2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
42 tls_close_construct_packet,
46 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
59 tls_close_construct_packet,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
77 tls_close_construct_packet,
81 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
84 tls13_setup_key_block,
85 tls13_generate_master_secret,
86 tls13_change_cipher_state,
87 tls13_final_finish_mac,
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
94 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
95 tls_close_construct_packet,
99 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
116 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
118 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
122 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
128 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
140 * Table of curve information.
141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
144 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
176 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
182 /* The default curves */
183 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
190 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
227 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
232 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
234 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
238 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
240 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
244 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
247 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
248 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
266 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
267 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
269 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
271 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
272 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
278 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
282 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
287 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
291 *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
292 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
295 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
296 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
306 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
311 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
314 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
317 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
319 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
320 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
324 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
327 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
330 const unsigned char *curves;
331 size_t num_curves, i;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
333 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
343 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
344 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
346 } else /* Should never happen */
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
351 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
352 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
365 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
367 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
368 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
379 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
383 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
400 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
401 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
407 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
409 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
411 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
413 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
417 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
419 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
420 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
424 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
437 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
438 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
440 unsigned char *glist, *p;
443 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
446 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
447 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
450 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
451 unsigned long idmask;
453 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
454 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
456 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
465 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
469 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
473 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
476 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
478 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
484 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
486 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
488 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
490 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
491 if (nid == NID_undef)
492 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
493 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
495 if (nid == NID_undef)
497 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
498 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
500 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
504 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
505 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
509 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
513 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
516 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
517 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
524 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
525 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
528 /* Determine curve ID */
529 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
530 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
531 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
535 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
537 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
539 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
540 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
542 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
543 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
545 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
551 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
552 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
553 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
555 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
556 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
559 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
560 * supported (see RFC4492).
562 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
563 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
564 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
565 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
566 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
569 if (i == num_formats)
574 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
575 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
576 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
578 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
580 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
581 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
582 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
583 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
584 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
588 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
589 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
594 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
601 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
605 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
607 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
608 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
609 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
611 *pformats = ecformats_default;
612 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
614 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
616 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
621 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
622 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
624 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
626 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
629 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
632 /* If not EC nothing to do */
633 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
635 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
639 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
642 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
646 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
647 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
649 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
655 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
656 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
657 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
658 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
659 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
661 return 0; /* Should never happen */
662 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
663 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
665 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
667 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
668 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
669 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
671 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
677 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
679 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
681 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
683 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
684 * is compatible with the client extensions.
686 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
688 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
691 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
694 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
695 unsigned char curve_id[2];
696 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
697 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
698 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
699 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
700 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
704 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
705 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
709 /* Need a shared curve */
710 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
714 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
718 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
723 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
726 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
727 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
730 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
731 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
736 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
737 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
739 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
743 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
745 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
748 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
751 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
753 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
758 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
762 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
769 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
772 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
775 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
779 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
781 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
782 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
784 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
785 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
788 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
789 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
793 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
794 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
795 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
796 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
797 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
798 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
799 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
801 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
802 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
807 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
808 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
810 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
811 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
813 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
814 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
815 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
816 /* Should never happen */
819 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
820 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
825 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
826 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
827 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
828 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
830 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
834 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
835 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
838 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
839 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
841 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
844 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
845 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
847 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
853 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
857 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
858 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
859 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
860 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
863 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
864 if (i == sent_sigslen
865 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
866 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
870 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
875 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
876 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
877 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
882 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
884 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
889 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
890 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
891 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
893 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
896 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
898 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
902 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
903 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
905 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
906 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
908 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
910 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
912 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
913 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
914 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
920 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
921 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
922 * @c: cipher to check
923 * @op: Security check that you want to do
925 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
927 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
929 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
930 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
932 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
934 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
935 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
938 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
941 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
944 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
946 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
948 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
951 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
953 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
954 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
964 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
965 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
966 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
967 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
968 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
971 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
973 PACKET extensions = *packet;
974 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
975 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
978 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
979 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
982 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
983 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
989 if (num_extensions <= 1)
992 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
993 if (extension_types == NULL) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
998 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
999 extensions = *packet;
1000 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1002 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1003 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1004 /* This should not happen. */
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1010 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1014 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1015 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1016 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1017 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1022 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1026 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1029 const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
1030 size_t num_curves = 0;
1032 int min_version, max_version, reason;
1034 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1035 if ((s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_3_VERSION)
1036 || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1038 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1039 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1041 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1042 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1044 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1045 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1046 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1047 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1048 || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1055 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1056 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1062 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1063 if (s->renegotiate) {
1064 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1065 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1066 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1067 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1068 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1073 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1074 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1077 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1078 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1079 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1080 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1081 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1082 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1083 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1084 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1085 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1086 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1087 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1088 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1094 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1095 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1096 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1097 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1098 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1099 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1100 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1101 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1102 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1103 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1104 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1112 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1115 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1117 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurvestmp;
1121 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1123 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1124 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1125 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1126 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1127 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1133 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
1135 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
1136 pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
1137 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1141 pcurvestmp = pcurves;
1143 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1144 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1145 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1146 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1150 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1151 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
1152 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1153 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
1154 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1156 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1161 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1168 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1170 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1171 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1172 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1173 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1174 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1175 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1176 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1180 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1181 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1182 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1185 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1186 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1190 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1200 const unsigned char *salg;
1202 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1204 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1205 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1206 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1207 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1208 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1209 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1210 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1211 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1217 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1220 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1221 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1222 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1223 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1224 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1225 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1229 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1230 unsigned char *idbytes;
1234 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1235 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1237 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1238 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1239 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1244 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1245 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1249 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1250 unsigned char *extbytes;
1251 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1257 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1258 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1264 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1272 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1274 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1275 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1277 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1278 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1286 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1287 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1288 * (see longer comment below)
1290 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1291 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1292 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1293 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1294 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1295 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1296 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1297 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1301 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1304 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1305 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1306 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1309 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1310 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1311 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1312 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1313 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1317 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1318 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1319 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1320 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1325 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1326 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1327 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1328 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1334 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1335 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1336 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1341 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1342 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1343 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1350 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1351 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1352 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1359 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1360 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1365 reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
1371 /* TLS1.3 specific extensions */
1372 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1374 size_t i, sharessent = 0;
1376 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we add this extension for versions < TLS1.3? */
1377 /* supported_versions extension */
1378 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1379 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1380 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1386 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
1387 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
1390 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
1391 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
1392 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1393 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1395 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1398 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1403 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1409 /* key_share extension */
1410 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1411 /* Extension data sub-packet */
1412 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1413 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
1414 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1420 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
1421 * now, just send one
1423 for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1424 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1425 unsigned int curve_id = 0;
1426 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
1429 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1432 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1433 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1439 /* Generate a key for this key_share */
1440 curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
1441 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1442 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1447 /* Encode the public key. */
1448 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
1450 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1452 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1456 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
1457 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
1458 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1460 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1461 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1462 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1467 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
1468 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
1469 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
1471 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
1472 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
1474 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1476 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1483 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1484 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1485 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1488 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1489 unsigned char *padbytes;
1492 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1497 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1498 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1504 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1505 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1509 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1518 * Add the key_share extension.
1520 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1522 static int add_client_key_share_ext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1524 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1525 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1526 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1533 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1534 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1535 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1540 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1546 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1547 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1548 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1549 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1550 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1554 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1555 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1557 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1558 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1561 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1563 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1564 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1565 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1566 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1574 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1577 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1580 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1581 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1582 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1583 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1586 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1587 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1592 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1593 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1598 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1599 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1602 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1603 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1604 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1605 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1612 const unsigned char *plist;
1615 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1617 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1619 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1620 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1621 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1622 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1628 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1631 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1633 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1634 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1635 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1641 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1644 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1647 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1648 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1649 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1655 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1656 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1657 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1658 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1659 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1660 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1661 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1668 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1669 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1670 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1671 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1672 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1673 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1674 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1675 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1676 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1677 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1679 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1686 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1687 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1688 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1689 const unsigned char *npa;
1690 unsigned int npalen;
1693 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1695 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1696 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1697 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1698 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1702 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1707 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit && !add_client_key_share_ext(s, pkt, al))
1710 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1715 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1717 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1718 * for other cases too.
1720 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1721 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1722 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1723 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1724 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1726 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1727 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1733 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1734 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1735 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1741 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1742 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1743 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1744 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1745 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1746 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1747 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1748 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1749 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1756 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1764 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1765 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1766 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1767 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1769 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1771 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1773 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1775 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1776 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1780 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1782 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1783 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1784 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1787 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1789 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1790 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1791 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1799 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1800 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1801 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1803 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1805 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1806 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1808 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1809 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1810 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1811 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1812 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1814 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1815 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1816 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1817 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1818 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1821 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1823 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1824 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1827 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1835 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1837 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1838 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1839 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1844 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1845 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1846 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1847 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1849 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1855 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1856 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1857 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1858 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1859 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1860 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1861 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1863 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1864 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1865 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1866 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1867 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1868 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1869 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1870 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1871 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1872 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1873 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1874 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1875 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1878 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1879 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1881 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1883 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1884 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1885 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1889 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1892 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1893 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1895 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1898 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1902 * Process the supported_groups extension if present. Returns success if the
1903 * extension is absent, or if it has been successfully processed.
1905 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
1907 static int tls_process_supported_groups(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1910 PACKET supported_groups_list;
1911 RAW_EXTENSION *suppgroups = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
1912 hello->num_extensions,
1913 TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups);
1915 if (suppgroups == NULL)
1918 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1919 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&suppgroups->data,
1920 &supported_groups_list)
1921 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
1922 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
1927 && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
1928 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
1929 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
1937 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1938 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1939 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1940 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1942 static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
1943 const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups,
1948 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
1951 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
1952 unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
1954 if (group_id == share_id
1955 && (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups,
1956 SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
1961 /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */
1962 return i < num_groups;
1966 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
1967 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1968 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
1970 static int process_key_share_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1972 unsigned int group_id;
1973 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
1974 const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves;
1975 size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves;
1976 int group_nid, found = 0;
1977 unsigned int curve_flags;
1980 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
1981 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1986 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
1987 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
1989 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1993 /* Get our list of supported curves */
1994 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) {
1995 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
1997 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2001 /* Get the clients list of supported curves */
2002 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
2003 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2005 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2009 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
2010 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
2011 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
2012 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
2013 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2015 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2020 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
2021 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
2026 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
2027 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) {
2028 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2030 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2034 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
2035 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) {
2036 /* Share not suitable */
2040 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
2042 if (group_nid == 0) {
2043 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2045 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2049 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2050 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
2051 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2053 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
2054 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2059 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2061 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2062 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2064 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2065 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
2067 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2068 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2070 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2073 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2076 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
2078 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2079 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2080 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2081 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2082 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2093 * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
2094 * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
2095 * object as required.
2097 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
2098 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
2101 * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
2102 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
2104 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
2107 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2109 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2110 s->servername_done = 0;
2111 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2112 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2113 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2116 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2117 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2118 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
2119 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
2120 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
2121 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
2123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2124 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2125 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
2126 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2128 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2129 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
2130 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2131 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2134 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2135 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2138 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2141 * We process the supported_groups extension first so that is done before
2142 * we get to key_share which needs to use the information in it.
2144 if (!tls_process_supported_groups(s, hello)) {
2145 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2150 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
2151 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
2154 for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
2155 RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
2157 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2158 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
2159 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2160 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2161 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2163 if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2164 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
2165 &currext->data, al))
2167 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2168 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2171 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2173 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2174 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2175 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2176 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2177 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2178 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2179 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2180 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2181 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2182 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2183 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2184 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2185 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2186 * the value of the Host: field.
2187 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2188 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2189 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2191 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2195 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2196 unsigned int servname_type;
2197 PACKET sni, hostname;
2199 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
2200 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
2201 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
2206 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
2207 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
2208 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
2210 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
2211 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
2212 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2214 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2215 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2217 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2218 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2219 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2224 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2225 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2229 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2230 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2234 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2235 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2239 s->servername_done = 1;
2242 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2243 * fall back to a full handshake.
2245 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2246 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2247 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2251 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2254 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
2257 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2261 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2262 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2264 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2265 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2272 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2273 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2275 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
2276 &ec_point_format_list)
2277 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2282 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2283 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2285 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2286 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2291 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2292 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
2293 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2294 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2295 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
2296 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2297 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2298 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2299 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2302 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2303 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2305 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
2306 &supported_sig_algs)
2307 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2308 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2313 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2314 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2318 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2319 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
2320 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2324 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2325 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2326 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2327 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2328 (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
2332 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2333 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2335 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2337 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2338 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2339 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2340 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2344 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2347 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2349 PACKET responder_id;
2350 const unsigned char *id_data;
2352 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2354 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2358 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2359 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
2360 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2361 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2365 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2366 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2370 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2371 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2372 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2377 /* Read in request_extensions */
2378 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
2379 &currext->data, &exts))
2382 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2383 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2384 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2385 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2386 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2387 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2388 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2389 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2390 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2398 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2400 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2404 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
2405 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2407 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2410 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2411 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2412 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2413 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2414 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2415 * anything like that, but this might change).
2417 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2418 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2419 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2420 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2421 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2423 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2427 else if (currext->type
2428 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2429 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2430 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
2431 &currext->data, al))
2435 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2436 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2437 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2438 && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2439 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
2440 &currext->data, al))
2444 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2445 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
2446 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2447 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2448 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit
2449 && !process_key_share_ext(s, &currext->data, al)) {
2453 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2454 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
2458 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2459 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2460 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2461 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2462 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2465 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
2466 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2467 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
2472 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2474 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2475 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2476 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2478 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2483 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2484 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2485 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2486 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2491 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2494 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2495 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
2496 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2499 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2508 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2509 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2510 * fill the length of the block.
2512 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2514 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2516 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2517 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2518 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2526 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2528 unsigned int length, type, size;
2529 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2530 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2533 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2535 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2537 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2538 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2540 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2542 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2544 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2547 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2548 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2552 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2553 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2557 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2558 const unsigned char *data;
2561 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2562 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2565 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2566 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2568 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2569 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2571 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2572 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2573 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2574 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2575 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2578 tlsext_servername = 1;
2580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2581 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2582 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2583 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2584 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2585 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2589 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2590 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2591 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2592 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2593 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2596 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2597 ecpointformatlist_length;
2598 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2599 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2600 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2601 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2607 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2609 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2610 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2611 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2612 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2614 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2617 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2618 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2621 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2622 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2624 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2627 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2628 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2631 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2632 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2636 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2637 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2638 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2640 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2641 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2642 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2643 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2644 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2645 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2647 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2649 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2650 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2651 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2654 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2659 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2660 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2661 unsigned char *selected;
2662 unsigned char selected_len;
2663 /* We must have requested it. */
2664 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2665 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2668 /* The data must be valid */
2669 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2670 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2673 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2676 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2677 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2678 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2682 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2683 * a single Serverhello
2685 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2686 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2687 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2688 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2691 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2692 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2693 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2697 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2699 /* We must have requested it. */
2700 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2701 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2705 * The extension data consists of:
2706 * uint16 list_length
2707 * uint8 proto_length;
2708 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2710 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2711 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2712 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2713 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2716 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2717 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2718 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2719 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2722 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2723 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2726 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2728 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2729 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2730 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2734 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2735 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2736 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2737 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2738 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2739 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2740 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
2741 (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
2742 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2744 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2745 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2746 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2747 unsigned int group_id;
2749 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
2753 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2758 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &group_id)) {
2759 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2761 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2765 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
2767 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
2770 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2772 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2776 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &encoded_pt)
2777 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
2778 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2780 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2784 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
2786 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2790 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2791 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2792 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2797 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
2798 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2800 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2803 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2805 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2806 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2808 } else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2812 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2813 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2817 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2818 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2819 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2820 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2821 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2822 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2823 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2827 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2836 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2837 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2838 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2839 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2840 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2842 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2843 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2844 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2846 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2852 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2855 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2856 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2857 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2866 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2868 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2872 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2877 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2879 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2880 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2884 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2885 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2888 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2889 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2893 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2895 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2896 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2897 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2898 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2900 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2902 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2905 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2906 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2909 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2910 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2913 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2914 s->servername_done = 0;
2920 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2921 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2923 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2925 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2928 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2929 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2931 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2932 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2935 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2938 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2939 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2940 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2944 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2949 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2950 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2951 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2952 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2953 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2954 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2955 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2956 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2959 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2960 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2961 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2963 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2966 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2967 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2969 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2970 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2974 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2978 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2983 * Upon success, returns 1.
2984 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2986 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2988 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2991 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2992 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2993 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2994 * influence which certificate is sent
2996 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2998 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2999 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3000 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3001 if (certpkey != NULL) {
3003 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
3004 * et al can pick it up.
3006 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3007 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3009 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3010 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3011 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3013 /* status request response should be sent */
3014 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3015 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3016 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3018 /* something bad happened */
3019 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3021 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3027 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
3034 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3036 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3037 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3041 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3042 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3043 * must contain uncompressed.
3045 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3046 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3047 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3048 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3049 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3050 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3051 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3052 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3054 unsigned char *list;
3055 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3056 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3057 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3058 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3059 found_uncompressed = 1;
3063 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3065 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3069 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3070 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3072 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3074 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3075 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3076 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3077 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3079 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3081 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3084 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
3085 * that we don't receive a status message
3087 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3088 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3089 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
3092 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3093 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3096 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3097 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3100 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3101 s->servername_done = 0;
3107 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3110 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3112 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
3113 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3117 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3125 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
3126 * type and return it.
3128 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
3129 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
3130 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
3132 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
3134 RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
3139 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
3140 if (exts[loop].type == type)
3148 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
3150 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
3151 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3152 * point to the resulting session.
3154 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3155 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3156 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3159 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3160 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3161 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3162 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3163 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3164 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3165 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3168 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3169 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3170 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3171 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3172 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3173 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3175 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
3179 const unsigned char *etick;
3181 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
3184 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3187 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
3188 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3191 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
3194 ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3195 hello->num_extensions,
3196 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
3197 if (ticketext == NULL)
3200 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
3203 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3206 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3209 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3211 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3212 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3213 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3214 * calculate the master secret later.
3218 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
3219 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3222 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
3223 hello->session_id_len, ret);
3225 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3226 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3229 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3232 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3233 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3236 default: /* fatal error */
3242 * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
3243 * ClientHello and we can support it
3248 int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
3250 RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
3252 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3254 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION
3255 || s->version > TLS1_2_VERSION))
3258 emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3259 hello->num_extensions,
3260 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
3263 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
3264 * client doesn't support EMS.
3269 /* The extensions must always be empty */
3270 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
3273 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3279 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3281 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3282 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
3283 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3284 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3285 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3286 * point to the resulting session.
3289 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3290 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3291 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3292 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3293 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3295 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3296 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3297 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3300 unsigned char *sdec;
3301 const unsigned char *p;
3302 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
3304 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3305 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3306 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3307 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3309 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3310 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3313 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3318 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3319 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3320 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3331 /* Check key name matches */
3332 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3333 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3337 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3338 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3339 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3340 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3341 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3342 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3348 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3351 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3355 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3357 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3362 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3363 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3364 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3367 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3368 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3369 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3372 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3373 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3374 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3375 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3376 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3377 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
3378 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
3379 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3383 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
3384 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3389 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3393 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3397 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3398 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3399 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3403 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3404 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3413 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3417 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3418 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3422 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3429 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3430 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3431 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3432 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3433 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3434 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3435 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3436 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3437 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3438 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3441 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3442 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3443 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3444 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3445 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3446 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3447 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3450 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3453 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3454 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3460 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3463 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3464 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3465 return table[i].nid;
3470 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3476 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3479 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3482 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3488 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3490 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3497 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3500 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3501 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3502 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3503 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3504 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3505 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3506 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3507 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3508 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3509 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3510 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3511 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3514 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3520 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3521 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3522 return tls12_md_info + i;
3528 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3530 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3531 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3533 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3536 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3539 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3543 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3544 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3547 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3548 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3551 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3552 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3555 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3556 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3558 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3559 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3561 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3562 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3568 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3569 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3570 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3572 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3573 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3575 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3576 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3578 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3580 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3581 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3583 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3585 if (psignhash_nid) {
3586 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3587 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3588 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3592 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3593 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3595 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3596 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3597 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3599 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3600 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3602 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3603 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3607 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3608 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3612 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3614 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3615 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3616 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3618 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3619 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3620 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3622 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3623 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3624 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3626 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3627 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3632 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3633 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3638 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3639 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3646 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3648 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3650 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3653 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3654 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3658 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3659 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3660 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3661 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3668 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3669 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3670 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3671 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3673 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3674 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3675 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3676 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3677 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3679 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3680 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3683 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3684 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3685 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3687 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3697 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3698 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3700 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3701 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3703 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3705 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3707 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3708 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3709 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3710 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3711 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3712 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3713 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3714 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3715 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3716 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3718 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3719 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3722 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3723 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3727 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3728 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3730 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3732 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3735 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3739 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3740 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3744 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3746 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
3749 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3750 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3752 /* Should never happen */
3756 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3757 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3758 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3760 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3761 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3765 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3770 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3771 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3773 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3774 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3777 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3778 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3779 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3780 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3781 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3783 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3784 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3785 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3786 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3792 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3793 * the certificate for signing.
3795 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3797 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3798 * supported it stays as NULL.
3800 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3801 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3802 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3805 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3806 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3807 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3811 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3812 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3815 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3816 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3817 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3818 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3819 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3820 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3821 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3822 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3828 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3829 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3830 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3832 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3833 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3834 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
3838 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3845 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3847 return (int)numsigalgs;
3850 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3851 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3852 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3854 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3855 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
3856 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
3860 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3862 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3864 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3866 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3868 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3869 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3872 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3876 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3879 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3881 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3882 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3883 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3884 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3885 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3886 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3888 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3889 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3890 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3894 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3896 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3899 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3902 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3904 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3906 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3908 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3916 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3917 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3919 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3922 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3923 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3926 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3927 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3932 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3933 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3935 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3939 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3943 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3946 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3948 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3953 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3954 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3956 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3957 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3958 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3960 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3967 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3968 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3969 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3971 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3972 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3973 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3979 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3983 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3987 if (default_nid == -1)
3989 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3991 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3992 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3993 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3998 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3999 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4003 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4004 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
4005 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4012 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4013 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4014 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4015 * attempting to use them.
4018 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4020 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4021 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4022 /* Strict mode flags */
4023 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4024 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4025 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4027 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4032 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4033 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4036 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4037 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4039 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4042 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
4044 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4045 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4047 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4049 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4050 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4056 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4059 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4061 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4062 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4064 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4071 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4072 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4073 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4074 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4075 else if (!check_flags)
4080 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4081 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4083 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4085 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4086 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
4088 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4091 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4092 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4093 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4094 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4097 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4098 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4099 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4103 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4104 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4107 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4108 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4109 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4112 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4113 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4114 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4117 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4118 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4119 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4128 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4129 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4131 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4133 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4134 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4135 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4138 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4145 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4146 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4150 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4151 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4152 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4153 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4155 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4162 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4163 else if (check_flags)
4164 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4166 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4167 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4168 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4169 else if (!check_flags)
4172 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4173 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4174 else if (strict_mode) {
4175 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4176 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4177 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4178 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4180 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4187 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4188 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4190 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
4192 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4195 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4198 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4202 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4206 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4208 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4209 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4211 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4212 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4213 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4217 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4220 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4222 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4224 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4225 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4227 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4228 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4229 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4231 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4232 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4233 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4234 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4235 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4240 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4243 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4245 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4246 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4250 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4251 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4252 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4253 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4254 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4256 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4259 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4263 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4266 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4267 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4274 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4275 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4277 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4278 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4279 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4280 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4281 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4282 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4283 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4286 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4287 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4289 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4293 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4295 int dh_secbits = 80;
4296 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4297 return DH_get_1024_160();
4298 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4299 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4304 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4305 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4308 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4316 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4317 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4319 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4320 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4328 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4329 return DH_get_2048_224();
4330 return DH_get_1024_160();
4334 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4337 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4340 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4341 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4342 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4343 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4345 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4348 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4350 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4353 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4355 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4356 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4357 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4358 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4360 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4361 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4363 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4364 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4367 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4369 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4372 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4375 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4377 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4378 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4380 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4381 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4383 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4384 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4389 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4390 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4391 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4394 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4396 int rv, start_idx, i;
4398 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4403 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4407 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4408 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4409 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);