2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 tls1_export_keying_material,
42 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
47 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
51 tls1_generate_master_secret,
52 tls1_change_cipher_state,
53 tls1_final_finish_mac,
54 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
55 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
58 tls1_export_keying_material,
59 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
60 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
65 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
69 tls1_generate_master_secret,
70 tls1_change_cipher_state,
71 tls1_final_finish_mac,
72 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 tls1_export_keying_material,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
79 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
80 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
84 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
87 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
88 * http, the cache would over fill
97 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
101 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
103 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
107 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
110 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
111 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
113 s->version = s->method->version;
116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
119 int nid; /* Curve NID */
120 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
121 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
125 * Table of curve information.
126 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
127 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
129 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
130 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
131 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
132 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
133 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
134 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
135 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
136 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
137 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
138 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
139 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
140 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
141 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
142 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
143 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
144 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
145 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
146 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
147 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
148 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
149 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
150 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
151 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
152 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
153 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
154 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
155 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
156 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
157 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
158 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
161 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
162 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
163 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
164 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
167 /* The default curves */
168 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
169 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
170 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
171 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
172 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
175 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
176 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
177 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
178 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
179 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
180 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
181 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
182 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
185 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
186 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
188 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
189 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
190 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
192 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
193 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
194 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
195 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
196 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
197 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
200 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
201 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
202 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
203 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
204 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
205 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
206 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
207 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
208 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
209 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
213 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
214 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
215 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
218 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
220 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
221 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
222 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
224 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
226 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
230 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
233 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
234 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
241 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
243 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
244 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
245 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
246 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
247 * lists in the first place.
248 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
249 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
250 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
252 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
253 const unsigned char **pcurves,
256 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
258 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
259 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
261 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
262 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
263 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
264 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
265 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
268 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
269 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
273 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
274 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
278 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
279 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
282 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
283 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
287 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
288 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
289 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
293 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
298 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
299 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
301 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
304 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
306 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
307 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
308 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
311 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
314 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
315 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
317 const unsigned char *curves;
318 size_t num_curves, i;
319 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
320 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
322 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
324 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
327 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
328 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
330 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
331 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
333 } else /* Should never happen */
336 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
338 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
339 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
340 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
346 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
347 * if there is no match.
348 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
349 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
350 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
352 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
354 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
355 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
357 /* Can't do anything on client side */
361 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
363 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
364 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
366 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
367 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
368 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
369 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
370 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
371 /* Should never happen */
374 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
378 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
379 * but s->options is a long...
381 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
382 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
384 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
385 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
386 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
387 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
389 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
392 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
395 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
397 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
398 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
399 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
401 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
405 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
406 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
407 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
408 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
409 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
412 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
413 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
421 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
425 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
426 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
428 unsigned char *clist, *p;
431 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
434 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
435 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
438 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
439 unsigned long idmask;
441 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
443 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
452 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
456 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
460 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
463 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
465 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
471 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
473 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
475 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
477 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
478 if (nid == NID_undef)
479 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
480 if (nid == NID_undef)
481 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
482 if (nid == NID_undef)
484 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
485 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
487 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
491 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
492 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
497 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
501 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
504 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
505 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
512 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
513 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
516 /* Determine curve ID */
517 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
518 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
519 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
523 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
525 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
527 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
528 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
530 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
531 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
533 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
539 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
540 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
541 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
543 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
544 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
547 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
548 * supported (see RFC4492).
550 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
551 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
552 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
553 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
554 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
557 if (i == num_formats)
562 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
563 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
564 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
566 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
568 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
569 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
570 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
571 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
572 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
576 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
577 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
582 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
589 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
593 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
595 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
596 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
597 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
599 *pformats = ecformats_default;
600 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
602 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
604 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
609 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
610 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
612 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
614 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
617 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
620 /* If not EC nothing to do */
621 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
623 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
627 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
630 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
634 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
635 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
637 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
643 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
644 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
645 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
646 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
647 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
649 return 0; /* Should never happen */
650 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
651 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
653 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
655 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
656 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
657 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
659 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
665 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
667 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
669 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
671 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
672 * is compatible with the client extensions.
674 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
676 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
679 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
682 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
683 unsigned char curve_id[2];
684 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
685 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
686 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
687 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
688 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
692 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
693 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
697 /* Need a shared curve */
698 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
702 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
711 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
714 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
715 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
718 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
719 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
721 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
724 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
725 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
727 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
731 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
736 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
737 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
738 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
739 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
741 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
742 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
743 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
744 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
745 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
746 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
748 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
749 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
750 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
755 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
756 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
757 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
760 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
763 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
768 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
769 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
770 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
772 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
773 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
776 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
777 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
781 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
782 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
783 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
784 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
785 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
786 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
787 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
789 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
790 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
795 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
796 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
798 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
799 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
801 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
802 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
803 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
804 /* Should never happen */
807 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
808 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
813 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
814 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
815 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
816 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
818 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
819 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
822 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
823 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
826 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
827 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
829 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
832 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
833 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
834 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
835 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
841 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
845 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
846 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
847 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
848 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
851 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
852 if (i == sent_sigslen
853 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
854 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
855 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
858 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
860 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
863 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
864 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
865 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
871 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
873 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
878 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
879 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
880 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
882 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
885 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
887 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
889 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
890 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
891 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
892 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
893 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
894 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
895 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
896 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
897 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
899 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
901 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
902 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
903 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
909 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
910 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
911 * @c: cipher to check
912 * @op: Security check that you want to do
914 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
916 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
918 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
919 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
921 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
923 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
924 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
926 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
927 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
930 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
933 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
935 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
937 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
940 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
941 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
942 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
952 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
953 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
954 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
955 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
956 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
959 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) {
960 PACKET extensions = *packet;
961 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
962 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
965 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
966 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
969 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
970 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
976 if (num_extensions <= 1)
979 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
980 if (extension_types == NULL) {
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
985 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
986 extensions = *packet;
987 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
989 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
990 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
991 /* This should not happen. */
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
997 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1001 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1002 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1003 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1004 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1009 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1013 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1014 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1017 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1018 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1020 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1022 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1024 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1025 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1027 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1028 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1030 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1031 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1032 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1033 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1044 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1046 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1047 if (s->renegotiate) {
1050 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1055 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1058 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1061 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1062 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1068 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1069 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1072 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1073 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1074 unsigned long size_str;
1078 * check for enough space.
1079 * 4 for the servername type and extension length
1080 * 2 for servernamelist length
1081 * 1 for the hostname type
1082 * 2 for hostname length
1086 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1088 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1091 /* extension type and length */
1092 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1093 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1095 /* length of servername list */
1096 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1098 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1099 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1101 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1105 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1106 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1107 * Client Hello message */
1109 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1110 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1116 * check for enough space.
1117 * 4 for the srp type type and extension length
1118 * 1 for the srp user identity
1119 * + srp user identity length
1121 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1124 /* fill in the extension */
1125 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1126 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1127 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1128 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1136 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1139 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1140 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1142 unsigned char *etmp;
1144 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1146 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1148 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1150 if (num_formats > 255) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1155 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1156 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1157 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1158 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1159 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1163 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1165 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1166 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1169 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1171 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1173 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1178 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1180 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1181 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1182 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1183 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1184 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1188 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1190 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1191 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1192 ret += curves_list_len;
1194 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1196 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1198 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1199 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1200 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1201 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1202 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1203 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1204 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1206 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1207 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1208 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1211 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1212 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1215 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1218 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1220 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1223 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1229 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1231 const unsigned char *salg;
1232 unsigned char *etmp;
1233 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1234 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1236 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1238 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1240 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1241 /* Fill in lengths */
1242 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1248 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1250 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1254 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1255 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1256 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1262 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1263 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1269 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1271 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1272 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1274 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1275 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1277 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1278 /* save position of id len */
1279 unsigned char *q = ret;
1280 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1281 /* skip over id len */
1283 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1289 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1293 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1294 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1295 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1297 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1301 * 1: peer may send requests
1302 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1304 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1305 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1307 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1312 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1314 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1315 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1317 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1319 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1325 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1326 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1327 * (see longer comment below)
1329 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1330 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1332 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1333 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1334 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1335 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1336 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1337 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1340 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1343 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1344 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1349 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1352 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1355 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1362 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1363 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1364 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1366 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1369 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1370 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
1374 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1378 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1379 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1380 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1383 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1384 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1386 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1387 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1393 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1395 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1402 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1405 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1409 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1410 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1413 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1414 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1416 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1419 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1420 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1421 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1422 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1427 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1429 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1432 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1437 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1443 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1451 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1452 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1455 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1456 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1457 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1460 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1465 const unsigned char *plist;
1468 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1472 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1474 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1476 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1478 if (plistlen > 255) {
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1483 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1484 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1485 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1486 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1491 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1494 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1496 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1497 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1499 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1502 /* if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket later */
1503 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1506 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1507 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1509 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1514 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1517 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1518 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1522 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1525 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1528 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1536 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1537 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1538 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1539 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1540 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1541 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1542 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1543 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1544 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1545 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1547 if (limit - ret < 36)
1549 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1554 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1555 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1556 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1558 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1562 * 1: peer may send requests
1563 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1565 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1566 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1568 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1573 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1574 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1575 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1576 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1577 const unsigned char *npa;
1578 unsigned int npalen;
1581 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1583 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1584 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1585 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1587 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1589 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1591 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1595 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1597 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1599 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1600 * for other cases too.
1602 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1603 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1604 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1605 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1606 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1608 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1612 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1613 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1617 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1618 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1619 unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1621 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1623 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1627 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1633 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1636 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1641 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1642 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1643 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1644 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1646 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1648 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1650 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1652 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1653 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1657 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1659 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1660 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1661 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1664 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1666 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1667 &s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1668 &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1669 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1677 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1678 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1679 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1681 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1683 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1684 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1686 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1687 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1688 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1689 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1690 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1692 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1693 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1694 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1695 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1696 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1699 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1700 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1701 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1702 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1705 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1715 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1716 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1717 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1722 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1723 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1724 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1725 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1727 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1733 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1734 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1735 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1736 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1737 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1738 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1739 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1741 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1742 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1743 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1744 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1745 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1746 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1747 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1748 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1749 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1750 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1751 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1752 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1753 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1756 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1757 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1761 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1762 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1763 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1767 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1770 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1771 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1773 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1776 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1779 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1780 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1782 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1783 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1786 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1787 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1789 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1792 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1795 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1796 s->servername_done = 0;
1797 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1798 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1799 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1802 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1803 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1804 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1805 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1806 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1807 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1809 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1810 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1814 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1815 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1816 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1818 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1819 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1820 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1821 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1824 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1825 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1828 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1830 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1833 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1836 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1840 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1841 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1844 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1846 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1849 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1850 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1851 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1852 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1854 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1855 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1857 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1858 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1861 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1863 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1864 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1865 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1866 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1867 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1868 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1869 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1870 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1871 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1872 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1873 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1874 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1875 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1876 * the value of the Host: field.
1877 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1878 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1879 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1881 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1885 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1886 unsigned int servname_type;
1887 PACKET sni, hostname;
1889 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1890 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1891 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1896 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1897 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1898 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1900 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1901 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1902 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1904 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1905 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1907 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1908 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1909 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1914 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1915 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1919 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1920 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1924 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1925 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1929 s->servername_done = 1;
1932 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1933 * fall back to a full handshake.
1935 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1936 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1937 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1941 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1944 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1947 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1951 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1952 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1954 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1955 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1962 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1963 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1965 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension,
1966 &ec_point_format_list)
1967 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1972 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1973 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1974 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1975 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1979 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1980 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1982 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1983 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension,
1984 &elliptic_curve_list)
1985 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1986 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1991 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1992 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
1993 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
1994 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1999 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2000 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2001 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2002 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
2003 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
2004 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2005 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2008 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2009 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2011 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2012 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2013 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2018 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2019 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2023 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2024 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2025 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2029 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2030 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2031 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2032 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2033 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list))
2036 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2038 PACKET responder_id;
2039 const unsigned char *id_data;
2041 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2043 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2047 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
2048 && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2049 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
2050 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2054 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2055 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2056 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2060 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2061 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2065 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2066 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2067 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2072 /* Read in request_extensions */
2073 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2076 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2077 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2078 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2079 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2080 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2081 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2082 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2083 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2084 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2092 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2094 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2098 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2099 unsigned int hbtype;
2101 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2102 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2103 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2107 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2108 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2110 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2111 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2112 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2115 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2121 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2122 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2124 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2127 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2128 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2129 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2130 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2131 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2132 * anything like that, but this might change).
2134 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2135 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2136 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2137 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2138 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2140 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2144 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2145 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2146 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2150 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2152 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2153 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2154 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2158 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2159 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2161 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2162 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2166 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2167 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2168 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2169 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2170 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2173 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2174 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2179 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2180 /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */
2181 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2187 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2189 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2190 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2191 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2193 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2198 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2199 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2200 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2201 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2206 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2209 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2210 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2211 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2214 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2223 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2224 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2225 * fill the length of the block.
2227 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2229 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2231 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2232 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2233 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2241 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2243 unsigned int length, type, size;
2244 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2245 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2248 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2250 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2252 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2253 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2255 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2256 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2259 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2261 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2263 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2266 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2267 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2271 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2272 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2276 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2277 const unsigned char *data;
2280 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2281 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2284 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2285 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2287 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2288 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2290 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2291 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2292 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2293 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2294 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2297 tlsext_servername = 1;
2299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2300 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2301 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2302 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2303 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2304 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2308 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2309 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2310 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2311 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2312 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2315 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2316 ecpointformatlist_length;
2317 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2318 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2319 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2320 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2326 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2328 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2329 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2330 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2331 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2333 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2336 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2337 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2340 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2342 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2344 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2347 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2348 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2351 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2352 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2356 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2357 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2358 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2360 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2361 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2362 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2363 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2364 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2365 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2367 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2369 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2370 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2371 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2374 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2379 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2380 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2381 unsigned char *selected;
2382 unsigned char selected_len;
2383 /* We must have requested it. */
2384 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2385 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2388 /* The data must be valid */
2389 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2390 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2394 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2396 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2397 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2398 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2401 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2402 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2403 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2406 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2407 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2408 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2412 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2414 /* We must have requested it. */
2415 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2416 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2420 * The extension data consists of:
2421 * uint16 list_length
2422 * uint8 proto_length;
2423 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2425 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2426 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2427 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2428 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2429 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2432 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2433 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2434 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2435 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2438 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2439 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2442 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2445 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2446 unsigned int hbtype;
2447 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2448 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2452 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2453 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2455 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2456 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2457 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2460 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2465 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2466 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2467 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2471 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2472 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2473 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2474 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2475 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2477 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2478 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2480 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2483 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2484 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2486 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2490 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2491 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2495 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2496 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2497 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2498 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2499 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2500 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2504 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2513 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2514 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2515 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2516 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2517 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2519 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2520 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2521 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2523 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2529 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2532 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2533 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2534 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2543 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2545 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2549 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2554 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2556 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2557 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2561 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2562 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2565 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2566 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2570 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2572 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2573 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2574 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2575 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2577 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2579 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2582 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2583 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2586 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2587 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2590 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2591 s->servername_done = 0;
2596 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2597 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2599 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2601 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2604 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2605 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2607 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2608 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2611 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2614 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2615 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2616 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2620 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2625 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2626 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2627 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2628 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2629 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2630 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2631 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2632 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2635 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2636 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2637 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2639 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2642 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2643 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2645 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2646 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2650 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2654 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2659 * Upon success, returns 1.
2660 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2662 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2664 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2667 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2668 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2669 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2670 * influence which certificate is sent
2672 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2674 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2675 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2676 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2677 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2679 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2680 * et al can pick it up.
2682 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2683 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2685 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2686 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2687 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2689 /* status request response should be sent */
2690 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2691 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2692 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2694 /* something bad happened */
2695 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2697 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2703 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2710 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2712 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2713 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2717 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2718 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2719 * must contain uncompressed.
2721 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2722 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2723 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2724 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2725 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2726 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2727 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2728 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2730 unsigned char *list;
2731 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2732 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2733 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2734 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2735 found_uncompressed = 1;
2739 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2741 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2745 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2746 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2748 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2750 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2751 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2752 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2753 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2755 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2757 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2760 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2761 * that we don't receive a status message
2763 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2764 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2765 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2768 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2769 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2772 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2773 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2776 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2777 s->servername_done = 0;
2783 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2786 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2788 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2789 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2793 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2801 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2802 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2803 * need to be handled at the same time.
2805 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2808 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2809 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2810 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2811 * point to the resulting session.
2813 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2814 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2815 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2818 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2819 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2820 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2821 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2822 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2823 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2824 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2827 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2828 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2829 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2830 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2831 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2832 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2834 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2837 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2838 const PACKET *session_id,
2842 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2845 int have_ticket = 0;
2846 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2849 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2850 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2853 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2856 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2859 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2863 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2864 unsigned int type, size;
2866 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2867 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2868 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2872 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2876 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2878 const unsigned char *etick;
2880 /* Duplicate extension */
2881 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2889 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2892 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2896 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2898 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2899 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2900 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2901 * calculate the master secret later.
2906 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2907 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2911 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2912 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2914 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2915 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2918 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2921 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2922 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2925 default: /* fatal error */
2931 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2932 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2933 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2939 if (have_ticket == 0)
2946 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2948 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2949 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2950 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2951 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2952 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2953 * point to the resulting session.
2956 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2957 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2958 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2959 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2960 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2962 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2963 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2964 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2967 unsigned char *sdec;
2968 const unsigned char *p;
2969 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2970 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2971 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2972 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2973 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2974 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2977 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2978 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2981 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2986 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2987 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2988 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2999 /* Check key name matches */
3000 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3001 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3005 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3006 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3007 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3008 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3009 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3010 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
3015 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3018 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3023 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3024 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3025 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3028 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3029 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3030 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3033 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3034 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3035 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3036 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3037 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3039 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3040 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3044 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3045 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3050 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3054 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3058 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3059 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3060 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3064 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3065 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3074 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3078 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3079 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3083 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3090 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3091 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3092 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3093 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3094 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3095 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3096 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3097 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3098 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3099 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3102 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3103 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3104 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3105 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3106 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3107 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3108 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3111 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3114 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3115 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3121 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3124 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3125 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3126 return table[i].nid;
3131 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3137 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3140 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3143 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3144 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3148 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3150 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3157 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3160 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3161 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3162 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3163 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3164 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3165 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3166 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3167 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3168 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3169 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3172 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3178 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3180 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3181 return tls12_md_info + i;
3187 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3189 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3190 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3192 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3195 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3198 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3202 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3203 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3206 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3207 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3210 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3211 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3213 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3214 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3215 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3217 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3218 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3220 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3221 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3227 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3228 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3229 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3231 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3232 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3234 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3235 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3237 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3239 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3240 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3242 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3244 if (psignhash_nid) {
3245 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3246 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3248 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3252 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3253 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3255 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3256 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3257 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3259 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3260 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3262 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3263 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3267 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3268 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3272 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3274 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3275 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3276 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3278 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3279 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3280 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3282 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3283 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3284 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3286 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3287 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3291 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3292 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3293 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3298 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3299 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3306 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3308 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3310 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3313 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3314 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3316 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3318 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3319 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3320 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3321 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3324 return tmpout - out;
3327 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3328 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3329 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3330 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3332 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3333 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3334 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3335 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3336 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3338 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3339 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3342 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3343 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3344 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3346 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3356 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3357 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3359 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3360 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3362 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3364 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3366 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3367 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3368 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3369 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3370 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3371 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3372 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3373 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3374 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3375 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3377 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3378 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3381 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3382 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3386 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3387 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3389 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3391 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3394 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3398 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3399 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3403 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3405 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3408 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3409 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3411 /* Should never happen */
3415 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3416 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3417 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3419 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3420 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3424 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3429 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3430 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3432 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3433 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3436 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3437 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3438 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3439 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3440 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3442 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3443 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3444 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3445 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3451 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3452 * the certificate for signing.
3454 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3456 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3457 * supported it stays as NULL.
3459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3460 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3461 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3464 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3465 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3466 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3470 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3471 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3473 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3474 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3475 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3476 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3477 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3478 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3479 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3485 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3486 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3487 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3489 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3494 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3501 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3503 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3506 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3507 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3508 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3510 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3511 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3515 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3517 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3519 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3521 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3523 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3524 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3527 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3531 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3534 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3536 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3537 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3538 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3539 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3540 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3541 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3543 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3544 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3545 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3549 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3551 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3554 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3557 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3559 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3561 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3563 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3571 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3572 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3574 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3577 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3578 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3581 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3582 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3587 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3588 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3590 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3594 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3598 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3601 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3604 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3609 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3610 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3612 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3613 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3614 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3616 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3623 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3624 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3625 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3627 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3628 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3629 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3635 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3639 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3643 if (default_nid == -1)
3645 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3647 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3648 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3649 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3654 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3655 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3659 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3660 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3661 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3668 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3669 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3670 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3671 * attempting to use them.
3674 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3676 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3677 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3678 /* Strict mode flags */
3679 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3680 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3681 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3683 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3688 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3689 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3692 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3693 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3695 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3698 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3700 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3701 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3703 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3705 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3706 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3712 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3715 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3717 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3718 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3720 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3727 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3728 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3729 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3730 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3731 else if (!check_flags)
3736 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3737 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3739 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3741 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3742 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3744 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3747 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3748 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3749 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3750 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3753 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3754 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3755 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3759 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3760 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3763 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3764 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3765 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3768 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3769 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3770 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3773 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3774 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3775 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3784 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3785 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3787 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3789 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3790 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3791 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3794 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3801 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3802 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3806 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3807 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3808 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3809 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3811 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3818 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3819 else if (check_flags)
3820 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3822 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3823 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3824 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3825 else if (!check_flags)
3828 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3829 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3830 else if (strict_mode) {
3831 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3832 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3833 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3834 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3836 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3843 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3844 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3846 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3848 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3851 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3854 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3858 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3862 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3864 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3865 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3867 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3868 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3869 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3873 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3876 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3878 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3880 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3881 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3883 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3884 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3885 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3887 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3888 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3889 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3890 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3891 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3896 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3899 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3901 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3902 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3906 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3907 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3908 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3909 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3910 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3912 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3915 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3919 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3922 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3923 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3930 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3931 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3933 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3934 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3935 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3936 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3937 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3938 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3939 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3942 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3943 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3945 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3950 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3952 int dh_secbits = 80;
3953 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3954 return DH_get_1024_160();
3955 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3956 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3961 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3962 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3965 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
3973 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3974 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3976 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3977 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
3985 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
3986 return DH_get_2048_224();
3987 return DH_get_1024_160();
3991 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3994 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
3997 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3998 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3999 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4000 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4002 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4005 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4007 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4010 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4012 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4013 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4014 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4015 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4017 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4018 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4020 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4021 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4024 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4026 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4029 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4032 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4034 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4035 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4037 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4038 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4040 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4041 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4046 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4047 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4048 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4051 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4053 int rv, start_idx, i;
4055 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4060 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4064 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4065 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4066 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);