2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235 static tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
315 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
324 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
387 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
390 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
391 const unsigned char **pcurves,
396 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
397 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
400 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
401 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
428 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
429 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
431 tls_curve_info *cinfo;
434 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
435 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
437 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
438 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
441 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
442 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
444 const unsigned char *curves;
446 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
447 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
449 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
452 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
455 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
457 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
460 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
465 else /* Should never happen */
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
469 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
471 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
472 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
477 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
478 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
482 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
484 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
485 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
487 /* Can't do anything on client side */
494 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
495 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
498 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
499 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
500 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
501 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
502 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
503 /* Should never happen */
506 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
509 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
511 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
516 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
518 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
519 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
523 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
527 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
528 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
539 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
540 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
542 unsigned char *clist, *p;
544 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
545 * while curve ids < 32
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
553 unsigned long idmask;
555 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
557 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
568 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
572 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
577 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
580 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
582 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
586 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
588 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
590 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
592 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
596 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
597 if (nid == NID_undef)
599 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
600 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
602 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
605 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
606 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
611 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
615 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
617 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
623 const EC_METHOD *meth;
626 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
627 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
630 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
633 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
637 /* Determine curve ID */
638 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
639 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
640 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
644 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
656 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
658 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
661 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
663 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
666 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
670 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
671 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
672 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
674 const unsigned char *p;
677 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
678 * is supported (see RFC4492).
680 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
682 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
683 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
684 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
694 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
695 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
697 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
698 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
700 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
705 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
712 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
715 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
717 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
719 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
724 *pformats = ecformats_default;
725 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
727 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
729 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
733 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
734 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
736 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
738 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
741 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
744 /* If not EC nothing to do */
745 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
750 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
754 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
755 * supported curves extension.
757 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
760 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
761 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
763 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
770 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
771 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
772 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
773 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
774 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
776 return 0; /* Should never happen */
777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
778 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
780 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
784 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
787 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
792 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
793 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
795 unsigned char curve_id[2];
796 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
798 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
799 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
802 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
803 * no other curves permitted.
807 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
808 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
809 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
810 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
811 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
815 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
816 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
818 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
819 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
821 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
824 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
829 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
835 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
837 /* Need a shared curve */
838 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
849 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
851 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
855 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
861 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
866 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
870 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
871 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
874 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
875 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
877 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
880 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
881 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
883 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
886 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
887 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
889 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
892 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
893 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
894 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
895 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
897 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
899 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
900 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
903 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
907 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
911 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
916 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
918 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
922 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
924 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
925 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
926 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
928 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
929 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
932 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
933 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
937 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
938 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
940 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
941 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
943 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
945 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
954 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
955 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
957 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
958 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
960 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
961 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
962 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
963 /* Should never happen */
966 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
967 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
973 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
989 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
991 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
994 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
998 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1000 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1011 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1015 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1016 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1017 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1019 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1022 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1023 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1028 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1034 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1036 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1042 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1045 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1046 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1050 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1051 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1052 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1053 * session and not global settings.
1056 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1061 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1062 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1063 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1066 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1067 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1068 * signature algorithms.
1070 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1072 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1077 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1079 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1080 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1087 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1090 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1094 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1097 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1099 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1102 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1104 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1106 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1109 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1112 unsigned char *ret = p;
1113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1114 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1116 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1119 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1120 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1122 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1124 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1126 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1127 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1128 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1129 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1138 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1139 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1140 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1145 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1147 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1149 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1150 unsigned long size_str;
1153 /* check for enough space.
1154 4 for the servername type and entension length
1155 2 for servernamelist length
1156 1 for the hostname type
1157 2 for hostname length
1161 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1162 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1165 /* extension type and length */
1166 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1167 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1169 /* length of servername list */
1170 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1172 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1173 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1175 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1179 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1184 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1190 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1192 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1195 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1205 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1206 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1207 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1209 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1210 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1216 /* check for enough space.
1217 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1218 1 for the srp user identity
1219 + srp user identity length
1221 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1223 /* fill in the extension */
1224 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1225 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1226 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1227 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1235 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1237 const unsigned char *plist;
1240 unsigned char *etmp;
1242 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1244 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1252 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1253 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1254 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1255 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1258 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1259 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1260 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1262 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1263 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1264 if (plistlen > 65532)
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1271 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1273 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1274 for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
1276 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1283 plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
1285 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1286 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1287 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1288 * resolves this to two bytes.
1290 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1294 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1296 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1299 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1300 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1301 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1302 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1304 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1305 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1306 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1308 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1309 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1311 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1315 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1316 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1318 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1321 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1322 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1326 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1332 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1335 const unsigned char *salg;
1336 unsigned char *etmp;
1337 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1338 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1342 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1344 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1345 /* Fill in lengths */
1346 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1351 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1352 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1354 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1356 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1358 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1361 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1364 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1369 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1372 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1376 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1378 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1379 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1385 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1387 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1394 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1395 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1396 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1398 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1399 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1401 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1403 /* save position of id len */
1404 unsigned char *q = ret;
1405 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1406 /* skip over id len */
1408 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1414 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1418 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1419 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1421 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1424 * 1: peer may send requests
1425 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1427 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1428 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1430 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1434 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1436 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1437 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1438 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1445 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1447 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1449 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1450 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1451 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1452 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1453 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1454 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1457 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1461 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1463 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1465 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1468 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1476 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1477 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1480 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1482 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1484 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1485 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1487 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1488 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1489 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1493 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1497 return NULL; /* error */
1498 if (cb_retval == -1)
1499 continue; /* skip this extension */
1501 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1503 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1505 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1509 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1510 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1514 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1515 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1517 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1518 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1520 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1522 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1523 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1524 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1525 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1527 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1529 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1531 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1539 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1544 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1551 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1554 unsigned char *ret = p;
1556 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1558 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1561 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1562 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1563 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1564 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1566 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1567 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1571 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1573 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1575 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1577 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1581 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1585 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1591 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1593 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1596 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1608 const unsigned char *plist;
1610 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1613 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1615 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1616 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1623 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1624 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1625 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1626 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1630 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1631 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1633 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1635 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1636 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1640 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1642 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1643 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1647 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1648 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1650 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1652 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1654 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1657 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1660 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1669 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1671 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1673 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1676 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1684 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1685 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1686 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1687 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1688 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1689 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1690 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1691 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1692 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1693 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1694 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1700 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1701 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1703 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1705 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1708 * 1: peer may send requests
1709 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1711 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1712 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1714 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1720 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1721 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1722 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1724 const unsigned char *npa;
1725 unsigned int npalen;
1728 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1729 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1731 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1732 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1734 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1736 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1741 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
1743 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1744 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1747 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
1749 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1752 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1756 return NULL; /* error */
1757 if (cb_retval == -1)
1758 continue; /* skip this extension */
1759 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1761 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1763 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1766 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1767 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1769 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1770 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1772 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1773 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1776 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1782 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1784 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1785 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1787 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1789 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1793 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1797 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1804 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1806 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1807 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1808 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1811 * returns: 0 on success. */
1812 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1813 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1817 const unsigned char *selected;
1818 unsigned char selected_len;
1821 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1827 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1828 * length-prefixed strings. */
1829 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1830 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1839 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1841 proto_len = data[i];
1847 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1853 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1854 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1855 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1856 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1857 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1858 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1859 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1861 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1864 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1865 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1870 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1875 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1876 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1877 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1882 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1883 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1884 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1885 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1887 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1888 unsigned short type, size;
1889 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1890 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1891 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1892 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1893 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1894 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1895 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1897 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1898 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1899 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1900 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1903 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1904 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1905 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1906 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1907 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1908 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1909 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1910 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1911 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1912 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1915 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1924 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1927 if (data+size > d+n)
1931 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1933 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1934 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1936 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1938 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1940 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1945 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1947 if (data + len != d+n)
1949 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1953 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1955 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1957 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1959 unsigned short type;
1960 unsigned short size;
1962 unsigned char *data = *p;
1963 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1966 s->servername_done = 0;
1967 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1969 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1972 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1974 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1975 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1978 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1979 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1980 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1982 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1983 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1987 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1988 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1992 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1993 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1994 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1996 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1997 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1999 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2000 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2002 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2003 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2005 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2006 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2008 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2009 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2011 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2012 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2015 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2016 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2019 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2023 if (data > (d+n-len))
2026 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2031 if (data+size > (d+n))
2034 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2036 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2037 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2038 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2039 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2041 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2042 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2043 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2044 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2045 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2046 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2047 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2048 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2049 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2050 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2051 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2052 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2053 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2054 the value of the Host: field.
2055 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2056 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2057 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2058 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2062 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2064 unsigned char *sdata;
2070 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2077 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2084 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2090 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2093 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2094 switch (servname_type)
2096 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2099 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2101 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2104 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2106 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2109 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2111 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2114 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2115 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2116 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2117 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2118 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2119 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2122 s->servername_done = 1;
2126 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2127 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2128 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2140 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2146 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2148 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2150 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2153 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2155 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2158 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2160 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2161 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2163 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2165 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2172 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2174 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2175 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2177 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2178 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2180 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2185 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2187 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2188 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2190 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2191 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2193 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2196 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2197 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2200 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2201 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2202 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2203 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2204 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2207 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2209 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2210 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2211 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2213 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2214 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2216 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2221 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2223 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2226 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2227 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2229 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2232 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2233 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2236 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2237 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2238 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2239 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2240 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2243 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2244 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2245 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2247 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2251 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2254 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2255 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2257 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2261 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2262 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2263 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2264 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2266 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2267 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2269 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2274 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2276 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2277 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2279 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2283 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2285 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2287 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2289 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2292 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2294 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2299 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2301 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2304 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2306 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2309 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2312 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2315 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2316 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2320 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2325 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2329 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2331 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2333 const unsigned char *sdata;
2335 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2340 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2349 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2353 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2357 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2362 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2366 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2371 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2372 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2375 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2376 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2377 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2379 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2380 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2383 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2384 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2386 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2387 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2392 /* Read in request_extensions */
2395 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2402 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2408 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2410 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2411 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2414 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2415 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2417 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2418 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2420 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2425 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2429 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2432 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2436 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2437 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2439 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2440 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2441 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2443 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2449 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2450 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2451 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2453 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2456 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2457 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2458 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2459 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2460 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2461 * anything like that, but this might change).
2463 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2464 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2465 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2466 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2467 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2468 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2472 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2473 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2474 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2476 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2479 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2480 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2484 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2485 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2487 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2491 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2492 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2493 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2494 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2495 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2497 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2499 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2501 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2503 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2504 if (type == record->ext_type)
2506 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2511 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2512 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2513 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2523 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2525 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2526 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2528 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2530 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2533 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2534 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2535 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2540 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2543 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2545 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2549 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2558 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2559 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2560 * the length of the block. */
2561 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2563 unsigned int off = 0;
2577 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2579 unsigned short length;
2580 unsigned short type;
2581 unsigned short size;
2582 unsigned char *data = *p;
2583 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2584 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2587 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2590 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2592 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2593 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2597 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2598 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2601 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2602 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2605 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2609 if (data+length != d+n)
2611 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2615 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2620 if (data+size > (d+n))
2623 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2624 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2625 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2627 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2629 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2631 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2634 tlsext_servername = 1;
2637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2638 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2640 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2641 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2643 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2645 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2648 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2649 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2650 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2652 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2655 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2656 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2658 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2659 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2660 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2661 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2662 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2665 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2667 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2669 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2670 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2672 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2675 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2677 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2680 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2682 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2683 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2685 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2689 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2692 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2693 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2695 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2699 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2700 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2701 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2702 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2704 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2706 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2708 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2713 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2715 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2716 * a status request message.
2718 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2720 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2723 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2724 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2727 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2728 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2730 unsigned char *selected;
2731 unsigned char selected_len;
2733 /* We must have requested it. */
2734 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2736 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2739 /* The data must be valid */
2740 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2742 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2745 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2747 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2750 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2751 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2753 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2756 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2757 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2758 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2762 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2766 /* We must have requested it. */
2767 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2769 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2774 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2777 /* The extension data consists of:
2778 * uint16 list_length
2779 * uint8 proto_length;
2780 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2784 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2786 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2790 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2792 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2795 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2796 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2797 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2798 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2800 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2803 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2804 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2807 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2809 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2811 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2814 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2818 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2819 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2821 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2822 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2823 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2825 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2830 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2832 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2836 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2837 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2839 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2842 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2844 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2846 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2847 if (record->ext_type == type)
2849 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2855 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2856 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2858 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2859 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2860 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2869 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2873 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2875 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2877 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2879 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2880 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2882 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2888 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2898 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2899 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2900 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2901 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2902 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2903 * absence on initial connect only.
2905 if (!renegotiate_seen
2906 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2907 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2909 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2911 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2919 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2922 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2926 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2928 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2933 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2935 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2936 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2938 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2939 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2941 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2942 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2947 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2951 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2952 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2959 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2964 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2966 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2967 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2970 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2971 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2973 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2974 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2978 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2979 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2980 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2981 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2983 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2985 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2986 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2987 * so this has to happen here in
2988 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2992 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2994 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2997 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2998 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3003 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3004 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3005 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3007 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3009 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3010 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3012 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3013 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3015 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3016 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3018 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3019 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3021 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3022 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3025 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3029 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3031 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3032 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3033 * abort the handshake.
3035 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3036 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3044 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3045 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3048 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3049 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3052 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3053 s->servername_done=0;
3059 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3061 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3064 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3065 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3066 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3067 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3069 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3072 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3073 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3074 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3075 if (certpkey == NULL)
3077 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3080 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3081 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3083 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3084 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3087 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3088 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3089 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3091 /* status request response should be sent */
3092 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3093 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3094 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3096 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3098 /* something bad happened */
3099 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3100 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3101 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3106 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3111 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3112 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3115 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3116 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3124 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3126 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3127 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3130 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3131 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3132 * it must contain uncompressed.
3134 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3135 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3136 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3137 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3138 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3140 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3142 unsigned char *list;
3143 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3144 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3145 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3147 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3149 found_uncompressed = 1;
3153 if (!found_uncompressed)
3155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3159 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3160 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3162 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3163 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3164 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3165 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3167 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3168 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3170 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3171 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3173 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3175 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3176 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3179 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3180 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3181 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3182 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3184 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3185 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3190 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3193 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3194 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3197 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3198 * there is no response.
3200 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3202 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3203 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3205 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3206 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3209 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3210 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3214 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3215 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3221 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3222 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3225 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3226 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3229 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3230 s->servername_done=0;
3236 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3239 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3241 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3243 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3247 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3255 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3256 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3257 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3259 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3260 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3261 * extension, if any.
3262 * len: the length of the session ID.
3263 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3264 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3265 * point to the resulting session.
3267 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3268 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3269 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3272 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3273 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3274 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3275 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3276 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3277 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3278 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3281 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3282 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3283 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3284 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3285 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3286 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3288 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3289 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3291 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3292 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3296 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3298 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3299 * to permit stateful resumption.
3301 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3303 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3307 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3315 /* Skip past cipher list */
3320 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3325 /* Now at start of extensions */
3326 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3329 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3331 unsigned short type, size;
3334 if (p + size > limit)
3336 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3341 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3342 * currently have one. */
3343 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3346 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3348 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3349 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3350 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3351 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3352 * calculate the master secret later. */
3355 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3358 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3359 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3361 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3363 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3364 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3366 default: /* fatal error */
3375 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3377 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3378 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3379 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3380 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3381 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3382 * point to the resulting session.
3385 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3386 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3387 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3388 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3390 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3391 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3392 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3395 unsigned char *sdec;
3396 const unsigned char *p;
3397 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3398 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3401 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3402 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3405 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3406 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3407 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3408 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3410 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3411 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3422 /* Check key name matches */
3423 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3425 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3426 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3427 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3428 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3430 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3431 * integrity checks on ticket.
3433 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3436 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3440 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3441 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3442 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3443 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3444 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3446 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3447 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3448 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3449 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3450 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3453 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3456 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3457 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3459 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3464 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3467 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3471 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3472 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3473 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3474 * as required by standard.
3477 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3478 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3486 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3491 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3499 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3500 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3501 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3502 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3503 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3504 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3505 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3508 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3509 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3510 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3511 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3514 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3517 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3519 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3525 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3528 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3530 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3531 return table[i].nid;
3536 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3541 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3542 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3545 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3548 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3549 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3553 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3555 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3556 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3563 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3566 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3567 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3570 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3572 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3575 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3577 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3578 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3579 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3581 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3582 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3584 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3585 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3586 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3588 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3589 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3593 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3597 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3599 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3602 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3604 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3605 #ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3606 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3609 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3610 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3612 return inf->mfunc();
3615 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3620 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3621 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3624 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3625 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3628 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3629 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3635 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3636 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3637 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3639 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3640 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3642 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3644 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3645 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3647 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3649 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3651 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3652 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3654 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3658 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3659 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3660 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3662 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3665 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3666 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3668 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3669 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3670 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3672 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3673 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3675 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3676 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3679 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3680 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3681 * then RSA is disabled.
3684 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3686 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3687 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3688 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3689 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3690 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3691 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3694 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3695 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3700 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3701 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3706 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3707 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3712 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3713 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3720 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3722 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3724 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3727 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3728 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3730 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3732 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3734 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3736 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3737 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3740 return tmpout - out;
3743 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3744 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3745 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3746 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3748 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3749 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3750 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3752 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3753 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3755 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3757 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3762 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3763 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3764 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3766 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3777 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3778 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3780 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3781 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3783 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3785 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3786 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3788 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3789 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3791 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3792 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3794 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3795 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3797 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3799 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3800 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3803 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3804 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3808 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3809 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3815 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3816 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3818 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3821 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3824 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3825 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3826 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3831 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3833 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3839 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3840 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3841 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3843 /* Should never happen */
3847 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3848 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3849 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3850 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3852 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3853 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3855 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3857 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3858 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3860 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3861 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3863 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3865 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3867 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3870 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3871 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3872 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3873 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3874 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3876 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3877 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3883 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3884 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3886 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3887 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3889 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3890 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3891 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3892 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3894 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3895 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3900 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3901 * use the certificate for signing.
3903 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3905 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3906 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3909 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3910 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3912 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3913 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3915 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3916 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3920 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3921 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3928 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3929 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3930 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3932 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3938 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3945 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3947 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3950 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3951 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3952 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3954 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3955 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3959 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3961 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3963 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3965 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3967 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3968 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3974 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3976 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3977 unsigned short hbtype;
3978 unsigned int payload;
3979 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3981 if (s->msg_callback)
3982 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3983 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3984 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3986 /* Read type and payload length first */
3987 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3988 return 0; /* silently discard */
3991 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3992 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3995 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3997 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4000 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4001 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4002 * payload, plus padding
4004 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4007 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4008 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4010 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4012 /* Random padding */
4013 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4015 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4017 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4018 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4019 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4020 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4022 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4027 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4031 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4032 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4033 * sequence number */
4036 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4039 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4047 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4049 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4051 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4052 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4054 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4055 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4056 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4062 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4063 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4069 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4070 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4076 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4077 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4079 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4081 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4082 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4083 * some random stuff.
4084 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4085 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4086 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4087 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4090 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4093 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4094 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4096 /* Sequence number */
4097 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4098 /* 16 random bytes */
4099 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4101 /* Random padding */
4102 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4104 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4107 if (s->msg_callback)
4108 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4109 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4110 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4112 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4121 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4126 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4129 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4131 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4134 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4135 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4137 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4139 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4141 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4149 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4150 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4151 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4152 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4153 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4154 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4157 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4158 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4159 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4160 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4163 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4165 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4166 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4169 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4170 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4174 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4175 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4176 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4180 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4184 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4187 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4189 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4194 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4195 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4197 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4199 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4200 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4201 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4202 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4204 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4212 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4213 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4214 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4215 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4219 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4220 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4221 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4222 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4228 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4232 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4236 if (default_nid == -1)
4238 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4240 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4241 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4242 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4246 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4247 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4251 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4252 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4254 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4260 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4261 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4262 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4263 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4266 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4268 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4269 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4270 /* Strict mode flags */
4271 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4272 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4273 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4275 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4280 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4281 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4283 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4284 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4287 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4291 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4294 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4296 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4298 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4299 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4302 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4303 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4304 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4306 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4307 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4316 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4319 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4320 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4321 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4323 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4331 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4332 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4333 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4336 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4342 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4343 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4346 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4349 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4350 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4352 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4357 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4358 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4359 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4360 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4361 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4364 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4365 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4366 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4367 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4371 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4372 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4380 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4381 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4384 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4387 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4388 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4390 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4393 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4401 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4402 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4404 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4407 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4408 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4409 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4411 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4416 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4424 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4425 else if(check_flags)
4426 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4428 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4429 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4430 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4431 else if (!check_flags)
4434 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4435 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4436 else if (strict_mode)
4438 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4439 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4441 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4442 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4446 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4454 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4456 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4461 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4464 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4467 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4472 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4473 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4474 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4475 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4476 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4481 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4486 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4490 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4491 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4493 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4495 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4497 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4501 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4505 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4508 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4510 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4511 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4513 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4515 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4516 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4518 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4520 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4522 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4523 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4525 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4530 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4534 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4536 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4537 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4541 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4543 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4544 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4545 else if (cpk->digest)
4546 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4549 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4551 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4552 * if the chain is invalid.
4556 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4557 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4560 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4561 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4568 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4569 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4571 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4572 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4573 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4574 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4575 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4576 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4578 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4579 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4581 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4587 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4589 int dh_secbits = 80;
4590 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4591 return DH_get_1024_160();
4592 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4594 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4601 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4602 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4605 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4612 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4613 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4614 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4616 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4617 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4624 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4625 return DH_get_2048_224();
4626 return DH_get_1024_160();
4630 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4633 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4636 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4637 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4642 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4644 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4647 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4649 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4650 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4651 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4652 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4655 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4656 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4659 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4661 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4664 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4667 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4670 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4671 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4675 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4676 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4678 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4679 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4683 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4684 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4685 * not sending one to the peer.
4686 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4689 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4691 int rv, start_idx, i;
4694 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4700 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4704 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4706 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4707 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);