks on ticket.
3420 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3423 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3427 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3428 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3429 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3430 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3431 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3433 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3434 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3435 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3436 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3437 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3440 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3443 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3444 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3447 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3450 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3454 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3455 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3456 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3457 * as required by standard.
3460 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3461 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3469 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3474 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3482 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3483 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3484 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3485 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3486 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3487 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3488 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3491 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3492 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3493 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3494 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3497 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3500 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3502 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3508 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3511 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3513 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3514 return table[i].nid;
3519 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3524 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3525 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3528 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3531 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3532 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3536 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3538 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3539 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3542 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3547 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3555 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3559 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3560 return EVP_sha224();
3562 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3563 return EVP_sha256();
3565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3566 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3567 return EVP_sha384();
3569 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3570 return EVP_sha512();
3578 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3583 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3584 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3587 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3588 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3591 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3592 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3598 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3599 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3600 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3602 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3603 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3605 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3607 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3608 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3610 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3612 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3614 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3615 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3617 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3621 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3622 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3623 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3625 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3628 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3629 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3630 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3631 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3633 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3634 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3635 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3637 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3638 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3640 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3642 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3644 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3649 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3650 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3651 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3653 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3664 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3665 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3667 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3668 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3670 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3672 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3673 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3674 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3676 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3677 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3679 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3681 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3682 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3685 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3686 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3690 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3691 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3697 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3698 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3700 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3703 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3706 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3707 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3708 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3713 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3715 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3721 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3722 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3723 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3725 /* Should never happen */
3729 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3730 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3732 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3733 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3735 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3737 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3738 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3740 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3741 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3743 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3745 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3747 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3750 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3751 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3752 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3753 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3754 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3756 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3763 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3764 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3766 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3767 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3769 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3770 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3771 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3772 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3774 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3775 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3780 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3781 * use the certificate for signing.
3783 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3785 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3786 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3789 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3790 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3792 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3793 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3795 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3796 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3800 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3801 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3808 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3809 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3810 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3812 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3818 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3825 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3827 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3830 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3831 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3832 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3834 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3835 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3839 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3841 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3843 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3845 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3847 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3848 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3854 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3856 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3857 unsigned short hbtype;
3858 unsigned int payload;
3859 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3861 /* Read type and payload length first */
3866 if (s->msg_callback)
3867 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3868 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3869 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3871 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3873 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3876 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3877 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3878 * payload, plus padding
3880 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3883 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3884 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3886 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3888 /* Random padding */
3889 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3891 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3893 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3894 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3895 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3896 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3898 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3903 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3907 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3908 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3909 * sequence number */
3912 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3915 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3923 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3925 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3927 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3928 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3930 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3931 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3932 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3938 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3939 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3945 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3946 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3952 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3953 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3955 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3957 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3958 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3959 * some random stuff.
3960 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3961 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3962 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3963 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3966 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3969 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3970 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3972 /* Sequence number */
3973 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3974 /* 16 random bytes */
3975 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3977 /* Random padding */
3978 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3980 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3983 if (s->msg_callback)
3984 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3985 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3986 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3988 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3997 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4002 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4005 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4007 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4010 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4011 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4013 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4015 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4017 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4025 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4026 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4027 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4028 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4029 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4030 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4033 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4034 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4035 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4036 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4039 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4041 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4042 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4045 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4046 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4050 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4051 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4052 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4056 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4060 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4063 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4065 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4070 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4071 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4073 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4075 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4076 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4077 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4078 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4080 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4088 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4089 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4090 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4091 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4095 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4096 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4097 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4098 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4104 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4108 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4112 if (default_nid == -1)
4114 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4116 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4117 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4118 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4122 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4123 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4127 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4128 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4130 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4136 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4137 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4138 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4139 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4142 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4144 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4145 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4146 /* Strict mode flags */
4147 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4148 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4149 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4151 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4156 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4157 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4159 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4160 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4163 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4167 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4170 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4172 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4174 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4175 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4178 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4179 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4180 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4182 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4183 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4192 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4195 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4196 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4197 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4199 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4207 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4208 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4209 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4212 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4218 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4219 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4222 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4225 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4226 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4228 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4233 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4234 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4235 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4236 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4237 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4240 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4241 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4242 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4243 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4247 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4248 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4256 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4257 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4260 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4263 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4264 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4266 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4269 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4277 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4278 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4280 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4283 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4284 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4285 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4287 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4292 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4300 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4301 else if(check_flags)
4302 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4304 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4305 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4306 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4307 else if (!check_flags)
4310 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4311 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4312 else if (strict_mode)
4314 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4315 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4317 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4318 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4322 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4330 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4332 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4337 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4340 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4343 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4348 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4349 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4350 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4351 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4352 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4357 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4362 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4366 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4367 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4369 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4371 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4373 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4377 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4381 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4384 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4386 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4387 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4389 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4391 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4392 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4394 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4396 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4398 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4399 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4401 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4406 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4410 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4412 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4413 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4417 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4419 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4420 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4421 else if (cpk->digest)
4422 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4425 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4427 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4428 * if the chain is invalid.
4432 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4433 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4436 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4437 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4444 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4445 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4447 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4448 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4449 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4450 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4451 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4452 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4454 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4455 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4457 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);