2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] =
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
246 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
247 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
250 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
252 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
253 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
254 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
256 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
259 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
261 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
264 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
266 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
268 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
270 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
272 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
274 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
276 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
278 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
280 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
288 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
290 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
292 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
294 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
296 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
298 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
300 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
302 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
306 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
308 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
310 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
312 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
318 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
321 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
322 const unsigned char **pcurves,
327 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
328 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
331 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
332 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
334 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
335 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
336 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
340 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
345 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
349 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
350 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
354 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
355 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
358 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
359 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
361 const unsigned char *curves;
363 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
364 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
366 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
369 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
372 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
374 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
377 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
379 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
382 else /* Should never happen */
385 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
386 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
388 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
394 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
395 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
399 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
401 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
402 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
404 /* Can't do anything on client side */
411 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
412 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
415 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
416 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
418 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
419 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
420 /* Should never happen */
423 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
426 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
433 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
435 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
436 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
438 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
442 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
443 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
454 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
455 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
457 unsigned char *clist, *p;
459 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
460 * while curve ids < 32
462 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
463 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
466 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
468 unsigned long idmask;
470 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
472 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
483 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
487 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
492 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
495 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
497 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
501 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
503 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
505 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
507 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
508 if (nid == NID_undef)
509 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
510 if (nid == NID_undef)
511 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
512 if (nid == NID_undef)
514 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
515 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
517 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
520 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
521 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
526 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
528 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
530 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
531 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
537 const EC_METHOD *meth;
540 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
541 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
542 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
545 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
548 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
552 /* Determine curve ID */
553 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
554 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
555 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
559 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
571 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
574 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
576 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
579 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
583 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
584 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
585 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
587 const unsigned char *p;
590 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
591 * is supported (see RFC4492).
593 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
595 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
596 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
597 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
607 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
608 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
610 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
611 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
613 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
618 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
625 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
628 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
630 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
632 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
633 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
637 *pformats = ecformats_default;
638 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
640 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
642 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
646 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
647 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
649 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
651 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
654 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
657 /* If not EC nothing to do */
658 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
663 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
667 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
668 * supported curves extension.
670 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
673 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
674 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
676 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
683 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
684 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
685 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
686 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
687 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
689 return 0; /* Should never happen */
690 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
691 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
693 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
697 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
698 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
700 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
705 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
706 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
708 unsigned char curve_id[2];
709 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
710 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
711 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
712 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
715 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
716 * no other curves permitted.
720 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
721 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
722 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
723 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
724 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
728 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
729 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
731 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
732 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
734 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
737 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
740 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
742 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
748 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
750 /* Need a shared curve */
751 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
757 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
762 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
764 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
768 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
774 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
779 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
783 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
784 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
787 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
788 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
790 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
793 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
794 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
796 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
799 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
800 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
802 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
805 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
806 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
807 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
808 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
810 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
812 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
813 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
816 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
817 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
820 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
823 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
827 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
828 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
829 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
832 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
834 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
838 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
840 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
841 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
842 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
844 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
845 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
848 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
849 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
853 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
854 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
856 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
857 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
859 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
861 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
862 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
866 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
868 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
870 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
873 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
876 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
877 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
879 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
880 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
882 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
883 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
884 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
885 /* Should never happen */
888 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
889 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
895 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
897 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
898 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
899 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
901 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
906 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
911 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
913 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
916 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
920 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
922 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
925 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
933 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
937 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
938 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
939 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
941 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
944 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
945 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
950 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
956 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
959 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
960 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
963 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
964 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
965 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
966 * session and not global settings.
969 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
972 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
973 size_t i, sigalgslen;
974 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
977 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
978 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
979 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
982 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
983 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
986 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
992 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
997 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1001 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1002 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1008 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1009 * signature algorithms.
1013 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1014 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1018 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1019 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1023 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1024 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1026 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1027 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1029 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1030 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1033 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1034 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1035 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1037 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1038 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1040 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1044 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1045 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1047 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1048 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1057 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1060 unsigned char *ret = p;
1061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1062 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1064 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1067 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1068 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1070 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1072 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1074 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1075 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1076 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1077 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1086 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1087 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1088 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1093 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1095 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1097 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1098 unsigned long size_str;
1101 /* check for enough space.
1102 4 for the servername type and entension length
1103 2 for servernamelist length
1104 1 for the hostname type
1105 2 for hostname length
1109 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1110 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1113 /* extension type and length */
1114 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1115 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1117 /* length of servername list */
1118 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1120 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1121 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1123 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1127 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1132 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1138 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1140 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1143 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1152 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1153 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1154 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1155 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1157 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1158 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1164 /* check for enough space.
1165 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1166 1 for the srp user identity
1167 + srp user identity length
1169 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1171 /* fill in the extension */
1172 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1173 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1174 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1175 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1183 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1185 const unsigned char *plist;
1188 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1190 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1191 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1199 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1200 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1201 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1204 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1205 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1206 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1208 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1209 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1210 if (plistlen > 65532)
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1216 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1217 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1219 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1220 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1221 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1222 * resolves this to two bytes.
1225 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1228 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1230 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1233 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1234 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1235 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1236 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1238 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1239 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1240 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1242 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1243 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1245 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1249 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1250 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1252 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1255 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1256 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1260 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1266 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1269 const unsigned char *salg;
1270 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1271 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1273 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1274 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1276 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1280 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1281 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1282 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1284 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1286 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1288 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1291 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1294 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1299 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1300 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1303 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1307 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1309 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1310 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1316 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1318 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1325 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1326 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1327 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1329 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1330 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1332 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1334 /* save position of id len */
1335 unsigned char *q = ret;
1336 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1337 /* skip over id len */
1339 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1345 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1349 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1350 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1353 * 1: peer may send requests
1354 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1356 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1357 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1359 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1363 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1365 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1366 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1367 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1374 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1378 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1380 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1382 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1385 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1393 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1394 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1395 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1396 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1397 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1398 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1400 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1401 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1403 if (limit < ret + 6)
1406 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1407 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1409 *(ret++) = list_len;
1410 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1413 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1414 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1417 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1419 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1421 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1422 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1424 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1425 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1426 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1430 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1434 return NULL; /* error */
1435 if (cb_retval == -1)
1436 continue; /* skip this extension */
1438 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1440 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1442 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1447 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1454 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1457 unsigned char *ret = p;
1458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1459 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1462 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1463 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1464 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1465 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1467 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1468 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1472 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1474 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1476 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1478 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1482 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1486 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1492 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1494 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1497 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1507 if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1509 const unsigned char *plist;
1511 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1514 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1516 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1517 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1524 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1525 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1526 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1527 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1531 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1532 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1534 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1535 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1537 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1538 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1542 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1544 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1545 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1549 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1550 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1551 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1553 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1555 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1557 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1560 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1563 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1572 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1574 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1576 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1579 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1587 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1588 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1589 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1590 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1591 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1592 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1593 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1594 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1595 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1596 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1597 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1603 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1604 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1606 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1609 * 1: peer may send requests
1610 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1612 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1613 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1615 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1621 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1622 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1623 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1625 const unsigned char *npa;
1626 unsigned int npalen;
1629 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1630 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1632 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1633 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1635 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1637 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1642 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1644 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1646 size_t authz_length;
1647 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1648 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1649 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1650 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1651 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1653 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1655 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1656 * uint8_t authz_type
1658 * uint8_t data[length]
1660 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1661 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1663 unsigned short length;
1667 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1669 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1673 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1681 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1682 * 2 bytes for extension type
1683 * 2 bytes for extension length
1684 * 1 byte for the list length
1685 * n bytes for the list */
1686 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1688 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1689 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1691 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1692 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1696 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1698 unsigned short length;
1703 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1705 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1708 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1715 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1716 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1720 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1723 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1725 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1727 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1728 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1730 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1731 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1734 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1737 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1741 return NULL; /* error */
1742 if (cb_retval == -1)
1743 break; /* skip this extension */
1744 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1746 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1748 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1756 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1763 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1765 unsigned short type;
1766 unsigned short size;
1768 unsigned char *data = *p;
1769 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1772 s->servername_done = 0;
1773 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1775 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1779 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1780 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1782 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1783 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1785 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1786 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1788 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1789 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1791 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1792 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1794 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1795 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1797 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1798 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1801 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1805 if (data > (d+n-len))
1808 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1813 if (data+size > (d+n))
1816 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1818 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1819 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1820 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1821 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1823 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1824 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1825 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1826 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1827 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1828 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1829 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1830 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1831 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1832 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1833 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1834 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1835 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1836 the value of the Host: field.
1837 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1838 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1839 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1840 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1844 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1846 unsigned char *sdata;
1852 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1859 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1866 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1872 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1875 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1876 switch (servname_type)
1878 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1881 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1883 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1886 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1888 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1891 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1893 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1896 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1897 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1898 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1899 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1900 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1901 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1904 s->servername_done = 1;
1908 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1909 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1910 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1922 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1928 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1930 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1932 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1935 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1937 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1940 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1942 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1943 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1945 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1947 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1954 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1955 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1957 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1958 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1960 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1961 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1963 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1968 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1970 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1971 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1973 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1974 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1976 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1979 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1980 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1983 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1984 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1985 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1986 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1987 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1990 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1991 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1993 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1994 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1995 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1997 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1998 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2000 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2005 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2007 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2010 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2011 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2013 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2016 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2017 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2020 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2021 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2022 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2023 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2024 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2027 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2028 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2029 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2030 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2032 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2036 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2039 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2040 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2042 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2046 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2047 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2048 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2049 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2051 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2052 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2054 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2059 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2061 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2062 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2064 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2068 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2070 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2072 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2074 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2077 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2079 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2084 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2086 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2089 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2091 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2094 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2097 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2100 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2101 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2105 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2106 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2111 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2115 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2117 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2119 const unsigned char *sdata;
2121 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2126 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2135 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2139 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2143 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2148 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2152 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2157 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2158 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2161 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2162 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2163 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2165 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2166 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2169 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2170 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2172 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2173 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2178 /* Read in request_extensions */
2181 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2188 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2194 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2196 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2197 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2200 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2201 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2203 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2204 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2206 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2211 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2215 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2218 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2222 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2223 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2225 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2226 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2227 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2229 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2235 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2236 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2238 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2241 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2242 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2243 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2244 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2245 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2246 * anything like that, but this might change).
2248 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2249 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2250 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2251 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2252 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2253 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2257 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2258 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2260 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2265 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2267 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2268 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2272 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2276 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2278 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2280 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2284 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2285 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2286 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2289 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2290 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2291 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2292 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2293 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2295 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2299 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2300 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2301 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2303 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2305 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2306 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2307 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2308 1 /* element size */,
2311 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2314 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2315 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2317 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2324 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2325 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2326 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2327 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2328 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2330 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2332 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2334 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2336 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2337 if (type == record->ext_type)
2341 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2342 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2344 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2346 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2351 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2352 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2355 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2356 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2357 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2358 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2359 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2360 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2362 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2363 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2366 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2367 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2379 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2381 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2382 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2384 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2386 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2389 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2390 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2391 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2396 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2399 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2401 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2405 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2414 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2415 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2416 * the length of the block. */
2417 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2419 unsigned int off = 0;
2433 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2435 unsigned short length;
2436 unsigned short type;
2437 unsigned short size;
2438 unsigned char *data = *p;
2439 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2440 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2442 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2443 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2447 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2448 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2451 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2455 if (data+length != d+n)
2457 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2461 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2466 if (data+size > (d+n))
2469 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2470 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2471 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2473 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2475 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2477 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2480 tlsext_servername = 1;
2483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2484 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2485 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2487 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2488 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2490 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2492 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2495 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2496 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2497 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2499 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2502 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2503 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2505 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2506 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2507 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2508 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2509 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2512 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2514 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2516 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2517 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2519 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2522 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2525 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2528 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2530 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2531 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2532 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2534 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2538 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2541 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2542 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2544 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2548 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2549 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2550 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2551 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2553 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2555 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2557 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2562 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2563 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2565 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2566 * a status request message.
2568 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2570 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2573 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2574 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2577 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2578 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2580 unsigned char *selected;
2581 unsigned char selected_len;
2583 /* We must have requested it. */
2584 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2586 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2589 /* The data must be valid */
2590 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2592 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2595 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2597 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2600 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2601 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2603 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2606 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2607 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2608 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2611 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2613 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2615 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2618 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2622 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2623 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2625 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2626 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2627 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2629 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2634 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2636 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2641 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2643 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2644 * an authz hello extension if the client
2645 * didn't request a proof. */
2646 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2647 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2649 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2651 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2657 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2661 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2662 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2664 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2668 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2669 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2670 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2671 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2673 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2677 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2680 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2681 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2683 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2686 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2688 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2690 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2691 if (record->ext_type == type)
2693 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2705 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2709 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2711 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2713 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2715 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2716 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2718 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2724 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2734 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2735 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2736 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2737 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2738 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2739 * absence on initial connect only.
2741 if (!renegotiate_seen
2742 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2743 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2745 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2747 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2755 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2758 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2762 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2764 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2769 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2771 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2772 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2774 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2775 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2777 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2778 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2783 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2787 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2788 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2795 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2800 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2802 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2803 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2806 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2807 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2809 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2810 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2814 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2815 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2816 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2817 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2819 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2821 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2822 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2823 * so this has to happen here in
2824 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2828 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2830 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2833 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2834 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2839 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2840 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2841 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2843 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2845 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2846 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2848 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2849 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2851 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2852 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2854 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2855 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2857 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2858 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2861 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2865 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2867 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2868 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2869 * abort the handshake.
2871 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2872 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2880 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2881 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2884 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2885 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2888 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2889 s->servername_done=0;
2895 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2897 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2900 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2901 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2902 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2903 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2905 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2908 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2909 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2910 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2911 if (certpkey == NULL)
2913 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2916 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2917 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2919 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2920 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2923 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2924 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2925 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2927 /* status request response should be sent */
2928 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2929 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2930 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2932 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2934 /* something bad happened */
2935 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2936 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2937 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2942 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2947 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2948 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2951 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2952 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2960 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2962 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2963 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2966 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2967 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2968 * it must contain uncompressed.
2970 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2971 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2972 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2973 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2974 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2976 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2978 unsigned char *list;
2979 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2980 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2981 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2983 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2985 found_uncompressed = 1;
2989 if (!found_uncompressed)
2991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2995 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2996 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2998 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2999 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3000 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3001 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3003 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3004 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3006 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3007 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3009 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3011 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3012 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3015 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3016 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3017 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3018 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3020 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3021 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3026 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3029 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3030 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3033 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3034 * there is no response.
3036 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3038 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3039 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3041 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3042 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3045 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3046 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3050 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3051 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3057 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3058 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3061 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3062 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3065 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3066 s->servername_done=0;
3072 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3075 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3077 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3079 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3083 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3091 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3092 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3093 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3095 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3096 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3097 * extension, if any.
3098 * len: the length of the session ID.
3099 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3100 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3101 * point to the resulting session.
3103 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3104 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3105 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3108 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3109 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3110 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3111 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3112 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3113 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3114 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3117 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3118 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3119 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3120 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3121 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3122 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3124 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3125 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3127 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3128 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3132 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3134 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3135 * to permit stateful resumption.
3137 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3139 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3143 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3144 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
3151 /* Skip past cipher list */
3156 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3161 /* Now at start of extensions */
3162 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3165 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3167 unsigned short type, size;
3170 if (p + size > limit)
3172 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3177 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3178 * currently have one. */
3179 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3182 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3184 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3185 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3186 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3187 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3188 * calculate the master secret later. */
3191 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3194 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3195 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3197 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3199 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3200 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3202 default: /* fatal error */
3211 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3213 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3214 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3215 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3216 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3217 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3218 * point to the resulting session.
3221 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3222 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3223 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3224 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3226 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3227 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3228 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3231 unsigned char *sdec;
3232 const unsigned char *p;
3233 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3234 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3237 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3238 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3241 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3242 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3243 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3244 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3246 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3247 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3258 /* Check key name matches */
3259 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3261 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3262 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3263 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3264 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3266 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3267 * integrity checks on ticket.
3269 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3272 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3276 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3277 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3278 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3279 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3280 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3282 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3283 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3284 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3285 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3286 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3289 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3292 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3293 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3296 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3299 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3303 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3304 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3305 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3306 * as required by standard.
3309 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3310 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3318 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3323 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3331 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3332 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3333 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3334 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3335 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3336 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3337 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3340 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3341 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3342 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3343 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3346 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3349 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3351 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3357 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3360 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3362 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3363 return table[i].nid;
3368 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3373 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3374 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3377 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3380 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3381 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3385 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3387 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3388 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3391 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3396 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3404 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3408 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3409 return EVP_sha224();
3411 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3412 return EVP_sha256();
3414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3415 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3416 return EVP_sha384();
3418 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3419 return EVP_sha512();
3427 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3432 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3433 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3436 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3437 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3440 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3441 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3447 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3448 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3449 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3451 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3452 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3454 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3456 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3457 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3459 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3461 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3463 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3464 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3466 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3470 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3471 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3472 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3474 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3477 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3478 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3479 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3480 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3482 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3483 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3484 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3486 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3487 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3489 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3491 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3493 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3498 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3499 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3500 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3502 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3513 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3514 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3516 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3517 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3519 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3521 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3522 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3523 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3525 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3526 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3528 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3530 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3531 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3534 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3535 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3539 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3540 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3546 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3547 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3549 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3552 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3555 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3556 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3557 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3562 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3564 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3570 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3571 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3572 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3574 /* Should never happen */
3578 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3579 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3581 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3582 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3584 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3586 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3587 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3589 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3590 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3592 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3594 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3596 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3599 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3600 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3601 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3602 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3603 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3605 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3606 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3612 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3613 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3615 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3616 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3618 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3619 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3620 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3621 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3623 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3624 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3629 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3630 * use the certificate for signing.
3632 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3634 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3635 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3638 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3639 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3642 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3644 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3645 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3649 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3650 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3657 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3658 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3659 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3661 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3667 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3674 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3676 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3679 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3680 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3681 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3683 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3684 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3688 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3690 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3692 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3694 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3696 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3697 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3703 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3705 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3706 unsigned short hbtype;
3707 unsigned int payload;
3708 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3710 /* Read type and payload length first */
3715 if (s->msg_callback)
3716 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3717 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3718 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3720 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3722 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3725 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3726 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3727 * payload, plus padding
3729 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3732 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3733 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3735 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3737 /* Random padding */
3738 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3740 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3742 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3743 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3744 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3745 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3747 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3752 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3756 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3757 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3758 * sequence number */
3761 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3764 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3772 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3774 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3776 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3777 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3779 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3780 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3781 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3787 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3788 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3790 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3794 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3795 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3801 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3802 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3804 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3806 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3807 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3808 * some random stuff.
3809 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3810 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3811 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3812 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3815 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3818 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3819 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3821 /* Sequence number */
3822 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3823 /* 16 random bytes */
3824 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3826 /* Random padding */
3827 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3829 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3832 if (s->msg_callback)
3833 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3834 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3835 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3837 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3846 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3851 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3854 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3856 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3859 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3860 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3862 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3864 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3866 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3874 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3875 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3876 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3877 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3878 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3879 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3882 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3883 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3884 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3885 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3888 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3890 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3891 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3894 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3895 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3899 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3900 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3901 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3905 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3909 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3912 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3914 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3919 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3920 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3922 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3924 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3925 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3926 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3927 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3929 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3937 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3938 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3939 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3940 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3944 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3945 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3946 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3947 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3953 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3957 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3961 if (default_nid == -1)
3963 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3965 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3966 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3967 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3971 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3972 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3976 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3977 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3979 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3985 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3986 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3987 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3988 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3991 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3993 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3994 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3995 /* Strict mode flags */
3996 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3997 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3998 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4000 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4005 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4006 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4008 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4009 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4012 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4016 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4019 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4021 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4023 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4024 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4027 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4028 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4029 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4031 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4032 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4041 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4044 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4045 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4046 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4048 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4056 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4057 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4058 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4061 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4067 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4068 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4071 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4074 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4075 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4077 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4082 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4083 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4084 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4085 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4086 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4089 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4090 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4091 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4092 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4096 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4097 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4105 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4106 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4109 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4112 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4113 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4115 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4118 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4126 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4127 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4129 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4132 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4133 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4134 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4136 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4141 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4149 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4150 else if(check_flags)
4151 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4153 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4154 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4155 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4156 else if (!check_flags)
4159 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4160 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4161 else if (strict_mode)
4163 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4164 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4166 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4167 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4171 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4179 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4181 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4186 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4189 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4192 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4197 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4198 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4199 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4200 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4201 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4206 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4211 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4215 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4216 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4218 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4220 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4222 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4226 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4230 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4233 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4235 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4236 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4238 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4240 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4241 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4243 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4245 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4247 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4248 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4250 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4255 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4259 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4261 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4262 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4266 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4268 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4269 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4270 else if (cpk->digest)
4271 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4274 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4276 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4277 * if the chain is invalid.
4281 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4282 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4285 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4286 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4293 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4294 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4296 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4297 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4298 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4299 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4300 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4301 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4303 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4304 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4306 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);