2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
253 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
254 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
255 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
258 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
260 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
261 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
262 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
263 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
264 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
265 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
266 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
267 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
269 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
270 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
271 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
272 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
273 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
274 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
275 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
276 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
277 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
278 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
279 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
280 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
281 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
282 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
283 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
284 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
287 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
289 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
290 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
293 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
295 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
296 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
297 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
299 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
302 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
304 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
307 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
309 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
311 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
313 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
315 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
317 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
319 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
321 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
323 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
325 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
327 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
329 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
331 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
333 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
335 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
337 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
339 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
341 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
343 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
345 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
347 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
349 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
351 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
353 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
355 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
361 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
364 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
365 const unsigned char **pcurves,
370 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
371 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
374 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
375 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
377 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
378 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
379 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
382 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
383 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
387 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
388 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
392 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
393 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
397 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
398 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
401 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
402 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
404 const unsigned char *curves;
406 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
407 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
409 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
412 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
415 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
420 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
422 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
425 else /* Should never happen */
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
429 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
431 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
437 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
438 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
442 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
444 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
445 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
447 /* Can't do anything on client side */
454 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
455 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
458 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
459 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
460 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
461 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
463 /* Should never happen */
466 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
469 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
471 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
476 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
478 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
479 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
481 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
485 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
486 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
497 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
498 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
500 unsigned char *clist, *p;
502 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
503 * while curve ids < 32
505 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
506 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
509 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
511 unsigned long idmask;
513 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
515 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
526 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
530 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
535 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
538 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
540 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
544 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
546 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
548 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
550 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
551 if (nid == NID_undef)
552 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
553 if (nid == NID_undef)
554 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
555 if (nid == NID_undef)
557 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
558 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
560 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
563 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
564 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
569 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
573 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
575 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
576 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
582 const EC_METHOD *meth;
585 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
586 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
587 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
590 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
593 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
597 /* Determine curve ID */
598 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
599 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
600 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
604 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
616 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
619 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
621 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
624 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
628 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
629 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
630 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
632 const unsigned char *p;
635 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
636 * is supported (see RFC4492).
638 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
640 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
641 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
642 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
652 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
653 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
655 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
656 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
658 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
663 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
670 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
673 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
675 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
677 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
678 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
682 *pformats = ecformats_default;
683 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
685 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
687 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
691 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
692 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
694 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
696 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
699 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
702 /* If not EC nothing to do */
703 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
708 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
712 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
713 * supported curves extension.
715 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
718 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
719 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
721 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
728 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
729 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
730 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
731 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
732 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
734 return 0; /* Should never happen */
735 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
736 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
738 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
742 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
743 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
745 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
750 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
751 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
753 unsigned char curve_id[2];
754 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
755 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
756 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
757 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
760 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
761 * no other curves permitted.
765 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
766 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
767 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
768 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
769 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
773 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
774 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
776 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
777 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
779 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
782 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
785 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
787 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
793 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
795 /* Need a shared curve */
796 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
802 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
807 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
809 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
813 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
819 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
824 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
828 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
829 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
832 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
833 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
835 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
838 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
839 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
841 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
850 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
851 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
852 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
853 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
855 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
857 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
858 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
861 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
862 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
865 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
868 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
872 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
873 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
877 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
879 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
883 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
885 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
886 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
887 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
889 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
890 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
893 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
894 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
898 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
899 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
901 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
902 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
904 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
906 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
907 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
911 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
913 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
915 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
918 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
921 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
922 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
924 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
925 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
927 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
928 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
929 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
930 /* Should never happen */
933 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
934 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
940 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
942 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
943 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
944 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
946 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
951 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
956 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
958 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
961 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
965 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
967 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
970 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
978 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
982 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
983 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
984 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
986 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
989 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
990 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
995 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1001 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1004 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1005 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1008 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1009 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1010 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1011 * session and not global settings.
1014 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1017 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1018 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1019 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1022 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1023 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1024 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1027 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1028 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1031 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1032 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1037 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1042 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1047 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1053 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1054 * signature algorithms.
1058 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1059 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1063 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1064 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1068 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1069 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1072 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1074 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1078 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1079 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1080 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1082 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1083 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1085 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1089 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1090 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1092 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1093 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1102 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1105 unsigned char *ret = p;
1106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1107 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1109 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1112 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1113 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1115 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1117 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1119 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1120 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1121 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1122 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1131 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1132 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1133 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1138 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1140 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1142 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1143 unsigned long size_str;
1146 /* check for enough space.
1147 4 for the servername type and entension length
1148 2 for servernamelist length
1149 1 for the hostname type
1150 2 for hostname length
1154 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1155 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1158 /* extension type and length */
1159 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1160 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1162 /* length of servername list */
1163 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1165 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1166 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1168 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1172 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1177 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1183 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1185 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1188 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1198 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1199 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1200 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1202 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1203 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1209 /* check for enough space.
1210 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1211 1 for the srp user identity
1212 + srp user identity length
1214 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1216 /* fill in the extension */
1217 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1218 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1219 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1220 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1228 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1230 const unsigned char *plist;
1233 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1235 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1236 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1243 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1244 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1245 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1246 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1249 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1250 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1251 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1253 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1254 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1255 if (plistlen > 65532)
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1262 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1264 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1265 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1266 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1267 * resolves this to two bytes.
1270 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1273 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1275 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1278 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1279 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1280 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1281 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1283 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1284 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1285 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1287 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1288 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1290 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1294 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1295 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1297 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1300 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1301 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1305 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1311 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1314 const unsigned char *salg;
1315 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1316 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1318 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1319 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1321 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1325 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1326 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1328 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1330 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1332 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1335 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1338 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1343 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1346 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1350 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1352 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1353 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1359 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1361 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1368 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1370 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1372 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1373 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1375 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1377 /* save position of id len */
1378 unsigned char *q = ret;
1379 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1380 /* skip over id len */
1382 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1388 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1392 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1393 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1396 * 1: peer may send requests
1397 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1399 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1400 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1402 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1406 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1408 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1409 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1410 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1412 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1417 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1419 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1421 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1422 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1423 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1424 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1425 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1426 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1429 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1433 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1435 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1437 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1440 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1448 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1449 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1452 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1454 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1456 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1457 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1459 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1460 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1461 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1465 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1469 return NULL; /* error */
1470 if (cb_retval == -1)
1471 continue; /* skip this extension */
1473 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1475 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1477 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1482 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1489 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1492 unsigned char *ret = p;
1493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1494 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1497 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1498 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1499 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1500 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1502 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1503 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1507 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1509 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1511 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1517 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1521 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1527 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1532 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1544 const unsigned char *plist;
1546 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1549 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1551 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1552 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1559 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1560 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1561 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1562 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1566 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1567 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1569 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1570 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1572 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1573 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1577 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1579 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1580 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1584 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1585 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1587 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1589 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1591 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1594 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1597 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1606 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1608 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1610 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1613 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1621 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1622 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1623 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1624 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1625 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1626 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1627 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1628 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1629 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1630 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1631 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1637 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1638 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1640 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1643 * 1: peer may send requests
1644 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1646 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1647 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1649 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1655 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1656 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1657 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1659 const unsigned char *npa;
1660 unsigned int npalen;
1663 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1664 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1666 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1667 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1669 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1671 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1676 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1677 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1681 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1684 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1686 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1688 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1689 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1691 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1692 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1695 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1698 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1702 return NULL; /* error */
1703 if (cb_retval == -1)
1704 break; /* skip this extension */
1705 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1707 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1709 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1717 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1719 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1720 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1722 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1724 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1728 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1732 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1739 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1741 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1742 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1743 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1746 * returns: 0 on success. */
1747 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1748 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1752 const unsigned char *selected;
1753 unsigned char selected_len;
1756 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1762 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1763 * length-prefixed strings. */
1764 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1765 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1774 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1776 proto_len = data[i];
1782 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1788 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1789 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1790 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1791 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1792 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1793 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1794 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1796 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1799 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1800 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1805 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1810 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1811 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1812 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1817 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1818 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1819 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1820 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1822 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1823 unsigned short type, size;
1824 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1825 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1826 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1827 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1828 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1829 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1830 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1832 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1833 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1834 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1835 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1838 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1839 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1840 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1841 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1842 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1843 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1844 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1845 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1846 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1847 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1850 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1859 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1862 if (data+size > d+n)
1866 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1868 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1869 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1871 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1873 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1875 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1880 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1882 if (data + len != d+n)
1884 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1888 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1890 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1892 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1894 unsigned short type;
1895 unsigned short size;
1897 unsigned char *data = *p;
1898 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1901 s->servername_done = 0;
1902 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1904 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1907 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1909 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1910 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1913 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1914 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1915 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1917 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
1918 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1922 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1923 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1927 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1928 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1929 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1931 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1932 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1934 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1935 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1937 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1938 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1940 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1941 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1943 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1944 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1946 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1947 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1950 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1954 if (data > (d+n-len))
1957 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1962 if (data+size > (d+n))
1965 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1967 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1968 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1969 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1970 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1972 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1973 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1974 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1975 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1976 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1977 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1978 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1979 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1980 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1981 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1982 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1983 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1984 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1985 the value of the Host: field.
1986 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1987 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1988 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1989 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1993 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1995 unsigned char *sdata;
2001 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2008 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2015 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2021 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2024 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2025 switch (servname_type)
2027 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2030 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2032 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2035 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2037 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2040 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2042 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2045 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2046 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2047 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2048 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2049 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2050 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2053 s->servername_done = 1;
2057 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2058 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2059 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2071 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2077 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2079 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2081 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2084 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2086 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2089 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2091 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2092 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2094 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2096 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2103 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2105 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2106 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2108 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2109 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2111 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2116 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2118 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2119 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2121 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2122 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2124 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2127 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2128 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2131 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2132 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2133 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2134 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2135 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2138 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2140 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2141 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2142 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2144 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2145 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2147 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2152 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2154 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2157 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2158 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2160 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2163 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2164 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2167 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2168 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2169 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2170 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2171 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2174 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2175 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2176 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2178 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2182 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2185 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2186 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2188 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2192 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2193 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2194 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2195 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2197 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2198 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2200 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2205 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2207 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2208 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2210 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2214 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2216 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2218 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2220 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2223 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2225 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2230 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2232 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2235 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2237 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2240 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2243 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2246 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2247 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2251 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2252 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2257 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2261 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2263 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2265 const unsigned char *sdata;
2267 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2272 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2281 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2285 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2289 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2294 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2298 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2303 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2304 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2307 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2308 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2309 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2311 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2312 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2315 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2316 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2318 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2319 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2324 /* Read in request_extensions */
2327 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2334 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2340 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2342 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2343 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2346 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2347 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2349 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2350 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2352 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2357 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2361 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2364 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2368 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2369 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2371 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2372 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2373 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2375 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2380 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2381 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2382 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2383 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2385 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2388 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2389 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2390 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2391 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2392 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2393 * anything like that, but this might change).
2395 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2396 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2397 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2398 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2399 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2400 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2404 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2405 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2406 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2408 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2410 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2411 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2414 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2415 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2417 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2421 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2422 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2423 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2424 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2425 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2427 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2429 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2431 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2433 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2434 if (type == record->ext_type)
2438 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2439 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2441 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2443 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2448 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2449 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2452 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2453 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2454 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2455 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2456 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2457 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2459 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2460 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2463 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2464 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2476 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2478 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2479 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2481 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2483 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2486 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2487 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2488 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2493 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2496 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2498 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2502 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2510 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2511 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2512 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2513 * the length of the block. */
2514 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2516 unsigned int off = 0;
2530 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2532 unsigned short length;
2533 unsigned short type;
2534 unsigned short size;
2535 unsigned char *data = *p;
2536 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2537 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2540 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2543 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2545 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2546 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2550 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2551 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2554 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2558 if (data+length != d+n)
2560 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2564 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2569 if (data+size > (d+n))
2572 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2573 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2574 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2576 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2578 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2580 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2583 tlsext_servername = 1;
2586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2587 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2589 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2590 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2592 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2594 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2597 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2598 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2599 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2601 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2604 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2605 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2607 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2608 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2609 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2610 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2611 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2614 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2616 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2618 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2619 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2621 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2624 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2627 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2630 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2632 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2633 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2635 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2639 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2642 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2643 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2645 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2649 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2650 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2651 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2652 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2654 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2656 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2658 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2663 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2665 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2666 * a status request message.
2668 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2670 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2673 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2674 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2677 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2678 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2680 unsigned char *selected;
2681 unsigned char selected_len;
2683 /* We must have requested it. */
2684 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2686 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2689 /* The data must be valid */
2690 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2692 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2695 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2697 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2700 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2701 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2703 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2706 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2707 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2708 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2712 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2716 /* We must have requested it. */
2717 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2719 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2724 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2727 /* The extension data consists of:
2728 * uint16 list_length
2729 * uint8 proto_length;
2730 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2734 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2736 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2740 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2742 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2745 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2746 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2747 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2748 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2750 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2753 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2754 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2757 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2759 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2761 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2764 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2768 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2769 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2771 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2772 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2773 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2775 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2780 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2782 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2786 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2787 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2789 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2792 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2794 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2796 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2797 if (record->ext_type == type)
2799 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2811 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2815 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2817 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2819 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2821 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2822 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2824 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2830 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2840 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2841 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2842 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2843 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2844 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2845 * absence on initial connect only.
2847 if (!renegotiate_seen
2848 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2849 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2851 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2853 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2861 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2864 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2868 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2870 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2875 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2877 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2878 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2880 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2881 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2883 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2884 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2889 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2893 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2894 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2901 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2906 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2908 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2909 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2912 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2913 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2915 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2916 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2920 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2921 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2922 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2923 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2925 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2927 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2928 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2929 * so this has to happen here in
2930 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2934 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2936 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2939 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2940 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2945 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2946 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2947 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2949 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2951 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2952 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2954 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2955 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2957 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2958 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2960 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2961 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2963 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2964 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2967 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2971 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2973 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2974 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2975 * abort the handshake.
2977 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2978 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2986 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2987 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2990 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2991 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2994 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2995 s->servername_done=0;
3001 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3003 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3006 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3007 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3008 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3009 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3011 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3014 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3015 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3016 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3017 if (certpkey == NULL)
3019 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3022 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3023 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3025 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3026 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3029 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3030 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3031 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3033 /* status request response should be sent */
3034 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3035 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3036 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3038 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3040 /* something bad happened */
3041 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3042 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3043 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3048 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3053 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3054 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3057 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3058 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3066 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3068 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3069 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3072 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3073 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3074 * it must contain uncompressed.
3076 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3077 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3078 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3079 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3080 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3082 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3084 unsigned char *list;
3085 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3086 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3087 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3089 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3091 found_uncompressed = 1;
3095 if (!found_uncompressed)
3097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3101 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3102 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3104 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3105 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3106 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3107 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3109 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3110 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3112 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3113 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3115 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3117 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3118 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3121 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3122 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3123 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3124 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3126 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3127 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3132 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3135 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3136 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3139 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3140 * there is no response.
3142 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3144 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3145 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3147 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3148 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3151 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3152 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3156 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3157 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3163 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3164 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3167 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3168 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3171 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3172 s->servername_done=0;
3178 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3181 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3183 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3185 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3189 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3197 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3198 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3199 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3201 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3202 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3203 * extension, if any.
3204 * len: the length of the session ID.
3205 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3206 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3207 * point to the resulting session.
3209 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3210 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3211 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3214 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3215 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3216 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3217 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3218 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3219 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3220 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3223 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3224 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3225 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3226 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3227 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3228 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3230 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3231 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3233 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3234 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3238 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3240 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3241 * to permit stateful resumption.
3243 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3245 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3249 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3257 /* Skip past cipher list */
3262 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3267 /* Now at start of extensions */
3268 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3271 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3273 unsigned short type, size;
3276 if (p + size > limit)
3278 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3283 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3284 * currently have one. */
3285 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3288 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3290 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3291 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3292 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3293 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3294 * calculate the master secret later. */
3297 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3300 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3301 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3303 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3305 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3306 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3308 default: /* fatal error */
3317 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3319 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3320 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3321 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3322 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3323 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3324 * point to the resulting session.
3327 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3328 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3329 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3330 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3332 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3333 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3334 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3337 unsigned char *sdec;
3338 const unsigned char *p;
3339 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3340 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3343 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3344 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3347 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3348 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3349 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3350 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3352 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3353 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3364 /* Check key name matches */
3365 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3367 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3368 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3369 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3370 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3372 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3373 * integrity checks on ticket.
3375 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3378 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3382 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3383 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3384 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3385 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3386 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3388 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3389 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3390 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3391 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3392 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3395 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3398 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3399 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3402 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3405 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3409 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3410 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3411 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3412 * as required by standard.
3415 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3416 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3424 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3429 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3437 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3438 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3439 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3440 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3441 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3442 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3443 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3446 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3447 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3448 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3449 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3452 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3455 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3457 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3463 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3466 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3468 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3469 return table[i].nid;
3474 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3479 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3480 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3483 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3486 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3487 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3491 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3493 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3494 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3497 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3502 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3509 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3510 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3514 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3515 return EVP_sha224();
3517 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3518 return EVP_sha256();
3520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3521 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3522 return EVP_sha384();
3524 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3525 return EVP_sha512();
3533 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3538 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3539 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3542 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3543 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3546 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3547 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3553 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3554 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3555 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3557 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3558 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3560 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3562 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3563 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3565 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3567 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3569 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3570 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3572 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3576 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3577 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3578 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3580 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3583 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3584 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3585 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3586 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3588 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3589 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3590 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3592 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3593 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3595 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3597 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3599 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3604 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3605 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3606 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3608 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3619 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3620 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3622 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3623 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3625 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3627 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3628 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3629 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3631 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3632 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3634 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3636 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3637 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3640 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3641 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3645 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3646 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3652 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3653 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3655 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3658 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3661 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3662 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3663 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3668 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3670 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3676 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3677 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3678 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3680 /* Should never happen */
3684 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3685 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3687 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3688 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3690 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3692 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3693 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3695 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3696 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3698 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3700 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3702 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3705 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3706 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3707 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3708 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3709 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3711 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3712 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3718 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3719 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3721 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3722 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3724 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3725 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3726 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3727 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3729 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3730 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3735 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3736 * use the certificate for signing.
3738 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3740 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3741 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3744 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3745 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3748 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3750 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3751 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3755 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3756 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3763 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3764 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3765 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3767 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3773 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3780 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3782 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3785 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3786 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3787 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3789 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3790 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3794 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3796 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3798 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3800 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3802 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3803 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3809 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3811 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3812 unsigned short hbtype;
3813 unsigned int payload;
3814 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3816 /* Read type and payload length first */
3821 if (s->msg_callback)
3822 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3823 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3824 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3826 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3828 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3831 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3832 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3833 * payload, plus padding
3835 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3838 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3839 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3841 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3843 /* Random padding */
3844 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3846 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3848 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3849 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3850 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3851 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3853 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3858 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3862 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3863 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3864 * sequence number */
3867 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3870 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3878 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3880 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3882 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3883 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3885 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3886 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3887 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3893 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3894 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3900 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3901 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3903 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3907 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3908 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3910 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3912 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3913 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3914 * some random stuff.
3915 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3916 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3917 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3918 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3921 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3924 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3925 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3927 /* Sequence number */
3928 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3929 /* 16 random bytes */
3930 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3932 /* Random padding */
3933 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3935 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3938 if (s->msg_callback)
3939 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3940 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3941 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3943 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3952 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3957 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3960 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3962 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3965 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3966 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3968 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3970 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3972 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3980 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3981 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3982 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3983 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3984 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3985 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3988 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3989 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3990 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3991 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3994 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3996 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3997 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4000 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4001 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4005 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4006 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4007 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4011 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4015 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4018 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4020 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4025 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4026 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4028 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4030 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4031 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4032 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4033 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4035 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4043 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4044 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4045 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4046 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4050 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4051 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4052 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4053 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4059 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4063 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4067 if (default_nid == -1)
4069 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4071 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4072 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4073 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4077 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4078 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4082 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4083 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4085 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4091 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4092 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4093 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4094 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4097 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4099 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4100 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4101 /* Strict mode flags */
4102 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4103 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4104 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4106 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4111 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4112 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4114 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4115 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4118 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4122 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4125 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4127 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4129 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4130 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4133 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4134 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4135 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4137 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4138 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4147 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4150 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4151 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4152 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4154 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4162 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4163 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4164 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4167 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4173 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4174 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4177 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4180 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4181 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4183 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4188 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4189 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4190 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4191 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4192 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4195 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4196 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4197 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4198 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4202 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4203 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4211 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4212 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4215 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4218 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4219 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4221 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4224 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4232 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4233 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4235 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4238 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4239 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4240 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4242 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4247 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4255 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4256 else if(check_flags)
4257 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4259 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4260 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4261 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4262 else if (!check_flags)
4265 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4266 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4267 else if (strict_mode)
4269 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4270 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4272 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4273 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4277 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4285 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4287 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4292 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4295 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4298 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4303 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4304 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4305 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4306 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4307 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4312 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4317 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4321 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4322 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4324 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4326 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4328 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4332 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4336 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4339 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4341 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4342 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4344 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4346 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4347 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4349 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4351 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4353 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4354 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4356 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4361 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4365 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4367 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4368 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4372 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4374 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4375 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4376 else if (cpk->digest)
4377 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4380 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4382 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4383 * if the chain is invalid.
4387 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4388 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4391 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4392 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4399 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4400 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4402 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4403 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4404 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4405 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4406 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4407 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4409 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4410 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4412 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);