2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
28 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
32 tls1_generate_master_secret,
33 tls1_change_cipher_state,
34 tls1_final_finish_mac,
35 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
36 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 tls1_export_keying_material,
40 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
41 tls_close_construct_packet,
45 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
49 tls1_generate_master_secret,
50 tls1_change_cipher_state,
51 tls1_final_finish_mac,
52 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
53 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
55 tls1_export_keying_material,
56 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
57 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
58 tls_close_construct_packet,
62 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
66 tls1_generate_master_secret,
67 tls1_change_cipher_state,
68 tls1_final_finish_mac,
69 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
70 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
72 tls1_export_keying_material,
73 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
74 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
75 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
76 tls_close_construct_packet,
80 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
83 tls13_setup_key_block,
84 tls13_generate_master_secret,
85 tls13_change_cipher_state,
86 tls13_final_finish_mac,
87 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
88 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
90 tls1_export_keying_material,
91 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
92 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
93 tls_close_construct_packet,
97 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
100 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
101 * http, the cache would over fill
103 return (60 * 60 * 2);
110 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
114 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
116 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
120 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
123 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
124 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
126 s->version = s->method->version;
129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
132 int nid; /* Curve NID */
133 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
134 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
138 * Table of curve information.
139 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
140 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
142 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
143 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
144 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
145 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
146 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
147 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
148 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
149 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
150 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
151 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
152 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
153 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
154 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
155 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
156 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
157 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
158 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
159 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
160 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
161 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
162 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
163 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
164 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
165 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
166 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
167 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
168 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
169 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
171 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
174 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
175 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
176 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
180 /* The default curves */
181 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
182 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
183 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
184 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
185 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
188 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
189 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
190 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
191 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
192 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
193 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
194 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
195 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
198 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
199 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
201 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
203 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
204 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
205 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
206 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
207 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
208 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
209 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
210 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
211 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
212 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
213 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
214 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
215 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
216 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
217 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
218 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
219 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
220 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
221 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
222 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
225 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
226 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
227 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
230 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
232 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
233 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
234 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
236 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
238 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
242 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
245 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
246 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
253 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
255 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
256 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
257 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
258 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
259 * lists in the first place.
260 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
261 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
262 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
264 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves,
267 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
269 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
270 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
272 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
273 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
274 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
275 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
276 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
279 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
280 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
284 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
285 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
289 *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
290 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
293 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
294 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
298 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
299 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
304 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
309 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
310 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
312 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
315 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
317 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
318 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
319 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
322 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
325 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
326 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
328 const unsigned char *curves;
329 size_t num_curves, i;
330 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
331 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
333 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
335 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
338 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
339 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
341 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
342 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
344 } else /* Should never happen */
347 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
349 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
350 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
351 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
357 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
358 * if there is no match.
359 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
360 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
361 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
363 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
365 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
366 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
368 /* Can't do anything on client side */
372 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
374 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
375 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
377 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
378 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
379 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
381 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
382 /* Should never happen */
385 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
389 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
390 * but s->options is a long...
392 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
393 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
395 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
396 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
397 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
398 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
399 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
402 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
405 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
407 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
408 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
409 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
411 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
415 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
416 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
417 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
418 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
419 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
422 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
423 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
431 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
435 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
436 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
438 unsigned char *glist, *p;
441 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
444 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
445 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
448 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
449 unsigned long idmask;
451 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
452 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
454 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
463 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
467 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
471 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
474 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
476 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
482 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
484 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
486 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
488 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
489 if (nid == NID_undef)
490 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
491 if (nid == NID_undef)
492 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
493 if (nid == NID_undef)
495 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
496 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
498 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
502 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
503 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
507 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
511 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
514 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
515 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
522 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
523 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
526 /* Determine curve ID */
527 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
528 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
529 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
533 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
535 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
537 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
538 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
540 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
541 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
543 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
549 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
550 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
551 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
553 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
554 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
557 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
558 * supported (see RFC4492).
560 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
561 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
562 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
563 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
564 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
567 if (i == num_formats)
572 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
573 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
574 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
576 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
578 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
579 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
580 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
581 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
582 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
586 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
587 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
592 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
599 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
603 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
605 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
606 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
607 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
609 *pformats = ecformats_default;
610 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
612 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
614 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
619 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
620 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
622 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
624 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
627 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
630 /* If not EC nothing to do */
631 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
633 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
637 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
640 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
644 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
645 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
647 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
653 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
654 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
655 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
656 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
657 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
659 return 0; /* Should never happen */
660 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
661 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
663 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
665 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
666 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
667 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
669 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
675 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
677 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
679 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
681 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
682 * is compatible with the client extensions.
684 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
686 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
689 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
692 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
693 unsigned char curve_id[2];
694 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
695 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
696 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
697 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
698 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
702 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
703 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
707 /* Need a shared curve */
708 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
712 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
716 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
721 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
724 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
725 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
728 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
729 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
731 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
734 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
735 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
737 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
741 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
743 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
746 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
747 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
748 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
751 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
752 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
753 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
758 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
759 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
765 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
766 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
767 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
770 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
773 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
777 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
778 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
779 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
780 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
782 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
783 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
786 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
787 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
791 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
792 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
793 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
794 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
795 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
796 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
797 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
799 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
800 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
805 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
806 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
808 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
809 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
811 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
812 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
813 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
814 /* Should never happen */
817 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
818 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
819 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
823 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
824 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
825 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
826 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
828 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
829 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
832 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
833 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
836 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
837 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
838 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
839 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
842 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
843 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
844 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
845 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
851 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
855 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
856 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
857 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
858 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
861 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
862 if (i == sent_sigslen
863 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
864 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
868 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
873 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
874 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
875 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
880 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
882 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
887 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
888 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
889 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
891 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
894 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
896 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
898 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
899 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
900 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
901 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
903 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
904 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
905 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
906 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
908 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
910 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
911 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
912 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
918 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
919 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
920 * @c: cipher to check
921 * @op: Security check that you want to do
923 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
925 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
927 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
928 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
930 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
932 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
933 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
935 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
936 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
939 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
942 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
944 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
946 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
949 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
951 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
952 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
962 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
963 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
964 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
965 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
966 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
969 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
971 PACKET extensions = *packet;
972 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
973 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
976 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
977 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
980 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
981 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
987 if (num_extensions <= 1)
990 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
991 if (extension_types == NULL) {
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
996 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
997 extensions = *packet;
998 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1000 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1001 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1002 /* This should not happen. */
1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1008 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1012 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1013 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1014 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1015 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1020 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1024 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1026 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1027 const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
1028 size_t num_curves = 0;
1030 int min_version, max_version, reason;
1032 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1033 if ((s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_3_VERSION)
1034 || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1036 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1037 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1039 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1040 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1042 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1043 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1044 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1045 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1046 || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1053 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1054 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1060 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1061 if (s->renegotiate) {
1062 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1063 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1064 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1065 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1066 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1071 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1072 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1075 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1076 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1077 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1078 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1079 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1080 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1081 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1082 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1083 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1084 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1085 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1086 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1092 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1093 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1094 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1095 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1096 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1097 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1098 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1099 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1100 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1101 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1102 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1103 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1113 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1115 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurvestmp;
1119 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1121 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1122 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1123 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1124 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1125 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1131 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
1133 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
1134 pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
1135 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1139 pcurvestmp = pcurves;
1141 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1142 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1143 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1144 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1148 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1149 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
1150 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1151 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
1152 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1154 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1159 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1166 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1168 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1169 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1170 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1171 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1172 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1173 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1174 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1178 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1179 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1180 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1183 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1184 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1187 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1188 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1196 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1198 const unsigned char *salg;
1200 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1202 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1203 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1204 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1205 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1206 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1207 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1208 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1209 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1215 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1218 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1219 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1220 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1221 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1222 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1223 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1227 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1228 unsigned char *idbytes;
1232 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1233 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1235 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1236 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1237 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1242 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1243 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1248 unsigned char *extbytes;
1249 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1255 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1256 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1262 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1270 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1272 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1273 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1275 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1276 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1284 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1285 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1286 * (see longer comment below)
1288 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1289 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1290 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1291 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1292 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1293 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1294 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1295 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1299 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1302 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1303 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1304 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1307 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1308 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1309 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1310 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1311 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1315 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1316 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1317 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1318 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1323 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1324 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1325 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1326 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1332 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1333 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1334 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1339 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1340 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1341 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1348 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1349 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1350 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1357 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1358 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1363 reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
1369 /* TLS1.3 specific extensions */
1370 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1372 size_t i, sharessent = 0;
1374 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we add this extension for versions < TLS1.3? */
1375 /* supported_versions extension */
1376 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1377 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1378 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1384 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
1385 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
1388 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
1389 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
1390 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1391 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1396 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1401 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1407 /* key_share extension */
1408 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1409 /* Extension data sub-packet */
1410 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1411 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
1412 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1418 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
1419 * now, just send one
1421 for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1422 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1423 unsigned int curve_id = 0;
1424 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
1427 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1430 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1431 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1433 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1437 /* Generate a key for this key_share */
1438 curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
1439 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1440 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1445 /* Encode the public key. */
1446 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
1448 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1450 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1454 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
1455 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
1456 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1458 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1459 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1460 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1465 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
1466 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
1467 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
1469 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
1470 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
1472 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1474 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1481 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1482 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1483 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1486 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1487 unsigned char *padbytes;
1490 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1495 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1496 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1502 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1503 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1507 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1517 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1518 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1519 * fill the length of the block.
1521 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
1523 PACKET tmp_protocol;
1525 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1526 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
1527 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
1535 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1537 unsigned int length, type, size;
1538 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1539 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1542 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1544 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1546 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1547 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1549 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1551 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1553 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
1556 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
1557 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1561 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
1562 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1566 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1567 const unsigned char *data;
1570 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
1571 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
1574 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1575 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1577 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1578 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
1580 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1581 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1582 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1583 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
1584 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1587 tlsext_servername = 1;
1589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1590 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1591 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
1592 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
1593 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
1594 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1598 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1599 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1600 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
1601 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
1602 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1605 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
1606 ecpointformatlist_length;
1607 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
1608 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1609 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1610 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1616 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1618 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1619 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1620 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
1621 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1623 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1626 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
1627 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1630 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1631 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
1633 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
1636 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
1637 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1640 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1641 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1645 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
1646 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
1647 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
1649 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
1650 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1651 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
1652 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
1653 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
1654 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
1656 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
1658 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
1659 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
1660 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1663 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
1667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1668 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1669 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
1670 unsigned char *selected;
1671 unsigned char selected_len;
1672 /* We must have requested it. */
1673 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
1674 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1677 /* The data must be valid */
1678 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
1679 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1682 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
1685 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
1686 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1687 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1691 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
1692 * a single Serverhello
1694 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
1695 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1696 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
1697 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1700 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1701 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1702 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1706 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
1708 /* We must have requested it. */
1709 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
1710 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1714 * The extension data consists of:
1715 * uint16 list_length
1716 * uint8 proto_length;
1717 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
1719 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
1720 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
1721 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
1722 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1725 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1726 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
1727 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1728 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1731 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
1732 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1735 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
1737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1738 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
1739 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
1743 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
1744 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
1745 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
1746 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
1747 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
1748 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1749 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
1750 (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1751 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1753 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
1754 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
1755 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1756 unsigned int group_id;
1758 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
1762 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1767 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &group_id)) {
1768 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1770 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1774 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
1776 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
1779 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1781 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1785 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &encoded_pt)
1786 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
1787 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1789 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1793 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1795 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1799 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1800 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1801 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1806 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
1807 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1809 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1812 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1814 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
1815 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
1817 } else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
1821 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1822 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1826 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
1827 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
1828 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
1829 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1830 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1831 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1832 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1836 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1845 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
1846 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
1847 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
1848 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
1849 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
1851 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1852 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1853 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1855 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1861 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
1864 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
1865 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
1866 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
1875 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1877 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
1881 /* Initialise digests to default values */
1882 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
1884 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
1885 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1886 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
1888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1889 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1890 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
1892 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
1893 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
1895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1896 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
1898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1899 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
1900 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
1901 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
1905 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1910 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1911 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1912 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1913 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1914 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1915 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1916 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
1917 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1920 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
1921 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
1922 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1924 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1927 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
1928 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
1929 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1930 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1931 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1935 ssl_set_default_md(s);
1939 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1943 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1945 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1946 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1950 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1951 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
1952 * must contain uncompressed.
1954 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1955 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1956 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
1957 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
1958 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
1959 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
1960 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1961 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1963 unsigned char *list;
1964 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1965 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1966 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
1967 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
1968 found_uncompressed = 1;
1972 if (!found_uncompressed) {
1973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1974 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1978 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1979 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1981 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1983 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
1984 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1985 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
1986 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1988 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
1990 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1993 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
1994 * that we don't receive a status message
1996 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
1997 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
1998 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
2001 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2002 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2005 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2006 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2009 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2010 s->servername_done = 0;
2016 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2019 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2021 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2022 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2026 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2034 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
2035 * type and return it.
2037 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
2038 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
2039 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
2041 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
2043 RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
2048 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
2049 if (exts[loop].type == type)
2057 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
2059 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
2060 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2061 * point to the resulting session.
2063 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2064 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2065 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2068 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2069 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2070 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2071 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2072 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2073 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2074 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2077 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2078 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2079 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2080 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2081 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2082 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2084 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
2088 const unsigned char *etick;
2090 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
2093 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2096 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
2097 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2100 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
2103 ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
2104 hello->num_extensions,
2105 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
2106 if (ticketext == NULL)
2109 ticketext->parsed = 1;
2111 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
2114 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2117 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2120 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2122 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2123 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2124 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2125 * calculate the master secret later.
2129 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
2130 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2133 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
2134 hello->session_id_len, ret);
2136 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2137 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2140 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2143 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2144 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2147 default: /* fatal error */
2153 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2155 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2156 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2157 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2158 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2159 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2160 * point to the resulting session.
2163 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2164 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2165 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2166 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2167 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2169 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2170 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2171 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2174 unsigned char *sdec;
2175 const unsigned char *p;
2176 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
2178 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2179 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2180 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2181 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2183 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2184 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2187 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2192 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2193 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2194 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2205 /* Check key name matches */
2206 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
2207 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
2211 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2212 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
2213 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
2214 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
2215 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
2216 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
2222 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
2225 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
2229 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
2231 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
2236 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2237 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
2238 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
2241 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
2242 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
2243 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2246 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2247 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2248 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
2249 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
2250 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2251 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
2252 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
2253 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2257 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
2258 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2263 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2267 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2271 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
2272 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
2273 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
2277 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2278 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2287 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
2291 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2292 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
2296 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2303 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2304 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2305 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2306 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2307 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2308 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2309 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
2310 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
2311 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
2312 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
2315 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2316 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2317 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2318 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
2319 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
2320 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
2321 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
2324 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2327 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
2328 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2334 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2337 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
2338 if ((table[i].id) == id)
2339 return table[i].nid;
2344 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2350 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
2353 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2356 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
2362 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2364 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
2371 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
2374 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
2375 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2376 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2377 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2378 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2379 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2380 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
2381 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
2382 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
2383 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
2384 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
2385 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
2388 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
2394 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
2395 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
2396 return tls12_md_info + i;
2402 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2404 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
2405 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
2407 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
2410 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
2413 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
2416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2417 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2418 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2421 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2422 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2425 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2426 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
2428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2429 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
2430 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
2432 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
2433 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
2435 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
2436 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
2442 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
2443 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
2444 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
2446 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
2447 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
2449 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
2450 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
2452 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
2454 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
2455 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
2457 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
2459 if (psignhash_nid) {
2460 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
2461 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
2462 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
2466 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2467 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
2469 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
2470 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
2471 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
2473 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2474 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
2476 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2477 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
2481 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2482 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2486 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
2488 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
2489 size_t i, sigalgslen;
2490 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
2492 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
2493 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
2494 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
2496 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
2497 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
2498 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
2499 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2500 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2501 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
2505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2506 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2507 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
2511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2512 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2513 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
2520 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
2522 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
2524 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
2527 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
2528 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
2532 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
2533 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
2534 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
2535 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
2542 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2543 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
2544 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
2545 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
2547 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
2548 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2549 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
2550 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2551 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
2553 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
2554 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
2557 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
2558 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
2559 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
2561 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
2571 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2572 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2574 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
2575 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2577 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
2579 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
2581 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
2582 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2583 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2584 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2585 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2586 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
2587 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
2588 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2589 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2590 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2592 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
2593 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
2596 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2597 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2601 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2602 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2604 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2606 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
2609 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2613 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
2614 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
2618 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2620 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
2623 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2624 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2626 /* Should never happen */
2630 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
2631 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
2632 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
2634 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
2635 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
2639 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2644 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2645 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
2647 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
2648 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2651 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
2652 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
2653 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
2654 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
2655 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
2657 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2658 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
2659 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2660 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
2666 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
2667 * the certificate for signing.
2669 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
2671 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2672 * supported it stays as NULL.
2674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2675 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
2676 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2679 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
2680 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2681 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
2684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2685 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
2686 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
2688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2689 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
2690 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
2691 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
2692 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
2693 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
2694 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
2695 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
2696 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
2702 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2703 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2704 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2706 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2707 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
2708 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2712 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
2719 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
2721 return (int)numsigalgs;
2724 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2725 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2726 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2728 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
2729 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
2730 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2734 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
2736 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
2738 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
2740 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
2742 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
2743 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
2746 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
2750 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
2753 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2755 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2756 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2757 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2758 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2759 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2760 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2762 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2763 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2764 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2768 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2770 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2773 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2776 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
2778 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2780 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2782 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2790 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2791 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2793 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2796 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
2797 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
2800 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
2801 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
2806 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2807 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2809 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2813 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2817 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2820 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2822 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
2827 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
2828 if (sigalgs == NULL)
2830 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2831 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
2832 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
2834 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
2841 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2842 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2843 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2845 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2846 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2847 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2853 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2857 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2861 if (default_nid == -1)
2863 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2865 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2866 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
2867 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
2872 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2873 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2877 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2878 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2879 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2886 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2887 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2888 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2889 * attempting to use them.
2892 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
2894 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2895 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2896 /* Strict mode flags */
2897 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2898 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2899 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2901 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2906 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2907 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2910 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2911 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2913 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2916 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2918 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2919 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2921 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2923 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2924 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2930 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
2933 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2935 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2936 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2938 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2945 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2946 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2947 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2948 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2949 else if (!check_flags)
2954 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2955 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2957 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2959 unsigned char rsign = 0;
2960 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
2962 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2965 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
2966 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
2967 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
2968 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2971 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2972 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
2973 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2977 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
2978 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2981 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2982 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
2983 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2986 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2987 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
2988 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2991 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2992 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
2993 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3002 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3003 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3005 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3007 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3008 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3009 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3012 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3019 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3020 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3024 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3025 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3026 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3027 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3029 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3036 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3037 else if (check_flags)
3038 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3040 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3041 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3042 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3043 else if (!check_flags)
3046 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3047 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3048 else if (strict_mode) {
3049 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3050 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3051 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3052 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3054 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3061 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3062 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3064 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3066 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3069 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3072 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3076 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3080 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3082 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3083 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3085 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3086 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3087 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3091 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3094 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3096 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3098 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3099 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3101 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3102 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3103 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3105 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3106 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3107 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3108 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3109 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3114 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3117 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3119 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3120 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3124 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3125 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3126 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3127 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3128 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3130 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3133 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3137 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3140 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3141 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3148 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3149 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3151 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3152 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3153 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3154 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3155 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3156 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3157 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3160 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3161 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3163 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3167 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3169 int dh_secbits = 80;
3170 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3171 return DH_get_1024_160();
3172 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3173 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3178 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3179 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3182 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
3190 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3191 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3193 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3194 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
3202 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
3203 return DH_get_2048_224();
3204 return DH_get_1024_160();
3208 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3211 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
3214 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3215 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3216 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3217 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3219 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
3222 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
3224 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
3227 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3229 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3230 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
3231 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
3232 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
3234 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3235 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
3237 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
3238 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
3241 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
3243 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
3246 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
3249 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
3251 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
3252 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3254 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
3255 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3257 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
3258 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
3263 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
3264 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3265 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3268 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
3270 int rv, start_idx, i;
3272 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
3277 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
3281 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
3282 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
3283 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);