2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
195 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
196 * http, the cache would over fill
198 return (60 * 60 * 2);
205 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
209 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
212 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
213 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
215 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
219 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
222 s->version = s->method->version;
225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
228 int nid; /* Curve NID */
229 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
230 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
233 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
234 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
236 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
269 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
273 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
274 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
276 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
277 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
278 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
279 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
280 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
281 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
285 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
286 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
287 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
288 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
289 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
290 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
291 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
293 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
294 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
295 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
296 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
297 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
298 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
299 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
300 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
301 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
304 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
305 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
306 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
309 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
311 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
312 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
313 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
315 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
318 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
320 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
322 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
324 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
326 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
328 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
330 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
332 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
334 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
336 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
338 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
340 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
342 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
344 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
346 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
348 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
350 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
352 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
354 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
356 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
358 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
360 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
362 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
364 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
366 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
368 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
370 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
372 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
374 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
376 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
384 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
386 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
387 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
388 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
389 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
390 * lists in the first place.
391 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
392 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
393 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
395 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
396 const unsigned char **pcurves,
399 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
401 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
402 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
404 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
405 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
406 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
407 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
408 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
411 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
412 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
416 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
417 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
421 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
422 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
425 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
426 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
430 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
431 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
436 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
441 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
442 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
444 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
447 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
448 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
450 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
451 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
452 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
455 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
458 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
459 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
461 const unsigned char *curves;
462 size_t num_curves, i;
463 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
464 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
466 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
468 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
472 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
474 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
475 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
477 } else /* Should never happen */
480 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
482 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
483 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
484 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
490 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
491 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
492 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
493 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
495 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
497 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
498 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
500 /* Can't do anything on client side */
504 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
506 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
507 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
509 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
510 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
511 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
512 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
513 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
514 /* Should never happen */
517 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
521 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
522 * but s->options is a long...
524 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
525 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
527 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
528 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
529 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
530 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
532 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
534 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
535 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
536 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
537 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
538 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
541 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
542 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
550 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
554 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
555 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
557 unsigned char *clist, *p;
560 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
563 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
564 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
567 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
568 unsigned long idmask;
570 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
572 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
582 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
586 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
590 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
593 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
595 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
601 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
603 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
605 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
607 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
608 if (nid == NID_undef)
609 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
610 if (nid == NID_undef)
611 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
612 if (nid == NID_undef)
614 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
615 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
617 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
621 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
622 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
627 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
631 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
634 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
635 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
640 const EC_METHOD *meth;
643 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
644 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
647 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
650 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
654 /* Determine curve ID */
655 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
656 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
657 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
660 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
669 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
671 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
673 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
675 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
677 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
682 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
683 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
684 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
686 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
687 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
690 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
691 * supported (see RFC4492).
693 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
694 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
695 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
696 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
697 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
700 if (i == num_formats)
705 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
706 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
707 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
709 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
710 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
715 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
722 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
726 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
728 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
729 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
730 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
732 *pformats = ecformats_default;
733 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
735 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
737 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
742 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
743 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
745 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
747 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
750 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
753 /* If not EC nothing to do */
754 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
758 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
763 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
766 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
770 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
771 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
773 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
779 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
780 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
781 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
782 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
783 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
785 return 0; /* Should never happen */
786 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
787 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
789 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
791 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
792 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
793 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
795 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
801 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
802 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
803 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
805 unsigned char curve_id[2];
806 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
807 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
808 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
809 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
813 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
816 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
817 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
818 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
819 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
820 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
821 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
825 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
826 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
828 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
829 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
831 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
833 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
836 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
838 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
845 /* Need a shared curve */
846 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
852 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
857 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
859 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
863 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
866 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
870 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
875 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
880 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
881 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
884 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
885 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
887 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
890 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
891 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
893 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
896 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
897 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
900 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
903 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
904 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
905 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
906 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
908 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
909 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
910 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
911 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
912 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
913 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
916 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
917 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
918 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
919 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
922 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
925 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
928 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
929 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
930 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
931 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
932 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
934 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
935 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
938 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
939 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
943 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
944 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
945 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
947 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
948 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
949 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
951 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
952 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
957 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
958 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
960 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
961 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
963 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
964 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
965 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
966 /* Should never happen */
969 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
970 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
974 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
975 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
976 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
977 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
978 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
980 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
985 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
988 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
989 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
991 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
994 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
995 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
997 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1003 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1007 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1008 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1009 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1010 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1013 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1014 if (i == sent_sigslen
1015 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1016 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1020 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1025 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1026 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1027 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1033 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1035 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1036 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1041 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1042 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1043 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1046 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1051 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1052 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1053 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1056 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1058 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1061 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1063 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1064 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1065 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1066 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1067 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1068 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1069 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1070 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1073 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1074 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1075 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1076 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1077 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1079 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1080 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1081 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1082 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1083 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1089 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1092 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k
1093 || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1095 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1098 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1100 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1102 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1105 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1106 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1109 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1110 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1111 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1112 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1114 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1116 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1117 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1119 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1120 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1122 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1123 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1124 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1125 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1136 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1138 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1139 if (s->renegotiate) {
1142 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1147 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1150 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1153 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1160 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1161 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1164 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1165 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1166 unsigned long size_str;
1170 * check for enough space.
1171 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1172 * 2 for servernamelist length
1173 * 1 for the hostname type
1174 * 2 for hostname length
1178 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1180 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1183 /* extension type and length */
1184 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1185 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1187 /* length of servername list */
1188 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1190 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1191 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1193 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1196 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1197 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1198 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1199 * Client Hello message */
1201 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1202 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1208 * check for enough space.
1209 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1210 * 1 for the srp user identity
1211 * + srp user identity length
1213 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1216 /* fill in the extension */
1217 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1218 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1219 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1220 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1225 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1228 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1231 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1232 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1234 unsigned char *etmp;
1236 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1238 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1240 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1242 if (num_formats > 255) {
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1248 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1249 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1250 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1251 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1255 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1257 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1258 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1261 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1263 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1265 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1270 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1272 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1273 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1274 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1275 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1276 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1280 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1282 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1283 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1284 ret += curves_list_len;
1286 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1288 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1290 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1291 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1292 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1293 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1294 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1295 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1296 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1298 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1299 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1300 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1303 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1304 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1307 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1310 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1312 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1315 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1321 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1323 const unsigned char *salg;
1324 unsigned char *etmp;
1325 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1326 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1328 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1330 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1332 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1333 /* Fill in lengths */
1334 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1339 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1341 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1345 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1346 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1347 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1353 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1354 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1360 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1362 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1363 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1365 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1366 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1368 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1369 /* save position of id len */
1370 unsigned char *q = ret;
1371 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1372 /* skip over id len */
1374 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1380 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1382 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1383 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1384 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1386 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1390 * 1: peer may send requests
1391 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1393 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1394 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1396 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1399 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1400 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1402 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1403 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1405 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1407 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1412 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1413 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1416 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1417 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1418 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1419 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1421 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1422 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1425 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1427 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1430 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1433 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1440 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1441 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1442 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1444 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1445 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1448 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1452 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1453 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1454 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1457 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1458 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1460 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1461 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1464 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1466 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1467 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1473 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1475 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1482 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1485 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1489 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1490 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1493 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1494 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1495 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1496 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1498 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1499 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1500 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1501 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1502 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1503 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1508 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1510 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1513 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1518 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1521 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1524 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1532 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1533 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1536 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1537 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1538 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1541 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1544 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1546 const unsigned char *plist;
1549 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1553 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1555 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1557 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1559 if (plistlen > 255) {
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1565 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1566 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1567 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1572 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1575 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1577 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1578 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1580 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1584 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1585 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1587 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1591 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1592 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1595 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1597 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1600 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1603 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1611 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1612 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1613 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1614 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1615 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1616 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1617 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1618 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1619 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1620 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1622 if (limit - ret < 36)
1624 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1628 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1629 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1630 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1631 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1633 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1637 * 1: peer may send requests
1638 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1640 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1641 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1643 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1648 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1649 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1650 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1651 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1652 const unsigned char *npa;
1653 unsigned int npalen;
1656 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1658 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1659 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1660 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1662 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1664 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1666 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1670 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1672 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1673 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1675 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1676 * for other cases too.
1678 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1679 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1680 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1682 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1687 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1688 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1692 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1693 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1694 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1696 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1698 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1702 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1708 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1711 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1716 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1717 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1718 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1719 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1722 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1723 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1727 const unsigned char *selected;
1728 unsigned char selected_len;
1731 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1738 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1739 * length-prefixed strings.
1741 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1750 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1751 proto_len = data[i];
1757 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1763 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1764 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1765 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1766 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1767 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1768 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1769 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1770 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1773 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1774 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1779 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1783 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1785 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1786 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1787 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1792 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1793 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1794 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1795 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1797 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1798 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1800 unsigned short type, size;
1801 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1802 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1803 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1804 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1805 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1806 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1807 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1809 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1810 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1811 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1812 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1815 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1816 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1817 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1818 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1819 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1820 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1821 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1822 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1823 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1824 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1827 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1831 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1836 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1839 if (data + size > d + n)
1843 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1844 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1845 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1847 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1849 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1851 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1854 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1856 if (data + len != d + n)
1858 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1862 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1864 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1866 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1867 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1869 unsigned short type;
1870 unsigned short size;
1872 unsigned char *data = *p;
1873 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1875 s->servername_done = 0;
1876 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1877 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1878 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1881 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1882 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1883 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1885 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1886 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1887 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1890 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1891 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1892 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1893 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1895 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1896 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
1897 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1898 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1900 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1901 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1904 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1905 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1906 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1907 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1911 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1913 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1917 if (data > (d + n - len))
1920 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1924 if (data + size > (d + n))
1926 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1927 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1928 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1929 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1931 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1932 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1935 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1937 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1938 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1939 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1940 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1941 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1942 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1943 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1944 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1945 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1946 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1947 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1948 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1949 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1950 * the value of the Host: field.
1951 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1952 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1953 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1955 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1959 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1960 unsigned char *sdata;
1965 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1971 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1977 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1982 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1985 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1986 switch (servname_type) {
1987 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1989 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1990 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1993 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1994 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1997 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1998 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1999 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2002 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2003 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2004 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2005 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2006 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2007 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2010 s->servername_done = 1;
2013 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2014 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2015 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2016 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2027 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2032 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2033 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2034 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2035 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2038 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2039 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2042 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2044 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2045 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2047 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2048 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2054 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2055 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2056 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2057 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2059 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2060 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2061 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2065 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2066 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2067 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2069 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2070 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2071 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2072 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2075 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2076 ecpointformatlist_length;
2077 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2078 ecpointformatlist_length);
2080 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2081 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2082 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2083 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2085 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2086 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2087 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2088 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2089 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2093 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2094 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2097 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2098 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2099 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2100 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2103 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2104 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2105 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2106 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2109 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2110 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2111 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2112 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2113 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2115 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2118 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2120 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2121 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2126 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2127 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2130 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2131 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2134 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2137 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2141 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2143 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2144 const unsigned char *sdata;
2146 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2150 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2157 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2161 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2164 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2169 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2171 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2174 if (data != sdata) {
2175 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2176 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2179 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2180 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2181 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2182 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2183 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2186 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2187 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2188 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2193 /* Read in request_extensions */
2195 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2200 if (dsize != size) {
2201 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2206 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2207 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2208 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2211 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2212 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2213 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2214 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2220 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2223 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2225 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2226 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2228 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2229 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2231 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2232 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2233 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2236 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2241 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2242 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2243 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2244 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2246 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2249 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2250 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2251 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2252 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2253 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2254 * anything like that, but this might change).
2256 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2257 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2258 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2259 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2260 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2262 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2266 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2267 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2268 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2270 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2271 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2272 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2276 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2277 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2278 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2279 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2280 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2284 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2285 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2286 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2288 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2290 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2293 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2294 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2295 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2296 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2297 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2300 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2311 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2313 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2315 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2317 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2324 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2328 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2329 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2330 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2334 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2341 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2343 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2344 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2345 * fill the length of the block.
2347 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2349 unsigned int off = 0;
2362 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2363 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2365 unsigned short length;
2366 unsigned short type;
2367 unsigned short size;
2368 unsigned char *data = *p;
2369 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2370 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2372 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2373 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2375 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2377 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2378 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2379 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2381 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2382 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2383 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2386 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2387 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2390 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2394 if (data + length != d + n) {
2395 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2399 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2403 if (data + size > (d + n))
2406 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2407 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2409 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2410 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2412 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2413 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2414 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2415 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2416 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2419 tlsext_servername = 1;
2421 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2422 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2423 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2424 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2426 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2427 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2431 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2432 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2433 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2434 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2435 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2436 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2439 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2440 ecpointformatlist_length;
2441 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2442 ecpointformatlist_length);
2445 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2447 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2448 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2449 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2450 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2452 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2455 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2456 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2459 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2461 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2463 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2466 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2467 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2470 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2471 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2473 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2474 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2475 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2476 unsigned char *selected;
2477 unsigned char selected_len;
2479 /* We must have requested it. */
2480 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2481 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2484 /* The data must be valid */
2485 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2486 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2490 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2492 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2493 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2494 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2497 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2498 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2499 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2502 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2503 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2504 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2508 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2511 /* We must have requested it. */
2512 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2513 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2517 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2521 * The extension data consists of:
2522 * uint16 list_length
2523 * uint8 proto_length;
2524 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2529 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2530 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2534 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2535 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2538 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2539 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2540 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2541 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2542 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2545 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2546 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2548 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2549 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2551 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2552 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2554 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2555 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2556 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2559 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2564 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2565 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2566 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2570 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2571 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2572 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2573 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2574 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2575 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2578 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2580 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2583 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2584 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2586 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2592 if (data != d + n) {
2593 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2597 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2598 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2599 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2600 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2601 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2602 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2606 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2617 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2618 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2619 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2620 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2621 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2622 * initial connect only.
2624 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2625 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2626 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2628 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2635 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2641 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2646 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2648 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2649 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2651 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2653 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2654 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2657 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2658 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2662 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2664 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2665 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2666 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2667 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2669 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2671 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2674 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2675 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2678 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2679 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2682 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2683 s->servername_done = 0;
2689 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2693 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2694 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2695 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2696 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2698 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2699 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2700 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2701 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2704 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2705 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2706 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2708 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2711 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2712 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2714 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2715 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2719 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2722 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2726 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2728 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2732 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2733 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2734 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2735 * influence which certificate is sent
2737 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2739 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2740 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2741 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2742 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2743 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2747 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2748 * et al can pick it up.
2750 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2751 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2753 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2754 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2755 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2757 /* status request response should be sent */
2758 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2759 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2760 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2762 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2764 /* something bad happened */
2765 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2766 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2767 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2771 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2775 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2776 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2779 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2780 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2788 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2790 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2791 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2793 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2795 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2796 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2797 * must contain uncompressed.
2799 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2800 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2801 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2802 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2803 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2804 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2805 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2806 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2807 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2809 unsigned char *list;
2810 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2811 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2812 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2813 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2814 found_uncompressed = 1;
2818 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2820 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2824 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2825 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2827 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2829 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2830 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2831 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2832 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2834 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2836 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2839 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2842 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2843 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2846 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2849 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2850 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2851 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2853 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2854 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2856 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2857 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2860 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2861 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2866 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2867 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2870 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2871 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2874 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2875 s->servername_done = 0;
2881 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2885 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2887 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2888 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2892 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2900 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2901 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2902 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2904 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2905 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2906 * extension, if any.
2907 * len: the length of the session ID.
2908 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2909 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2910 * point to the resulting session.
2912 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2913 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2914 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2917 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2918 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2919 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2920 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2921 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2922 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2923 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2926 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2927 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2928 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2929 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2930 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2931 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2933 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2934 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2936 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2937 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2941 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2944 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2947 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2949 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2953 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2954 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2960 /* Skip past cipher list */
2965 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2970 /* Now at start of extensions */
2971 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2974 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
2975 unsigned short type, size;
2978 if (p + size > limit)
2980 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2984 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2987 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2990 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2992 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2993 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2994 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2995 * calculate the master secret later.
2999 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3001 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3002 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3004 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3006 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3007 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3009 default: /* fatal error */
3019 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3021 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3022 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3023 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3024 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3025 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3026 * point to the resulting session.
3029 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3030 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3031 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3032 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3034 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3035 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3036 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3039 unsigned char *sdec;
3040 const unsigned char *p;
3041 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3042 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3045 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3046 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3049 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3050 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3051 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3052 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3053 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3054 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3063 /* Check key name matches */
3064 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3066 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3067 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3068 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3069 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3072 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3075 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3077 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3081 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3082 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3083 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3084 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3085 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3086 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3089 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3090 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3091 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3092 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3093 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3095 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3098 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3099 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3100 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3105 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3108 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3112 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3113 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3114 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3118 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3119 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3128 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3133 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3140 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3141 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3142 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3143 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3144 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3145 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3146 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3149 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3150 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3151 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3152 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3155 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3158 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3159 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3165 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3168 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3169 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3170 return table[i].nid;
3175 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3181 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3182 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3185 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3188 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3189 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3193 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3195 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3196 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3202 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3205 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3206 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3209 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3211 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3212 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3213 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3214 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3215 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3218 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3222 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info) / sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3224 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3227 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3229 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3230 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3232 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3233 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3235 return inf->mfunc();
3238 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3241 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3242 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3243 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3245 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3246 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3247 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3249 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3250 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3251 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3257 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3258 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3259 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3261 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3262 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3264 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3265 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3266 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3268 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3270 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3271 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3272 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3274 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3276 if (psignhash_nid) {
3277 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3278 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3280 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3284 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3285 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3287 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3288 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3289 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3291 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3292 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3294 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3295 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3299 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3300 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3304 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3306 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3307 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3308 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3310 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3311 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3312 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3314 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3315 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3316 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3317 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3318 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3319 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3323 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3324 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3325 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3329 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3330 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3331 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3338 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3340 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3342 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3345 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3346 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3348 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3350 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3351 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3352 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3353 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3356 return tmpout - out;
3359 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3360 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3361 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3362 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3364 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3365 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3366 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3367 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3368 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3370 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3371 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3374 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3375 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3376 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3378 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3388 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3389 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3391 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3392 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3394 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3396 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3397 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3398 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3399 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3401 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3402 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3403 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3404 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3405 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3406 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3407 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3409 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3410 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3413 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3414 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3418 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3419 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3421 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3424 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3427 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3428 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3429 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3433 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3435 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3438 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3439 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3441 /* Should never happen */
3445 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3446 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3447 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3448 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3450 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3451 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3455 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3461 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3462 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3465 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3466 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3468 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3469 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3471 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3473 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3475 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3477 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3478 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3479 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3480 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3481 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3482 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3483 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3484 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3490 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3491 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3492 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3493 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3494 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3495 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3496 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3497 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3498 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3499 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3500 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3506 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3507 * the certificate for signing.
3509 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3511 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3512 * supported it stays as NULL.
3514 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3515 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3516 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3518 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3519 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3520 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3521 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3524 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3525 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3526 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3532 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3533 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3534 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3536 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3541 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3548 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3550 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3553 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3554 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3555 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3557 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3558 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3562 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3564 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3566 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3568 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3570 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3571 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3574 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3575 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3577 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3578 unsigned short hbtype;
3579 unsigned int payload;
3580 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3582 if (s->msg_callback)
3583 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3584 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3585 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3587 /* Read type and payload length first */
3588 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3589 return 0; /* silently discard */
3592 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3593 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3596 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3597 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3601 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3602 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3604 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3605 if (buffer == NULL) {
3606 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3611 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3612 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3614 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3616 /* Random padding */
3617 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3619 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3620 3 + payload + padding);
3622 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3623 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3624 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3625 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3627 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3631 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3635 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3636 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3640 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3642 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3649 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3651 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3653 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3654 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3656 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3657 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3658 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3663 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3664 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3669 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3670 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3671 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3676 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3677 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3679 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3682 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3683 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3684 * some random stuff.
3685 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3686 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3687 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3688 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3691 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3693 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3698 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3699 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3701 /* Sequence number */
3702 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3703 /* 16 random bytes */
3704 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3706 /* Random padding */
3707 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3709 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3711 if (s->msg_callback)
3712 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3713 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3714 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3716 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3725 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3729 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3732 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3734 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3737 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3740 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3742 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3744 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3746 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3754 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3755 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3756 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3757 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3758 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3759 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3763 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3764 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3765 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3766 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3769 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3770 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3773 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3774 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3779 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3780 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3782 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3786 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3790 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3793 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3796 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3801 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3802 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3804 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3805 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3806 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3807 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3808 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3810 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3817 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3818 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3819 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3820 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3822 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3823 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3824 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3825 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3831 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3835 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3839 if (default_nid == -1)
3841 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3843 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3844 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3845 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3850 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3851 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3855 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3856 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3857 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3864 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3865 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3866 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3867 * attempting to use them.
3870 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3872 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3873 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3874 /* Strict mode flags */
3875 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3876 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3877 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3879 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3884 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3885 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3887 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3888 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3890 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3893 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3895 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3897 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3899 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3900 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3903 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3904 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3905 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3906 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3907 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3908 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3915 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3918 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3919 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3920 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3922 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3929 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3930 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3931 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3932 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3933 else if (!check_flags)
3938 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3939 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3941 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3943 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3944 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3946 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3949 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3950 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3951 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3952 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3953 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3956 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3957 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3958 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3959 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3963 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3964 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3973 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3974 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3976 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3978 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3979 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3980 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3983 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3990 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3991 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3995 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3996 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3997 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3998 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4000 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4007 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4008 else if (check_flags)
4009 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4011 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4012 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4013 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4014 else if (!check_flags)
4017 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4018 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4019 else if (strict_mode) {
4020 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4021 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4022 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4023 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4025 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4032 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4033 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4037 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4040 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4043 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4048 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4049 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4050 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4051 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4052 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4056 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4060 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4062 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4063 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4065 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4066 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4067 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4071 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4074 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4076 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4078 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4079 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4081 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4082 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4083 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4085 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4086 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4087 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4088 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4089 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4094 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4097 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4099 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4100 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4104 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4105 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4106 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4107 else if (cpk->digest)
4108 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4110 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4113 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4117 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4118 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4120 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4121 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4128 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4129 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4131 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4132 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4133 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4134 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4135 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4136 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4139 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4140 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4142 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4148 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4150 int dh_secbits = 80;
4151 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4152 return DH_get_1024_160();
4153 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4154 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4159 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4160 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4163 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4169 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4170 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4171 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4173 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4174 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4180 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4181 return DH_get_2048_224();
4182 return DH_get_1024_160();
4186 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4189 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4191 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4192 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4196 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4198 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4201 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4203 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4204 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4205 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4206 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4208 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4209 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4212 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4214 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4217 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4220 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4222 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4223 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4225 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4226 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4228 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4229 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4234 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4235 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4236 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4239 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4241 int rv, start_idx, i;
4243 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4248 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4252 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4253 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4254 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);