2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 tls1_export_keying_material,
42 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
57 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
58 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
60 tls1_export_keying_material,
61 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
62 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
63 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
64 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
65 tls_close_construct_packet,
69 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
73 tls1_generate_master_secret,
74 tls1_change_cipher_state,
75 tls1_final_finish_mac,
76 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
77 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
78 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
80 tls1_export_keying_material,
81 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
82 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
83 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
84 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
85 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
86 tls_close_construct_packet,
90 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
93 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
94 * http, the cache would over fill
103 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
107 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
109 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
113 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
116 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
117 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
119 s->version = s->method->version;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
125 int nid; /* Curve NID */
126 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
127 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
131 * Table of curve information.
132 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
133 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
135 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
136 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
137 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
138 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
139 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
140 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
141 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
142 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
143 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
144 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
145 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
146 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
147 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
148 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
149 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
150 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
151 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
152 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
153 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
154 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
155 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
156 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
157 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
158 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
159 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
160 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
161 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
162 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
164 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
167 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
168 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
169 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
173 /* The default curves */
174 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
175 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
176 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
177 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
178 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
181 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
182 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
183 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
184 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
185 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
186 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
187 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
188 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
191 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
192 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
194 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
195 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
196 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
197 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
198 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
199 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
200 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
201 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
202 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
203 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
204 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
205 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
206 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
207 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
208 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
209 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
210 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
211 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
212 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
213 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
214 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
215 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
218 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
219 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
220 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
223 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
225 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
226 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
227 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
229 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
231 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
235 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
238 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
239 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
246 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
248 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
249 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
250 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
251 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
252 * lists in the first place.
253 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
254 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
255 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
257 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
258 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
260 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
262 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
263 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
265 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
266 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
267 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
268 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
269 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
272 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
273 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
277 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
278 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
282 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
283 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
286 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
287 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
291 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
292 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
297 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
302 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
303 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
305 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
308 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
310 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
311 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
312 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
315 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
318 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
319 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
321 const unsigned char *curves;
322 size_t num_curves, i;
323 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
324 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
326 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
328 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
331 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
332 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
334 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
335 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
337 } else /* Should never happen */
340 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
342 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
343 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
344 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
350 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
351 * if there is no match.
352 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
353 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
354 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
356 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
358 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
359 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
361 /* Can't do anything on client side */
365 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
367 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
368 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
370 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
371 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
372 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
373 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
374 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
375 /* Should never happen */
378 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
382 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
383 * but s->options is a long...
385 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
386 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
388 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
389 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
390 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
391 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
392 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
395 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
398 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
400 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
401 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
402 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
404 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
408 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
409 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
410 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
411 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
412 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
415 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
416 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
424 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
428 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
429 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
431 unsigned char *clist, *p;
434 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
437 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
438 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
441 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
442 unsigned long idmask;
444 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
446 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
455 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
459 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
463 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
466 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
468 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
474 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
476 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
478 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
480 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
481 if (nid == NID_undef)
482 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
483 if (nid == NID_undef)
484 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
485 if (nid == NID_undef)
487 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
488 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
490 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
494 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
495 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
499 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
503 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
506 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
507 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
514 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
515 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
518 /* Determine curve ID */
519 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
520 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
521 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
525 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
527 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
529 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
530 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
532 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
533 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
535 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
541 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
542 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
543 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
545 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
546 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
549 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
550 * supported (see RFC4492).
552 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
553 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
554 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
555 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
556 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
559 if (i == num_formats)
564 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
565 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
566 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
568 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
570 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
571 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
572 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
573 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
574 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
578 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
579 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
584 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
591 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
595 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
597 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
598 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
599 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
601 *pformats = ecformats_default;
602 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
604 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
606 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
611 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
612 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
614 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
616 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
619 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
622 /* If not EC nothing to do */
623 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
625 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
629 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
632 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
636 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
637 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
639 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
645 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
646 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
647 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
648 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
649 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
651 return 0; /* Should never happen */
652 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
653 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
655 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
657 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
658 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
659 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
661 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
667 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
669 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
671 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
673 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
674 * is compatible with the client extensions.
676 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
678 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
681 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
684 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
685 unsigned char curve_id[2];
686 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
687 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
688 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
689 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
690 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
694 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
695 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
699 /* Need a shared curve */
700 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
704 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
708 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
713 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
716 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
717 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
720 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
721 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
723 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
726 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
727 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
729 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
735 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
738 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
739 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
740 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
741 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
743 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
744 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
745 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
746 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
747 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
748 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
750 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
751 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
752 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
757 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
758 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
759 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
762 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
765 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
768 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
769 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
770 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
771 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
772 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
774 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
775 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
778 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
779 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
783 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
784 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
785 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
786 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
787 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
788 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
789 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
791 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
792 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
797 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
798 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
800 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
801 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
803 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
804 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
805 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
806 /* Should never happen */
809 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
810 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
815 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
816 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
817 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
818 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
820 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
824 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
825 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
828 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
829 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
831 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
834 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
835 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
837 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
843 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
847 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
848 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
849 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
850 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
853 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
854 if (i == sent_sigslen
855 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
856 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
860 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
865 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
866 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
867 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
872 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
874 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
879 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
880 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
881 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
883 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
886 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
888 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
890 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
891 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
892 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
893 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
895 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
896 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
897 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
898 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
900 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
902 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
903 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
904 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
910 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
911 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
912 * @c: cipher to check
913 * @op: Security check that you want to do
915 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
917 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
919 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
920 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
922 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
924 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
925 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
927 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
928 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
931 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
934 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
936 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
938 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
941 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
943 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
944 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
954 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
955 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
956 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
957 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
958 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
961 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
963 PACKET extensions = *packet;
964 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
965 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
968 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
969 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
972 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
973 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
979 if (num_extensions <= 1)
982 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
983 if (extension_types == NULL) {
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
988 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
989 extensions = *packet;
990 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
992 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
993 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
994 /* This should not happen. */
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1000 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1004 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1005 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1006 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1007 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1012 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1016 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1019 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1021 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1023 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1024 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1026 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1027 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1029 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1030 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1031 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1032 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1040 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1041 if (s->renegotiate) {
1042 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, 2)
1043 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1044 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1045 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1046 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1051 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1052 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1055 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1056 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1057 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, 2)
1058 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1059 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1060 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1061 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1062 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name, 1)
1063 /* Sub-packet for a single hostname host name */
1064 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1065 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1066 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1067 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1068 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1069 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1075 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1076 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1077 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, 2)
1078 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1079 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1080 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 1)
1081 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1082 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt,
1083 OPENSSL_WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1084 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1085 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1086 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1087 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1097 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1099 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1100 size_t num_curves, num_formats;
1103 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1105 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, 2)
1106 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1107 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1108 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 1)
1109 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1110 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1111 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1117 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1119 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1120 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1125 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, 2)
1126 /* Sub-packet for curves extension */
1127 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1128 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)) {
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1132 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1133 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1134 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1135 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, pcurves[0], 1)
1136 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, pcurves[1], 1)) {
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1138 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1143 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1148 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1150 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1152 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1153 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1154 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1155 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1156 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1157 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1158 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1162 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1163 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1164 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1167 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1168 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1171 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, 2)
1172 /* Sub-packet for ticket extension */
1173 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1174 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)
1175 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1182 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1184 const unsigned char *salg;
1186 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1188 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, 2)
1189 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1190 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1191 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1192 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1193 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1194 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1195 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1201 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1204 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, 2)
1205 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1206 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1207 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp, 1)
1208 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1209 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)) {
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1213 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1214 unsigned char *idbytes;
1218 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1219 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1221 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1222 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 1)
1223 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1224 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen
1225 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1230 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1231 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)) {
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1235 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1236 unsigned char *extbytes;
1237 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1243 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1244 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1250 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1257 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1262 * 1: peer may send requests
1263 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1265 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1266 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1268 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1270 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, 2)
1271 /* Sub-packet for Hearbeat extension */
1272 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1273 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, mode, 1)
1274 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1282 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1284 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1285 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1287 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, 2)
1288 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1296 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1297 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1298 * (see longer comment below)
1300 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1301 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt,
1302 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, 2)
1303 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1304 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1305 /* Sub-packet for ALPN proto list */
1306 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1307 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1308 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1309 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1310 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1314 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1317 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1318 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = 0;
1319 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1322 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, 2)
1323 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1324 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1325 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1326 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)) {
1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1330 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1331 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1332 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1333 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, prof->id, 2)) {
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1344 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1345 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1346 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1351 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, 2)
1352 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1358 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1359 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, 2)
1360 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1367 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, 2)
1368 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1374 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1375 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1376 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1379 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1380 unsigned char *padbytes;
1383 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1388 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1389 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1395 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, 2)
1396 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1397 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1401 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1402 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1413 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1414 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1417 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1418 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1420 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1423 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1424 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1425 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1426 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1431 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1433 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1436 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1441 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1444 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1447 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1455 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1456 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1459 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1460 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1461 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1464 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1469 const unsigned char *plist;
1472 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1476 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1478 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1480 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1482 if (plistlen > 255) {
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1487 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1488 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1489 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1490 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1495 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1498 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1500 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1501 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1503 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1507 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1510 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1513 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1514 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1516 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1520 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1523 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1524 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1528 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1531 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1534 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1543 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1544 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1545 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1546 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1547 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1548 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1549 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1550 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1551 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1553 if (limit - ret < 36)
1555 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1560 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1561 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1562 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1564 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1568 * 1: peer may send requests
1569 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1571 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1572 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1574 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1580 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1581 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1582 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1583 const unsigned char *npa;
1584 unsigned int npalen;
1587 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1589 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1590 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1591 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1593 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1595 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1597 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1601 if (!custom_ext_add_old(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1603 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1605 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1606 * for other cases too.
1608 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1609 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1610 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1611 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1612 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1614 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1618 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1619 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1623 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1624 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1625 unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1627 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1629 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1633 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1639 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1642 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1647 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1648 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1649 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1650 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1652 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1654 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1656 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1658 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1659 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1663 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1665 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1666 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1667 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1670 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1672 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1673 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1674 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1682 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1683 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1684 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1686 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1688 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1689 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1691 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1692 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1693 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1694 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1695 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1697 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1698 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1699 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1700 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1701 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1704 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1706 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1707 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1710 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1720 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1721 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1722 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1727 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1728 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1729 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1730 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1732 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1738 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1739 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1740 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1741 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1742 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1743 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1744 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1746 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1747 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1748 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1749 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1750 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1751 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1752 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1753 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1754 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1755 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1756 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1757 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1758 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1761 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1762 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1766 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1767 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1768 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1772 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1775 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1776 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1778 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1781 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1784 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1785 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1787 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1788 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1791 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1792 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1794 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1797 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1800 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1801 s->servername_done = 0;
1802 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1804 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1807 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1808 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1809 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1810 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1811 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1812 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1814 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1815 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1819 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1820 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1821 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1823 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1824 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1825 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1826 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1829 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1830 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1833 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1835 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1838 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1841 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1845 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1846 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1849 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1851 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1854 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1855 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1856 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1857 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1859 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1860 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1862 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1863 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1866 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1868 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1869 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1870 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1871 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1872 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1873 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1874 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1875 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1876 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1877 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1878 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1879 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1880 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1881 * the value of the Host: field.
1882 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1883 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1884 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1886 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1890 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1891 unsigned int servname_type;
1892 PACKET sni, hostname;
1894 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1895 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1896 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1901 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1902 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1903 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1905 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1906 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1907 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1909 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1910 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1912 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1913 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1914 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1919 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1920 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1924 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1925 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1929 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1930 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1934 s->servername_done = 1;
1937 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1938 * fall back to a full handshake.
1940 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1941 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1942 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1946 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1949 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1952 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1956 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1957 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1959 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1960 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1967 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1968 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1970 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
1971 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1976 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1977 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1979 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1980 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1984 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1985 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1987 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1988 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
1989 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1990 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1995 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1996 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
1998 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
1999 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2004 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2005 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2006 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2007 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
2008 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
2009 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2011 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2014 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2015 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2017 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2018 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2019 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2024 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2025 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2029 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2030 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2031 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2034 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2035 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2036 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2037 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2038 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2039 (&extension, &responder_id_list))
2042 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2044 PACKET responder_id;
2045 const unsigned char *id_data;
2047 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2049 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2053 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
2054 && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2055 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
2056 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2060 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2061 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2062 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2066 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2067 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2071 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2072 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2073 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2078 /* Read in request_extensions */
2079 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2082 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2083 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2084 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2085 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2086 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2087 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2088 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2089 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2090 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2098 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2100 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2104 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2105 unsigned int hbtype;
2107 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2108 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2109 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2113 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2114 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2116 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2117 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2118 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2121 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2127 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2128 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2130 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2133 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2134 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2135 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2136 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2137 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2138 * anything like that, but this might change).
2140 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2141 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2142 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2143 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2144 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2146 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2150 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2151 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2152 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2156 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2158 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2159 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2160 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2164 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2165 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2167 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2168 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2172 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2173 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2174 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2175 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2176 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2179 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2180 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2185 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2187 * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
2189 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2195 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2197 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2198 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2199 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2201 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2206 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2207 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2208 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2209 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2214 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2217 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2218 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2219 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2222 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2231 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2232 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2233 * fill the length of the block.
2235 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2237 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2239 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2240 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2241 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2249 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2251 unsigned int length, type, size;
2252 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2253 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2256 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2258 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2260 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2261 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2263 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2264 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2267 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2269 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2271 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2274 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2275 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2279 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2280 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2284 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2285 const unsigned char *data;
2288 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2289 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2292 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2293 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2295 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2296 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2298 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2299 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2300 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2301 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2302 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2305 tlsext_servername = 1;
2307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2308 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2309 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2310 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2311 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2312 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2316 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2317 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2318 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2319 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2320 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2323 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2324 ecpointformatlist_length;
2325 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2326 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2327 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2328 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2334 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2336 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2337 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2338 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2339 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2341 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2344 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2345 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2348 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2349 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2351 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2354 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2355 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2358 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2359 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2363 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2364 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2365 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2367 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2368 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2369 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2370 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2371 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2372 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2374 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2376 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2377 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2378 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2381 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2386 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2387 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2388 unsigned char *selected;
2389 unsigned char selected_len;
2390 /* We must have requested it. */
2391 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2392 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2395 /* The data must be valid */
2396 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2397 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2400 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2403 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2404 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2405 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2408 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2409 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2410 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2413 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2414 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2415 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2419 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2421 /* We must have requested it. */
2422 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2423 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2427 * The extension data consists of:
2428 * uint16 list_length
2429 * uint8 proto_length;
2430 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2432 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2433 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2434 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2435 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2438 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2439 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2440 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2441 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2444 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2445 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2448 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2451 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2452 unsigned int hbtype;
2453 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2454 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2458 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2459 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2461 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2462 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2463 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2466 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2472 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2473 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2477 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2478 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2479 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2480 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2481 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2482 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2483 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2485 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2488 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2489 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2491 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2495 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2496 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2500 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2501 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2502 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2503 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2504 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2505 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2506 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2510 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2519 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2520 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2521 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2522 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2523 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2525 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2526 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2527 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2529 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2535 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2538 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2539 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2540 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2549 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2551 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2555 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2560 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2562 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2563 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2567 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2568 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2571 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2572 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2576 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2578 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2579 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2580 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2581 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2583 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2585 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2588 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2589 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2592 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2593 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2596 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2597 s->servername_done = 0;
2603 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2604 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2606 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2608 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2611 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2612 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2614 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2615 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2618 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2621 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2622 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2623 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2627 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2632 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2633 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2634 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2635 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2636 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2637 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2638 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2639 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2642 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2643 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2644 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2646 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2649 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2650 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2652 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2653 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2657 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2661 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2666 * Upon success, returns 1.
2667 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2669 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2671 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2674 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2675 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2676 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2677 * influence which certificate is sent
2679 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2681 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2682 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2683 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2684 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2686 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2687 * et al can pick it up.
2689 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2690 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2692 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2693 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2694 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2696 /* status request response should be sent */
2697 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2698 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2699 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2701 /* something bad happened */
2702 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2704 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2710 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2717 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2719 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2720 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2722 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2724 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2725 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2726 * must contain uncompressed.
2728 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2729 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2730 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2731 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2732 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2733 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2734 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2735 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2737 unsigned char *list;
2738 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2739 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2740 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2741 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2742 found_uncompressed = 1;
2746 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2748 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2752 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2753 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2755 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2757 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2758 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2759 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2760 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2762 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2764 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2767 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2768 * that we don't receive a status message
2770 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2771 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2772 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2775 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2776 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2779 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2780 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2783 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2784 s->servername_done = 0;
2790 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2793 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2795 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2796 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2800 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2808 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2809 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2810 * need to be handled at the same time.
2812 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2815 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2816 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2817 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2818 * point to the resulting session.
2820 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2821 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2822 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2825 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2826 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2827 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2828 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2829 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2830 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2831 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2834 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2835 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2836 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2837 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2838 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2839 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2841 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2844 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2845 const PACKET *session_id,
2849 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2852 int have_ticket = 0;
2853 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2856 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2857 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2860 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2863 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2866 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2870 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2871 unsigned int type, size;
2873 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2874 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2875 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2879 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2883 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2885 const unsigned char *etick;
2887 /* Duplicate extension */
2888 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2896 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2899 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2903 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2905 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2906 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2907 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2908 * calculate the master secret later.
2913 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2914 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2918 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2919 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2921 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2922 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2925 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2928 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2929 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2932 default: /* fatal error */
2938 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2939 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2940 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2946 if (have_ticket == 0)
2953 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2955 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2956 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2957 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2958 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2959 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2960 * point to the resulting session.
2963 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2964 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2965 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2966 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2967 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2969 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2970 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2971 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2974 unsigned char *sdec;
2975 const unsigned char *p;
2976 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2977 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2978 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2979 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2980 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2982 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2983 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2986 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2991 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2992 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2993 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3004 /* Check key name matches */
3005 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3006 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3010 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3011 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3012 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3013 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3014 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3015 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3021 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3024 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3028 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3030 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3035 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3036 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3037 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3040 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3041 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3042 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3045 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3046 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3047 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3048 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3049 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3050 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3051 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3055 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3056 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3061 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3065 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3069 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3070 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3071 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3075 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3076 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3085 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3089 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3090 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3094 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3101 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3102 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3103 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3104 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3105 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3106 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3107 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3108 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3109 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3110 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3113 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3114 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3115 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3116 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3117 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3118 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3119 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3122 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3125 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3126 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3132 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3135 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3136 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3137 return table[i].nid;
3142 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3147 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3150 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3153 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3154 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3158 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3160 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3167 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3170 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3171 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3172 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3173 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3174 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3175 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3176 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3177 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3178 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3179 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3180 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3181 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3184 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3190 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3191 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3192 return tls12_md_info + i;
3198 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3200 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3201 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3203 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3206 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3209 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3213 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3214 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3217 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3218 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3221 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3222 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3225 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3226 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3228 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3229 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3231 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3232 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3238 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3239 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3240 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3242 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3243 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3245 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3246 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3248 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3250 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3251 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3253 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3255 if (psignhash_nid) {
3256 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3257 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3258 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3262 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3263 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3265 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3266 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3267 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3269 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3270 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3272 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3273 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3277 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3278 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3282 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3284 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3285 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3286 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3288 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3289 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3290 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3292 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3293 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3294 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3296 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3297 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3302 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3303 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3308 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3309 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3316 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3318 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3320 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3324 * Old version of the tls12_copy_sigalgs function used by code that has not
3325 * yet been converted to WPACKET yet. It will be deleted once WPACKET conversion
3329 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs_old(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3330 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3332 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3334 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3335 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3336 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3337 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3340 return tmpout - out;
3343 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3344 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3347 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3348 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3349 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, psig[0], 1)
3350 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, psig[1], 1))
3357 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3358 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3359 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3360 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3362 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3363 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3364 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3365 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3366 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3368 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3369 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3372 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3373 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3374 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3376 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3386 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3387 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3389 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3390 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3392 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3394 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3396 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3397 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3398 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3399 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3400 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3401 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3402 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3403 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3404 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3405 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3407 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3408 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3411 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3412 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3416 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3417 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3419 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3421 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3424 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3428 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3429 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3433 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3435 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3438 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3439 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3441 /* Should never happen */
3445 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3446 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3447 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3449 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3450 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3454 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3459 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3460 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3462 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3463 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3466 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3467 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3468 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3469 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3470 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3472 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3473 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3474 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3475 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3481 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3482 * the certificate for signing.
3484 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3486 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3487 * supported it stays as NULL.
3489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3490 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3491 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3494 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3495 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3496 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3499 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3500 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3501 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3504 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3505 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3506 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3507 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3508 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3509 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3510 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3511 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3517 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3518 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3519 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3521 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3526 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3533 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3535 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3538 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3539 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3540 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3542 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3543 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3547 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3549 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3551 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3553 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3555 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3556 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3559 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3563 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3566 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3568 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3569 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3570 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3571 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3572 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3573 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3575 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3576 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3577 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3581 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3583 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3586 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3589 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3591 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3593 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3595 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3603 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3604 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3606 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3609 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3610 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3613 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3614 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3619 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3620 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3622 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3626 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3630 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3633 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3635 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3640 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3641 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3643 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3644 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3645 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3647 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3654 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3655 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3656 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3658 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3659 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3660 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3666 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3670 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3674 if (default_nid == -1)
3676 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3678 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3679 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3680 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3685 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3686 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3690 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3691 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3692 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3699 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3700 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3701 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3702 * attempting to use them.
3705 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3707 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3708 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3709 /* Strict mode flags */
3710 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3711 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3712 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3714 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3719 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3720 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3723 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3724 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3726 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3729 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3731 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3732 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3734 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3736 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3737 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3743 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3746 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3748 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3749 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3751 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3758 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3759 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3760 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3761 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3762 else if (!check_flags)
3767 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3768 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3770 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3772 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3773 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3775 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3778 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3779 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3780 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3781 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3784 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3785 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3786 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3790 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3791 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3794 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3795 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3796 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3799 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3800 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3801 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3804 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3805 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3806 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3815 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3816 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3818 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3820 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3821 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3822 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3825 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3832 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3833 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3837 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3838 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3839 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3840 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3842 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3849 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3850 else if (check_flags)
3851 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3853 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3854 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3855 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3856 else if (!check_flags)
3859 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3860 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3861 else if (strict_mode) {
3862 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3863 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3864 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3865 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3867 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3874 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3875 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3877 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3879 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3882 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3885 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3889 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3893 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3895 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3896 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3898 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3899 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3900 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3904 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3907 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3909 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3911 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3912 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3914 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3915 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3916 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3918 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3919 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3920 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3921 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3922 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3927 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3930 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3932 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3933 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3937 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3938 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3939 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3940 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3941 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3943 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3946 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3950 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3953 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3954 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3961 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3962 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3964 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3965 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3966 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3967 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3968 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3969 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3970 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3973 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3974 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3976 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3980 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3982 int dh_secbits = 80;
3983 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3984 return DH_get_1024_160();
3985 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3986 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3991 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3992 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3995 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4003 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4004 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4006 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4007 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4015 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4016 return DH_get_2048_224();
4017 return DH_get_1024_160();
4021 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4024 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4027 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4028 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4029 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4030 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4032 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4035 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4037 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4040 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4042 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4043 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4044 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4045 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4047 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4048 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4050 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4051 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4054 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4056 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4059 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4062 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4064 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4065 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4067 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4068 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4070 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4071 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4076 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4077 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4078 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4081 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4083 int rv, start_idx, i;
4085 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4090 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4094 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4095 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4096 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);