2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
315 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
324 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
388 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
390 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
391 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
392 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
393 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
394 * lists in the first place.
395 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
396 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
397 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
399 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
400 const unsigned char **pcurves,
403 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
406 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
407 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
411 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
412 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
414 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
415 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
416 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
419 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
420 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
424 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
425 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
429 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
430 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
434 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
435 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
439 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
448 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
453 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
454 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
456 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
459 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
460 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
462 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
463 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
464 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
467 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
470 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
471 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
473 const unsigned char *curves;
474 size_t num_curves, i;
475 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
476 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
478 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
481 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
484 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
486 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
489 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
491 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
494 else /* Should never happen */
497 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
499 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2)
501 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
502 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
508 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
509 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
510 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
511 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
513 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
515 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
516 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
518 /* Can't do anything on client side */
525 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
526 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
529 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
530 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
531 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
532 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
533 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
534 /* Should never happen */
537 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
541 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
542 * but s->options is a long...
544 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
546 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
547 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
548 if(!tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
550 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
552 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref+=2)
554 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
555 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp+=2)
557 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
559 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
563 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
564 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
572 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
576 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
577 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
579 unsigned char *clist, *p;
581 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
582 * while curve ids < 32
584 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
585 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
588 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
590 unsigned long idmask;
592 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
594 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
605 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
609 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
614 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
617 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
619 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
623 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
625 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
627 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
629 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
630 if (nid == NID_undef)
631 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
632 if (nid == NID_undef)
633 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
634 if (nid == NID_undef)
636 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
637 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
639 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
642 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
643 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
648 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
652 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
654 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
655 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
660 const EC_METHOD *meth;
663 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
664 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
667 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
670 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
674 /* Determine curve ID */
675 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
676 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
677 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
681 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
693 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
695 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
698 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
700 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
703 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
707 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
708 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
709 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
711 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
712 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
714 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
715 * is supported (see RFC4492).
717 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
719 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
721 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++)
723 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
726 if (i == num_formats)
731 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
732 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
734 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
736 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
738 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] &&
739 pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
744 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
751 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
754 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
756 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
758 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
759 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
763 *pformats = ecformats_default;
764 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
766 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
768 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
772 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
773 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
775 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
777 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
780 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
783 /* If not EC nothing to do */
784 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
789 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
793 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
794 * supported curves extension.
796 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
799 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
800 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
802 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
809 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
810 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
811 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
812 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
813 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
815 return 0; /* Should never happen */
816 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
817 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
819 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
823 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
824 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
826 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
832 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
833 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
835 unsigned char curve_id[2];
836 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
837 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
838 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
839 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
842 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
843 * no other curves permitted.
847 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
848 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
849 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
850 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
851 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
855 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
856 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
858 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
859 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
861 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
864 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
867 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
869 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
875 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
877 /* Need a shared curve */
878 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
884 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
889 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
891 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
895 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
898 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
902 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
907 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
911 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
912 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
915 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
916 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
918 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
921 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
922 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
924 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
927 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
928 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
930 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
933 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
934 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
935 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
936 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
938 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
940 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
941 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
944 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
945 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
948 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
952 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
953 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
954 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
957 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
959 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
963 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
965 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
966 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
967 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
969 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
970 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
973 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
974 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
978 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
979 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
981 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
982 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
984 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
986 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
987 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
991 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
992 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
995 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
996 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
998 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
999 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1001 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1002 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1003 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1004 /* Should never happen */
1007 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1008 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1014 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1016 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1017 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1018 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1020 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1025 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1030 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
1032 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1035 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1039 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1041 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1044 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1052 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1056 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1057 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1058 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1060 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1063 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1064 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1069 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1075 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1076 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1077 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1083 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1086 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1087 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1091 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1092 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1093 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1094 * session and not global settings.
1097 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1102 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1103 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1104 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1107 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1108 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1109 * signature algorithms.
1111 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1112 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1113 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1114 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1115 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1116 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1118 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1120 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1121 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1125 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1126 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1128 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1129 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1131 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1133 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1135 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1136 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1142 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1145 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1147 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1150 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1152 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1154 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1157 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1160 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1161 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1163 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1165 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1168 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1169 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1171 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1173 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1175 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1176 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1177 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1178 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1189 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1191 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1196 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1204 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1207 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1215 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1216 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1219 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1221 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1222 unsigned long size_str;
1226 * check for enough space.
1227 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1228 * 2 for servernamelist length
1229 * 1 for the hostname type
1230 * 2 for hostname length
1234 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1235 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1238 /* extension type and length */
1239 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1240 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1242 /* length of servername list */
1243 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1245 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1246 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1248 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1253 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1254 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1255 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1257 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1258 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1265 * check for enough space.
1266 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1267 * 1 for the srp user identity
1268 * + srp user identity length
1270 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1272 /* fill in the extension */
1273 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1274 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1275 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1276 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1284 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1286 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1287 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1289 unsigned char *etmp;
1291 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1293 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1294 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1295 if (num_formats > 255)
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1301 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1302 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1303 s2n(num_formats + 1,ret);
1304 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats ;
1305 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1308 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1309 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1310 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1313 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1314 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2) return NULL;
1315 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2)
1317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1322 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1324 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1325 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
1327 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1329 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1330 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1334 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1336 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1337 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1338 ret += curves_list_len;
1340 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1342 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1345 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1346 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1347 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1348 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1350 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1351 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1352 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1354 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1355 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1357 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1361 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1362 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1364 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1367 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1368 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1372 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1378 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1381 const unsigned char *salg;
1382 unsigned char *etmp;
1383 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1384 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1386 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1388 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1390 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1391 /* Fill in lengths */
1392 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1397 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1398 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1400 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1402 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1404 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1407 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1410 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1415 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1418 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1422 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1424 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1425 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1431 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1433 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1440 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1441 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1442 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1444 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1445 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1447 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1449 /* save position of id len */
1450 unsigned char *q = ret;
1451 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1452 /* skip over id len */
1454 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1460 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1464 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1465 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1467 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1471 * 1: peer may send requests
1472 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1474 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1475 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1477 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1481 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1483 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1484 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1485 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1487 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1492 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1494 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1496 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1497 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1498 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1499 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1500 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1501 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1505 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1509 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1511 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1516 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1524 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1525 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1526 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1528 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1533 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1534 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1536 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1537 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1539 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1541 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1542 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1543 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1544 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1546 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1548 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1550 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1556 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1558 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1565 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1568 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1572 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1575 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1576 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1578 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1581 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1582 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1583 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1584 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1588 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1590 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1594 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1600 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1602 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1605 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1614 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1615 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1618 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1620 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1622 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1629 const unsigned char *plist;
1631 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1634 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1636 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1637 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1644 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1645 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1646 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1647 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1651 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1652 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1654 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1656 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1657 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1661 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1663 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1664 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1668 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1669 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1671 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1673 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1675 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1678 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1681 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1687 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
1691 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1693 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1695 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1698 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1707 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1708 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1709 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1710 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1711 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1712 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1713 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1714 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1715 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1716 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1717 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1722 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1723 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1724 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1726 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1728 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1732 * 1: peer may send requests
1733 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1735 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1736 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1738 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1744 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1745 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1746 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1748 const unsigned char *npa;
1749 unsigned int npalen;
1752 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1753 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1755 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1756 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1758 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1760 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1764 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1766 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1767 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1769 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4
1770 * might want to disable for other cases too.
1772 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1773 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1774 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1777 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1783 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1785 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1786 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1788 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1790 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1794 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1800 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1803 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1807 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1809 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1810 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1811 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1814 * returns: 0 on success. */
1815 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1816 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1820 const unsigned char *selected;
1821 unsigned char selected_len;
1824 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1830 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1831 * length-prefixed strings. */
1832 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1833 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1842 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1844 proto_len = data[i];
1850 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1856 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1857 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1858 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1859 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1860 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1861 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1862 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1864 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1867 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1868 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1873 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1879 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1880 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1881 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1886 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1887 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1888 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1889 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1891 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1892 unsigned short type, size;
1893 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1894 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1895 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1896 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1897 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1898 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1899 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1901 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1902 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1903 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1904 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1907 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1908 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1909 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1910 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1911 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1912 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1913 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1914 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1915 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1916 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1919 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1928 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1931 if (data+size > d+n)
1935 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1937 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1938 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1940 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1942 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1944 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1949 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1951 if (data + len != d+n)
1953 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1957 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1959 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1962 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1964 unsigned short type;
1965 unsigned short size;
1967 unsigned char *data = *p;
1968 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1970 s->servername_done = 0;
1971 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1973 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1976 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1978 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1979 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1983 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1984 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1988 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1989 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1990 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1992 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1993 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1995 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1996 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1999 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2000 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2004 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2006 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2007 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2011 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2013 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2017 if (data > (d+n-len))
2020 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2025 if (data+size > (d+n))
2028 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2030 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2031 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2032 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2033 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2035 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2037 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2039 else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2042 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2044 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2045 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2046 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2047 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2048 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2049 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2050 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2051 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2052 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2053 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2054 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2055 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2056 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2057 * the value of the Host: field.
2058 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2059 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2060 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2062 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2066 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2068 unsigned char *sdata;
2074 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2081 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2088 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2094 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2097 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2098 switch (servname_type)
2100 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2103 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2105 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2108 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2110 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2113 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2115 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2118 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2119 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2120 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2121 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2122 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2123 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2126 s->servername_done = 1;
2130 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2131 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2132 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2144 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2150 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2152 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2154 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2157 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2159 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2162 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2164 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2165 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2167 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2169 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2176 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2178 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2179 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2181 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2182 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2184 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2189 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2191 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2192 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2194 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2195 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2197 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2200 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2201 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2204 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2205 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2206 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2207 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2208 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2211 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2213 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2214 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2215 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2217 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2218 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2219 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2220 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
2222 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2227 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2229 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2232 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2233 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2235 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2238 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2239 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2242 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2243 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2244 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2245 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2246 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2249 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2250 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2251 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2253 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2257 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2260 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2261 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2263 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2267 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2268 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2269 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2270 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2272 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2273 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2275 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2280 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2282 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2283 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2285 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2289 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2292 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2294 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2299 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2301 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2304 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2306 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2310 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2315 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2319 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2321 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2323 const unsigned char *sdata;
2325 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2330 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2339 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2343 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2347 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2352 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2356 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2361 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2362 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2365 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2366 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2367 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2369 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2370 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2373 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2374 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2376 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2377 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2382 /* Read in request_extensions */
2385 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2392 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2398 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2400 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2401 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2404 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2405 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2407 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2408 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2410 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2415 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2419 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2422 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2426 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2427 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2429 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2430 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2431 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2433 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2439 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2440 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2441 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2444 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2447 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2448 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2449 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2450 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2451 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2452 * anything like that, but this might change).
2454 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2455 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2456 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2457 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2458 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2460 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2464 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2465 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2466 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2468 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2471 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2472 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2476 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2478 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2479 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2481 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2486 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2487 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2488 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2490 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2491 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2492 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2493 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2494 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2498 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2509 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2511 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2512 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2514 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2516 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2523 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2526 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2527 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2529 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2533 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2542 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2543 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2544 * the length of the block. */
2545 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2547 unsigned int off = 0;
2561 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2563 unsigned short length;
2564 unsigned short type;
2565 unsigned short size;
2566 unsigned char *data = *p;
2567 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2568 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2571 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2573 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2575 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2577 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2578 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2582 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2583 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2586 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2587 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2590 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2594 if (data+length != d+n)
2596 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2600 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2605 if (data+size > (d+n))
2608 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2609 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2610 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2613 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2615 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2617 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2619 else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2621 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2623 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2625 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2628 tlsext_servername = 1;
2631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2632 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2634 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2635 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2637 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2639 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2644 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2645 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2646 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2648 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2651 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2652 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2655 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2656 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2657 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2658 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2659 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2662 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2664 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2666 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2667 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2669 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2672 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2674 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2677 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2679 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2680 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2682 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2686 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2689 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2690 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2692 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2696 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2697 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2698 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2699 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2701 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2703 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2705 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2710 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2712 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2713 * a status request message.
2715 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2717 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2720 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2721 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2724 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2725 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2727 unsigned char *selected;
2728 unsigned char selected_len;
2730 /* We must have requested it. */
2731 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2733 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2736 /* The data must be valid */
2737 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2739 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2742 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2744 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2747 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2748 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2750 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2753 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2754 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2755 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2759 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2763 /* We must have requested it. */
2764 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2766 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2771 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2775 * The extension data consists of:
2776 * uint16 list_length
2777 * uint8 proto_length;
2778 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2783 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2785 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2789 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2791 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2794 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2795 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2796 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2797 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2799 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2802 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2803 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2806 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2810 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2811 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2813 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2814 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2815 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2817 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2823 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2825 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2830 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2831 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2833 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2834 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2835 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2836 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2839 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2840 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2842 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2850 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2854 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2856 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2858 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2860 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2861 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2863 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2869 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2879 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2880 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2881 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2882 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2883 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2884 * absence on initial connect only.
2886 if (!renegotiate_seen
2887 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2888 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2890 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2892 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2900 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2903 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2907 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2909 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2914 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2916 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2917 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2919 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2920 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2922 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2923 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2925 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2928 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2932 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2933 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2940 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2945 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2947 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2948 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2951 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2952 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2954 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2955 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2959 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2960 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2961 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2962 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2964 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2966 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2967 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2968 * so this has to happen here in
2969 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2973 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2975 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2978 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2979 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2984 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2985 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2986 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2988 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2990 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2991 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2993 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2994 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2996 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2997 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2999 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3000 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3002 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3003 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3006 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3010 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3012 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3013 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3014 * abort the handshake.
3016 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3017 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3025 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3026 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3029 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3030 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3033 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3034 s->servername_done=0;
3040 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3044 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3045 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3047 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3048 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3050 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3051 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
3053 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3054 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3057 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3058 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
3060 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
3062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3063 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3064 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3067 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3068 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3071 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3072 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3077 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3080 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3084 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3086 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3089 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3090 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3091 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3092 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3094 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3097 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3098 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3099 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3100 if (certpkey == NULL)
3102 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3105 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3106 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3108 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3109 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3112 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3113 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3114 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3116 /* status request response should be sent */
3117 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3118 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3119 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3121 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3123 /* something bad happened */
3124 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3125 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3126 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3131 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3136 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3137 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3140 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3141 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3149 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3151 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3152 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3155 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3156 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3157 * it must contain uncompressed.
3159 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3160 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3161 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3162 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3163 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3165 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3167 unsigned char *list;
3168 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3169 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3170 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3172 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3174 found_uncompressed = 1;
3178 if (!found_uncompressed)
3180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3184 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3185 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3187 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3188 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3189 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3190 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3192 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3193 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3195 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3196 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3198 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3200 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3201 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3204 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3205 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3206 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3207 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3209 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3210 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3215 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3218 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3219 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3222 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3223 * there is no response.
3225 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3227 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3228 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3230 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3231 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3234 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3235 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3239 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3240 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3246 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3247 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3250 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3251 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3254 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3255 s->servername_done=0;
3261 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3264 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3266 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3268 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3272 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3281 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3282 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3283 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3285 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3286 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3287 * extension, if any.
3288 * len: the length of the session ID.
3289 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3290 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3291 * point to the resulting session.
3293 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3294 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3295 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3298 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3299 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3300 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3301 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3302 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3303 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3304 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3307 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3308 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3309 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3310 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3311 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3312 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3314 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3315 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3317 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3318 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3322 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3324 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3325 * to permit stateful resumption.
3327 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3329 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3333 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3341 /* Skip past cipher list */
3346 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3351 /* Now at start of extensions */
3352 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3355 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3357 unsigned short type, size;
3360 if (p + size > limit)
3362 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3367 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3368 * currently have one. */
3369 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3372 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3374 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3375 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3376 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3377 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3378 * calculate the master secret later. */
3381 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3384 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3385 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3387 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3389 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3390 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3392 default: /* fatal error */
3402 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3404 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3405 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3406 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3407 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3408 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3409 * point to the resulting session.
3412 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3413 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3414 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3415 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3417 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3418 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3419 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3422 unsigned char *sdec;
3423 const unsigned char *p;
3424 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3425 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3428 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3429 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3432 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3433 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3434 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3435 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3437 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3438 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3449 /* Check key name matches */
3450 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3452 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3453 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3454 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3455 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3457 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3458 * integrity checks on ticket.
3460 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3463 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3467 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3468 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3469 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3470 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3471 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3473 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3476 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3477 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3478 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3479 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3480 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3483 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3486 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3487 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3489 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3494 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3497 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3501 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3502 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3503 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3504 * as required by standard.
3507 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3508 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3516 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3521 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3529 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3530 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3531 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3532 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3533 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3534 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3535 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3538 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3539 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3540 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3541 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3544 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3547 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3549 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3555 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3558 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3560 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3561 return table[i].nid;
3566 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3571 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3572 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3575 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3578 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3579 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3583 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3585 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3586 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3593 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3596 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3597 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3600 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3602 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3605 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3607 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3608 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3609 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3611 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3612 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3614 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3615 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3616 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3618 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3619 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3623 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3627 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3629 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3632 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3634 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3635 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3637 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3638 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3640 return inf->mfunc();
3643 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3648 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3649 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3652 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3653 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3656 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3657 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3663 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3664 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3665 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3667 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3668 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3670 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3672 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3673 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3675 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3677 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3679 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3680 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3682 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3686 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3687 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3688 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3690 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3693 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3694 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3696 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3697 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3698 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3700 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3701 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3703 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3704 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3707 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3708 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3709 * then RSA is disabled.
3712 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3714 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3715 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3716 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3717 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3718 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3719 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3722 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3723 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3728 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3729 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3734 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3735 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3740 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3741 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3748 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3750 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3752 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3755 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3756 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3758 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3760 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3762 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3764 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3765 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3768 return tmpout - out;
3771 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3772 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3773 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3774 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3776 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3777 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3778 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3780 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3781 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3783 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3785 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3790 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3791 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3792 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3794 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3805 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3806 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3808 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3809 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3811 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3813 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3814 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3816 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3817 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3819 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3820 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3822 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3823 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3825 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3827 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3828 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3831 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3832 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3836 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3837 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3843 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3844 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3846 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3849 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3852 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3853 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3854 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3859 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3861 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3864 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3865 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3867 /* Should never happen */
3871 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3872 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3873 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3874 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3876 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3877 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3881 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3887 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3888 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3891 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3892 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3894 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3895 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3897 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3899 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3901 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3904 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3905 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3906 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3907 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3908 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3910 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3911 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3917 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3918 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3920 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3921 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3923 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3924 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3925 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3926 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3928 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3929 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3934 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3935 * use the certificate for signing.
3937 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3939 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3940 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3943 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3944 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3947 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3949 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3950 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3954 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3955 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3962 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3963 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3964 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3966 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3972 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3979 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3981 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3984 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3985 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3986 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3988 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3989 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3993 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3995 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3997 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3999 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
4001 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
4002 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
4006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
4008 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4010 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
4011 unsigned short hbtype;
4012 unsigned int payload;
4013 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4015 if (s->msg_callback)
4016 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4017 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
4018 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4020 /* Read type and payload length first */
4021 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4022 return 0; /* silently discard */
4025 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4026 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
4029 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
4031 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4034 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4035 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4036 * payload, plus padding
4038 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4041 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4046 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4047 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4049 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4051 /* Random padding */
4052 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4054 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4056 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4057 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4058 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4059 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4061 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4066 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4070 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4071 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4072 * sequence number */
4075 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4078 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4086 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4088 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4090 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4091 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4093 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4094 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4095 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4101 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4102 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4108 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4109 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4115 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4116 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4118 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4121 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4122 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4123 * some random stuff.
4124 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4125 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4126 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4127 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4130 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4133 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4138 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4139 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4141 /* Sequence number */
4142 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4143 /* 16 random bytes */
4144 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4146 /* Random padding */
4147 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4149 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4152 if (s->msg_callback)
4153 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4154 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4155 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4157 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4166 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4171 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4174 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4176 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4179 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4180 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4182 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4184 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4186 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4194 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4195 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4196 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4197 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4198 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4199 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4202 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4203 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4204 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4205 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4208 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4210 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4211 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4214 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4215 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4219 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4220 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4221 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4225 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4229 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4232 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4234 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4239 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4240 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4242 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4244 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4245 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4246 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4247 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4249 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4257 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4258 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4259 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4260 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4264 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4265 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4266 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4267 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4273 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4277 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4281 if (default_nid == -1)
4283 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4285 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4286 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4287 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4291 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4292 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4296 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4297 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4299 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4305 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4306 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4307 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4308 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4311 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4313 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4314 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4315 /* Strict mode flags */
4316 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4317 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4318 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4320 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4325 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4326 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4328 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4329 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4332 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4336 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4339 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4341 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4343 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4344 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4347 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4348 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4349 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4351 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4352 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4361 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4364 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4365 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4366 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4368 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4376 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4377 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4378 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4379 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4380 else if (!check_flags)
4384 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4385 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4388 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4391 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4392 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4394 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4399 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4400 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4401 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4402 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4403 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4406 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4407 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4408 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4409 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4413 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4414 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4422 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4423 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4426 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4429 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4430 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4432 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4435 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4443 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4444 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4446 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4449 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4450 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4451 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4453 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4458 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4466 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4467 else if(check_flags)
4468 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4470 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4471 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4472 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4473 else if (!check_flags)
4476 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4477 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4478 else if (strict_mode)
4480 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4481 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4483 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4484 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4488 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4496 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4498 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4503 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4506 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4509 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4514 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4515 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4516 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4517 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4518 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4523 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4528 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4532 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4533 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4535 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4537 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4539 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4543 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4547 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4550 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4552 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4553 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4555 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4557 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4558 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4560 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4562 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4564 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4565 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4567 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4572 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4576 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4578 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4579 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4583 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4585 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4586 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4587 else if (cpk->digest)
4588 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4591 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4593 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4594 * if the chain is invalid.
4598 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4599 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4602 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4603 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4610 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4611 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4613 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4614 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4615 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4616 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4617 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4618 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4620 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4621 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4623 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4628 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4629 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4631 int dh_secbits = 80;
4632 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4633 return DH_get_1024_160();
4634 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4636 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4643 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4644 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4647 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4654 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4655 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4656 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4658 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4659 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4666 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4667 return DH_get_2048_224();
4668 return DH_get_1024_160();
4672 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4675 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4678 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4679 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4684 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4686 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4689 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4691 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4692 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4693 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4694 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4697 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4698 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4701 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4703 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4706 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4709 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4712 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4713 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4717 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4718 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4720 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4721 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4725 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4726 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4727 * not sending one to the peer.
4728 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4731 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4733 int rv, start_idx, i;
4736 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4742 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4746 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4748 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4749 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);