2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
27 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
31 tls1_generate_master_secret,
32 tls1_change_cipher_state,
33 tls1_final_finish_mac,
34 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
35 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 tls1_export_keying_material,
39 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
40 tls_close_construct_packet,
44 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
48 tls1_generate_master_secret,
49 tls1_change_cipher_state,
50 tls1_final_finish_mac,
51 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
52 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 tls1_export_keying_material,
55 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
56 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
57 tls_close_construct_packet,
61 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
65 tls1_generate_master_secret,
66 tls1_change_cipher_state,
67 tls1_final_finish_mac,
68 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
69 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 tls1_export_keying_material,
72 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
73 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
74 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
75 tls_close_construct_packet,
79 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
82 tls13_setup_key_block,
83 tls13_generate_master_secret,
84 tls13_change_cipher_state,
85 tls13_final_finish_mac,
86 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
87 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 tls1_export_keying_material,
90 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
91 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
92 tls_close_construct_packet,
96 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
99 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
100 * http, the cache would over fill
102 return (60 * 60 * 2);
109 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
113 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
115 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
119 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
122 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
123 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
125 s->version = s->method->version;
128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
131 int nid; /* Curve NID */
132 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
133 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
137 * Table of curve information.
138 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
139 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
141 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
142 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
143 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
144 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
145 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
146 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
147 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
148 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
149 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
150 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
151 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
152 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
153 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
154 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
155 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
156 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
157 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
158 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
159 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
160 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
161 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
162 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
163 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
164 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
165 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
166 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
167 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
168 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
169 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
170 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
173 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
174 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
175 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
176 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
179 /* The default curves */
180 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
181 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
182 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
183 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
184 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
187 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
188 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
189 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
190 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
191 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
192 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
193 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
194 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
197 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
198 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
200 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
201 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
202 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
203 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
204 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
205 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
206 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
207 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
208 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
209 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
210 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
211 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
212 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
213 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
214 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
215 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
216 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
217 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
218 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
219 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
220 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
221 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
224 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
225 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
226 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
229 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
231 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
232 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
233 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
235 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
237 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
241 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
244 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
245 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
252 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
254 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
255 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
256 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
257 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
258 * lists in the first place.
259 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
260 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
261 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
263 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves,
266 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
268 *pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
269 pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
271 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
272 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
273 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
274 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
275 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
278 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
279 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
283 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
284 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
288 *pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
289 pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
292 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
293 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
297 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
298 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
303 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
308 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
309 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
311 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
314 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
316 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
317 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
318 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
321 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
324 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
325 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
327 const unsigned char *curves;
328 size_t num_curves, i;
329 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
330 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
332 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
334 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
337 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
338 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
340 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
343 } else /* Should never happen */
346 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
348 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
349 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
350 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
356 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
357 * if there is no match.
358 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
359 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
360 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
362 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
364 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
365 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
367 /* Can't do anything on client side */
371 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
373 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
374 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
376 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
377 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
378 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
379 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
380 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
381 /* Should never happen */
384 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
388 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
389 * but s->options is a long...
391 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
392 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
394 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
395 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
396 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
397 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
401 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
404 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
406 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
407 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
408 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
410 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
414 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
415 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
416 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
417 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
418 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
421 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
422 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
430 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
434 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
435 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
437 unsigned char *glist, *p;
440 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
443 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
444 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
447 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
448 unsigned long idmask;
450 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
451 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
453 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
462 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
466 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
470 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
473 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
475 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
481 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
483 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
485 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
487 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
488 if (nid == NID_undef)
489 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
490 if (nid == NID_undef)
491 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
492 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
495 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
497 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
501 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
502 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
506 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
510 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
513 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
514 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
521 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
522 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
525 /* Determine curve ID */
526 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
527 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
528 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
532 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
534 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
536 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
537 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
539 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
540 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
542 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
548 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
549 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
550 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
552 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
553 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
556 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
557 * supported (see RFC4492).
559 if (comp_id && s->session->ext.ecpointformats) {
560 pformats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
561 num_formats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len;
562 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
563 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
566 if (i == num_formats)
571 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
572 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
573 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
575 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
577 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
578 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
579 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
580 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
581 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
585 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
586 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
591 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
598 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
602 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
604 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
605 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
606 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
608 *pformats = ecformats_default;
609 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
611 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
613 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
618 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
619 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
621 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
623 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
626 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
629 /* If not EC nothing to do */
630 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
632 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
636 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
639 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
643 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
644 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
646 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
652 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
653 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
654 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
655 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
656 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
658 return 0; /* Should never happen */
659 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
660 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
662 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
664 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
665 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
666 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
668 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
674 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
676 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
678 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
680 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
681 * is compatible with the client extensions.
683 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
685 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
688 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
691 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
692 unsigned char curve_id[2];
693 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
694 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
695 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
696 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
697 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
701 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
702 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
706 /* Need a shared curve */
707 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
711 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
715 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
720 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
722 /* Default sigalg schemes */
723 static const unsigned int tls12_sigalgs[] = {
724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
725 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
726 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
727 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
730 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
731 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
732 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
734 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
735 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
736 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
738 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
739 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
740 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
744 static const unsigned int suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
745 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
746 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
750 typedef struct sigalg_lookup_st {
757 SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
758 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_EC, 0},
759 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_EC, 0},
760 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_EC, 0},
761 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_EC, 0},
763 * PSS must appear before PKCS1 so that we prefer that when signing where
766 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 1},
767 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 1},
768 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 1},
769 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 0},
770 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 0},
771 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 0},
772 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 0},
773 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_DSA, 0},
774 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_DSA, 0},
775 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_DSA, 0},
776 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_DSA, 0},
777 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, 0},
778 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, 0},
779 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, NID_id_GostR3411_94, NID_id_GostR3410_2001, 0}
782 static int tls_sigalg_get_hash(unsigned int sigalg)
787 for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
789 if (curr->sigalg == sigalg)
796 static int tls_sigalg_get_sig(unsigned int sigalg)
801 for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
803 if (curr->sigalg == sigalg)
810 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned int **psigs)
813 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
817 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
818 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
819 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
820 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
822 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
823 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
826 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
827 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
831 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
832 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
833 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
834 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
835 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
836 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
837 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
839 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
840 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
845 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
846 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
848 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, unsigned int sig,
851 const unsigned int *sent_sigs;
853 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
854 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
855 /* Should never happen */
858 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
859 if (pkeyid != tls_sigalg_get_sig(sig)) {
860 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
864 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
865 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
866 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
867 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
869 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
873 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
874 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
877 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
878 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha256) {
879 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
880 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
883 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
884 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha384) {
885 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
886 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
892 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
896 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
897 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
898 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
899 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
902 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
903 if (i == sent_sigslen
904 && (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha1
905 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
909 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig));
911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
915 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical reasons we
916 * have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
918 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
919 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
920 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
921 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
922 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
927 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
929 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
934 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
935 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
936 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
938 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
941 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
943 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
945 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
946 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
947 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
948 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
950 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
951 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
952 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
953 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
955 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
957 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
958 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
959 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
965 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
966 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
967 * @c: cipher to check
968 * @op: Security check that you want to do
970 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
972 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
974 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
975 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
977 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
979 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
980 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
982 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
983 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
986 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
989 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
991 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
993 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
996 /* Initialise digests to default values */
997 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
999 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
1000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1001 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
1003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1004 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1005 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
1007 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
1008 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
1010 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1011 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
1013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1014 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
1015 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
1016 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
1020 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1025 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1026 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1027 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1028 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1029 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1030 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1031 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
1032 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1035 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
1036 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
1037 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1038 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1039 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1042 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
1043 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1045 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1046 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1050 ssl_set_default_md(s);
1054 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1059 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1061 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1062 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1063 * point to the resulting session.
1065 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1066 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1067 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1070 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1071 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1072 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1073 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1074 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1075 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1076 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1079 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1080 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1081 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1082 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1083 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1084 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1086 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1091 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1094 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1097 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1098 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1101 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1104 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1105 if (!ticketext->present)
1108 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1111 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1114 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1117 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1119 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1120 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1121 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1122 * calculate the master secret later.
1127 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1128 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1130 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
1131 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1134 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
1137 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
1138 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1141 default: /* fatal error */
1147 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1149 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1150 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1151 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1152 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1153 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1154 * point to the resulting session.
1157 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
1158 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1159 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
1160 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
1161 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
1163 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1164 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1165 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1168 unsigned char *sdec;
1169 const unsigned char *p;
1170 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
1172 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1173 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1174 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
1175 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
1177 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1178 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1181 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1186 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1187 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1188 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1199 /* Check key name matches */
1200 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1201 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
1205 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
1206 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
1207 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1208 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1209 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
1210 etick + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <=
1216 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1219 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1223 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1225 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1230 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1231 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1232 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1235 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1236 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1237 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1240 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1241 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1242 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1243 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1244 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1245 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1246 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1247 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1251 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1252 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1257 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1261 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1265 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1266 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1267 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1271 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1272 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1281 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1285 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1286 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1290 int tls12_get_sigandhash(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
1295 SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1299 md_id = EVP_MD_type(md);
1300 sig_id = EVP_PKEY_id(pk);
1301 if (md_id == NID_undef)
1304 for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1306 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id
1307 && (!curr->notls12 || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1308 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curr->sigalg))
1323 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
1324 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX},
1325 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX},
1326 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX},
1327 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX},
1328 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX},
1329 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX},
1330 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX},
1331 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX},
1332 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX},
1335 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(int hash_nid)
1338 if (hash_nid == NID_undef)
1341 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
1342 if (tls12_md_info[i].nid == hash_nid)
1343 return tls12_md_info + i;
1349 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(int hash_nid)
1351 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
1352 if (hash_nid == NID_md5 && FIPS_mode())
1354 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_nid);
1357 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
1360 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(int sig_nid)
1363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1365 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
1367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1369 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
1371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1373 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
1375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1376 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
1377 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1379 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
1380 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1382 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
1383 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
1389 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
1390 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
1391 int *psignhash_nid, unsigned int data)
1393 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
1394 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
1396 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
1397 hash_nid = tls_sigalg_get_hash(data);
1399 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
1401 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
1402 sign_nid = tls_sigalg_get_sig(data);
1404 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
1406 if (psignhash_nid) {
1407 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
1408 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
1409 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
1413 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1414 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, unsigned int ptmp)
1416 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
1417 const tls12_hash_info *hinf
1418 = tls12_get_hash_info(tls_sigalg_get_hash(ptmp));
1419 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1421 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
1423 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1424 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(tls_sigalg_get_sig(ptmp)) == -1)
1426 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1427 sigalgstr[0] = (ptmp >> 8) & 0xff;
1428 sigalgstr[1] = ptmp & 0xff;
1429 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)sigalgstr);
1433 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1434 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1438 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1440 const unsigned int *sigalgs;
1441 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1442 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1444 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1445 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
1446 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
1448 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1449 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
1450 switch (tls_sigalg_get_sig(*sigalgs)) {
1451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1453 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1459 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1465 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1472 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1474 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1476 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1479 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1480 const unsigned int *psig, size_t psiglen)
1484 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1485 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, *psig)) {
1486 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1493 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1494 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
1495 const unsigned int *pref, size_t preflen,
1496 const unsigned int *allow, size_t allowlen)
1498 const unsigned int *ptmp, *atmp;
1499 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1500 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1501 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1502 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, *ptmp))
1504 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1505 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1508 shsig->rsigalg = *ptmp;
1509 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
1511 &shsig->signandhash_nid, *ptmp);
1521 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1522 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1524 const unsigned int *pref, *allow, *conf;
1525 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1527 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
1529 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1531 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1532 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1533 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1534 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1535 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1536 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1537 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1538 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1539 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1540 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1542 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
1543 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1546 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1547 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1551 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1552 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1554 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1556 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
1559 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1563 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1564 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1568 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1570 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1575 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1576 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1578 /* Should never happen */
1582 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1584 /* Invalid data length */
1585 if ((size & 1) != 0)
1590 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1591 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(size
1592 * sizeof(*s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs));
1593 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
1595 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = size;
1596 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs[i]);
1606 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1611 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
1612 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1614 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
1615 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1618 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
1619 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
1620 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->sign_nid);
1621 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
1622 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->hash_nid);
1624 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
1625 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
1626 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
1627 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
1633 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
1634 * the certificate for signing.
1636 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1638 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
1639 * supported it stays as NULL.
1641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1642 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
1643 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
1645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1646 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
1647 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
1648 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
1651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1652 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
1653 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
1655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1656 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
1657 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
1658 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
1659 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
1660 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
1661 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
1662 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
1663 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
1669 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1670 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1671 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1673 unsigned int *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1674 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1675 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1678 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1682 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1684 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1685 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, *psig);
1687 return (int)numsigalgs;
1690 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1691 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1692 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1694 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
1695 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1696 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1700 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
1702 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
1704 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
1706 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->rsigalg & 0xff);
1708 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->rsigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1709 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1712 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
1716 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
1719 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1721 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1722 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1723 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1724 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1725 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1726 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1728 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1729 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1730 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1734 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1736 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1739 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1742 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
1744 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1746 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1748 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1756 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1757 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1759 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
1762 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
1763 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
1766 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
1767 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
1772 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1773 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1775 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1779 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1783 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1786 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1788 unsigned int *sigalgs, *sptr;
1793 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1794 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1797 * TODO(TLS1.3): Somehow we need to be able to set RSA-PSS as well as
1798 * RSA-PKCS1. For now we only allow setting of RSA-PKCS1
1800 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1802 SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1803 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
1804 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
1806 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1808 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id && !curr->notls12) {
1809 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
1814 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1819 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1820 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1821 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
1823 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1824 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1825 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
1831 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
1835 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
1839 if (default_nid == -1)
1841 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
1843 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
1844 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
1845 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
1850 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1851 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
1855 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1856 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1857 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
1864 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1865 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1866 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1867 * attempting to use them.
1870 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
1872 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1873 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1874 /* Strict mode flags */
1875 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1876 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1877 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1879 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
1884 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
1885 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
1888 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
1889 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1891 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1894 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
1896 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
1897 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1899 pk = cpk->privatekey;
1901 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
1902 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1908 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
1911 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1913 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1914 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
1916 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
1923 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1924 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
1925 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
1926 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1927 else if (!check_flags)
1932 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1933 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1935 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
1938 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
1940 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1943 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
1944 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
1945 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1946 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
1949 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1950 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1951 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
1955 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1956 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
1959 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1960 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
1961 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
1964 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1965 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
1966 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
1969 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1970 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
1971 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
1980 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
1981 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
1983 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
1985 const unsigned int *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
1986 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
1987 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(*p) == NID_sha1
1988 && tls_sigalg_get_sig(*p) == rsign)
1991 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
1998 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
1999 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
2003 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2004 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2005 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2006 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2008 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2015 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2016 else if (check_flags)
2017 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2019 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2020 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
2021 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2022 else if (!check_flags)
2025 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2026 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2027 else if (strict_mode) {
2028 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2029 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2030 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2031 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2033 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2040 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2041 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2043 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2045 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2048 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2051 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2055 const unsigned char *ctypes;
2059 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
2061 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2062 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
2064 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
2065 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
2066 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2070 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2073 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2075 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
2077 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2078 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2080 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2081 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2082 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2084 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2085 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2086 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2087 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2088 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2093 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2096 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2098 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2099 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2103 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2104 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
2105 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2106 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
2107 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2109 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2112 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2116 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
2119 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2120 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2127 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2128 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2130 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
2131 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
2132 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2133 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2134 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2135 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2136 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2139 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
2140 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2142 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2146 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2148 int dh_secbits = 80;
2149 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2150 return DH_get_1024_160();
2151 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2152 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2157 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2158 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
2161 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2169 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2170 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2172 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2173 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2181 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2182 return DH_get_2048_224();
2183 return DH_get_1024_160();
2187 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2190 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2193 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2194 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2195 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2196 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2198 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2201 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2203 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2206 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2208 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2209 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
2210 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2211 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2213 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2214 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
2216 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
2217 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
2220 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2222 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2225 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2228 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2230 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2231 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2233 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2234 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2236 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2237 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2242 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
2243 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2244 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2247 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2249 int rv, start_idx, i;
2251 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2256 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2260 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2261 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2262 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);