2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
117 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
118 # include <openssl/ec.h>
121 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
122 #include <openssl/rand.h>
123 #include "ssl_locl.h"
125 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
128 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
129 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
130 SSL_SESSION **psess);
131 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
132 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
135 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
138 tls1_setup_key_block,
139 tls1_generate_master_secret,
140 tls1_change_cipher_state,
141 tls1_final_finish_mac,
142 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
143 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
144 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
147 tls1_export_keying_material,
149 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
150 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
154 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
157 tls1_setup_key_block,
158 tls1_generate_master_secret,
159 tls1_change_cipher_state,
160 tls1_final_finish_mac,
161 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
162 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
163 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
166 tls1_export_keying_material,
167 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
168 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
169 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
173 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
176 tls1_setup_key_block,
177 tls1_generate_master_secret,
178 tls1_change_cipher_state,
179 tls1_final_finish_mac,
180 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
181 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
182 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
185 tls1_export_keying_material,
186 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
187 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
188 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
189 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
193 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
196 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
197 * http, the cache would over fill
199 return (60 * 60 * 2);
206 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
210 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
213 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
214 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
216 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
220 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
223 s->version = s->method->version;
226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
228 static int nid_list[] = {
229 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
230 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
231 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
232 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
235 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
236 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
237 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
238 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
239 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
240 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
241 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
243 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
244 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
245 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
246 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
247 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
248 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
249 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
250 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
251 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
252 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
253 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
254 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
255 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
256 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
259 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
265 /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
266 static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
267 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
268 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
269 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
270 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
273 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
274 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
275 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
276 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
277 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
278 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
279 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
280 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
281 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
288 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
289 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
291 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
292 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
293 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
294 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
295 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
296 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
297 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
298 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
299 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
300 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
301 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
302 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
303 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
304 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
307 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
308 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
310 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
311 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
312 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
313 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
314 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
315 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
316 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
317 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
318 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
319 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
320 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
321 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
322 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
324 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
325 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
329 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
330 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
331 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
335 /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
336 static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = {
337 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
338 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
339 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
341 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
342 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
343 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
344 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
346 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
347 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
348 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
349 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
351 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
352 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
353 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
354 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
355 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
356 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
358 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
359 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
360 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
361 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
362 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
364 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
365 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
366 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
367 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
368 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
369 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
371 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
372 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
373 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
377 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
379 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
380 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
381 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
383 return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
386 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
388 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
390 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
392 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
394 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
396 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
398 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
400 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
402 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
404 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
406 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
408 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
410 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
412 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
414 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
416 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
418 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
420 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
422 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
424 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
426 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
428 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
430 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
432 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
434 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
436 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
438 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
440 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
442 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
444 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
452 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
454 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
455 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
456 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
457 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
458 * lists in the first place.
459 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
460 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
461 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
463 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
464 const unsigned char **pcurves,
467 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
469 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
470 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
472 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
473 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
474 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
475 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
476 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
479 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
480 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
484 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
485 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
489 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
490 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
495 *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
496 pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
500 if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
501 *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
502 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
504 *pcurves = eccurves_all;
505 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
510 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
511 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
516 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
521 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
522 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
524 const unsigned char *curves;
525 size_t num_curves, i;
526 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
527 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
529 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
531 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
534 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
535 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
537 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
538 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
540 } else /* Should never happen */
543 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
545 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
546 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
553 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
554 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
555 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
556 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
558 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
560 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
561 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
563 /* Can't do anything on client side */
567 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
569 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
570 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
572 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
573 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
574 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
575 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
576 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
577 /* Should never happen */
580 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
584 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
585 * but s->options is a long...
587 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
588 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
590 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
591 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
592 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
593 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
595 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
598 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
601 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
603 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
604 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
605 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
607 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
611 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
612 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
613 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
614 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
616 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
617 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
625 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
629 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
630 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
632 unsigned char *clist, *p;
635 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
638 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
639 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
643 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
646 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
647 unsigned long idmask;
649 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
651 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
652 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) {
657 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
658 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]);
659 if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve))
660 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
662 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
666 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
669 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
679 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
683 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
687 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
690 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
692 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
698 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
700 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
702 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
704 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
705 if (nid == NID_undef)
706 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
707 if (nid == NID_undef)
708 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
709 if (nid == NID_undef)
711 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
712 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
714 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
718 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
719 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
724 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
728 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
731 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
732 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
737 const EC_METHOD *meth;
740 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
741 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
744 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
747 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
751 /* Determine curve ID */
752 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
753 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
754 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
757 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
766 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
768 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
770 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
772 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
774 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
779 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
780 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
781 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
783 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
784 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
787 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
788 * supported (see RFC4492).
790 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
791 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
792 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
793 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
794 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
797 if (i == num_formats)
802 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
803 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
804 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
806 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
808 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
809 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
810 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
811 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
812 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
816 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
817 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
822 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
829 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
833 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
835 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
836 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
837 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
839 *pformats = ecformats_default;
840 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
842 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
844 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
849 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
850 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
852 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
854 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
857 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
860 /* If not EC nothing to do */
861 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
865 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
870 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
873 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
877 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
878 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
880 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
886 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
887 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
888 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
889 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
890 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
892 return 0; /* Should never happen */
893 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
894 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
896 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
898 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
899 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
900 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
902 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
908 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
909 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
910 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
912 unsigned char curve_id[2];
913 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
914 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
915 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
916 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
920 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
923 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
924 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
925 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
926 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
927 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
928 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
932 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
933 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
935 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
936 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
938 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
940 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
943 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
945 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
951 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
952 /* Need a shared curve */
953 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
959 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
964 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
966 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
970 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
973 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
977 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
982 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
987 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
988 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
991 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
992 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
994 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
997 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
998 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
1000 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
1003 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1004 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
1007 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
1010 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
1011 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
1012 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
1013 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
1015 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
1016 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
1017 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
1018 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1020 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
1021 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1022 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
1024 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1025 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
1029 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1030 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1031 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1032 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1035 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
1038 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1041 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1042 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1043 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1044 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1045 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
1047 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1048 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1051 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1052 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
1056 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
1057 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
1058 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1059 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1060 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1061 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1062 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1064 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1065 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1070 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1071 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1073 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1074 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1076 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1077 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1078 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1079 /* Should never happen */
1082 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1083 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1087 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1088 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1089 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1090 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1091 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1093 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1097 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1098 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1101 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1102 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1104 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1107 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1108 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1110 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1116 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1120 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1121 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1122 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1123 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1126 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1127 if (i == sent_sigslen
1128 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1129 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1133 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1139 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1141 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1142 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1147 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1148 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1149 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1152 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1155 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1156 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1157 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1160 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1161 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1162 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1166 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1167 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2.
1169 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1170 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
1171 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
1172 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1173 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1177 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1178 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1182 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1183 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1190 * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1191 * signature algorithms.
1194 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1195 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1198 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1199 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1202 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1203 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1205 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1206 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1207 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1208 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1211 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1212 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1213 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1214 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1215 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1217 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1218 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1219 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1220 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1221 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1227 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1228 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1231 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1232 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1233 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1234 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1236 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1238 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1239 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1241 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1242 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1244 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1245 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1246 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1247 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1255 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1256 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1262 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1264 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1265 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1266 unsigned long size_str;
1270 * check for enough space.
1271 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1272 * 2 for servernamelist length
1273 * 1 for the hostname type
1274 * 2 for hostname length
1278 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1280 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1283 /* extension type and length */
1284 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1285 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1287 /* length of servername list */
1288 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1290 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1291 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1293 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1297 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1298 if (s->renegotiate) {
1301 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1306 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1309 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1312 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1319 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1320 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1321 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1322 * Client Hello message */
1324 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1325 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1331 * check for enough space.
1332 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1333 * 1 for the srp user identity
1334 * + srp user identity length
1336 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1339 /* fill in the extension */
1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1341 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1342 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1343 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1348 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1351 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1354 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1355 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1357 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1359 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1361 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1363 if (num_formats > 255) {
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1368 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1369 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1370 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1371 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1372 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1376 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1378 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1379 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1382 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1384 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1386 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1390 curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves;
1391 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1392 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1393 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1394 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len);
1395 ret += curves_list_len;
1397 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1399 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1401 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1402 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1403 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1404 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1405 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1406 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1407 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1409 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1410 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1411 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1414 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1415 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1418 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1421 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1423 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1426 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1432 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1434 const unsigned char *salg;
1435 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1436 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1438 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1439 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1441 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1444 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1445 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1446 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1448 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1450 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1453 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1456 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1461 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1463 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1467 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1468 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1469 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1475 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1476 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1483 * 2 bytes for status request type
1484 * 2 bytes for status request len
1485 * 1 byte for OCSP request type
1486 * 2 bytes for length of ids
1487 * 2 bytes for length of extensions
1489 if ((long)(limit - ret - 9 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1491 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1492 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1494 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1495 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1497 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1498 /* save position of id len */
1499 unsigned char *q = ret;
1500 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1501 /* skip over id len */
1503 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1509 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1511 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1512 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1513 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1515 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1519 * 1: peer may send requests
1520 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1522 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1523 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1525 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1528 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1529 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1531 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1532 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1534 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1536 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1541 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1542 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1544 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1545 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1546 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1547 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1548 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1549 s->cert->alpn_sent = 1;
1551 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1552 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1555 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1557 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1560 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1563 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1570 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1571 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1572 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1576 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1577 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1578 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1581 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1582 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1584 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1585 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1588 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1590 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1591 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1597 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1599 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1604 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1607 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1611 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1612 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1615 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1616 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1617 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1618 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1620 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1621 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1622 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1623 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1624 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1625 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1628 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation
1630 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1635 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1637 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1638 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1639 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1642 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1646 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1649 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1654 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1657 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1660 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1667 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1669 const unsigned char *plist;
1672 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1676 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1678 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1680 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1682 if (plistlen > 255) {
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1687 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1688 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1689 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1690 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1695 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1698 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1700 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1701 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1703 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1707 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1708 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1710 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1713 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1714 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1715 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1717 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1719 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1722 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1725 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1730 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1731 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1734 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1736 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1739 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1742 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1750 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1751 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1752 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1753 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1754 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1755 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1756 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1757 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1758 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1759 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1761 if (limit - ret < 36)
1763 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1767 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1768 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1769 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1770 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1772 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1776 * 1: peer may send requests
1777 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1779 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1780 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1782 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1787 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1788 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1789 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1790 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1791 const unsigned char *npa;
1792 unsigned int npalen;
1795 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1797 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1798 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1799 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1801 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1803 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1805 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1809 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1812 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1813 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1814 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1816 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1818 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1822 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1826 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1829 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1833 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1835 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1836 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1837 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1842 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1843 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1844 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1845 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1847 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1848 const unsigned char *limit)
1850 unsigned short type, size;
1851 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1852 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1853 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1854 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1855 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1856 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1857 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1859 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1860 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1861 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1862 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1865 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1866 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1867 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1868 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1869 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1870 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1871 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1872 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1873 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1874 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1877 if (limit - data <= 2)
1881 if (limit - data < 4)
1886 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1889 if (limit - data < size)
1893 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1894 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1895 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1897 if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
1899 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1901 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1904 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1906 if (limit - data != (int)(len))
1908 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1912 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1914 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1917 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to save the ALPN extension in a
1918 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1919 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1920 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1923 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1924 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1933 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1934 * length-prefixed strings.
1936 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1945 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1946 proto_len = data[i];
1952 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1958 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL)
1959 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed);
1960 s->cert->alpn_proposed = OPENSSL_malloc(data_len);
1961 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed == NULL) {
1962 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1965 memcpy(s->cert->alpn_proposed, data, data_len);
1966 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = data_len;
1970 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1975 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1976 * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_*
1977 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1978 * returns 1 on success, 0 on failure: al/ret set only on failure
1980 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al)
1982 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1983 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1985 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1986 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1987 s->cert->alpn_proposed,
1988 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len,
1989 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1991 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1992 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1993 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1994 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1995 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1996 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1999 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
2000 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2001 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2002 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2003 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2011 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2012 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
2014 unsigned short type;
2015 unsigned short size;
2017 unsigned char *data = *p;
2018 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2020 s->servername_done = 0;
2021 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2022 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2023 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2026 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2027 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2028 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2030 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
2031 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed) {
2032 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed);
2033 s->cert->alpn_proposed = NULL;
2035 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
2036 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2037 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2038 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2041 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2042 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2043 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit);
2044 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2046 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2047 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2048 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2049 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2051 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2052 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2053 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2054 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2058 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2063 if (limit - data < 2)
2068 if (limit - data != len)
2071 while (limit - data >= 4) {
2075 if (limit - data < size)
2078 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
2080 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2081 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2083 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2085 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2086 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2087 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2088 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2089 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2090 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2091 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2092 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2093 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2094 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2095 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2096 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2097 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2098 * the value of the Host: field.
2099 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2100 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2101 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2103 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2107 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2108 unsigned char *sdata;
2121 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2128 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2129 switch (servname_type) {
2130 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2132 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2135 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2136 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2139 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2140 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2141 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2144 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2145 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2146 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2147 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2148 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2149 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2152 s->servername_done = 1;
2155 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2156 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2157 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2158 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2172 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2173 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2174 if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1))
2176 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2178 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2180 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2181 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2183 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2188 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2189 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2190 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2191 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2193 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2194 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2197 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2198 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2199 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2201 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2202 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2203 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2204 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2207 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2208 ecpointformatlist_length;
2209 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2210 ecpointformatlist_length);
2214 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
2215 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2216 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2217 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2218 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2219 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2221 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2222 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2223 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2224 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2226 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2227 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2228 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2229 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
2233 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2236 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2237 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2238 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2239 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2242 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2243 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2244 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2245 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2249 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
2250 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2251 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2252 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2253 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2254 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2257 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2258 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2259 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2260 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2263 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2266 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2267 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2268 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2272 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2273 /* shouldn't really happen */
2274 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2277 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2278 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2279 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2281 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2282 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2283 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2284 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2289 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2290 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2291 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2292 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2294 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2297 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2298 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2300 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2301 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2303 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2307 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2309 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2311 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2316 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2318 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2319 const unsigned char *sdata;
2321 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2328 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2329 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2331 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2334 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2335 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2336 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2340 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2349 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2355 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2358 if (data != sdata) {
2359 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2362 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2363 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2364 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2369 /* Read in request_extensions */
2378 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2379 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2380 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2383 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2384 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2385 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2390 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2393 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2395 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2396 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2398 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2399 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2401 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2402 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2403 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2406 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2411 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2412 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2413 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2415 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2418 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2419 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2420 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2421 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2422 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2423 * anything like that, but this might change).
2425 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2426 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2427 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2428 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2429 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2431 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2435 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2436 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2437 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2441 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2442 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2443 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2444 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2445 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2453 /* Spurious data on the end */
2461 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2463 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2464 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2465 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2467 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2473 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2478 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data
2479 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking.
2482 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
2483 const unsigned char *data,
2484 const unsigned char *limit,
2487 unsigned short type, size, len;
2488 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
2489 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
2492 if (limit - data <= 2)
2496 if (limit - data < len)
2499 while (limit - data >= 4) {
2503 if (limit - data < size)
2505 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2514 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2515 unsigned char *limit)
2518 unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
2520 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled
2521 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically
2522 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
2523 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
2525 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, limit, &al) <= 0) {
2526 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2530 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2535 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2536 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, limit, &al) <= 0) {
2537 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2544 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2546 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2547 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2548 * fill the length of the block.
2550 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2552 unsigned int off = 0;
2565 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2566 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2568 unsigned short length;
2569 unsigned short type;
2570 unsigned short size;
2571 unsigned char *data = *p;
2572 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2573 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2575 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2576 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2578 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2580 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2581 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2582 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2584 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2585 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2586 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2589 if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
2593 if ((d + n) - data != length) {
2594 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2598 while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
2602 if ((d + n) - data < size)
2605 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2606 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2608 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2609 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2610 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2613 tlsext_servername = 1;
2615 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2616 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2617 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2618 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2620 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2621 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2625 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2626 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2627 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2628 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2629 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2630 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2633 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2634 ecpointformatlist_length;
2635 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2636 ecpointformatlist_length);
2640 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2641 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2642 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2643 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2644 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2647 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2649 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2650 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2651 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2652 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2654 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2657 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2659 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2662 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2664 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2665 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2666 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2669 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2672 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2673 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2674 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2678 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2679 /* shouldn't really happen */
2680 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2682 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2683 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2684 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2686 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2687 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2690 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2691 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2696 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2698 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2701 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2702 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2705 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2706 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2708 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2709 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2710 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2711 unsigned char *selected;
2712 unsigned char selected_len;
2714 /* We must have requested it. */
2715 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2716 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2719 /* The data must be valid */
2720 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2721 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2725 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2727 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2728 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2729 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2733 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2734 * a single Serverhello
2736 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2737 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2738 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2739 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2742 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2743 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2744 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2748 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2751 /* We must have requested it. */
2752 if (!s->cert->alpn_sent) {
2753 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2757 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2761 * The extension data consists of:
2762 * uint16 list_length
2763 * uint8 proto_length;
2764 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2769 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2770 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2774 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2775 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2778 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2779 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2780 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2781 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2782 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2785 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2786 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2789 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2790 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2792 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2794 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2795 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2797 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2798 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2800 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2801 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2802 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2805 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2810 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2811 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2812 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2817 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2818 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2820 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2826 if (data != d + n) {
2827 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2831 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2832 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2833 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2834 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2835 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2836 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2840 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2851 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2852 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2853 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2854 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2855 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2856 * initial connect only.
2858 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2859 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2860 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2862 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2869 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2872 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2876 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2877 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2879 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2884 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2885 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2886 /* shouldn't really happen */
2887 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2890 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2891 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2892 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2894 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2895 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2896 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2898 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2900 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2903 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
2904 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2909 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
2910 * server opaque PRF input
2912 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2913 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2917 s->cert->alpn_sent = 0;
2921 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2926 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2928 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2929 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2931 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2933 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2934 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2937 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2938 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2942 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2944 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2945 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2946 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2947 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2949 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2951 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2953 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2956 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we
2957 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this
2958 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early().
2963 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2964 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2966 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2968 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2969 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2974 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2975 /* shouldn't really happen */
2976 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2978 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2980 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2981 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2982 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
2983 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
2985 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF
2986 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input!
2989 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2990 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2991 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2993 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2994 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2995 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2997 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2998 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2999 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3002 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
3003 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3007 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3009 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we
3010 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the
3013 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3014 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3021 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3022 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3025 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3026 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3029 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3030 s->servername_done = 0;
3036 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3040 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3041 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
3042 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3043 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3044 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3046 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3047 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
3048 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3049 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3052 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3053 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
3054 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
3055 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3056 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3059 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3060 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3062 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3063 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3067 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3070 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3074 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3076 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3080 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
3081 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
3082 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
3083 * influence which certificate is sent
3085 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3087 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3088 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3089 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3090 if (certpkey == NULL) {
3091 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3095 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
3096 * et al can pick it up.
3098 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3099 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3101 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3102 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3103 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3105 /* status request response should be sent */
3106 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3107 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3108 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3110 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3112 /* something bad happened */
3113 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3114 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3115 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3119 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3121 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) {
3127 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3128 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3131 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3132 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3140 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3142 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3143 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3145 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3147 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3148 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3149 * must contain uncompressed.
3151 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3152 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3153 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3154 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3155 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3156 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3157 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
3158 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3159 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3161 unsigned char *list;
3162 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3163 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3164 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3165 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3166 found_uncompressed = 1;
3170 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3172 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3176 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3177 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3179 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3181 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3182 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3183 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3184 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3186 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3188 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3190 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3191 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
3193 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
3194 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
3195 * value from the server too.
3198 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3199 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3200 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3204 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
3205 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
3207 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3208 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
3209 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
3210 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3211 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3216 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3217 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3218 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3220 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
3223 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3224 && !(s->hit) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3227 * Call callback with resp == NULL and resplen == -1 so callback
3228 * knows there is no response
3230 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3232 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3233 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3236 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3237 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3242 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3243 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3246 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3247 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3250 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3251 s->servername_done = 0;
3257 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
3261 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3263 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
3264 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3268 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3276 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3277 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3278 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3280 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3281 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3282 * extension, if any.
3283 * len: the length of the session ID.
3284 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3285 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3286 * point to the resulting session.
3288 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3289 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3290 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3293 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3294 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3295 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3296 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3297 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3298 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3299 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3302 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3303 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3304 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3305 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3306 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3307 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3309 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3310 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3312 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3313 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3317 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3320 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3323 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3325 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3329 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3330 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3338 /* Skip past cipher list */
3344 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3350 /* Now at start of extensions */
3354 while (limit - p >= 4) {
3355 unsigned short type, size;
3358 if (limit - p < size)
3360 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3364 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3367 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3370 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3372 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3373 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3374 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3375 * calculate the master secret later.
3379 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3381 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3382 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3384 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3386 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3387 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3389 default: /* fatal error */
3399 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3401 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3402 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3403 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3404 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3405 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3406 * point to the resulting session.
3409 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3410 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3411 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3412 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3414 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3415 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3416 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3419 unsigned char *sdec;
3420 const unsigned char *p;
3421 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3422 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3425 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3427 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3428 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3429 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3430 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3431 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3432 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3441 /* Check key name matches */
3442 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3444 if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3445 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0
3446 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3447 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3453 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3456 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3460 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3461 if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) {
3462 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3463 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3468 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3469 if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3470 || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3473 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3474 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3475 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3478 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3479 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3480 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3481 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3482 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3484 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3485 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3489 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3490 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3495 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3498 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3502 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3503 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3504 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3508 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3509 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3518 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3522 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3523 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3527 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3534 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3535 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3536 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3537 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3538 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3539 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3540 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3543 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3544 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3545 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3546 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3549 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3552 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3553 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3559 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3562 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3563 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3564 return table[i].nid;
3569 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3575 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3576 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3579 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3582 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3583 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3587 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3589 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3590 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3593 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3596 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3597 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3598 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
3604 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3605 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3608 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3609 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3610 return EVP_sha224();
3612 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3613 return EVP_sha256();
3615 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3616 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3617 return EVP_sha384();
3619 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3620 return EVP_sha512();
3628 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3631 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3632 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3633 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3635 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3636 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3637 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3639 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3640 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3641 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3647 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3648 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3649 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3651 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3652 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3654 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3655 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3656 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3658 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3660 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3661 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3662 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3664 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3666 if (psignhash_nid) {
3667 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3668 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3670 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3674 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3675 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3676 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3677 const unsigned char *allow,
3680 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3681 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3682 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3683 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3684 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3686 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3688 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3689 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3692 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3693 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3694 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3696 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3706 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3707 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3709 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3710 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3712 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3714 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3715 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3716 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3717 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3718 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3720 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3721 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3722 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3723 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3724 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3725 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3726 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3728 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3729 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3732 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3733 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3737 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3738 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3740 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3742 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3745 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3749 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3750 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3754 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3756 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3759 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3760 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3762 /* Should never happen */
3766 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3767 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3768 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3769 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3771 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3772 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3776 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3782 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3783 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3786 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3787 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3789 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3790 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3792 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3794 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3796 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3798 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3799 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3800 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3801 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3802 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3803 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3804 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3805 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3811 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3812 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3813 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3814 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3815 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3816 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3817 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3818 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3819 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3820 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3821 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3827 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3828 * the certificate for signing.
3830 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3832 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3833 * supported it stays as NULL.
3835 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3836 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3837 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3839 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3840 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3841 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3842 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3845 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3846 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3847 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3853 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3854 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3855 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3857 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3862 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3869 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3871 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3874 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3875 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3876 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3878 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3879 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3883 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3885 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3887 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3889 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3891 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3892 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3895 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3896 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3898 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3899 unsigned short hbtype;
3900 unsigned int payload;
3901 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3903 if (s->msg_callback)
3904 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3905 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3906 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3908 /* Read type and payload length first */
3909 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3910 return 0; /* silently discard */
3913 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3914 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3917 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3918 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3922 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3923 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3925 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3930 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3931 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3933 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3935 /* Random padding */
3936 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3937 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3941 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3942 3 + payload + padding);
3944 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3945 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3946 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3947 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3949 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3953 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3957 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3958 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3962 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3964 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3971 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3973 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3975 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3976 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3978 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3979 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3980 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3985 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3986 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3991 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3992 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3998 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3999 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4001 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4004 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4005 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4006 * some random stuff.
4007 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4008 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4009 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4010 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4013 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4018 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4019 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4021 /* Sequence number */
4022 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4023 /* 16 random bytes */
4024 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
4025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4029 /* Random padding */
4030 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
4031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4035 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4037 if (s->msg_callback)
4038 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4039 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4040 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4042 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4052 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4056 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4059 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4061 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4064 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4067 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4069 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4071 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4073 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4081 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4082 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4083 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4084 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4085 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4086 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4090 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4091 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4092 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4093 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4096 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
4097 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4100 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4101 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4106 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
4107 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
4109 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4113 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4117 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4120 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
4123 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4128 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4129 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4131 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
4132 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4133 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4134 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4135 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4137 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4144 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4145 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4146 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4147 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4149 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4150 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4151 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4152 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4158 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4162 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4166 if (default_nid == -1)
4168 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4170 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4171 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4172 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4177 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4178 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4182 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4183 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
4184 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4191 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4192 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4193 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4194 * attempting to use them.
4197 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4199 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4200 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4201 /* Strict mode flags */
4202 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4203 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4204 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4206 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4211 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4212 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4214 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4215 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4217 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4220 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4222 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4224 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4226 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4227 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4230 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4231 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4232 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
4233 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
4234 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4235 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4242 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4245 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4246 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4247 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4249 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4256 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4257 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4258 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4259 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4260 else if (!check_flags)
4265 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4266 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4268 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4270 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4271 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4273 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4276 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4277 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4278 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4279 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4280 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4283 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4284 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4285 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4286 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4290 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4291 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4300 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4301 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4303 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4305 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4306 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4307 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4310 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4317 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4318 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4322 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4323 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4324 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4325 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4327 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4334 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4335 else if (check_flags)
4336 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4338 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4339 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4340 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4341 else if (!check_flags)
4344 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4345 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4346 else if (strict_mode) {
4347 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4348 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4349 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4350 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4352 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4359 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4360 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4364 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4367 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4370 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4375 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4376 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4377 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4378 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4379 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4383 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4387 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4389 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4390 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4392 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4393 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4394 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4398 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4401 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4403 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4405 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4406 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4408 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4409 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4410 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4412 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4413 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4414 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4415 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4416 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4421 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4424 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4426 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4427 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4431 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4432 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4433 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4434 else if (cpk->digest)
4435 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4437 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4440 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4444 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4445 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4447 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4448 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4455 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4456 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4458 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4459 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4460 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4461 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4462 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4463 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4466 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4467 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4469 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);