2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 tls1_export_keying_material,
42 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
47 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
51 tls1_generate_master_secret,
52 tls1_change_cipher_state,
53 tls1_final_finish_mac,
54 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
55 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
58 tls1_export_keying_material,
59 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
60 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
65 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
69 tls1_generate_master_secret,
70 tls1_change_cipher_state,
71 tls1_final_finish_mac,
72 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 tls1_export_keying_material,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
79 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
80 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
84 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
87 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
88 * http, the cache would over fill
97 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
101 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
103 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
107 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
110 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
111 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
113 s->version = s->method->version;
116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
119 int nid; /* Curve NID */
120 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
121 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
124 /* Mask for curve type */
125 # define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3
126 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
127 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
128 # define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2
131 * Table of curve information.
132 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
133 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
135 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
136 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
137 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
138 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
139 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
140 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
141 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
142 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
143 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
144 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
145 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
146 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
147 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
148 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
149 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
150 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
151 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
152 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
153 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
154 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
155 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
156 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
157 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
158 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
159 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
160 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
161 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
162 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
165 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM},
168 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
169 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
171 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
174 /* The default curves */
175 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
176 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
177 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
178 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
179 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
182 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
183 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
184 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
185 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
186 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
187 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
188 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
189 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
192 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
193 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
195 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
196 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
197 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
198 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
199 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
200 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
201 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
202 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
203 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
204 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
205 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
206 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
207 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
208 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
209 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
210 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
211 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
212 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
213 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
214 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
215 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
216 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
220 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
221 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
222 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
225 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
227 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
228 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
230 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
233 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
236 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
237 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
244 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
246 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
247 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
248 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
249 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
250 * lists in the first place.
251 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
252 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
253 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
255 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
256 const unsigned char **pcurves,
259 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
261 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
262 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
264 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
265 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
266 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
267 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
268 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
271 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
272 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
281 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
282 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
285 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
286 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
290 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
291 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
296 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
301 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
302 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
304 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
307 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
309 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
310 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
311 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
314 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
317 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
318 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
320 const unsigned char *curves;
321 size_t num_curves, i;
322 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
323 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
325 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
327 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
330 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
331 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
333 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
334 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
336 } else /* Should never happen */
339 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
341 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
342 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
343 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
349 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
350 * if there is no match.
351 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
352 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
353 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
355 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
357 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
358 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
360 /* Can't do anything on client side */
364 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
366 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
367 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
369 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
370 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
371 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
372 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
373 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
374 /* Should never happen */
377 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
381 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
382 * but s->options is a long...
384 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
385 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
387 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
388 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
389 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
390 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
392 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
395 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
398 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
400 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
401 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
402 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
404 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
408 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
409 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
410 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
411 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
412 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
415 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
416 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
424 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
428 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
429 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
431 unsigned char *clist, *p;
434 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
437 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
438 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
441 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
442 unsigned long idmask;
444 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
446 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
455 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
459 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
463 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
466 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
468 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
474 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
476 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
478 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
480 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
481 if (nid == NID_undef)
482 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
483 if (nid == NID_undef)
484 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
485 if (nid == NID_undef)
487 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
488 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
490 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
494 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
495 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
500 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
504 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
507 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
508 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
515 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
516 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
519 /* Determine curve ID */
520 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
521 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
522 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
526 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
528 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
530 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
531 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
533 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
534 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
536 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
542 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
543 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
544 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
546 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
547 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
550 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
551 * supported (see RFC4492).
553 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
554 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
555 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
556 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
557 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
560 if (i == num_formats)
565 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
566 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
567 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
569 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
571 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
572 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
573 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
574 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
575 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
579 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
580 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
585 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
592 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
596 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
598 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
599 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
600 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
602 *pformats = ecformats_default;
603 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
605 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
607 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
612 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
613 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
615 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
617 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
620 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
623 /* If not EC nothing to do */
624 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
626 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
630 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
633 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
637 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
638 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
640 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
646 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
647 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
648 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
649 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
650 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
652 return 0; /* Should never happen */
653 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
654 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
656 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
658 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
659 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
660 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
662 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
668 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
670 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
672 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
674 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
675 * is compatible with the client extensions.
677 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
679 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
682 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
685 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
686 unsigned char curve_id[2];
687 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
688 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
689 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
690 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
691 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
695 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
696 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
700 /* Need a shared curve */
701 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
705 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
709 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
714 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
717 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
718 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
721 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
722 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
724 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
727 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
728 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
730 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
734 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
736 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
739 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
740 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
741 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
742 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
744 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
745 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
746 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
747 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
748 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
749 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
751 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
752 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
753 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
758 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
759 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
760 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
763 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
766 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
770 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
771 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
772 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
773 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
775 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
776 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
779 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
780 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
784 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
785 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
786 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
787 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
788 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
789 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
790 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
792 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
793 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
798 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
799 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
801 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
802 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
804 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
805 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
806 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
807 /* Should never happen */
810 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
811 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
812 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
816 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
817 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
818 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
821 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
825 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
826 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
829 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
830 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
832 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
835 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
836 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
838 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
844 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
848 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
849 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
850 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
851 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
854 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
855 if (i == sent_sigslen
856 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
857 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
861 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
866 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
867 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
868 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
874 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
876 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
881 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
882 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
883 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
885 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
888 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
890 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
892 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
893 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
894 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
895 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
896 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
897 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
898 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
899 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
902 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
904 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
905 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
906 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
912 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
913 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
914 * @c: cipher to check
915 * @op: Security check that you want to do
917 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
919 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
921 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
922 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
924 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
926 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
927 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
929 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
930 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
933 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
936 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
938 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
940 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
943 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
944 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
945 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
955 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
956 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
957 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
958 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
959 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
962 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) {
963 PACKET extensions = *packet;
964 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
965 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
968 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
969 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
972 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
973 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
979 if (num_extensions <= 1)
982 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
983 if (extension_types == NULL) {
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
988 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
989 extensions = *packet;
990 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
992 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
993 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
994 /* This should not happen. */
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1000 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1004 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1005 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1006 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1007 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1012 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1016 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1017 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1020 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1021 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1023 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1025 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1027 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1028 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1030 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1031 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1033 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1034 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1035 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1036 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1047 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1049 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1050 if (s->renegotiate) {
1053 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1058 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1061 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1064 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1071 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1072 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1075 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1076 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1077 unsigned long size_str;
1081 * check for enough space.
1082 * 4 for the servername type and extension length
1083 * 2 for servernamelist length
1084 * 1 for the hostname type
1085 * 2 for hostname length
1089 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1091 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1094 /* extension type and length */
1095 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1096 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1098 /* length of servername list */
1099 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1101 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1102 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1104 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1107 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1108 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1109 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1110 * Client Hello message */
1112 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1113 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1119 * check for enough space.
1120 * 4 for the srp type type and extension length
1121 * 1 for the srp user identity
1122 * + srp user identity length
1124 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1127 /* fill in the extension */
1128 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1129 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1130 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1131 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1139 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1142 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1143 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1145 unsigned char *etmp;
1147 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1149 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1151 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1153 if (num_formats > 255) {
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1158 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1159 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1160 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1161 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1162 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1166 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1168 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1169 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1172 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1174 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1176 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1181 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1183 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1184 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1185 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1186 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1187 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1191 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1193 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1194 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1195 ret += curves_list_len;
1197 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1199 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1201 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1202 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1203 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1204 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1205 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1206 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1207 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1209 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1210 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1211 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1214 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1215 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1218 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1221 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1223 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1226 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1232 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1234 const unsigned char *salg;
1235 unsigned char *etmp;
1236 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1237 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1239 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1241 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1243 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1244 /* Fill in lengths */
1245 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1251 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1253 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1257 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1258 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1259 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1265 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1266 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1272 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1274 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1275 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1277 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1278 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1280 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1281 /* save position of id len */
1282 unsigned char *q = ret;
1283 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1284 /* skip over id len */
1286 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1292 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1296 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1297 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1298 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1300 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1304 * 1: peer may send requests
1305 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1307 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1308 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1310 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1315 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1317 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1318 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1320 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1322 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1328 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1329 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1330 * (see longer comment below)
1332 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1333 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1335 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1336 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1337 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1338 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1339 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1340 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1343 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1346 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1347 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1352 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1355 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1358 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1365 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1366 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1367 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1372 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1373 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
1377 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1381 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1382 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1383 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1386 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1387 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1389 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1390 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1398 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1405 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1408 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1412 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1413 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1416 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1417 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1419 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1422 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1423 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1424 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1425 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1430 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1432 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1435 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1440 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1443 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1446 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1454 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1455 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1458 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1459 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1460 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1463 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1468 const unsigned char *plist;
1471 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1475 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1477 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1479 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1481 if (plistlen > 255) {
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1486 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1487 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1488 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1489 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1494 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1497 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1499 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1500 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1502 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1505 /* if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket later */
1506 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1509 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1510 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1512 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1517 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1520 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1521 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1525 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1528 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1531 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1539 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1540 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1541 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1542 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1543 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1544 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1545 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1546 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1547 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1548 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1550 if (limit - ret < 36)
1552 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1557 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1558 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1559 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1561 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1565 * 1: peer may send requests
1566 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1568 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1569 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1571 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1577 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1578 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1579 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1580 const unsigned char *npa;
1581 unsigned int npalen;
1584 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1586 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1587 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1588 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1590 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1592 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1594 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1598 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1600 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1602 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1603 * for other cases too.
1605 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1606 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1607 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1608 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1609 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1611 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1615 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1616 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1620 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1621 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1622 unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1624 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1626 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1630 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1636 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1639 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1644 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1645 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1646 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1647 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1649 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1651 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1653 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1655 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1656 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1660 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1662 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1663 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1664 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1667 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1669 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1670 &s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1671 &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1672 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1680 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1681 * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_*
1682 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1683 * returns 1 on success, 0
1685 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al)
1687 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1688 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1690 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1691 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1692 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1693 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1694 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1696 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1697 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1698 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1699 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1700 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1701 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1704 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1706 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1707 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1710 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1711 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1721 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1722 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1723 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1728 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1729 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1730 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1731 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1733 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1739 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1740 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1741 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1742 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1743 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1744 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1745 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1747 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1748 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1749 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1750 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1751 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1752 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1753 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1754 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1755 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1756 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1757 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1758 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1759 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1762 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1763 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1767 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1768 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1769 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1773 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1776 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1777 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1779 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1782 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1785 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1786 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1788 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1789 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1792 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1793 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1795 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1798 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1801 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1802 s->servername_done = 0;
1803 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1805 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1808 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1809 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1810 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1811 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1812 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1813 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1815 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1816 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1820 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1821 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1822 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1824 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1825 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1826 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1827 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1830 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1831 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1834 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1836 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1839 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1842 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1846 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1847 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1850 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1852 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1855 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1856 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1857 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1858 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1860 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1861 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1863 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1864 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1867 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1869 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1870 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1871 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1872 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1873 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1874 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1875 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1876 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1877 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1878 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1879 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1880 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1881 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1882 * the value of the Host: field.
1883 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1884 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1885 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1887 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1891 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1892 unsigned int servname_type;
1893 PACKET sni, hostname;
1895 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1896 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1897 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1902 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1903 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1904 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1906 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1907 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1908 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1910 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1911 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1913 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1914 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1915 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1920 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1921 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1925 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1926 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1930 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1931 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1935 s->servername_done = 1;
1938 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1939 * fall back to a full handshake.
1941 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1942 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1943 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1947 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1950 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1953 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1957 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1958 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1960 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1961 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1968 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1969 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1971 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension,
1972 &ec_point_format_list)
1973 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1978 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1979 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1980 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1981 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1985 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1986 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1988 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1989 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension,
1990 &elliptic_curve_list)
1991 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1992 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1997 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1998 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
1999 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2000 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2005 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2006 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2007 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2008 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
2009 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
2010 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2011 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2014 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2015 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2017 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2018 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2019 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2024 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2025 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2029 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2030 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2031 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2036 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2037 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2038 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2039 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list))
2042 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2044 PACKET responder_id;
2045 const unsigned char *id_data;
2047 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2049 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2053 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
2054 && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2055 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
2056 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2060 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2061 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2062 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2066 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2067 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2071 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2072 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2073 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2078 /* Read in request_extensions */
2079 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2082 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2083 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2084 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2085 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2086 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2087 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2088 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2089 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2090 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2098 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2100 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2104 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2105 unsigned int hbtype;
2107 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2108 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2109 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2113 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2114 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2116 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2117 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2118 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2121 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2127 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2128 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2130 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2133 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2134 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2135 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2136 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2137 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2138 * anything like that, but this might change).
2140 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2141 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2142 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2143 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2144 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2146 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2150 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2151 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2152 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2156 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2158 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2159 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2160 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2164 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2165 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2167 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2168 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2172 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2173 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2174 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2175 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2176 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2179 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2180 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2185 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2186 /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */
2187 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2193 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2195 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2196 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2197 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2199 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2204 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2205 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2206 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2207 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2212 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2215 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2216 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2217 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2220 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2229 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2230 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2231 * fill the length of the block.
2233 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2235 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2237 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2238 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2239 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2247 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2249 unsigned int length, type, size;
2250 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2251 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2254 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2256 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2258 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2259 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2260 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2261 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2262 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2265 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2267 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2269 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2272 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2273 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2277 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2278 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2282 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2283 const unsigned char *data;
2286 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2287 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2290 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2291 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2293 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2294 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2296 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2297 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2298 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2299 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2300 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2303 tlsext_servername = 1;
2305 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2306 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2307 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2308 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2309 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2310 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2314 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2315 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2316 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2317 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2318 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2321 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2322 ecpointformatlist_length;
2323 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2324 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2325 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2326 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2332 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2334 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2335 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2336 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2337 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2339 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2342 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2343 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2346 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2348 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2350 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2353 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2354 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2357 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2358 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2362 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2363 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2364 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2366 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2367 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2368 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2369 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2370 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2371 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2373 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2375 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2376 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2377 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2380 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2385 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2386 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2387 unsigned char *selected;
2388 unsigned char selected_len;
2389 /* We must have requested it. */
2390 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2391 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2394 /* The data must be valid */
2395 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2396 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2400 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2402 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2403 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2404 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2407 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2408 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2409 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2412 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2413 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2414 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2418 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2420 /* We must have requested it. */
2421 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2422 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2426 * The extension data consists of:
2427 * uint16 list_length
2428 * uint8 proto_length;
2429 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2431 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2432 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2433 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2434 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2435 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2438 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2439 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2440 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2441 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2444 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2445 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2448 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2451 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2452 unsigned int hbtype;
2453 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2454 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2458 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2459 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2461 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2462 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2463 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2466 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2472 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2473 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2477 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2478 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2479 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2480 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2481 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2483 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2484 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2486 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2489 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2490 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2492 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2496 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2497 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2501 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2502 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2503 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2504 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2505 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2506 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2510 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2519 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2520 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2521 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2522 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2523 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2525 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2526 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2527 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2529 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2535 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2538 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2539 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2540 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2549 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2551 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2555 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2560 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2562 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2563 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2567 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2568 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2571 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2572 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2576 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2578 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2579 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2580 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2581 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2583 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2585 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2588 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2589 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2592 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2593 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2596 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2597 s->servername_done = 0;
2602 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2603 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2605 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2607 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2610 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2611 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2613 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2614 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2617 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2620 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2621 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2622 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2626 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2631 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2632 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2633 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2634 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2635 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2636 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2637 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2638 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2641 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2642 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2643 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2645 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2648 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2649 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2651 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2652 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2656 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2660 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2664 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2666 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2667 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2670 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2671 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2672 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2673 * influence which certificate is sent
2675 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2677 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2678 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2679 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2680 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2681 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2685 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2686 * et al can pick it up.
2688 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2689 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2691 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2692 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2693 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2695 /* status request response should be sent */
2696 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2697 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2698 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2700 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2702 /* something bad happened */
2703 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2704 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2705 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2709 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2711 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) {
2717 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2718 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2721 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2722 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2730 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2732 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2733 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2737 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2738 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2739 * must contain uncompressed.
2741 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2742 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2743 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2744 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2745 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2746 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2747 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2748 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2750 unsigned char *list;
2751 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2752 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2753 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2754 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2755 found_uncompressed = 1;
2759 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2761 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2765 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2766 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2768 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2770 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2771 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2772 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2773 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2775 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2777 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2780 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2781 * that we don't receive a status message
2783 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2784 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2785 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2788 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2789 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2792 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2793 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2796 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2797 s->servername_done = 0;
2803 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2806 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2808 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2809 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2813 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2821 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2822 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2823 * need to be handled at the same time.
2825 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2828 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2829 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2830 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2831 * point to the resulting session.
2833 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2834 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2835 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2838 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2839 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2840 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2841 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2842 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2843 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2844 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2847 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2848 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2849 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2850 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2851 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2852 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2854 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2857 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2858 const PACKET *session_id,
2862 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2865 int have_ticket = 0;
2866 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2869 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2870 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2873 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2876 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2879 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2883 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2884 unsigned int type, size;
2886 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2887 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2888 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2892 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2896 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2898 const unsigned char *etick;
2900 /* Duplicate extension */
2901 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2909 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2912 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2916 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2918 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2919 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2920 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2921 * calculate the master secret later.
2926 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2927 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2931 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2932 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2934 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2935 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2938 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2941 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2942 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2945 default: /* fatal error */
2951 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2952 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2953 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2959 if (have_ticket == 0)
2966 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2968 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2969 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2970 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2971 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2972 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2973 * point to the resulting session.
2976 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2977 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2978 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2979 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2980 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2982 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2983 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2984 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2987 unsigned char *sdec;
2988 const unsigned char *p;
2989 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2990 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2991 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2992 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2993 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2994 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2997 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2998 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3001 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3006 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3007 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3008 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3019 /* Check key name matches */
3020 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3021 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3025 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3026 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3027 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3028 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3029 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3030 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
3035 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3038 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3043 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3044 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3045 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3048 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3049 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3050 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3053 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3054 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3055 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3056 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3057 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3059 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3060 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3064 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3065 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3070 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3074 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3078 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3079 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3080 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3084 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3085 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3094 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3098 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3099 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3103 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3110 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3111 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3112 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3113 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3114 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3115 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3116 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3117 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3118 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3119 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3122 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3123 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3124 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3125 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3126 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3127 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3128 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3131 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3134 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3135 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3141 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3144 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3145 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3146 return table[i].nid;
3151 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3157 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3160 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3163 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3164 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3168 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3170 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3177 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3180 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3181 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3182 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3183 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3184 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3185 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3186 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3187 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3188 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3189 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3192 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3198 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3200 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3201 return tls12_md_info + i;
3207 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3209 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3210 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3212 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3215 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3218 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3222 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3223 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3226 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3227 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3230 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3231 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3233 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3234 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3235 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3237 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3238 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3240 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3241 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3247 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3248 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3249 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3251 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3252 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3254 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3255 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3257 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3259 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3260 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3262 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3264 if (psignhash_nid) {
3265 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3266 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3268 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3272 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3273 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3275 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3276 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3277 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3279 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3280 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3282 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3283 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3287 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3288 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3292 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3294 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3295 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3296 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3298 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3299 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3300 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3302 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3303 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3304 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3305 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3306 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3307 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3312 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3313 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3318 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3319 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3326 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3328 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3330 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3333 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3334 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3336 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3338 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3339 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3340 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3341 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3344 return tmpout - out;
3347 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3348 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3349 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3350 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3352 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3353 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3354 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3355 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3356 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3358 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3359 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3362 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3363 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3364 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3366 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3376 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3377 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3379 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3380 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3382 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3384 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3386 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3387 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3388 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3389 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3390 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3391 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3392 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3393 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3394 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3395 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3397 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3398 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3401 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3402 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3406 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3407 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3409 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3411 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3414 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3418 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3419 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3423 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3425 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3428 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3429 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3431 /* Should never happen */
3435 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3436 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3437 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3439 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3440 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3444 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3449 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3450 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3452 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3453 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3456 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3457 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3458 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3459 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3460 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3462 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3463 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3464 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3465 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3471 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3472 * the certificate for signing.
3474 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3476 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3477 * supported it stays as NULL.
3479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3480 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3481 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3484 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3485 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3486 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3490 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3491 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3493 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3494 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3495 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3496 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3497 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3498 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3499 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3505 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3506 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3507 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3509 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3514 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3521 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3523 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3526 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3527 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3528 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3530 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3531 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3535 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3537 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3539 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3541 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3543 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3544 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3547 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3551 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3554 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3556 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3557 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3558 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3559 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3560 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3561 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3563 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3564 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3565 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3569 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3571 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3574 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3577 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3579 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3581 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3583 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3591 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3592 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3594 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3597 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3598 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3601 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3602 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3607 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3608 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3610 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3614 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3618 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3621 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3624 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3629 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3630 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3632 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3633 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3634 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3636 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3643 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3644 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3645 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3647 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3648 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3649 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3655 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3659 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3663 if (default_nid == -1)
3665 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3667 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3668 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3669 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3674 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3675 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3679 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3680 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3681 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3688 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3689 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3690 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3691 * attempting to use them.
3694 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3696 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3697 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3698 /* Strict mode flags */
3699 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3700 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3701 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3703 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3708 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3709 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3712 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3713 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3715 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3718 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3720 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3721 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3723 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3725 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3726 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3732 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3735 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3737 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3738 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3740 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3747 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3748 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3749 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3750 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3751 else if (!check_flags)
3756 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3757 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3759 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3761 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3762 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3764 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3767 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3768 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3769 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3770 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3773 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3774 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3775 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3779 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3780 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3783 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3784 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3785 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3788 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3789 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3790 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3793 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3794 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3795 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3804 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3805 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3807 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3809 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3810 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3811 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3814 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3821 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3822 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3826 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3827 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3828 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3829 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3831 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3838 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3839 else if (check_flags)
3840 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3842 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3843 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3844 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3845 else if (!check_flags)
3848 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3849 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3850 else if (strict_mode) {
3851 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3852 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3853 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3854 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3856 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3863 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3864 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3866 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3868 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3871 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3874 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3878 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3882 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3884 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3885 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3887 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3888 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3889 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3893 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3896 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3898 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3900 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3901 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3903 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3904 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3905 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3907 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3908 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3909 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3910 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3911 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3916 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3919 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3921 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3922 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3926 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3927 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3928 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3929 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3930 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3932 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3935 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3939 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3942 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3943 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3950 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3951 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3953 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3954 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3955 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3956 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3957 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3958 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3959 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3962 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3963 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3965 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3970 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3972 int dh_secbits = 80;
3973 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3974 return DH_get_1024_160();
3975 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3976 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3981 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3982 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3985 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
3993 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3994 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3996 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3997 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4005 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4006 return DH_get_2048_224();
4007 return DH_get_1024_160();
4011 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4014 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4017 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4018 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4019 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4020 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4022 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4025 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4027 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4030 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4032 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4033 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4034 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4035 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4037 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4038 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4040 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4041 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4044 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4046 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4049 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4052 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4054 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4055 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4057 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4058 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4060 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4061 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4066 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4067 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4068 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4071 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4073 int rv, start_idx, i;
4075 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4080 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4084 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4085 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4086 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);