1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
125 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
126 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
128 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
139 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
144 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
148 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
151 tls1_setup_key_block,
152 tls1_generate_master_secret,
153 tls1_change_cipher_state,
154 tls1_final_finish_mac,
155 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
156 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
157 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 tls1_export_keying_material,
160 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
161 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
162 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
166 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
169 tls1_setup_key_block,
170 tls1_generate_master_secret,
171 tls1_change_cipher_state,
172 tls1_final_finish_mac,
173 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
174 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
175 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
177 tls1_export_keying_material,
178 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
179 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
180 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
181 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
185 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
188 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
189 * http, the cache would over fill
191 return (60 * 60 * 2);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
208 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
211 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
212 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
214 s->version = s->method->version;
217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
220 int nid; /* Curve NID */
221 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
222 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
225 # define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x1
226 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
227 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
230 * Table of curve information.
231 * NB: do not delete entries or reorder this array. It is used as a lookup
232 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
235 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
236 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
240 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
241 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
242 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
243 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
244 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
245 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
246 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
247 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
248 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
249 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
250 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
251 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
252 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
253 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
254 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
255 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
256 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
257 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
258 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
259 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
260 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
261 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
266 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
267 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
269 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
272 /* The default curves */
273 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
274 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
275 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
277 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
278 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
279 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
280 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
281 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
282 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
283 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
284 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
285 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
286 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
287 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
288 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
289 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
292 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
293 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
294 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
295 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
296 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
297 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
298 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
299 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
300 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
301 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
302 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
303 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
304 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
305 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
306 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
307 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
308 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
310 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
311 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
313 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
314 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
315 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
316 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
317 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
318 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
319 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
320 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
321 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
322 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
323 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
324 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
325 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
326 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
327 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
331 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
332 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
333 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
336 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
338 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
339 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
341 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
344 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
347 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
348 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
355 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
357 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
358 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
359 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
360 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
361 * lists in the first place.
362 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
363 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
364 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
366 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
367 const unsigned char **pcurves,
370 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
372 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
373 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
375 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
376 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
377 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
378 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
379 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
382 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
383 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
387 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
388 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
392 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
393 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
396 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
397 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
401 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
402 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
407 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
412 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
413 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
415 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
418 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
420 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
421 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
422 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
425 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
428 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
429 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
431 const unsigned char *curves;
432 size_t num_curves, i;
433 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
434 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
436 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
438 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
441 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
442 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
444 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
445 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
447 } else /* Should never happen */
450 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
452 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
453 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
454 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
460 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
461 * if there is no match.
462 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
463 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
464 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
466 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
468 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
469 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
471 /* Can't do anything on client side */
475 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
477 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
478 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
480 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
481 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
482 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
483 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
484 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
485 /* Should never happen */
488 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
492 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
493 * but s->options is a long...
495 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
496 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
498 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
499 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
500 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
501 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
503 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
506 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
509 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
511 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
512 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
513 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
515 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
519 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
520 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
521 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
522 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
523 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
526 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
527 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
535 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
539 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
540 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
542 unsigned char *clist, *p;
545 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
548 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
549 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
552 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
553 unsigned long idmask;
555 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
557 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
566 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
570 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
574 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
577 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
579 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
585 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
587 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
589 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
591 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
592 if (nid == NID_undef)
593 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
594 if (nid == NID_undef)
595 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
596 if (nid == NID_undef)
598 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
599 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
601 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
605 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
606 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
611 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
615 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
618 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
619 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
626 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
627 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
630 /* Determine curve ID */
631 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
632 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
633 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
637 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
639 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
641 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
642 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
644 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
645 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
647 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
653 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
654 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
655 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
657 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
658 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
661 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
662 * supported (see RFC4492).
664 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
665 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
666 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
667 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
668 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
671 if (i == num_formats)
676 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
677 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
678 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
680 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
682 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
683 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
684 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
685 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
686 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
690 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
691 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
696 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
703 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
707 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
709 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
710 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
711 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
713 *pformats = ecformats_default;
714 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
716 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
718 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
723 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
724 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
726 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
728 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
731 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
734 /* If not EC nothing to do */
735 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
737 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
741 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
744 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
748 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
749 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
751 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
757 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
758 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
759 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
760 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
761 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
763 return 0; /* Should never happen */
764 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
765 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
767 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
769 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
770 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
771 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
773 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
779 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
781 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
783 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
785 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
786 * is compatible with the client extensions.
788 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
790 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
793 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
796 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
797 unsigned char curve_id[2];
798 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
799 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
800 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
801 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
802 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
806 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
807 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
811 /* Need a shared curve */
812 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
816 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
820 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
825 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
828 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
829 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
832 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
833 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
835 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
838 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
839 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
841 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
845 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
847 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
850 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
851 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
852 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
853 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
855 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
856 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
857 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
858 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
859 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
860 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
862 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
863 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
864 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
869 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
870 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
871 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
874 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
877 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
881 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
882 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
883 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
884 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
886 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
887 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
890 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
891 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
895 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
896 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
897 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
898 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
899 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
900 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
901 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
903 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
904 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
909 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
910 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
912 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
913 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
915 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
916 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
917 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
918 /* Should never happen */
921 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
922 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
927 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
928 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
929 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
930 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
932 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
936 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
937 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
940 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
941 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
943 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
946 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
947 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
949 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
955 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
959 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
960 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
961 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
962 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
965 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
966 if (i == sent_sigslen
967 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
968 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
972 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
977 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
978 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
979 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
985 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
987 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
992 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
993 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
994 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
997 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
999 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1000 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1001 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1002 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1003 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1005 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1006 /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
1007 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1008 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1009 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1010 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1011 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1012 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1013 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1014 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1016 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1017 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1018 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1019 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1020 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1025 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1027 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1028 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1029 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1031 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1034 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1036 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1038 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1041 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
1042 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
1043 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
1053 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
1054 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
1055 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
1056 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
1057 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
1060 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) {
1061 PACKET extensions = *packet;
1062 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
1063 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
1066 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
1067 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
1070 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
1071 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1077 if (num_extensions <= 1)
1080 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
1081 if (extension_types == NULL) {
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1086 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
1087 extensions = *packet;
1088 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1090 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1091 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1092 /* This should not happen. */
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1098 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1102 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1103 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1104 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1105 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1110 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1114 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1115 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1118 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1119 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1121 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1123 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1125 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1126 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1128 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1129 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1131 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1132 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1133 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1134 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1145 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1147 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1148 if (s->renegotiate) {
1151 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1156 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1159 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1162 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1169 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1170 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1173 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1174 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1175 unsigned long size_str;
1179 * check for enough space.
1180 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1181 * 2 for servernamelist length
1182 * 1 for the hostname type
1183 * 2 for hostname length
1187 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1189 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1192 /* extension type and length */
1193 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1194 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1196 /* length of servername list */
1197 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1199 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1200 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1202 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1206 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1207 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1208 * Client Hello message */
1210 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1211 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1217 * check for enough space.
1218 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1219 * 1 for the srp user identity
1220 * + srp user identity length
1222 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1225 /* fill in the extension */
1226 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1227 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1228 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1229 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1237 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1240 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1241 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1243 unsigned char *etmp;
1245 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1247 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1249 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1251 if (num_formats > 255) {
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1256 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1257 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1258 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1259 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1260 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1264 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1266 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1267 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1270 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1272 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1274 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1279 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1281 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1282 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1283 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1284 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1285 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1289 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1291 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1292 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1293 ret += curves_list_len;
1295 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1297 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1299 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1300 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1301 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1302 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1303 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1304 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1305 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1307 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1308 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1309 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1312 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1313 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1316 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1319 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1321 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1324 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1330 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1332 const unsigned char *salg;
1333 unsigned char *etmp;
1334 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1335 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1337 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1339 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1341 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1342 /* Fill in lengths */
1343 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1348 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1350 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1354 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1355 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1356 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1362 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1363 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1369 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1371 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1372 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1374 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1375 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1377 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1378 /* save position of id len */
1379 unsigned char *q = ret;
1380 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1381 /* skip over id len */
1383 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1389 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1392 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1393 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1394 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1400 * 1: peer may send requests
1401 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1403 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1404 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1406 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1411 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1413 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1414 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1416 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1418 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1423 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1424 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1426 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1427 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1428 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1429 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1430 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1433 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1436 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1437 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1442 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1445 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1448 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1455 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1456 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1457 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1459 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1460 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1463 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1467 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1468 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1469 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1472 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1473 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1475 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1476 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1482 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1484 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1491 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1494 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1498 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1499 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1502 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1503 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1505 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1507 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1508 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1509 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1510 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1511 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1516 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1518 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1521 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1526 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1532 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1540 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1541 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1544 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1545 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1546 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1549 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1552 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1554 const unsigned char *plist;
1557 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1561 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1563 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1565 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1567 if (plistlen > 255) {
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1572 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1573 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1574 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1575 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1580 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1583 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1585 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1586 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1588 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1592 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1593 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1595 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1603 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1604 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1608 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1611 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1614 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1622 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1623 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1624 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1625 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1626 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1627 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1628 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1629 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1630 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1631 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1633 if (limit - ret < 36)
1635 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1640 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1641 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1642 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1644 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1648 * 1: peer may send requests
1649 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1651 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1652 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1654 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1660 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1661 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1662 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1663 const unsigned char *npa;
1664 unsigned int npalen;
1667 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1669 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1670 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1671 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1673 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1675 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1677 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1681 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1683 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1684 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1686 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1687 * for other cases too.
1689 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1690 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1691 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1692 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1693 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1695 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1700 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1701 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1705 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1706 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1707 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1709 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1711 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1715 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1721 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1724 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1729 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1730 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1731 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1732 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1735 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1737 unsigned int data_len;
1738 unsigned int proto_len;
1739 const unsigned char *selected;
1740 const unsigned char *data;
1741 unsigned char selected_len;
1744 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1748 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1749 * length-prefixed strings.
1751 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
1752 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
1753 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
1757 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
1759 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
1761 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
1763 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1764 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1765 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1766 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1767 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1768 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1769 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1772 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1773 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1778 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1782 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1784 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1785 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1786 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1791 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1792 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1793 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1794 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1796 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1798 unsigned int type, size;
1799 const unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
1802 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1803 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1804 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1805 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1806 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1807 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1808 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1810 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1811 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1812 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1813 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1816 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1817 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1818 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1819 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1820 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1821 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1822 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1823 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1824 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1825 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1830 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1831 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1832 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
1833 || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
1836 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1839 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1840 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1841 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1843 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
1844 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
1845 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1847 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1849 if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1852 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1854 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
1855 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1857 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1861 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1863 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1865 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1870 const unsigned char *data;
1871 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1873 s->servername_done = 0;
1874 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1876 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1879 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1880 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1882 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1883 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1887 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1888 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1889 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1891 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1892 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1893 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1894 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1895 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1899 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1900 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1903 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1905 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1908 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
1911 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
1914 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt))
1917 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1920 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
1923 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1924 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1926 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
1929 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1930 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
1932 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1933 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1936 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1938 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1939 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1940 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1941 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1942 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1943 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1944 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1945 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1946 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1947 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1948 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1949 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1950 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1951 * the value of the Host: field.
1952 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1953 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1954 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1956 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1960 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1961 const unsigned char *sdata;
1962 unsigned int servname_type;
1966 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
1967 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
1970 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
1971 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
1972 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
1973 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
1976 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1977 switch (servname_type) {
1978 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1980 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1983 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1984 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1987 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1988 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1989 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1992 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
1993 (unsigned char *)s->session
1996 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1999 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2000 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2001 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2002 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2003 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2006 s->servername_done = 1;
2009 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
2010 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2013 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2014 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2015 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2016 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2025 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
2026 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
2030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2031 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2032 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
2033 || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2036 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2038 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
2041 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2043 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
2044 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
2049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2050 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2051 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2053 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2054 || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
2058 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2059 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2060 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2061 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2062 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2063 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2066 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2067 ecpointformatlist_length;
2068 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2069 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2070 ecpointformatlist_length))
2072 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2075 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2076 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2077 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2080 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2081 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
2083 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2084 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
2085 || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
2086 || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
2090 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2093 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2094 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2095 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2096 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2099 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2100 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2101 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2102 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2103 ellipticcurvelist_length))
2105 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2108 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2109 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2113 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2114 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2115 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
2116 || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2117 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2118 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
2119 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2122 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2125 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
2126 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2129 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2130 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
2131 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2134 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2137 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
2138 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
2141 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2142 const unsigned char *sdata;
2144 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2145 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2146 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2149 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
2151 unsigned int idsize;
2153 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
2154 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
2155 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
2160 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2163 if (data != sdata) {
2164 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2167 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2168 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2169 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2170 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2171 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2174 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2175 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2176 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2181 /* Read in request_extensions */
2182 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2183 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2184 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2189 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2190 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2191 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2192 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2193 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2198 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2201 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2204 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2205 unsigned int hbtype;
2207 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
2208 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2209 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2213 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2214 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2216 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2217 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2218 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2221 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2227 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2228 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2229 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2231 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2234 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2235 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2236 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2237 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2238 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2239 * anything like that, but this might change).
2241 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2242 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2243 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2244 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2245 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2247 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2251 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2252 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2253 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
2255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2256 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2257 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2261 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2263 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2264 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2265 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
2269 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2270 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2271 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2274 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2275 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2279 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2280 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2281 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2282 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2283 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2286 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2291 /* Spurious data on the end */
2292 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
2297 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2299 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2300 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2301 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2303 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2309 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2313 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2316 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2317 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2318 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2322 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2331 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2332 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2333 * fill the length of the block.
2335 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2339 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2340 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2341 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2349 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2351 unsigned int length, type, size;
2352 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2353 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2355 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2356 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2358 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2360 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2361 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2363 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2364 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2367 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2368 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2371 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2373 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2376 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2377 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2381 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2382 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2386 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2387 const unsigned char *data;
2390 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2391 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2394 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2395 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2397 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2398 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2400 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2401 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2402 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2403 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2404 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2407 tlsext_servername = 1;
2409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2410 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2411 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2412 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2413 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2414 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2418 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2419 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2420 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2421 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2422 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2425 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2426 ecpointformatlist_length;
2427 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2428 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2429 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2430 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2436 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2438 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2439 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2440 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2441 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2443 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2446 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2447 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2450 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2452 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2454 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2457 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2458 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2461 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2462 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2465 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2466 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2467 unsigned char *selected;
2468 unsigned char selected_len;
2469 /* We must have requested it. */
2470 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2471 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2474 /* The data must be valid */
2475 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2476 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2480 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2482 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2483 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2484 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2487 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2488 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2489 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2492 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2493 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2494 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2498 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2500 /* We must have requested it. */
2501 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2502 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2506 * The extension data consists of:
2507 * uint16 list_length
2508 * uint8 proto_length;
2509 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2511 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2512 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2513 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2514 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2515 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2518 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2519 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2520 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2521 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2524 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2525 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2528 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2531 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2532 unsigned int hbtype;
2533 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2534 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2538 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2539 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2541 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2542 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2543 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2546 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2552 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2553 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2557 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2558 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2559 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2560 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2561 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2562 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2565 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2566 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2568 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2571 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2572 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2574 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2578 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2579 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2583 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2584 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2585 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2586 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2587 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2588 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2592 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2601 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2602 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2603 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2604 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2605 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2606 * initial connect only.
2608 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2609 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2610 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2611 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2612 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2618 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2621 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2622 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2623 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2632 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2638 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2643 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2645 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2646 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2650 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2651 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2654 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2655 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2659 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2661 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2662 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2663 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2664 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2666 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2668 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2671 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2672 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2675 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2676 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2679 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2680 s->servername_done = 0;
2685 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2686 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2688 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2689 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2690 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2693 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2694 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2696 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2697 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2700 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2703 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2704 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2705 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2709 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2713 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2714 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2715 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2716 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2717 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2718 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2719 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2720 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2723 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2724 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2725 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2726 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2727 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2730 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2731 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2733 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2734 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2738 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2742 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2746 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2748 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2749 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2752 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2753 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2754 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2755 * influence which certificate is sent
2757 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2759 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2760 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2761 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2762 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2763 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2767 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2768 * et al can pick it up.
2770 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2771 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2773 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2774 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2775 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2777 /* status request response should be sent */
2778 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2779 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2780 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2782 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2784 /* something bad happened */
2785 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2786 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2787 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2791 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2795 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2796 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2799 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2800 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2808 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2810 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2811 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2815 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2816 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2817 * must contain uncompressed.
2819 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2820 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2821 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2822 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2823 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2824 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2825 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2826 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2828 unsigned char *list;
2829 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2830 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2831 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2832 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2833 found_uncompressed = 1;
2837 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2839 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2843 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2844 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2846 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2848 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2849 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2850 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2851 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2853 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2855 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2858 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2859 * that we don't receive a status message
2861 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2862 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2863 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2866 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2867 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2870 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2871 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2874 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2875 s->servername_done = 0;
2881 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2884 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2886 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2887 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2891 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2899 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2900 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2901 * need to be handled at the same time.
2903 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2906 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2907 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2908 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2909 * point to the resulting session.
2911 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2912 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2913 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2916 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2917 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2918 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2919 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2920 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2921 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2922 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2925 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2926 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2927 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2928 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2929 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2930 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2932 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2935 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2936 const PACKET *session_id,
2940 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2943 int have_ticket = 0;
2944 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2947 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2948 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2951 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2954 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2957 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2961 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2962 unsigned int type, size;
2964 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2965 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2966 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2970 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2974 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2976 const unsigned char *etick;
2978 /* Duplicate extension */
2979 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2987 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2990 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2994 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2996 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2997 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2998 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2999 * calculate the master secret later.
3004 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
3005 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3009 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3010 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3012 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3013 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3016 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3019 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3020 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3023 default: /* fatal error */
3029 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
3030 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3031 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3037 if (have_ticket == 0)
3044 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3046 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3047 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3048 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3049 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3050 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3051 * point to the resulting session.
3054 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3055 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3056 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3057 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3058 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3060 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3061 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3062 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3065 unsigned char *sdec;
3066 const unsigned char *p;
3067 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
3068 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3069 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3070 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3071 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3072 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3075 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3076 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3079 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3084 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3085 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3086 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3097 /* Check key name matches */
3098 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) {
3102 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3103 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3104 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3105 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3111 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3114 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3119 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3120 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3121 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3124 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3125 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3126 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3129 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3130 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3131 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3132 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3133 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3135 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3136 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3139 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3140 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3145 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3149 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3153 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3154 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3155 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3159 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3160 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3169 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3173 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3174 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3178 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3185 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3186 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3187 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3188 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3189 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3190 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3191 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3192 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3193 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3194 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3197 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3198 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3199 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3200 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3201 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3202 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3203 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3206 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3209 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3210 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3216 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3219 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3220 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3221 return table[i].nid;
3226 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3232 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3235 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3238 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3239 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3243 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3245 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3252 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3255 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3256 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3257 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3258 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3259 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3260 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3261 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3262 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3263 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3264 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3267 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3273 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3275 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3276 return tls12_md_info + i;
3282 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3284 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3285 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3287 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3290 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3293 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3296 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3297 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3298 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3301 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3302 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3305 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3306 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3308 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3309 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3310 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3312 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3313 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3315 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3316 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3322 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3323 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3324 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3326 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3327 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3329 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3330 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3332 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3334 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3335 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3337 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3339 if (psignhash_nid) {
3340 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3341 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3343 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3347 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3348 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3350 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3351 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3352 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3354 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3355 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3357 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3358 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3362 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3363 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3367 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3369 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3370 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3371 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3373 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3374 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3375 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3377 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3378 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3379 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3380 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3381 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3382 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3387 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3388 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3393 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3394 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3401 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3403 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3405 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3408 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3409 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3411 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3413 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3414 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3415 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3416 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3419 return tmpout - out;
3422 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3423 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3424 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3425 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3427 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3428 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3429 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3430 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3431 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3433 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3434 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3437 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3438 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3439 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3441 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3451 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3452 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3454 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3455 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3457 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3459 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3461 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3462 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3463 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3464 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3465 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3466 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3467 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3468 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3469 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3470 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3472 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3473 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3476 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3477 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3481 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3482 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3484 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3486 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3489 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3493 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3494 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3498 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3500 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3503 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3504 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3506 /* Should never happen */
3510 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3511 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3512 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3514 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3515 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3519 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3524 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3525 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3527 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3528 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3531 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3532 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3533 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3534 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3535 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3537 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3538 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3539 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3540 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3546 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3547 * the certificate for signing.
3549 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3551 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3552 * supported it stays as NULL.
3554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3555 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3556 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3559 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3560 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3561 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3565 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3566 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3568 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3569 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3570 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3571 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3572 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3573 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3574 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3580 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3581 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3582 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3584 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3589 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3596 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3598 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3601 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3602 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3603 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3605 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3606 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3610 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3612 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3614 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3616 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3618 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3619 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3622 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3626 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3629 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3631 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3632 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3633 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3634 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3635 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3636 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3638 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3639 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3640 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3644 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3646 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3649 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3652 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3654 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3656 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3658 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3666 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3667 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3669 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3672 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3673 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3676 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3677 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3682 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3683 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3685 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3689 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3693 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3696 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3699 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3704 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3705 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3707 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3708 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3709 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3711 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3718 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3719 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3720 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3722 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3723 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3724 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3730 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3734 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3738 if (default_nid == -1)
3740 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3742 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3743 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3744 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3749 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3750 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3754 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3755 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3756 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3763 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3764 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3765 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3766 * attempting to use them.
3769 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3771 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3772 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3773 /* Strict mode flags */
3774 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3775 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3776 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3778 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3783 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3784 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3787 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3788 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3790 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3793 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3795 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3796 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3798 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3800 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3801 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3807 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3810 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3812 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3813 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3815 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3822 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3823 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3824 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3825 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3826 else if (!check_flags)
3831 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3832 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3834 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3836 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3837 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3839 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3842 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3843 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3844 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3845 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3848 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3849 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3850 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3854 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3855 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3858 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3859 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3860 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3863 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3864 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3865 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3868 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3869 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3870 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3879 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3880 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3882 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3884 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3885 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3886 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3889 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3896 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3897 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3901 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3902 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3903 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3904 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3906 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3913 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3914 else if (check_flags)
3915 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3917 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3918 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3919 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3920 else if (!check_flags)
3923 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3924 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3925 else if (strict_mode) {
3926 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3927 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3928 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3929 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3931 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3938 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3939 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3941 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3943 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3946 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3949 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3953 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3957 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3959 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3960 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3962 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3963 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3964 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3968 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3971 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3973 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3975 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3976 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3978 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3979 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3980 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3982 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3983 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3984 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3985 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3986 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3991 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3994 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3996 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3997 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4001 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4002 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4003 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4004 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4005 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4007 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4010 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4014 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4017 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4018 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4025 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4026 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4028 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4029 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4030 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4031 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4032 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4033 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4034 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4037 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4038 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4040 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4045 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4047 int dh_secbits = 80;
4048 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4049 return DH_get_1024_160();
4050 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4051 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4056 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4057 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4060 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4066 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4067 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4068 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4070 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4071 if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
4077 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4078 return DH_get_2048_224();
4079 return DH_get_1024_160();
4083 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4086 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4089 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4090 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4091 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4092 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4094 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4097 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4099 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4102 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4104 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4105 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4106 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4107 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4109 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4110 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4112 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4113 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4116 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4118 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4121 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4124 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4126 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4127 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4129 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4130 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4132 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4133 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4138 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4139 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4140 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4143 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4145 int rv, start_idx, i;
4147 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4152 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4156 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4157 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4158 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);