2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] =
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
246 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
247 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
250 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
252 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
253 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
254 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
256 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
259 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
261 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
264 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
266 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
268 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
270 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
272 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
274 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
276 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
278 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
280 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
288 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
290 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
292 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
294 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
296 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
298 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
300 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
302 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
306 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
308 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
310 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
312 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
318 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
321 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
322 const unsigned char **pcurves,
327 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
328 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
331 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
332 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
334 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
335 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
336 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
340 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
345 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
349 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
350 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
354 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
355 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
358 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
359 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
361 const unsigned char *curves;
363 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
364 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
366 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
369 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
372 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
374 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
377 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
379 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
382 else /* Should never happen */
385 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
386 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
388 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
394 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
395 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
399 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
401 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
402 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
404 /* Can't do anything on client side */
411 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
412 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
415 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
416 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
418 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
419 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
420 /* Should never happen */
423 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
426 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
433 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
435 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
436 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
438 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
442 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
443 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
454 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
455 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
457 unsigned char *clist, *p;
459 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
460 * while curve ids < 32
462 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
463 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
466 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
468 unsigned long idmask;
470 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
472 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
483 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
487 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
492 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
495 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
497 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
501 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
503 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
505 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
507 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
508 if (nid == NID_undef)
509 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
510 if (nid == NID_undef)
511 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
512 if (nid == NID_undef)
514 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
515 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
517 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
520 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
521 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
526 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
530 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
532 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
533 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
539 const EC_METHOD *meth;
542 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
543 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
544 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
547 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
550 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
554 /* Determine curve ID */
555 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
556 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
557 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
561 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
573 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
576 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
578 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
581 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
585 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
586 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
587 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
589 const unsigned char *p;
592 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
593 * is supported (see RFC4492).
595 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
597 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
598 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
599 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
609 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
610 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
612 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
613 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
615 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
620 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
627 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
628 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
630 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
632 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
635 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
638 /* If not EC nothing to do */
639 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
644 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
648 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
649 * supported curves extension.
651 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
654 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
655 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
657 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
664 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
665 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
666 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
667 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
668 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
670 return 0; /* Should never happen */
671 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
672 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
674 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
678 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
679 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
681 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
686 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
687 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
689 unsigned char curve_id[2];
690 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
691 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
692 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
693 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
696 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
697 * no other curves permitted.
701 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
702 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
703 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
704 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
705 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
709 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
710 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
712 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
713 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
715 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
718 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
721 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
723 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
729 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
731 /* Need a shared curve */
732 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
738 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
743 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
745 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
749 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
753 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
757 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
758 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
761 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
762 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
764 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
767 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
768 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
770 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
773 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
774 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
776 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
779 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
780 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
781 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
782 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
784 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
786 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
787 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
790 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
791 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
794 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
797 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
801 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
802 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
803 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
806 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
808 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
811 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
813 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
814 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
815 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
817 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
818 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
821 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
822 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
826 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
827 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
829 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
830 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
832 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
834 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
835 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
839 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
841 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
843 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
846 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
849 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
850 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
852 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
853 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
855 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
856 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
857 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
858 /* Should never happen */
861 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
862 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
867 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
869 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
870 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
871 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
873 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
875 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
878 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
883 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
885 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
887 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
888 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
892 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
894 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
897 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
905 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
908 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
909 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
910 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
912 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
915 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
916 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
918 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
921 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
927 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
930 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
931 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
934 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
935 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
936 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
937 * session and not global settings.
940 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
943 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
944 size_t i, sigalgslen;
945 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
948 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
949 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
950 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
953 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
954 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
957 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
958 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
963 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
968 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
973 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
979 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
980 * signature algorithms.
984 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
985 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
989 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
990 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
994 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
995 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
998 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1000 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1001 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1005 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1006 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1008 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1009 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1011 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1015 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1016 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1018 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1019 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1028 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1031 unsigned char *ret = p;
1032 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1033 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1035 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1038 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1039 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1041 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1043 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1045 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1046 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1047 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1048 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1057 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1058 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1059 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1064 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1066 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1068 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1069 unsigned long size_str;
1072 /* check for enough space.
1073 4 for the servername type and entension length
1074 2 for servernamelist length
1075 1 for the hostname type
1076 2 for hostname length
1080 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1081 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1084 /* extension type and length */
1085 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1086 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1088 /* length of servername list */
1089 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1091 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1092 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1094 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1098 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1103 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1109 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1111 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1114 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1124 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1125 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1126 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1128 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1129 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1135 /* check for enough space.
1136 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1137 1 for the srp user identity
1138 + srp user identity length
1140 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1142 /* fill in the extension */
1143 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1144 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1145 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1146 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1154 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1156 const unsigned char *plist;
1158 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
1160 plist = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1162 plistlen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1165 plist = ecformats_default;
1166 plistlen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
1169 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1170 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1177 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1178 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1179 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1180 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1183 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1184 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1185 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1187 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1188 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1189 if (plistlen > 65532)
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1195 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1196 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1198 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1199 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1200 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1201 * resolves this to two bytes.
1204 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1207 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1209 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1212 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1213 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1214 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1215 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1217 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1218 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1219 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1221 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1222 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1224 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1228 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1229 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1231 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1234 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1235 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1239 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1245 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1248 const unsigned char *salg;
1249 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1250 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1252 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1253 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1255 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1259 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1260 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1261 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1263 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1265 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1267 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1270 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1273 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1278 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1279 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1282 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1286 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1288 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1289 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1295 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1297 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1304 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1305 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1306 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1308 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1309 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1311 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1313 /* save position of id len */
1314 unsigned char *q = ret;
1315 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1316 /* skip over id len */
1318 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1324 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1328 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1329 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1332 * 1: peer may send requests
1333 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1335 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1336 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1338 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1342 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1344 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1345 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1346 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1348 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1353 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1357 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1359 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1361 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1364 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1372 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1373 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1374 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1375 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1376 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1377 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1380 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1381 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1383 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1385 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1386 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1388 *(ret++) = list_len;
1389 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1392 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1399 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1402 unsigned char *ret = p;
1403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1404 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1407 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1408 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1412 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1414 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1416 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1418 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1422 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1426 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1432 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1434 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1437 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1447 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
1448 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1450 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1453 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1454 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
1455 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1461 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1462 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
1463 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1464 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1465 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1468 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1469 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1471 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1472 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1474 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1475 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1479 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1481 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1482 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1486 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1487 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1488 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1490 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1492 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1494 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1500 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1509 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1511 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1516 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1524 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1525 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1526 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1527 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1528 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1529 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1530 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1531 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1532 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1533 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1534 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1540 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1541 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1543 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1546 * 1: peer may send requests
1547 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1549 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1550 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1552 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1558 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1559 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1560 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1562 const unsigned char *npa;
1563 unsigned int npalen;
1566 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1567 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1569 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1570 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1572 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1574 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1579 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1581 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1583 size_t authz_length;
1584 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1585 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1586 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1587 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1588 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1590 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1592 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1593 * uint8_t authz_type
1595 * uint8_t data[length]
1597 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1598 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1600 unsigned short length;
1604 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1606 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1610 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1618 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1619 * 2 bytes for extension type
1620 * 2 bytes for extension length
1621 * 1 byte for the list length
1622 * n bytes for the list */
1623 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1625 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1626 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1628 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1629 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1633 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1635 unsigned short length;
1640 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1642 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1645 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1652 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1659 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1661 unsigned short type;
1662 unsigned short size;
1664 unsigned char *data = *p;
1665 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1668 s->servername_done = 0;
1669 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1671 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1675 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1676 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1678 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1679 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1681 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1682 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1684 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1685 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1687 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1688 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1690 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1691 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1693 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1694 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1697 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1701 if (data > (d+n-len))
1704 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1709 if (data+size > (d+n))
1712 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1714 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1715 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1716 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1717 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1719 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1720 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1721 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1722 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1723 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1724 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1725 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1726 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1727 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1728 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1729 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1730 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1731 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1732 the value of the Host: field.
1733 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1734 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1735 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1736 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1740 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1742 unsigned char *sdata;
1748 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1755 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1762 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1768 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1771 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1772 switch (servname_type)
1774 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1777 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1779 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1782 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1784 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1787 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1789 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1792 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1793 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1794 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1795 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1796 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1797 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1800 s->servername_done = 1;
1804 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1805 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1806 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1818 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1824 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1826 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1828 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1831 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1833 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1836 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1838 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1839 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1841 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1843 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1850 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1851 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1853 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1854 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1856 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1858 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1863 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1865 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1866 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1868 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1869 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1871 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1874 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1875 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1878 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1879 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1880 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1881 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1882 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1885 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1886 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1888 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1889 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1890 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1892 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
1894 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1899 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1901 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1904 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1905 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1907 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1910 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1911 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1914 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1915 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1916 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1917 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1918 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1921 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1922 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1923 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1924 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1926 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1930 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1933 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1934 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1936 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1940 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1941 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1942 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1943 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1945 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1946 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1948 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1953 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1955 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1956 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1958 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1962 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1964 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1966 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1968 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1971 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
1973 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1978 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
1980 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1983 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1985 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1988 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
1991 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1994 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1995 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1999 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2000 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2005 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2009 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2011 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2013 const unsigned char *sdata;
2015 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2020 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2029 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2033 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2037 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2042 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2046 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2051 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2052 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2055 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2056 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2057 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2059 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2060 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2063 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2064 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2066 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2067 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2072 /* Read in request_extensions */
2075 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2082 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2088 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2090 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2091 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2094 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2095 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2097 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2098 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2100 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2105 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2109 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2112 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2116 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2117 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2119 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2120 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2121 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2123 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2129 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2130 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2132 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2135 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2136 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2137 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2138 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2139 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2140 * anything like that, but this might change).
2142 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2143 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2144 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2145 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2146 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2147 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2151 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2152 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2154 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2159 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2161 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2162 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2166 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2170 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2172 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2174 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2178 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2179 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2180 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2183 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2184 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2185 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2186 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2187 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2189 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2193 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2194 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2195 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2197 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2199 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2200 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2201 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2202 1 /* element size */,
2205 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2208 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2209 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2211 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2225 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2227 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2228 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2230 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2232 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2235 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2236 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2237 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2242 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2245 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2247 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2251 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2260 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2261 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2262 * the length of the block. */
2263 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2265 unsigned int off = 0;
2279 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2281 unsigned short length;
2282 unsigned short type;
2283 unsigned short size;
2284 unsigned char *data = *p;
2285 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2286 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2289 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2293 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2294 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2297 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2301 if (data+length != d+n)
2303 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2307 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2312 if (data+size > (d+n))
2315 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2316 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2317 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2319 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2321 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2323 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2326 tlsext_servername = 1;
2329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2330 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2331 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2333 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2334 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2336 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2338 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2341 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2342 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2343 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2345 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2348 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2349 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2351 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2352 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2353 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2354 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2355 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2358 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2360 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2362 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2363 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2365 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2368 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2371 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2374 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2376 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2377 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2378 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2380 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2384 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2387 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2388 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2390 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2394 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2395 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2396 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2397 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2399 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2401 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2403 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2408 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2409 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2411 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2412 * a status request message.
2414 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2416 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2419 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2420 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2423 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2424 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2426 unsigned char *selected;
2427 unsigned char selected_len;
2429 /* We must have requested it. */
2430 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
2432 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2435 /* The data must be valid */
2436 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2438 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2441 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2443 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2446 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2447 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2449 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2452 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2453 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2454 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2457 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2459 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2461 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2464 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2468 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2469 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2471 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2472 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2473 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2475 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2480 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2482 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2487 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2489 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2490 * an authz hello extension if the client
2491 * didn't request a proof. */
2492 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2493 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2495 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2497 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2503 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2507 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2508 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2510 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2514 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2515 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2516 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2517 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2519 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2523 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2531 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2535 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2537 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2539 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2541 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2542 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2544 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2550 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2560 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2561 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2562 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2563 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2564 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2565 * absence on initial connect only.
2567 if (!renegotiate_seen
2568 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2569 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2571 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2573 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2581 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2584 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2588 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2590 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2595 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2597 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2598 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2600 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2601 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2603 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2604 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2609 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2613 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2614 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2621 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2624 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
2625 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
2626 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
2629 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2630 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2631 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
2632 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
2636 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2637 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2642 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
2643 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
2644 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
2645 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
2647 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2652 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2654 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2655 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2658 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2659 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2661 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2662 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2666 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2667 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2668 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2669 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2671 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2673 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2674 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2675 * so this has to happen here in
2676 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2680 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2682 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2685 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2686 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2691 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2692 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2693 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2695 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2697 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2698 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2700 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2701 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2703 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2704 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2706 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2707 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2709 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2710 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2713 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2717 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2719 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2720 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2721 * abort the handshake.
2723 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2724 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2732 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2733 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2736 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2737 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2740 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2741 s->servername_done=0;
2747 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2749 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2752 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2753 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2754 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2755 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2757 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2760 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2761 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2762 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2763 if (certpkey == NULL)
2765 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2768 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2769 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2771 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2772 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2775 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2776 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2777 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2779 /* status request response should be sent */
2780 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2781 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2782 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2784 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2786 /* something bad happened */
2787 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2788 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2789 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2794 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2799 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2800 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2803 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2804 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2812 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2814 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2815 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2818 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2819 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2820 * it must contain uncompressed.
2822 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2823 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2824 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2825 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2826 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2828 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2830 unsigned char *list;
2831 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2832 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2833 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2835 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2837 found_uncompressed = 1;
2841 if (!found_uncompressed)
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2847 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2848 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2850 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2851 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2852 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2853 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2855 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2856 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2858 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2859 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2861 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2863 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2864 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2867 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2868 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2869 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2870 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2872 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2873 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2878 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2881 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2882 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2885 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2886 * there is no response.
2888 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2890 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2891 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2893 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2894 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2897 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2898 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2902 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2903 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2909 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2910 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2913 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2914 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2917 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2918 s->servername_done=0;
2924 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2927 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2929 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2931 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2935 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2943 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2944 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2945 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2947 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2948 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2949 * extension, if any.
2950 * len: the length of the session ID.
2951 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2952 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2953 * point to the resulting session.
2955 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2956 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2957 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2960 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2961 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2962 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2963 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2964 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2965 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2966 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2969 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2970 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2971 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2972 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2973 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2974 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2976 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2977 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2979 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2980 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2984 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2986 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2987 * to permit stateful resumption.
2989 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2991 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2995 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2996 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
3003 /* Skip past cipher list */
3008 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3013 /* Now at start of extensions */
3014 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3017 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3019 unsigned short type, size;
3022 if (p + size > limit)
3024 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3029 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3030 * currently have one. */
3031 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3034 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3036 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3037 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3038 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3039 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3040 * calculate the master secret later. */
3043 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3046 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3047 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3049 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3051 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3052 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3054 default: /* fatal error */
3063 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3065 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3066 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3067 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3068 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3069 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3070 * point to the resulting session.
3073 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3074 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3075 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3076 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3078 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3079 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3080 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3083 unsigned char *sdec;
3084 const unsigned char *p;
3085 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3086 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3089 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3090 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3093 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3094 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3095 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3096 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3098 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3099 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3110 /* Check key name matches */
3111 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3113 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3114 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3115 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3116 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3118 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3119 * integrity checks on ticket.
3121 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3124 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3128 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3129 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3130 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3131 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3132 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3134 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3135 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3136 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3137 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3138 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3141 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3144 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3145 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3148 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3151 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3155 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3156 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3157 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3158 * as required by standard.
3161 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3162 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3170 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3175 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3183 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3184 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3185 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3186 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3187 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3188 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3189 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3192 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3193 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3194 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3195 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3198 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3201 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3203 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3209 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3212 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3214 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3215 return table[i].nid;
3220 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3225 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3226 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3229 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3232 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3233 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3237 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3239 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3240 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3243 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3248 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3256 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3260 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3261 return EVP_sha224();
3263 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3264 return EVP_sha256();
3266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3267 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3268 return EVP_sha384();
3270 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3271 return EVP_sha512();
3279 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3284 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3285 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3288 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3289 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3291 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3292 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3293 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3299 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3300 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3301 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3303 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3304 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3306 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3308 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3309 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3311 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3313 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3315 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3316 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3318 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3322 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3323 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3324 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3326 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3329 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3330 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3331 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3332 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3334 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3335 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3336 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3338 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3339 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3341 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3343 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3345 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3350 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3351 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3352 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3354 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3365 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3366 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3368 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3369 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3371 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3373 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3374 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3375 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3377 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3378 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3380 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3382 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3383 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3386 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3387 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3391 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3392 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3398 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3399 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3401 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3404 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3407 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3408 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3409 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3414 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3416 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3422 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3423 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3424 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3426 /* Should never happen */
3430 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3431 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3433 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3434 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3436 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3438 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3439 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3441 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3442 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3444 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3446 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3448 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3451 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3452 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3453 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3454 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3455 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3457 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3458 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3464 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3465 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3467 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3468 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3470 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3471 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3472 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3473 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3475 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3476 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3481 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3482 * use the certificate for signing.
3484 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3486 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3487 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3490 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3491 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3494 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3496 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3497 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3501 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3502 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3509 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3510 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3511 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3513 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3519 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3526 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3528 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3531 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3532 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3533 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3535 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3536 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3540 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3542 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3544 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3546 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3548 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3549 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3555 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3557 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3558 unsigned short hbtype;
3559 unsigned int payload;
3560 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3562 /* Read type and payload length first */
3567 if (s->msg_callback)
3568 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3569 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3570 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3572 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3574 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3577 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3578 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3579 * payload, plus padding
3581 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3584 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3585 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3587 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3589 /* Random padding */
3590 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3592 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3594 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3595 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3596 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3597 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3599 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3604 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3608 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3609 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3610 * sequence number */
3613 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3616 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3624 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3626 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3628 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3629 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3631 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3632 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3633 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3639 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3640 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3642 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3646 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3647 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3649 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3653 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3654 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3656 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3658 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3659 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3660 * some random stuff.
3661 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3662 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3663 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3664 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3667 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3670 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3671 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3673 /* Sequence number */
3674 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3675 /* 16 random bytes */
3676 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3678 /* Random padding */
3679 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3681 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3684 if (s->msg_callback)
3685 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3686 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3687 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3689 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3698 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3703 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3706 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3708 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3711 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3712 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3714 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3716 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3718 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3726 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3727 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3728 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3729 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3730 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3731 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3734 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3735 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3736 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3737 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3740 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3742 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3743 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3746 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3747 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3751 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3752 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3753 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3757 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3761 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3764 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3766 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3771 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3772 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3774 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3776 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3777 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3778 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3779 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3781 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3789 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3790 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3791 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3792 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3796 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3797 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3798 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3799 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3805 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3809 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3813 if (default_nid == -1)
3815 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3817 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3818 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3819 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3823 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3824 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3828 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3829 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3831 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3837 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3838 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3839 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3840 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3843 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3845 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3846 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3847 /* Strict mode flags */
3848 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3849 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3850 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3852 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3857 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3858 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3860 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3861 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3864 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3868 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3871 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3873 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3875 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3876 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3879 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3880 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3881 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3883 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3884 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3893 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3896 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3897 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3898 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3900 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3908 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3909 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3910 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
3913 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3919 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
3920 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
3923 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
3926 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3927 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3929 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3934 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3935 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3936 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3937 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3938 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3941 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3942 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3943 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3944 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3948 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3949 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3957 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
3958 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
3961 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
3964 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3965 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
3967 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3970 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
3978 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3979 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
3981 if (!check_flags) goto end;
3984 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3985 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3986 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3988 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
3993 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4001 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4002 else if(check_flags)
4003 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4005 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4006 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4007 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4008 else if (!check_flags)
4011 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4012 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4013 else if (strict_mode)
4015 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4016 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4018 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4019 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4023 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4031 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4033 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4038 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4041 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4044 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4049 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4050 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4051 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4052 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4053 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4058 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4063 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4067 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4068 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4070 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4072 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4074 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4078 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4082 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4085 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4087 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4088 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4090 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4092 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4093 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4095 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4097 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4099 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4100 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4102 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4107 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4111 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4113 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4114 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4118 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4120 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4121 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4122 else if (cpk->digest)
4123 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4126 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4128 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4129 * if the chain is invalid.
4133 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4134 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4137 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4138 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4145 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4146 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4148 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4149 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4150 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4151 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4152 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4153 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4155 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4156 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4158 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);