2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235 static tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
315 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
324 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
387 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
390 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
391 const unsigned char **pcurves,
396 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
397 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
400 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
401 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
428 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
429 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
431 tls_curve_info *cinfo;
434 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
435 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
437 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
438 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
441 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
442 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
444 const unsigned char *curves;
446 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
447 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
449 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
452 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
455 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
457 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
460 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
465 else /* Should never happen */
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
469 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
471 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
472 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
477 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
478 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
482 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
484 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
485 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
487 /* Can't do anything on client side */
494 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
495 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
498 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
499 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
500 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
501 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
502 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
503 /* Should never happen */
506 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
509 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
511 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
516 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
518 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
519 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
523 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
527 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
528 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
539 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
540 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
542 unsigned char *clist, *p;
544 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
545 * while curve ids < 32
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
553 unsigned long idmask;
555 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
557 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
568 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
572 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
577 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
580 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
582 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
586 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
588 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
590 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
592 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
596 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
597 if (nid == NID_undef)
599 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
600 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
602 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
605 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
606 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
611 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
615 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
617 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
623 const EC_METHOD *meth;
626 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
627 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
630 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
633 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
637 /* Determine curve ID */
638 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
639 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
640 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
644 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
656 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
658 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
661 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
663 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
666 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
670 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
671 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
672 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
674 const unsigned char *p;
677 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
678 * is supported (see RFC4492).
680 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
682 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
683 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
684 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
694 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
695 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
697 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
698 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
700 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
705 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
712 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
715 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
717 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
719 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
724 *pformats = ecformats_default;
725 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
727 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
729 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
733 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
734 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
736 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
738 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
741 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
744 /* If not EC nothing to do */
745 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
750 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
754 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
755 * supported curves extension.
757 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
760 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
761 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
763 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
770 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
771 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
772 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
773 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
774 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
776 return 0; /* Should never happen */
777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
778 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
780 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
784 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
787 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
792 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
793 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
795 unsigned char curve_id[2];
796 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
798 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
799 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
802 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
803 * no other curves permitted.
807 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
808 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
809 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
810 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
811 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
815 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
816 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
818 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
819 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
821 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
824 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
829 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
835 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
837 /* Need a shared curve */
838 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
849 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
851 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
855 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
861 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
866 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
870 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
871 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
874 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
875 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
877 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
880 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
881 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
883 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
886 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
887 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
889 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
892 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
893 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
894 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
895 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
897 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
899 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
900 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
903 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
907 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
911 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
916 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
918 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
922 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
924 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
925 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
926 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
928 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
929 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
932 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
933 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
937 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
938 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
940 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
941 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
943 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
945 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
954 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
955 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
957 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
958 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
960 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
961 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
962 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
963 /* Should never happen */
966 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
967 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
973 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
989 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
991 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
994 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
998 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1000 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1011 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1015 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1016 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1017 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1019 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1022 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1023 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1028 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1034 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1036 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1042 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1045 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1046 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1050 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1051 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1052 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1053 * session and not global settings.
1056 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1061 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1062 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1063 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1066 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1067 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1068 * signature algorithms.
1070 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1072 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1077 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1079 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1080 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1087 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1090 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1094 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1097 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1099 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1102 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1104 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1106 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1109 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1112 unsigned char *ret = p;
1113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1114 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1116 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1119 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1120 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1122 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1124 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1126 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1127 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1128 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1129 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1138 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1139 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1140 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1145 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1147 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1149 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1150 unsigned long size_str;
1153 /* check for enough space.
1154 4 for the servername type and entension length
1155 2 for servernamelist length
1156 1 for the hostname type
1157 2 for hostname length
1161 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1162 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1165 /* extension type and length */
1166 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1167 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1169 /* length of servername list */
1170 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1172 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1173 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1175 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1179 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1184 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1190 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1192 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1195 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1205 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1206 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1207 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1209 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1210 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1216 /* check for enough space.
1217 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1218 1 for the srp user identity
1219 + srp user identity length
1221 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1223 /* fill in the extension */
1224 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1225 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1226 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1227 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1235 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1237 const unsigned char *plist;
1240 unsigned char *etmp;
1242 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1244 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1252 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1253 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1254 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1255 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1258 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1259 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1260 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1262 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1263 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1264 if (plistlen > 65532)
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1271 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1273 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1274 for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
1276 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1283 plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
1285 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1286 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1287 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1288 * resolves this to two bytes.
1290 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1294 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1296 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1299 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1300 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1301 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1302 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1304 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1305 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1306 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1308 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1309 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1311 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1315 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1316 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1318 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1321 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1322 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1326 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1332 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1335 const unsigned char *salg;
1336 unsigned char *etmp;
1337 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1338 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1342 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1344 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1345 /* Fill in lengths */
1346 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1351 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1352 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1354 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1356 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1358 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1361 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1364 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1369 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1372 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1376 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1378 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1379 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1385 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1387 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1394 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1395 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1396 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1398 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1399 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1401 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1403 /* save position of id len */
1404 unsigned char *q = ret;
1405 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1406 /* skip over id len */
1408 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1414 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1418 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1419 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1422 * 1: peer may send requests
1423 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1425 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1426 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1428 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1432 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1434 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1435 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1436 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1438 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1443 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1445 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1448 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1449 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1450 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1451 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1452 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1455 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1459 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1461 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1463 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1466 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1474 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1475 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1478 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1480 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1482 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1483 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1485 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1486 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1487 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1491 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1495 return NULL; /* error */
1496 if (cb_retval == -1)
1497 continue; /* skip this extension */
1499 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1501 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1503 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1507 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1508 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1512 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1513 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1515 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1516 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1518 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1520 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1521 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1522 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1523 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1525 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1527 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1529 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1535 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1537 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1542 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1549 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1552 unsigned char *ret = p;
1554 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1556 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1559 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1560 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1561 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1562 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1564 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1565 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1569 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1571 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1573 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1575 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1579 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1583 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1589 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1591 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1594 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1606 const unsigned char *plist;
1608 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1611 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1613 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1614 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1621 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1622 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1623 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1624 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1628 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1629 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1631 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1633 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1634 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1638 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1640 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1641 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1645 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1646 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1648 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1650 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1652 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1655 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1658 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1667 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1669 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1671 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1674 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1682 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1683 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1684 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1685 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1686 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1687 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1688 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1689 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1690 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1691 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1692 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1698 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1699 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1701 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1704 * 1: peer may send requests
1705 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1707 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1708 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1710 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1716 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1717 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1718 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1720 const unsigned char *npa;
1721 unsigned int npalen;
1724 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1725 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1727 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1728 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1730 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1732 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1737 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
1739 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1740 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1743 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
1745 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1748 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1752 return NULL; /* error */
1753 if (cb_retval == -1)
1754 continue; /* skip this extension */
1755 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1757 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1759 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1762 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1763 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1765 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1766 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1768 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1769 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1772 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1778 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1780 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1781 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1783 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1785 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1789 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1793 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1800 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1802 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1803 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1804 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1807 * returns: 0 on success. */
1808 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1809 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1813 const unsigned char *selected;
1814 unsigned char selected_len;
1817 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1823 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1824 * length-prefixed strings. */
1825 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1826 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1835 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1837 proto_len = data[i];
1843 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1849 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1850 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1851 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1852 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1853 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1854 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1855 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1857 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1860 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1861 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1866 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1871 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1872 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1873 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1878 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1879 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1880 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1881 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1883 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1884 unsigned short type, size;
1885 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1886 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1887 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1888 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1889 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1890 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1891 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1893 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1894 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1895 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1896 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1899 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1900 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1901 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1902 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1903 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1904 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1905 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1906 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1907 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1908 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1911 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1920 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1923 if (data+size > d+n)
1927 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1929 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1930 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1932 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1934 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1936 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1941 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1943 if (data + len != d+n)
1945 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1949 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1951 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1953 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1955 unsigned short type;
1956 unsigned short size;
1958 unsigned char *data = *p;
1959 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1962 s->servername_done = 0;
1963 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1965 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1968 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1970 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1971 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1974 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1975 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1976 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1978 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1979 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1983 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1984 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1988 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1989 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1990 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1992 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1993 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1995 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1996 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1998 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1999 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2001 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2002 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2004 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2005 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2007 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2008 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2011 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2012 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2015 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2019 if (data > (d+n-len))
2022 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2027 if (data+size > (d+n))
2030 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2032 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2033 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2034 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2035 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2037 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2038 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2039 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2040 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2041 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2042 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2043 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2044 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2045 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2046 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2047 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2048 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2049 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2050 the value of the Host: field.
2051 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2052 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2053 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2054 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2058 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2060 unsigned char *sdata;
2066 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2073 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2080 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2086 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2089 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2090 switch (servname_type)
2092 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2095 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2097 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2100 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2102 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2105 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2107 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2110 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2111 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2112 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2113 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2114 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2115 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2118 s->servername_done = 1;
2122 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2123 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2124 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2136 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2142 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2144 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2146 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2149 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2151 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2154 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2156 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2157 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2159 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2161 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2168 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2170 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2171 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2173 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2174 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2176 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2181 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2183 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2184 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2186 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2187 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2189 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2192 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2193 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2196 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2197 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2198 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2199 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2200 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2203 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2205 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2206 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2207 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2209 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2210 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2212 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2217 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2219 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2222 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2223 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2225 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2228 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2229 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2232 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2233 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2234 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2235 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2236 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2239 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2240 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2241 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2243 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2247 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2250 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2251 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2253 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2257 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2258 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2259 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2260 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2262 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2263 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2265 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2270 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2272 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2273 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2275 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2279 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2281 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2283 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2285 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2288 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2290 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2295 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2297 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2300 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2302 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2305 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2308 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2311 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2312 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2316 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2321 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2325 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2327 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2329 const unsigned char *sdata;
2331 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2336 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2345 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2349 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2353 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2358 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2362 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2367 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2368 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2371 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2372 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2373 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2375 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2376 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2379 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2380 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2382 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2383 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2388 /* Read in request_extensions */
2391 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2398 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2404 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2406 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2407 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2410 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2411 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2413 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2414 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2416 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2421 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2425 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2428 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2432 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2433 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2435 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2436 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2437 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2439 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2445 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2446 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2447 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2449 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2452 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2453 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2454 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2455 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2456 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2457 * anything like that, but this might change).
2459 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2460 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2461 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2462 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2463 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2464 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2468 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2469 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2470 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2472 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2475 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2476 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2480 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2481 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2483 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2487 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2488 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2489 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2490 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2491 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2493 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2495 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2497 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2499 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2500 if (type == record->ext_type)
2502 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2507 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2508 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2509 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2519 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2521 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2522 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2524 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2526 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2529 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2530 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2531 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2536 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2539 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2541 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2545 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2554 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2555 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2556 * the length of the block. */
2557 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2559 unsigned int off = 0;
2573 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2575 unsigned short length;
2576 unsigned short type;
2577 unsigned short size;
2578 unsigned char *data = *p;
2579 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2580 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2583 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2586 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2588 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2589 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2593 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2594 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2597 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2598 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2601 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2605 if (data+length != d+n)
2607 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2611 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2616 if (data+size > (d+n))
2619 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2620 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2621 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2623 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2625 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2627 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2630 tlsext_servername = 1;
2633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2634 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2636 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2637 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2639 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2641 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2644 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2645 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2646 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2648 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2651 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2652 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2654 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2655 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2656 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2657 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2658 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2661 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2663 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2665 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2666 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2668 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2671 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2673 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2676 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2678 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2679 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2681 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2685 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2688 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2689 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2691 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2695 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2696 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2697 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2698 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2700 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2702 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2704 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2709 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2711 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2712 * a status request message.
2714 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2716 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2719 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2720 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2722 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2723 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2724 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2726 unsigned char *selected;
2727 unsigned char selected_len;
2729 /* We must have requested it. */
2730 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2732 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2735 /* The data must be valid */
2736 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2738 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2741 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2743 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2746 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2747 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2749 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2752 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2753 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2754 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2758 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2762 /* We must have requested it. */
2763 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2765 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2770 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2773 /* The extension data consists of:
2774 * uint16 list_length
2775 * uint8 proto_length;
2776 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2780 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2782 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2786 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2788 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2791 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2792 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2793 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2794 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2796 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2799 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2800 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2803 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2805 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2807 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2810 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2814 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2815 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2817 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2818 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2819 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2821 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2826 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2828 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2832 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2833 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2835 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2838 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2840 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2842 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2843 if (record->ext_type == type)
2845 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2851 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2852 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2854 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2855 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2856 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2865 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2869 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2871 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2873 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2875 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2876 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2878 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2884 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2894 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2895 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2896 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2897 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2898 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2899 * absence on initial connect only.
2901 if (!renegotiate_seen
2902 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2903 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2905 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2907 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2915 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2918 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2922 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2924 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2929 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2931 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2932 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2934 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2935 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2937 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2938 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2943 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2947 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2948 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2955 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2960 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2962 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2963 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2966 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2967 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2969 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2970 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2974 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2975 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2976 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2977 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2979 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2981 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2982 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2983 * so this has to happen here in
2984 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2988 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2990 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2993 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2994 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2999 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3000 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3001 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3003 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3005 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3006 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3008 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3009 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3011 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3012 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3014 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3015 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3017 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3018 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3021 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3025 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3027 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3028 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3029 * abort the handshake.
3031 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3032 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3040 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3041 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3044 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3045 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3048 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3049 s->servername_done=0;
3055 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3057 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3060 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3061 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3062 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3063 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3065 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3068 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3069 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3070 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3071 if (certpkey == NULL)
3073 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3076 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3077 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3079 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3080 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3083 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3084 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3085 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3087 /* status request response should be sent */
3088 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3089 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3090 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3092 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3094 /* something bad happened */
3095 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3096 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3097 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3102 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3107 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3108 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3111 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3112 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3120 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3122 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3123 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3126 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3127 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3128 * it must contain uncompressed.
3130 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3131 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3132 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3133 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3134 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3136 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3138 unsigned char *list;
3139 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3140 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3141 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3143 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3145 found_uncompressed = 1;
3149 if (!found_uncompressed)
3151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3155 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3156 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3158 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3159 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3160 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3161 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3163 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3164 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3166 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3167 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3169 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3171 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3172 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3175 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3176 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3177 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3178 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3180 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3181 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3186 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3189 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3190 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3193 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3194 * there is no response.
3196 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3198 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3199 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3201 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3202 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3205 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3206 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3210 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3211 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3217 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3218 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3221 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3222 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3225 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3226 s->servername_done=0;
3232 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3235 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3237 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3239 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3243 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3251 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3252 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3253 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3255 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3256 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3257 * extension, if any.
3258 * len: the length of the session ID.
3259 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3260 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3261 * point to the resulting session.
3263 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3264 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3265 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3268 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3269 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3270 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3271 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3272 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3273 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3274 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3277 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3278 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3279 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3280 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3281 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3282 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3284 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3285 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3287 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3288 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3292 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3294 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3295 * to permit stateful resumption.
3297 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3299 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3303 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3311 /* Skip past cipher list */
3316 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3321 /* Now at start of extensions */
3322 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3325 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3327 unsigned short type, size;
3330 if (p + size > limit)
3332 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3337 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3338 * currently have one. */
3339 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3342 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3344 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3345 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3346 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3347 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3348 * calculate the master secret later. */
3351 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3354 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3355 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3357 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3359 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3360 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3362 default: /* fatal error */
3371 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3373 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3374 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3375 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3376 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3377 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3378 * point to the resulting session.
3381 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3382 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3383 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3384 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3386 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3387 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3388 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3391 unsigned char *sdec;
3392 const unsigned char *p;
3393 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3394 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3397 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3398 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3401 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3402 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3403 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3404 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3406 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3407 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3418 /* Check key name matches */
3419 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3421 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3422 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3423 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3424 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3426 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3427 * integrity checks on ticket.
3429 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3432 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3436 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3437 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3438 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3439 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3440 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3442 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3443 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3444 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3445 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3446 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3449 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3452 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3453 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3456 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3459 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3463 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3464 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3465 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3466 * as required by standard.
3469 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3470 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3478 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3483 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3491 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3492 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3493 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3494 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3495 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3496 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3497 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3500 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3501 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3502 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3503 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3506 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3509 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3511 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3517 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3520 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3522 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3523 return table[i].nid;
3528 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3533 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3534 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3537 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3540 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3541 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3545 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3547 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3548 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3555 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3558 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3559 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3562 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3564 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3567 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3569 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3570 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3571 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3573 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3574 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3576 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3577 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3578 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3580 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3581 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3585 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3589 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3591 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3594 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3596 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3597 #ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3598 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3601 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3602 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3604 return inf->mfunc();
3607 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3612 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3613 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3616 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3617 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3620 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3621 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3627 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3628 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3629 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3631 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3632 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3634 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3636 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3637 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3639 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3641 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3643 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3644 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3646 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3650 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3651 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3652 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3654 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3657 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3658 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3660 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3661 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3662 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3664 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3665 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3667 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3668 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3671 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3672 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3673 * then RSA is disabled.
3676 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3678 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3679 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3680 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3681 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3682 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3683 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3686 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3687 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3692 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3693 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3698 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3699 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3703 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3704 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3705 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3712 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3714 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3716 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3719 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3720 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3722 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3724 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3726 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3728 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3729 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3732 return tmpout - out;
3735 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3736 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3737 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3738 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3740 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3741 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3742 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3744 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3745 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3747 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3749 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3754 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3755 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3756 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3758 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3769 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3770 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3772 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3773 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3775 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3777 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3778 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3780 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3781 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3783 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3784 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3786 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3787 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3789 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3791 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3792 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3795 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3796 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3800 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3801 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3807 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3808 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3810 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3813 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3816 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3817 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3818 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3823 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3825 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3831 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3832 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3833 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3835 /* Should never happen */
3839 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3840 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3841 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3842 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3844 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3845 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3847 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3849 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3850 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3852 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3853 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3855 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3857 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3859 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3862 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3863 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3864 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3865 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3866 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3868 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3869 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3875 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3876 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3878 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3879 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3881 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3882 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3883 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3884 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3886 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3887 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3892 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3893 * use the certificate for signing.
3895 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3897 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3898 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3901 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3902 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3905 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3907 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3908 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3912 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3913 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3920 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3921 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3922 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3924 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3930 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3937 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3939 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3942 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3943 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3944 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3946 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3947 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3951 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3953 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3955 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3957 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3959 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3960 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3966 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3968 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3969 unsigned short hbtype;
3970 unsigned int payload;
3971 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3973 if (s->msg_callback)
3974 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3975 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3976 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3978 /* Read type and payload length first */
3979 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3980 return 0; /* silently discard */
3983 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3984 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3987 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3989 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3992 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3993 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3994 * payload, plus padding
3996 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3999 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4000 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4002 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4004 /* Random padding */
4005 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4007 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4009 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4010 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4011 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4012 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4014 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4019 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4023 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4024 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4025 * sequence number */
4028 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4031 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4039 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4041 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4043 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4044 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4046 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4047 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4048 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4050 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4054 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4055 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4057 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4061 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4062 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4064 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4068 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4069 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4071 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4073 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4074 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4075 * some random stuff.
4076 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4077 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4078 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4079 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4082 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4085 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4086 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4088 /* Sequence number */
4089 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4090 /* 16 random bytes */
4091 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4093 /* Random padding */
4094 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4096 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4099 if (s->msg_callback)
4100 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4101 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4102 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4104 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4113 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4118 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4121 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4123 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4126 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4127 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4129 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4131 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4133 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4141 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4142 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4143 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4144 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4145 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4146 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4149 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4150 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4151 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4152 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4155 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4157 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4158 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4161 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4162 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4166 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4167 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4168 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4172 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4176 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4179 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4181 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4186 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4187 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4189 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4191 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4192 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4193 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4194 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4196 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4204 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4205 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4206 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4207 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4211 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4212 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4213 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4214 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4220 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4224 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4228 if (default_nid == -1)
4230 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4232 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4233 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4234 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4238 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4239 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4243 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4244 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4246 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4252 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4253 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4254 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4255 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4258 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4260 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4261 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4262 /* Strict mode flags */
4263 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4264 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4265 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4267 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4272 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4273 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4275 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4276 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4279 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4283 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4286 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4288 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4290 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4291 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4294 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4295 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4296 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4298 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4299 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4308 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4311 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4312 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4313 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4315 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4323 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4324 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4325 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4328 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4334 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4335 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4338 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4341 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4342 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4344 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4349 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4350 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4351 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4352 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4353 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4356 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4357 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4358 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4359 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4363 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4364 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4372 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4373 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4376 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4379 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4380 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4382 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4385 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4393 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4394 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4396 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4399 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4400 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4401 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4403 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4408 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4416 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4417 else if(check_flags)
4418 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4420 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4421 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4422 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4423 else if (!check_flags)
4426 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4427 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4428 else if (strict_mode)
4430 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4431 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4433 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4434 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4438 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4446 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4448 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4453 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4456 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4459 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4464 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4465 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4466 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4467 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4468 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4473 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4478 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4482 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4483 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4485 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4487 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4489 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4493 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4497 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4500 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4502 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4503 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4505 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4507 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4508 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4510 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4512 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4514 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4515 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4517 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4522 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4526 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4528 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4529 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4533 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4535 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4536 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4537 else if (cpk->digest)
4538 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4541 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4543 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4544 * if the chain is invalid.
4548 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4549 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4552 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4553 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4560 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4561 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4563 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4564 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4565 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4566 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4567 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4568 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4570 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4571 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4573 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4579 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4581 int dh_secbits = 80;
4582 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4583 return DH_get_1024_160();
4584 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4586 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4593 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4594 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4597 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4604 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4605 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4606 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4608 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4609 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4616 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4617 return DH_get_2048_224();
4618 return DH_get_1024_160();
4622 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4625 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4628 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4629 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4634 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4636 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4639 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4641 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4642 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4643 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4644 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4647 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4648 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4651 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4653 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4656 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4659 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4662 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4663 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4667 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4668 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4670 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4671 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4675 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4676 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4677 * not sending one to the peer.
4678 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4681 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4683 int rv, start_idx, i;
4686 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4692 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4696 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4698 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4699 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);