2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
299 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
301 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
302 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
303 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
305 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
308 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
310 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
313 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
315 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
319 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
321 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
325 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
327 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
329 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
331 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
333 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
335 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
337 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
339 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
341 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
343 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
345 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
347 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
349 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
351 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
353 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
355 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
357 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
359 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
361 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
363 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
365 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
367 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
373 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
376 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
377 const unsigned char **pcurves,
382 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
383 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
386 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
387 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
389 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
390 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
391 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
394 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
395 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
399 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
400 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
404 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
405 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
409 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
410 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
413 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
414 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
416 const unsigned char *curves;
418 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
419 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
421 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
424 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
427 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
429 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
432 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
434 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
437 else /* Should never happen */
440 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
441 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
443 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
449 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
450 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
454 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
456 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
457 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
459 /* Can't do anything on client side */
466 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
467 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
470 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
472 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
473 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
475 /* Should never happen */
478 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
481 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
483 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
488 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
490 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
491 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
493 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
497 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
498 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
509 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
510 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
512 unsigned char *clist, *p;
514 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
515 * while curve ids < 32
517 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
518 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
521 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
523 unsigned long idmask;
525 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
527 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
538 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
542 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
547 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
550 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
552 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
556 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
558 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
560 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
562 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
563 if (nid == NID_undef)
564 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
565 if (nid == NID_undef)
566 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
569 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
570 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
572 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
575 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
576 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
581 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
585 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
587 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
588 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
593 const EC_METHOD *meth;
596 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
597 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
600 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
603 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
607 /* Determine curve ID */
608 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
610 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
614 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
626 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
628 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
631 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
633 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
640 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
641 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
642 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
644 const unsigned char *p;
647 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
648 * is supported (see RFC4492).
650 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
652 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
653 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
654 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
664 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
665 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
667 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
668 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
670 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
675 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
682 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
685 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
687 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
689 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
694 *pformats = ecformats_default;
695 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
697 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
699 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
703 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
704 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
708 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
711 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
714 /* If not EC nothing to do */
715 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
720 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
724 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
725 * supported curves extension.
727 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
730 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
731 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
733 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
740 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
741 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
742 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
743 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
744 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
746 return 0; /* Should never happen */
747 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
748 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
750 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
754 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
762 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
763 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
765 unsigned char curve_id[2];
766 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
767 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
768 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
769 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
772 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
773 * no other curves permitted.
777 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
778 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
779 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
780 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
781 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
785 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
786 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
788 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
789 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
791 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
794 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
797 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
799 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
805 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
807 /* Need a shared curve */
808 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
814 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
821 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
825 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
831 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
840 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
841 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
853 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
856 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
859 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
862 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
863 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
864 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
867 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
869 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
870 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
881 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
882 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
883 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
886 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
888 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
892 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
894 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
895 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
896 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
907 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
908 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
910 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
911 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
913 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
915 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
916 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
920 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
921 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
924 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
925 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
927 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
928 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
930 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
931 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
932 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
933 /* Should never happen */
936 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
937 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
943 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
945 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
946 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
947 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
949 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
954 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
959 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
961 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
964 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
968 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
970 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
973 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
981 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
985 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
986 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
989 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
992 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
993 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
998 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1004 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1007 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1008 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1011 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1012 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1013 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1014 * session and not global settings.
1017 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1020 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1021 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1022 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1025 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1026 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1027 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1030 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1031 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1034 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1040 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1045 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1050 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1056 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1057 * signature algorithms.
1061 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1066 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1067 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1075 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1077 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1078 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1082 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1083 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1085 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1086 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1088 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1090 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1092 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1093 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1099 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1102 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1103 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1105 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1107 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1110 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1111 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1113 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1115 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1117 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1118 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1119 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1120 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1129 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1130 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1131 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1136 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1138 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1140 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1141 unsigned long size_str;
1144 /* check for enough space.
1145 4 for the servername type and entension length
1146 2 for servernamelist length
1147 1 for the hostname type
1148 2 for hostname length
1152 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1153 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1156 /* extension type and length */
1157 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1158 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1160 /* length of servername list */
1161 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1163 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1164 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1166 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1170 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1175 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1181 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1183 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1186 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1196 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1197 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1198 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1200 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1201 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1207 /* check for enough space.
1208 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1209 1 for the srp user identity
1210 + srp user identity length
1212 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1214 /* fill in the extension */
1215 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1216 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1217 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1218 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1226 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1228 const unsigned char *plist;
1231 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1233 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1234 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1241 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1242 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1243 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1244 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1247 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1248 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1249 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1251 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1252 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1253 if (plistlen > 65532)
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1259 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1260 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1262 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1263 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1264 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1265 * resolves this to two bytes.
1268 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1271 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1273 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1276 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1277 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1278 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1279 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1281 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1282 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1283 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1285 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1286 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1288 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1292 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1293 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1295 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1298 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1299 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1303 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1309 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1312 const unsigned char *salg;
1313 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1314 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1316 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1317 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1319 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1323 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1324 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1326 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1328 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1330 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1333 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1336 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1341 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1344 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1348 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1350 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1351 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1357 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1359 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1366 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1367 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1368 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1370 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1371 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1373 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1375 /* save position of id len */
1376 unsigned char *q = ret;
1377 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1378 /* skip over id len */
1380 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1386 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1390 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1391 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1393 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1396 * 1: peer may send requests
1397 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1399 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1400 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1402 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1406 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1408 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1409 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1410 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1412 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1417 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1419 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1421 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1422 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1423 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1424 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1425 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1426 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1429 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1433 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1435 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1437 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1440 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1447 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1448 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1449 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1452 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1453 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1455 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1456 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1458 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1460 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1461 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1462 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1463 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1465 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1467 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1469 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1475 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1477 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1482 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1485 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1489 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1492 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1493 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1495 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1498 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1499 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1500 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1501 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1503 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1504 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1508 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1510 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1512 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1514 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1518 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1522 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1528 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1530 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1533 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1545 const unsigned char *plist;
1547 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1550 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1552 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1553 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1560 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1561 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1562 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1563 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1567 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1568 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1570 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1571 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1573 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1574 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1578 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1580 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1581 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1585 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1586 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1588 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1590 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1592 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1595 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1598 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1607 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1609 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1611 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1614 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1622 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1623 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1624 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1625 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1626 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1627 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1628 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1629 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1630 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1631 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1632 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1638 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1639 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1641 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1643 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1646 * 1: peer may send requests
1647 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1649 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1650 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1652 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1658 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1659 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1660 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1662 const unsigned char *npa;
1663 unsigned int npalen;
1666 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1667 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1669 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1670 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1672 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1674 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1678 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1681 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1683 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1684 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1686 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1688 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1692 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1696 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1699 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1703 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1704 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1705 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1706 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1711 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1712 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1713 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1714 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1716 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1717 unsigned short type, size;
1718 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1719 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1720 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1721 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1722 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1723 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1724 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1726 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1727 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1728 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1729 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1732 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1733 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1734 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1735 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1736 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1737 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1738 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1739 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1740 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1741 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1744 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1753 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1756 if (data+size > d+n)
1760 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1762 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1763 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1765 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1767 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1769 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1774 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1776 if (data + len != d+n)
1778 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1782 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1784 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1786 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1788 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1789 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1790 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1793 * returns: 0 on success. */
1794 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1795 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1799 const unsigned char *selected;
1800 unsigned char selected_len;
1803 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1809 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1810 * length-prefixed strings. */
1811 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1812 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1821 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1823 proto_len = data[i];
1829 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1835 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1836 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1837 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1838 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1839 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1840 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1841 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1843 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1846 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1847 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1852 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1856 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1858 unsigned short type;
1859 unsigned short size;
1861 unsigned char *data = *p;
1862 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1865 s->servername_done = 0;
1866 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1868 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1871 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1872 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1873 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1875 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1876 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1879 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1881 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1882 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1885 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1886 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1887 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1891 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1892 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1893 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1895 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1896 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1898 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1899 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1901 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1902 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1904 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1905 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1907 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1908 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1910 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1911 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1914 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1918 if (data > (d+n-len))
1921 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1926 if (data+size > (d+n))
1929 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1931 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1932 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1933 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1934 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1936 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1937 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1938 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1939 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1940 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1941 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1942 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1943 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1944 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1945 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1946 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1947 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1948 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1949 the value of the Host: field.
1950 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1951 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1952 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1953 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1957 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1959 unsigned char *sdata;
1965 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1972 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1979 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1985 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1988 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1989 switch (servname_type)
1991 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1994 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1996 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1999 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2001 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2004 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2006 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2009 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2010 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2011 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2012 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2013 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2014 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2017 s->servername_done = 1;
2021 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2022 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2023 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2035 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2041 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2043 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2045 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2048 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2050 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2053 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2055 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2056 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2058 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2060 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2067 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2069 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2070 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2072 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2073 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2075 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2080 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2082 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2083 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2085 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2086 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2088 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2091 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2092 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2095 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2096 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2097 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2098 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2099 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2102 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2104 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2105 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2106 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2108 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2109 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2111 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2116 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2118 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2121 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2122 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2124 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2127 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2128 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2131 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2132 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2133 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2134 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2135 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2138 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2139 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2140 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2142 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2146 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2149 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2150 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2152 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2156 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2157 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2158 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2159 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2161 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2162 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2164 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2169 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2171 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2172 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2174 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2178 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2180 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2182 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2184 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2187 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2189 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2194 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2196 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2199 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2201 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2204 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2207 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2210 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2211 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2215 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2220 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2224 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2226 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2228 const unsigned char *sdata;
2230 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2235 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2244 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2248 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2252 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2257 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2261 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2266 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2267 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2270 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2271 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2272 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2274 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2275 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2278 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2279 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2281 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2282 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2287 /* Read in request_extensions */
2290 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2297 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2303 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2305 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2306 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2309 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2310 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2312 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2313 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2315 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2320 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2324 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2327 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2331 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2332 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2334 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2335 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2336 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2338 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2344 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2345 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2346 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2348 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2351 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2352 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2353 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2354 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2355 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2356 * anything like that, but this might change).
2358 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2359 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2360 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2361 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2362 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2363 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2367 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2368 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2369 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2371 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2374 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2375 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2379 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2380 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2382 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2386 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2387 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2388 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2389 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2390 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2394 if (!custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al))
2405 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2407 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2408 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2410 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2412 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2415 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2416 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2417 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2422 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2425 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2426 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2428 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2432 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2441 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2442 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2443 * the length of the block. */
2444 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2446 unsigned int off = 0;
2460 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2462 unsigned short length;
2463 unsigned short type;
2464 unsigned short size;
2465 unsigned char *data = *p;
2466 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2467 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2470 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2473 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2475 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2476 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2480 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2481 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2484 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2488 if (data+length != d+n)
2490 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2494 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2499 if (data+size > (d+n))
2502 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2503 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2504 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2506 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2508 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2510 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2513 tlsext_servername = 1;
2516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2517 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2519 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2520 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2522 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2524 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2529 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2530 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2531 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2533 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2536 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2537 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2540 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2541 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2542 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2543 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2544 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2547 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2549 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2551 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2552 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2554 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2557 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2560 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2563 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2565 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2566 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2568 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2572 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2575 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2576 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2578 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2582 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2583 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2584 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2585 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2587 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2589 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2591 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2596 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2598 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2599 * a status request message.
2601 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2603 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2606 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2607 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2610 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2611 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2613 unsigned char *selected;
2614 unsigned char selected_len;
2616 /* We must have requested it. */
2617 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2619 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2622 /* The data must be valid */
2623 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2625 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2628 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2630 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2633 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2634 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2636 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2639 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2640 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2641 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2645 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2649 /* We must have requested it. */
2650 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2652 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2657 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2660 /* The extension data consists of:
2661 * uint16 list_length
2662 * uint8 proto_length;
2663 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2667 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2669 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2673 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2675 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2678 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2679 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2680 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2681 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2683 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2686 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2687 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2690 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2692 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2694 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2697 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2701 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2702 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2704 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2705 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2706 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2708 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2713 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2715 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2719 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2720 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2722 else if (!custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al))
2730 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2734 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2736 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2738 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2740 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2741 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2743 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2749 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2759 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2760 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2761 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2762 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2763 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2764 * absence on initial connect only.
2766 if (!renegotiate_seen
2767 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2768 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2770 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2772 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2780 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2783 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2787 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2789 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2794 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2796 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2797 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2799 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2800 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2802 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2803 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2808 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2812 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2813 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2820 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2825 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2827 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2828 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2831 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2832 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2834 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2835 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2839 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2840 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2841 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2842 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2844 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2846 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2847 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2848 * so this has to happen here in
2849 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2853 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2855 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2858 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2859 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2864 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2865 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2866 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2868 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2870 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2871 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2873 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2874 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2876 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2877 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2879 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2880 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2882 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2883 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2886 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2890 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2892 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2893 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2894 * abort the handshake.
2896 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2897 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2905 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2906 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2909 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2910 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2913 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2914 s->servername_done=0;
2920 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2922 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2925 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2926 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2927 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2928 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2930 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2933 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2934 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2935 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2936 if (certpkey == NULL)
2938 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2941 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2942 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2944 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2945 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2948 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2949 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2950 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2952 /* status request response should be sent */
2953 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2954 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2955 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2957 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2959 /* something bad happened */
2960 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2961 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2962 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2967 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2972 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2973 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2976 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2977 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2985 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2987 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2988 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2991 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2992 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2993 * it must contain uncompressed.
2995 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2996 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2997 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2998 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2999 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3001 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3003 unsigned char *list;
3004 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3005 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3006 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3008 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3010 found_uncompressed = 1;
3014 if (!found_uncompressed)
3016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3020 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3021 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3023 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3024 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3025 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3026 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3028 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3029 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3031 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3032 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3034 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3036 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3037 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3040 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3041 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3042 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3043 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3045 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3046 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3051 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3054 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3055 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3058 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3059 * there is no response.
3061 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3063 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3064 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3066 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3067 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3070 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3071 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3075 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3076 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3082 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3083 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3086 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3087 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3090 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3091 s->servername_done=0;
3097 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3100 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3102 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3104 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3108 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3116 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3117 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3118 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3120 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3121 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3122 * extension, if any.
3123 * len: the length of the session ID.
3124 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3125 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3126 * point to the resulting session.
3128 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3129 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3130 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3133 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3134 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3135 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3136 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3137 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3138 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3139 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3142 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3143 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3144 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3145 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3146 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3147 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3149 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3150 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3152 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3153 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3157 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3159 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3160 * to permit stateful resumption.
3162 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3164 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3168 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3176 /* Skip past cipher list */
3181 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3186 /* Now at start of extensions */
3187 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3190 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3192 unsigned short type, size;
3195 if (p + size > limit)
3197 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3202 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3203 * currently have one. */
3204 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3207 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3209 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3210 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3211 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3212 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3213 * calculate the master secret later. */
3216 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3219 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3220 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3222 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3224 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3225 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3227 default: /* fatal error */
3236 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3238 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3239 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3240 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3241 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3242 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3243 * point to the resulting session.
3246 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3247 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3248 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3249 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3251 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3252 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3253 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3256 unsigned char *sdec;
3257 const unsigned char *p;
3258 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3259 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3262 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3263 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3266 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3267 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3268 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3269 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3271 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3272 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3283 /* Check key name matches */
3284 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3286 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3287 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3288 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3289 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3291 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3292 * integrity checks on ticket.
3294 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3297 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3301 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3302 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3303 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3304 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3305 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3307 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3308 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3309 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3310 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3311 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3314 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3317 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3318 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3320 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3325 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3328 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3332 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3333 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3334 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3335 * as required by standard.
3338 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3339 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3347 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3352 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3360 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3361 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3362 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3363 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3364 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3365 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3366 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3369 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3370 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3371 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3372 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3375 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3378 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3380 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3386 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3389 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3391 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3392 return table[i].nid;
3397 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3402 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3403 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3406 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3409 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3410 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3414 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3416 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3417 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3420 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3425 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3433 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3436 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3437 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3438 return EVP_sha224();
3440 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3441 return EVP_sha256();
3443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3444 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3445 return EVP_sha384();
3447 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3448 return EVP_sha512();
3456 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3461 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3462 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3465 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3466 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3469 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3470 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3476 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3477 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3478 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3480 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3481 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3483 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3485 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3486 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3488 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3490 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3492 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3493 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3495 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3499 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3500 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3501 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3503 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3506 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3507 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3508 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3509 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3511 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3512 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3513 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3515 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3516 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3518 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3520 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3522 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3527 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3528 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3529 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3531 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3542 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3543 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3545 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3546 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3548 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3550 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3551 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3553 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3554 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3556 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3557 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3559 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3560 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3562 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3564 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3565 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3568 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3569 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3573 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3574 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3580 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3581 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3583 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3586 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3589 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3590 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3591 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3596 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3598 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3604 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3605 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3606 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3608 /* Should never happen */
3612 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3613 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3614 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3615 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3617 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3618 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3620 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3622 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3623 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3625 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3626 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3628 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3630 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3632 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3635 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3636 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3637 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3638 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3639 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3641 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3642 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3648 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3649 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3651 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3652 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3654 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3655 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3656 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3657 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3659 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3660 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3665 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3666 * use the certificate for signing.
3668 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3670 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3671 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3674 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3675 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3678 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3680 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3681 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3685 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3686 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3693 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3694 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3695 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3697 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3703 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3710 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3712 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3715 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3716 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3717 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3719 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3720 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3724 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3726 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3728 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3730 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3732 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3733 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3739 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3741 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3742 unsigned short hbtype;
3743 unsigned int payload;
3744 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3746 if (s->msg_callback)
3747 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3748 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3749 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3751 /* Read type and payload length first */
3752 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3753 return 0; /* silently discard */
3756 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3757 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3760 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3762 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3765 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3766 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3767 * payload, plus padding
3769 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3772 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3773 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3775 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3777 /* Random padding */
3778 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3780 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3782 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3783 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3784 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3785 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3787 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3792 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3796 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3797 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3798 * sequence number */
3801 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3804 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3812 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3814 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3816 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3817 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3819 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3820 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3821 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3823 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3827 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3828 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3834 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3835 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3841 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3842 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3844 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3846 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3847 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3848 * some random stuff.
3849 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3850 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3851 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3852 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3855 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3858 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3859 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3861 /* Sequence number */
3862 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3863 /* 16 random bytes */
3864 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3866 /* Random padding */
3867 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3869 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3872 if (s->msg_callback)
3873 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3874 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3875 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3877 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3886 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3891 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3894 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3896 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3899 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3900 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3902 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3904 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3906 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3914 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3915 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3916 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3917 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3918 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3919 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3922 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3923 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3924 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3925 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3928 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3930 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3931 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3934 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3935 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3939 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3940 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3941 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3945 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3949 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3952 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3954 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3959 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3960 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3962 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3964 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3965 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3966 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3967 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3969 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3977 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3978 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3979 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3980 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3984 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3985 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3986 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3987 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3993 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3997 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4001 if (default_nid == -1)
4003 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4005 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4006 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4007 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4011 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4012 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4016 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4017 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4019 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4025 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4026 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4027 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4028 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4031 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4033 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4034 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4035 /* Strict mode flags */
4036 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4037 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4038 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4040 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4045 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4046 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4048 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4049 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4052 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4056 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4059 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4061 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4063 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4064 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4067 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4068 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4069 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4071 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4072 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4081 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4084 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4085 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4086 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4088 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4096 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4097 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4098 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4101 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4107 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4108 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4111 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4114 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4115 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4117 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4122 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4123 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4124 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4125 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4126 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4129 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4130 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4131 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4132 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4136 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4137 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4145 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4146 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4149 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4152 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4153 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4155 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4158 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4166 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4167 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4169 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4172 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4173 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4174 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4176 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4181 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4189 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4190 else if(check_flags)
4191 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4193 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4194 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4195 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4196 else if (!check_flags)
4199 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4200 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4201 else if (strict_mode)
4203 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4204 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4206 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4207 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4211 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4219 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4221 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4226 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4229 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4232 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4237 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4238 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4239 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4240 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4241 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4246 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4251 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4255 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4256 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4258 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4260 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4262 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4266 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4270 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4273 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4275 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4276 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4278 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4280 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4281 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4283 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4285 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4287 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4288 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4290 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4295 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4299 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4301 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4302 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4306 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4308 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4309 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4310 else if (cpk->digest)
4311 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4314 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4316 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4317 * if the chain is invalid.
4321 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4322 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4325 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4326 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4333 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4334 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4336 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4337 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4338 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4339 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4340 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4341 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4343 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4344 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4346 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);