2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
299 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
301 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
302 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
303 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
305 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
308 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
310 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
313 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
315 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
319 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
321 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
325 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
327 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
329 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
331 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
333 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
335 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
337 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
339 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
341 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
343 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
345 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
347 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
349 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
351 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
353 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
355 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
357 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
359 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
361 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
363 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
365 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
367 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
373 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
376 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
377 const unsigned char **pcurves,
382 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
383 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
386 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
387 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
389 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
390 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
391 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
394 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
395 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
399 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
400 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
404 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
405 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
409 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
410 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
413 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
414 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
416 const unsigned char *curves;
418 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
419 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
421 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
424 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
427 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
429 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
432 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
434 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
437 else /* Should never happen */
440 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
441 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
443 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
449 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
450 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
454 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
456 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
457 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
459 /* Can't do anything on client side */
466 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
467 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
470 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
472 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
473 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
475 /* Should never happen */
478 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
481 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
483 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
488 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
490 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
491 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
493 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
497 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
498 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
509 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
510 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
512 unsigned char *clist, *p;
514 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
515 * while curve ids < 32
517 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
518 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
521 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
523 unsigned long idmask;
525 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
527 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
538 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
542 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
547 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
550 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
552 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
556 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
558 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
560 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
562 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
563 if (nid == NID_undef)
564 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
565 if (nid == NID_undef)
566 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
569 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
570 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
572 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
575 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
576 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
581 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
585 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
587 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
588 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
593 const EC_METHOD *meth;
596 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
597 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
600 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
603 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
607 /* Determine curve ID */
608 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
610 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
614 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
626 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
628 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
631 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
633 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
640 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
641 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
642 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
644 const unsigned char *p;
647 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
648 * is supported (see RFC4492).
650 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
652 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
653 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
654 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
664 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
665 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
667 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
668 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
670 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
675 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
682 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
685 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
687 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
689 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
694 *pformats = ecformats_default;
695 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
697 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
699 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
703 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
704 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
708 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
711 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
714 /* If not EC nothing to do */
715 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
720 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
724 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
725 * supported curves extension.
727 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
730 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
731 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
733 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
740 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
741 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
742 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
743 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
744 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
746 return 0; /* Should never happen */
747 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
748 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
750 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
754 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
762 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
763 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
765 unsigned char curve_id[2];
766 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
767 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
768 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
769 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
772 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
773 * no other curves permitted.
777 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
778 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
779 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
780 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
781 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
785 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
786 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
788 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
789 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
791 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
794 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
797 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
799 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
805 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
807 /* Need a shared curve */
808 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
814 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
821 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
825 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
831 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
840 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
841 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
853 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
856 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
859 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
862 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
863 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
864 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
867 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
869 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
870 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
881 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
882 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
883 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
886 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
888 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
892 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
894 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
895 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
896 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
907 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
908 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
910 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
911 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
913 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
915 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
916 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
920 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
921 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
924 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
925 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
927 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
928 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
930 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
931 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
932 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
933 /* Should never happen */
936 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
937 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
943 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
945 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
946 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
947 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
949 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
954 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
959 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
961 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
964 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
968 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
970 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
973 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
981 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
985 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
986 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
989 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
992 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
993 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
998 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1004 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1007 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1008 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1011 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1012 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1013 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1014 * session and not global settings.
1017 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1020 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1021 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1022 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1025 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1026 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1027 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1030 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1031 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1034 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1040 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1045 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1050 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1056 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1057 * signature algorithms.
1061 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1066 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1067 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1075 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1077 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1078 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1082 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1083 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1085 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1086 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1088 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1092 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1095 unsigned char *ret = p;
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1097 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1099 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1102 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1103 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1105 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1107 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1109 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1110 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1111 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1112 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1121 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1122 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1123 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1128 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1130 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1132 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1133 unsigned long size_str;
1136 /* check for enough space.
1137 4 for the servername type and entension length
1138 2 for servernamelist length
1139 1 for the hostname type
1140 2 for hostname length
1144 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1145 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1148 /* extension type and length */
1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1150 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1152 /* length of servername list */
1153 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1155 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1156 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1158 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1162 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1167 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1175 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1178 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1188 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1189 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1190 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1192 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1193 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 /* check for enough space.
1200 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1201 1 for the srp user identity
1202 + srp user identity length
1204 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1206 /* fill in the extension */
1207 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1208 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1209 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1210 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1218 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1220 const unsigned char *plist;
1223 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1225 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1226 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1234 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1235 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1236 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1239 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1240 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1241 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1243 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1244 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > 65532)
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1252 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1254 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1255 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1256 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1257 * resolves this to two bytes.
1260 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1263 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1265 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1268 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1269 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1270 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1271 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1273 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1274 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1275 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1277 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1278 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1280 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1284 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1285 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1287 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1290 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1291 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1295 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1301 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1304 const unsigned char *salg;
1305 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1306 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1308 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1309 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1311 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1315 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1316 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1318 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1320 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1322 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1328 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1336 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1340 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1342 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1343 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1349 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1351 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1358 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1360 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1362 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1363 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1365 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1367 /* save position of id len */
1368 unsigned char *q = ret;
1369 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1370 /* skip over id len */
1372 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1378 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1382 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1383 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1385 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1388 * 1: peer may send requests
1389 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1391 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1392 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1394 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1398 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1400 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1401 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1402 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1404 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1409 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1411 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1413 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1414 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1415 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1416 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1417 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1418 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1421 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1425 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1427 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1432 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1440 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1441 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1444 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1446 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1448 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1449 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1451 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1452 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1453 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1457 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1461 return NULL; /* error */
1462 if (cb_retval == -1)
1463 continue; /* skip this extension */
1465 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1467 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1469 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1473 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1474 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1476 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1477 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1479 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1481 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1482 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1483 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1484 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1486 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1488 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1490 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1496 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1498 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1503 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1510 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1513 unsigned char *ret = p;
1515 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1517 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1520 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1521 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1522 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1523 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1525 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1526 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1530 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1532 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1534 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1536 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1540 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1544 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1550 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1552 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1555 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1567 const unsigned char *plist;
1569 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1572 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1574 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1575 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1582 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1583 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1584 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1585 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1589 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1590 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1592 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1593 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1595 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1596 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1600 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1602 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1603 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1607 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1608 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1610 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1612 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1614 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1617 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1620 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1629 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1631 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1633 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1636 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1644 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1645 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1646 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1647 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1648 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1649 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1650 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1651 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1652 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1653 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1654 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1660 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1661 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1663 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1665 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1668 * 1: peer may send requests
1669 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1671 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1672 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1674 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1680 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1681 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1682 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1684 const unsigned char *npa;
1685 unsigned int npalen;
1688 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1689 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1691 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1692 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1694 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1696 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1701 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
1703 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1704 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1707 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
1709 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1712 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1716 return NULL; /* error */
1717 if (cb_retval == -1)
1718 continue; /* skip this extension */
1719 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1721 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1723 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1727 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1729 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1730 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1732 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1734 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1738 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1742 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1750 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1751 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1752 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1757 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1758 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1759 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1760 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1762 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1763 unsigned short type, size;
1764 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1765 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1766 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1767 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1768 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1769 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1770 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1772 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1773 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1774 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1775 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1778 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1779 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1780 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1781 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1782 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1783 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1784 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1785 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1786 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1787 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1790 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1799 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1802 if (data+size > d+n)
1806 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1808 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1809 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1811 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1813 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1815 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1820 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1822 if (data + len != d+n)
1824 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1828 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1830 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1832 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1834 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1835 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1836 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1839 * returns: 0 on success. */
1840 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1841 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1845 const unsigned char *selected;
1846 unsigned char selected_len;
1849 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1855 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1856 * length-prefixed strings. */
1857 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1858 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1867 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1869 proto_len = data[i];
1875 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1881 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1882 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1883 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1884 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1885 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1886 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1887 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1889 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1892 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1893 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1898 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1902 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1904 unsigned short type;
1905 unsigned short size;
1907 unsigned char *data = *p;
1908 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1911 s->servername_done = 0;
1912 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1914 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1917 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1918 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1919 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1921 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1922 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1925 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1927 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1928 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1932 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1933 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1937 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1938 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1939 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1941 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1942 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1944 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1945 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1947 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1948 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1950 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1951 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1953 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1954 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1956 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1957 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1960 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1964 if (data > (d+n-len))
1967 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1972 if (data+size > (d+n))
1975 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1977 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1978 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1979 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1980 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1982 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1983 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1984 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1985 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1986 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1987 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1988 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1989 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1990 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1991 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1992 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1993 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1994 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1995 the value of the Host: field.
1996 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1997 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1998 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1999 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2003 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2005 unsigned char *sdata;
2011 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2018 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2025 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2034 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2035 switch (servname_type)
2037 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2040 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2042 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2045 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2047 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2050 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2052 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2055 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2056 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2057 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2058 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2059 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2060 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2063 s->servername_done = 1;
2067 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2068 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2069 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2081 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2086 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2087 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2089 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2091 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2094 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2096 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2099 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2101 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2102 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2104 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2106 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2112 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2113 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2115 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2116 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2118 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2119 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2121 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2126 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2128 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2129 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2131 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2132 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2134 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2137 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2138 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2141 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2142 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2143 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2144 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2145 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2148 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2150 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2151 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2152 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2154 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2155 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2157 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2162 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2164 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2167 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2168 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2170 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2173 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2174 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2177 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2178 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2179 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2180 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2181 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2184 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2185 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2186 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2188 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2192 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2195 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2196 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2198 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2202 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2203 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2204 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2205 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2207 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2208 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2210 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2215 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2217 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2218 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2220 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2224 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2226 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2228 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2230 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2233 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2235 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2240 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2242 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2245 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2247 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2250 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2253 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2256 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2257 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2261 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2266 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2270 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2272 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2274 const unsigned char *sdata;
2276 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2281 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2290 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2294 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2298 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2303 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2307 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2312 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2313 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2316 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2317 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2318 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2320 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2321 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2324 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2325 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2327 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2328 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2333 /* Read in request_extensions */
2336 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2343 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2349 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2351 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2352 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2355 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2356 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2358 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2359 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2361 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2366 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2370 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2373 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2377 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2378 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2380 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2381 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2382 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2384 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2390 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2391 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2392 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2394 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2397 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2398 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2399 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2400 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2401 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2402 * anything like that, but this might change).
2404 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2405 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2406 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2407 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2408 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2409 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2413 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2414 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2415 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2417 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2420 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2421 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2425 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2426 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2428 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2432 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2433 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2434 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2435 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2436 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2438 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2440 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2442 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2444 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2445 if (type == record->ext_type)
2447 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2460 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2462 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2463 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2465 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2467 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2470 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2471 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2472 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2477 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2480 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2482 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2486 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2495 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2496 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2497 * the length of the block. */
2498 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2500 unsigned int off = 0;
2514 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2516 unsigned short length;
2517 unsigned short type;
2518 unsigned short size;
2519 unsigned char *data = *p;
2520 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2521 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2523 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2524 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2527 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2529 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2530 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2533 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2534 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2535 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2538 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2542 if (data+length != d+n)
2544 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2548 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2553 if (data+size > (d+n))
2556 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2557 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2558 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2560 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2562 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2564 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2567 tlsext_servername = 1;
2570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2571 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2573 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2574 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2576 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2578 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2581 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2582 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2583 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2585 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2588 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2589 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2591 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2592 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2593 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2594 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2595 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2598 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2600 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2602 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2603 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2605 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2608 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2611 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2614 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2616 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2617 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2619 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2623 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2626 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2627 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2629 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2633 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2634 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2635 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2636 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2638 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2640 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2642 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2647 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2649 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2650 * a status request message.
2652 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2654 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2657 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2658 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2661 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2662 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2664 unsigned char *selected;
2665 unsigned char selected_len;
2667 /* We must have requested it. */
2668 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2670 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2673 /* The data must be valid */
2674 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2676 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2679 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2681 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2684 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2685 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2687 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2690 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2691 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2692 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2696 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2700 /* We must have requested it. */
2701 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2703 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2708 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2711 /* The extension data consists of:
2712 * uint16 list_length
2713 * uint8 proto_length;
2714 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2718 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2720 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2724 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2726 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2729 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2730 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2731 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2732 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2734 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2737 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2738 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2741 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2743 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2745 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2748 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2752 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2753 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2755 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2756 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2757 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2759 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2764 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2766 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2770 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2771 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2773 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2776 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2778 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2780 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2781 if (record->ext_type == type)
2783 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2795 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2799 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2801 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2803 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2805 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2806 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2808 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2814 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2824 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2825 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2826 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2827 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2828 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2829 * absence on initial connect only.
2831 if (!renegotiate_seen
2832 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2833 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2835 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2837 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2845 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2848 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2852 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2854 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2859 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2861 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2862 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2864 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2865 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2867 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2868 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2873 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2877 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2878 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2885 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2890 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2892 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2893 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2896 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2897 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2899 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2900 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2904 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2905 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2906 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2907 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2909 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2911 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2912 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2913 * so this has to happen here in
2914 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2918 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2920 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2923 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2924 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2929 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2930 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2931 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2933 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2935 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2936 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2938 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2939 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2941 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2942 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2944 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2945 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2947 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2948 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2951 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2955 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2957 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2958 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2959 * abort the handshake.
2961 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2962 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2970 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2971 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2974 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2975 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2978 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2979 s->servername_done=0;
2985 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2987 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2990 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2991 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2992 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2993 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2995 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2998 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2999 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3000 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3001 if (certpkey == NULL)
3003 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3006 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3007 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3009 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3010 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3013 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3014 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3015 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3017 /* status request response should be sent */
3018 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3019 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3020 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3022 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3024 /* something bad happened */
3025 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3026 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3027 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3032 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3037 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3038 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3041 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3042 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3050 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3052 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3053 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3055 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3056 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3057 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3058 * it must contain uncompressed.
3060 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3061 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3062 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3063 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3064 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3066 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3068 unsigned char *list;
3069 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3070 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3071 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3073 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3075 found_uncompressed = 1;
3079 if (!found_uncompressed)
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3085 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3086 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3088 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3089 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3090 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3091 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3093 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3094 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3096 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3097 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3099 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3101 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3102 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3105 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3106 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3107 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3108 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3110 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3111 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3116 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3119 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3120 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3123 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3124 * there is no response.
3126 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3128 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3129 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3131 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3132 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3135 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3136 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3140 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3141 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3147 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3148 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3151 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3152 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3155 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3156 s->servername_done=0;
3162 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3165 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3167 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3169 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3173 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3181 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3182 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3183 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3185 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3186 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3187 * extension, if any.
3188 * len: the length of the session ID.
3189 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3190 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3191 * point to the resulting session.
3193 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3194 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3195 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3198 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3199 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3200 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3201 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3202 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3203 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3204 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3207 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3208 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3209 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3210 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3211 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3212 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3214 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3215 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3217 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3218 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3222 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3224 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3225 * to permit stateful resumption.
3227 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3229 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3233 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3241 /* Skip past cipher list */
3246 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3251 /* Now at start of extensions */
3252 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3255 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3257 unsigned short type, size;
3260 if (p + size > limit)
3262 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3267 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3268 * currently have one. */
3269 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3272 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3274 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3275 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3276 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3277 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3278 * calculate the master secret later. */
3281 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3284 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3285 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3287 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3289 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3290 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3292 default: /* fatal error */
3301 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3303 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3304 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3305 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3306 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3307 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3308 * point to the resulting session.
3311 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3312 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3313 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3314 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3316 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3317 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3318 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3321 unsigned char *sdec;
3322 const unsigned char *p;
3323 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3324 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3327 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3328 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3331 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3332 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3333 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3334 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3336 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3337 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3348 /* Check key name matches */
3349 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3351 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3352 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3353 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3354 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3356 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3357 * integrity checks on ticket.
3359 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3362 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3366 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3367 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3368 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3369 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3370 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3372 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3373 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3374 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3375 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3376 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3379 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3382 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3383 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3386 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3389 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3393 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3394 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3395 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3396 * as required by standard.
3399 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3400 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3408 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3413 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3421 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3422 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3423 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3424 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3425 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3426 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3427 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3430 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3431 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3432 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3433 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3436 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3439 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3441 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3447 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3450 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3452 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3453 return table[i].nid;
3458 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3463 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3464 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3467 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3470 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3471 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3475 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3477 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3478 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3481 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3486 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3494 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3498 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3499 return EVP_sha224();
3501 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3502 return EVP_sha256();
3504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3505 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3506 return EVP_sha384();
3508 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3509 return EVP_sha512();
3517 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3522 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3523 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3526 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3527 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3530 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3531 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3537 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3538 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3539 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3541 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3542 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3544 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3546 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3547 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3549 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3551 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3553 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3554 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3556 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3560 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3561 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3562 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3564 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3567 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3568 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3569 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3570 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3572 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3573 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3574 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3576 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3577 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3579 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3581 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3583 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3588 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3589 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3590 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3592 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3603 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3604 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3606 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3607 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3609 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3611 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3612 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3614 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3615 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3617 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3618 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3620 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3621 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3623 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3625 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3626 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3629 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3630 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3634 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3635 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3641 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3642 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3644 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3647 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3650 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3651 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3652 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3657 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3659 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3665 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3666 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3667 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3669 /* Should never happen */
3673 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3674 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3675 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3676 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3678 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3679 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3681 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3683 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3684 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3686 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3687 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3689 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3691 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3693 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3696 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3697 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3698 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3699 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3700 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3702 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3703 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3709 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3710 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3712 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3713 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3715 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3716 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3717 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3718 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3720 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3721 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3726 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3727 * use the certificate for signing.
3729 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3731 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3732 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3735 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3736 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3739 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3741 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3742 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3746 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3747 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3754 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3755 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3756 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3758 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3764 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3771 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3773 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3776 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3777 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3778 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3780 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3781 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3785 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3787 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3789 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3791 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3793 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3794 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3798 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3800 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3802 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3803 unsigned short hbtype;
3804 unsigned int payload;
3805 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3807 if (s->msg_callback)
3808 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3809 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3810 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3812 /* Read type and payload length first */
3813 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3814 return 0; /* silently discard */
3817 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3818 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3821 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3823 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3826 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3827 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3828 * payload, plus padding
3830 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3833 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3834 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3836 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3838 /* Random padding */
3839 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3841 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3843 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3844 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3845 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3846 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3848 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3853 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3857 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3858 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3859 * sequence number */
3862 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3865 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3873 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3875 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3877 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3878 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3880 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3881 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3882 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3884 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3888 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3889 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3891 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3895 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3896 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3898 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3902 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3903 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3905 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3907 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3908 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3909 * some random stuff.
3910 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3911 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3912 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3913 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3916 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3919 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3920 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3922 /* Sequence number */
3923 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3924 /* 16 random bytes */
3925 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3927 /* Random padding */
3928 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3930 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3933 if (s->msg_callback)
3934 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3935 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3936 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3938 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3947 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3952 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3955 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3957 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3960 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3961 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3963 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3965 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3967 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3975 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3976 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3977 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3978 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3979 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3980 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3983 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3984 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3985 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3986 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3989 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3991 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3992 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3995 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3996 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4000 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4001 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4002 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4006 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4010 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4013 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4015 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4020 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4021 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4023 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4025 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4026 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4027 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4028 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4030 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4038 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4039 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4040 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4041 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4045 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4046 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4047 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4048 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4054 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4058 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4062 if (default_nid == -1)
4064 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4066 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4067 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4068 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4072 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4073 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4077 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4078 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4080 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4086 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4087 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4088 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4089 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4092 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4094 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4095 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4096 /* Strict mode flags */
4097 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4098 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4099 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4101 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4106 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4107 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4109 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4110 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4113 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4117 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4120 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4122 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4124 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4125 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4128 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4129 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4130 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4132 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4133 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4142 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4145 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4146 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4147 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4149 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4157 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4158 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4159 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4162 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4168 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4169 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4172 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4175 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4176 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4178 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4183 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4184 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4185 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4186 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4187 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4190 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4191 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4192 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4193 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4197 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4198 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4206 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4207 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4210 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4213 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4214 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4216 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4219 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4227 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4228 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4230 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4233 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4234 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4235 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4237 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4242 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4250 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4251 else if(check_flags)
4252 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4254 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4255 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4256 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4257 else if (!check_flags)
4260 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4261 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4262 else if (strict_mode)
4264 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4265 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4267 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4268 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4272 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4280 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4282 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4287 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4290 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4293 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4298 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4299 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4300 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4301 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4302 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4307 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4312 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4316 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4317 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4319 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4321 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4323 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4327 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4331 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4334 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4336 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4337 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4339 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4341 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4342 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4344 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4346 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4348 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4349 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4351 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4356 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4360 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4362 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4363 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4367 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4369 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4370 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4371 else if (cpk->digest)
4372 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4375 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4377 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4378 * if the chain is invalid.
4382 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4383 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4386 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4387 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4394 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4395 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4397 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4398 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4399 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4400 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4401 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4402 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4404 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4405 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4407 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);