2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
127 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
128 SSL_SESSION **psess);
129 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
130 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
132 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
135 tls1_setup_key_block,
136 tls1_generate_master_secret,
137 tls1_change_cipher_state,
138 tls1_final_finish_mac,
139 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
140 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
141 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 tls1_export_keying_material,
146 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
147 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
151 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
154 tls1_setup_key_block,
155 tls1_generate_master_secret,
156 tls1_change_cipher_state,
157 tls1_final_finish_mac,
158 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
159 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
160 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 tls1_export_keying_material,
164 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
165 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
166 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
170 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
173 tls1_setup_key_block,
174 tls1_generate_master_secret,
175 tls1_change_cipher_state,
176 tls1_final_finish_mac,
177 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
178 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
179 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 tls1_export_keying_material,
183 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
184 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
185 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
186 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
190 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
193 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
194 * http, the cache would over fill
196 return (60 * 60 * 2);
203 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
207 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
209 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
222 int nid; /* Curve NID */
223 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
224 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
227 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
228 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
230 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
231 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
232 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
233 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
234 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
235 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
236 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
237 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
238 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
239 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
240 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
241 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
242 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
243 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
244 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
245 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
246 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
247 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
248 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
249 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
250 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
251 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
252 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
253 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
254 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
255 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
256 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
257 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
258 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
261 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
263 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
264 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
267 /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
268 static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
269 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
270 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
271 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
272 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
273 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
274 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
275 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
276 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
277 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
278 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
279 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
280 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
281 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
284 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
288 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
289 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
291 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
292 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
293 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
294 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
295 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
296 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
297 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
298 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
299 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
300 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
301 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
302 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
303 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
305 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
306 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
308 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
309 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
310 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
311 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
312 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
313 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
314 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
315 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
316 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
317 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
318 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
319 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
320 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
321 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
322 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
326 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
327 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
328 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
331 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
333 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
334 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
336 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
339 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
341 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
343 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
345 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
347 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
349 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
351 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
353 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
355 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
357 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
359 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
361 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
363 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
365 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
367 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
369 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
371 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
373 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
375 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
377 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
379 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
381 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
383 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
385 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
387 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
389 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
391 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
393 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
395 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
397 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
405 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
407 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
408 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
409 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
410 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
411 * lists in the first place.
412 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
413 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
414 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
416 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
417 const unsigned char **pcurves,
420 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
422 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
423 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
425 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
426 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
427 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
428 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
429 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
432 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
433 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
437 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
438 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
442 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
443 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
446 if (!s->server || (s->cert && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)) {
447 *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
448 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
450 *pcurves = eccurves_all;
451 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
456 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
457 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
462 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
467 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
468 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
470 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
473 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
475 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
476 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
477 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
480 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
483 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
484 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
486 const unsigned char *curves;
487 size_t num_curves, i;
488 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
489 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
491 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
493 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
496 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
497 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
499 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
500 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
502 } else /* Should never happen */
505 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
507 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
508 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
509 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
515 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
516 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
517 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
518 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
520 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
522 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
523 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
525 /* Can't do anything on client side */
529 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
531 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
532 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
534 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
535 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
536 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
537 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
538 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
539 /* Should never happen */
542 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
546 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
547 * but s->options is a long...
549 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
550 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
552 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
553 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
554 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
555 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
557 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
560 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
563 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
565 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
566 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
567 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
569 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
573 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
574 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
575 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
576 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
577 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
580 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
581 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
589 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
593 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
594 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
596 unsigned char *clist, *p;
599 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
602 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
603 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
606 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
607 unsigned long idmask;
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
611 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
620 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
624 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
628 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
631 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
633 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
639 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
641 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
643 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
645 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
646 if (nid == NID_undef)
647 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
648 if (nid == NID_undef)
649 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
650 if (nid == NID_undef)
652 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
653 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
655 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
659 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
660 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
665 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
669 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
672 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
673 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
678 const EC_METHOD *meth;
681 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
682 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
685 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
688 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
692 /* Determine curve ID */
693 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
694 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
695 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
698 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
707 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
709 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
711 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
713 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
715 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
720 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
721 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
722 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
724 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
725 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
728 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
729 * supported (see RFC4492).
731 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
732 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
733 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
734 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
735 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
738 if (i == num_formats)
743 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
744 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
745 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
747 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
749 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
750 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
751 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
752 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
753 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
757 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
758 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
763 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
770 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
774 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
776 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
777 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
778 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
780 *pformats = ecformats_default;
781 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
783 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
785 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
790 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
791 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
793 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
795 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
798 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
801 /* If not EC nothing to do */
802 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
806 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
811 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
814 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
818 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
819 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
821 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
827 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
828 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
829 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
830 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
831 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
833 return 0; /* Should never happen */
834 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
835 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
837 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
839 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
840 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
841 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
843 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
849 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
850 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
851 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
853 unsigned char curve_id[2];
854 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
855 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
856 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
857 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
861 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
864 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
865 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
866 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
867 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
868 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
869 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
873 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
874 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
876 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
877 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
879 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
881 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
884 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
886 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
892 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
893 /* Need a shared curve */
894 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
900 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
905 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
907 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
911 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
914 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
918 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
923 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
926 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
927 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
930 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
931 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
933 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
936 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
937 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
939 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
943 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
945 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
948 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
949 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
950 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
951 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
953 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
954 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
955 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
956 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
957 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
958 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
962 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
963 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
964 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
967 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
970 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
974 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
975 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
976 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
977 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
979 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
980 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
983 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
984 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
988 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
989 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
990 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
991 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
992 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
993 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
994 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
996 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
997 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1002 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1003 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1005 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1006 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1008 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1009 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1010 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1011 /* Should never happen */
1014 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1015 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1020 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1021 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1022 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1023 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1025 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1029 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1030 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1033 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1034 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1036 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1039 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1040 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1042 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1048 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1052 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1053 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1054 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1055 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1058 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1059 if (i == sent_sigslen
1060 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1061 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1065 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1070 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1071 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1072 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1074 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1078 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1080 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1085 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1086 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1087 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1090 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1092 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1093 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1094 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1095 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1096 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1098 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1099 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1101 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1104 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1105 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1106 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1107 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1108 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1109 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1110 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1111 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1112 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1113 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1114 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1116 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1118 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1119 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1120 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1125 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1127 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1128 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1129 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1131 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1134 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1136 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1138 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1141 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1142 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1145 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1146 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1148 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1150 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1152 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1153 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1155 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1156 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1158 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1159 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1160 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)
1161 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1172 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1174 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1175 if (s->renegotiate) {
1178 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1183 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1186 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1189 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1196 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1197 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1200 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1201 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1202 unsigned long size_str;
1206 * check for enough space.
1207 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1208 * 2 for servernamelist length
1209 * 1 for the hostname type
1210 * 2 for hostname length
1214 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1216 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1219 /* extension type and length */
1220 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1221 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1223 /* length of servername list */
1224 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1226 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1227 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1229 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1233 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1234 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1235 * Client Hello message */
1237 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1238 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1244 * check for enough space.
1245 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1246 * 1 for the srp user identity
1247 * + srp user identity length
1249 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1252 /* fill in the extension */
1253 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1254 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1255 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1256 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1264 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1267 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1268 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1270 unsigned char *etmp;
1272 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1274 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1276 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1278 if (num_formats > 255) {
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1283 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1284 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1285 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1286 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1287 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1291 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1293 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1294 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1297 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1299 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1301 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1306 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1308 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1309 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1310 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1311 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1312 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1316 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1318 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1319 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1320 ret += curves_list_len;
1322 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1324 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1326 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1327 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1328 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1329 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1330 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1331 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1332 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1334 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1335 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1336 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1339 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1340 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1343 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1346 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1348 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1351 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1357 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1359 const unsigned char *salg;
1360 unsigned char *etmp;
1361 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1362 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1364 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1366 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1368 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1369 /* Fill in lengths */
1370 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1375 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1377 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1381 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1382 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1383 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1389 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1390 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1396 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1398 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1399 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1401 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1402 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1404 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1405 /* save position of id len */
1406 unsigned char *q = ret;
1407 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1408 /* skip over id len */
1410 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1416 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1419 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1420 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1422 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1426 * 1: peer may send requests
1427 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1429 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1430 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1432 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1436 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1438 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1439 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1441 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1443 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1448 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1449 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1451 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1452 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1453 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1454 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1455 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1458 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1461 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1462 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1467 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1470 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1473 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1480 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1481 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1482 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1484 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1485 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1488 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1492 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1493 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1494 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1497 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1498 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1500 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1501 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1507 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1509 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1516 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1519 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1523 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1524 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1527 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1528 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1530 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1533 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1534 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1535 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1536 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1537 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1542 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1544 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1547 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1552 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1555 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1558 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1566 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1567 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1570 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1571 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1572 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1575 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1580 const unsigned char *plist;
1583 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1587 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1589 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1591 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1593 if (plistlen > 255) {
1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1598 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1599 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1600 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1601 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1606 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1609 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1611 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1612 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1614 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1618 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1619 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1621 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1626 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1629 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1630 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1634 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1637 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1640 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1648 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1649 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1650 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1651 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1652 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1653 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1654 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1655 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1656 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1657 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1659 if (limit - ret < 36)
1661 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1666 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1667 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1668 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1670 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1674 * 1: peer may send requests
1675 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1677 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1678 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1680 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1686 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1687 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1688 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1689 const unsigned char *npa;
1690 unsigned int npalen;
1693 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1695 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1696 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1697 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1699 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1701 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1703 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1707 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1709 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1710 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1712 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1713 * for other cases too.
1715 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1716 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1717 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1719 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1724 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1725 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1729 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1730 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1731 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1733 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1735 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1739 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1745 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1748 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1753 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1754 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1755 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1756 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1759 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1761 unsigned int data_len;
1762 unsigned int proto_len;
1763 const unsigned char *selected;
1764 unsigned char *data;
1765 unsigned char selected_len;
1768 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1772 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1773 * length-prefixed strings.
1775 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
1776 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
1777 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
1781 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
1783 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
1785 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
1787 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1788 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1789 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1790 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1791 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1792 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1793 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1796 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1797 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1802 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1808 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1809 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1810 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1815 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1816 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1817 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1818 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1820 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1822 unsigned int type, size;
1823 unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
1825 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1826 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1827 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1828 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1829 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1830 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1831 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1833 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1834 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1835 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1836 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1839 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1840 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1841 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1842 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1843 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1844 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1845 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1846 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1847 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1848 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1851 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1852 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type)
1853 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)
1854 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, size))
1857 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1860 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1861 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1862 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1864 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &eblock1, len1)
1865 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &eblock2, len2)
1866 || PACKET_remaining(pkt))
1868 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1870 if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1873 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1875 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &eblock1, len)
1876 || PACKET_remaining(pkt))
1878 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1882 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1884 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1886 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1891 unsigned char *data;
1892 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1894 s->servername_done = 0;
1895 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1897 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1900 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1901 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1903 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1904 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1907 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1908 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1909 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1910 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1912 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1913 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1914 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1915 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1916 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1920 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1921 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1924 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1926 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1929 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
1932 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1935 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
1938 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1939 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1941 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
1944 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1945 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
1947 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1948 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1951 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1953 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1954 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1955 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1956 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1957 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1958 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1959 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1960 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1961 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1962 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1963 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1964 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1965 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1966 * the value of the Host: field.
1967 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1968 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1969 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1971 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1975 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1976 unsigned char *sdata;
1977 unsigned int servname_type;
1981 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
1982 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
1985 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
1986 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
1987 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
1988 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
1991 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1992 switch (servname_type) {
1993 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1995 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1998 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1999 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2002 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2003 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2004 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2007 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
2008 (unsigned char *)s->session
2011 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2014 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2015 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2016 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2017 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2018 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2021 s->servername_done = 1;
2024 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
2025 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2028 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2029 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2030 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2031 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2040 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
2041 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))
2045 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2046 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2047 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
2048 || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2051 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2053 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
2056 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2058 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
2059 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
2064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2065 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2066 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2068 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2069 || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
2073 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2074 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2075 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2076 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2077 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2078 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2081 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2082 ecpointformatlist_length;
2083 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2084 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2085 ecpointformatlist_length))
2087 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2090 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2091 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2092 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2095 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2096 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
2098 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2099 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
2100 || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
2101 || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
2105 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2108 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2109 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2110 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2111 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2114 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2115 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2116 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2117 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2118 ellipticcurvelist_length))
2120 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2123 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2124 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2128 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2129 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2130 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
2131 || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2132 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2133 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
2134 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2137 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2140 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
2141 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2144 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2145 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)
2146 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2149 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2152 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
2153 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
2156 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2157 const unsigned char *sdata;
2159 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2160 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2161 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2164 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
2166 unsigned int idsize;
2168 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
2169 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
2170 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
2175 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2178 if (data != sdata) {
2179 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2182 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2183 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2184 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2185 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2186 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2189 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2190 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2191 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2196 /* Read in request_extensions */
2197 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2198 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2199 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2204 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2205 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2206 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2207 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2208 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2213 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2216 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2219 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2220 unsigned int hbtype;
2222 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
2223 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2224 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2228 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2229 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2231 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2232 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2233 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2236 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2242 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2243 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2244 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2246 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2249 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2250 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2251 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2252 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2253 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2254 * anything like that, but this might change).
2256 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2257 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2258 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2259 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2260 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2262 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2266 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2267 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2268 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
2270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2271 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2272 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2276 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2278 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2279 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2280 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
2284 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2285 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2286 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2288 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2290 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2293 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2294 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2295 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2296 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2297 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2300 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2305 /* Spurious data on the end */
2306 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
2311 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2313 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2315 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2317 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2323 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2327 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2330 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2331 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2332 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2336 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2345 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2346 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2347 * fill the length of the block.
2349 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2351 unsigned int off = 0;
2364 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2365 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2367 unsigned short length;
2368 unsigned short type;
2369 unsigned short size;
2370 unsigned char *data = *p;
2371 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2372 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2375 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2377 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2379 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2380 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2382 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2383 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2386 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2387 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2390 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2394 if (data + length != d + n) {
2395 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2399 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2403 if (data + size > (d + n))
2406 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2407 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2409 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2410 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2412 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2413 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2414 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2415 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2416 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2419 tlsext_servername = 1;
2421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2422 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2423 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2424 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2426 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2427 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2431 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2432 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2433 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2434 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2435 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2438 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2439 ecpointformatlist_length;
2440 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2441 ecpointformatlist_length);
2444 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2446 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2447 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2448 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2449 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2451 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2454 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2455 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2458 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2460 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2462 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2465 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2466 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2469 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2470 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2473 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2474 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2475 unsigned char *selected;
2476 unsigned char selected_len;
2478 /* We must have requested it. */
2479 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2480 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2483 /* The data must be valid */
2484 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2485 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2489 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2491 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2492 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2493 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2496 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2497 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2498 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2501 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2502 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2503 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2507 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2510 /* We must have requested it. */
2511 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2512 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2516 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2520 * The extension data consists of:
2521 * uint16 list_length
2522 * uint8 proto_length;
2523 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2528 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2529 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2533 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2534 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2537 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2538 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2539 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2540 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2543 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2544 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2547 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2549 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2550 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2552 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2553 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2554 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2557 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2563 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2564 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2568 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2569 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2570 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2571 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2572 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2573 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2576 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2578 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2581 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2582 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2584 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2590 if (data != d + n) {
2591 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2595 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2596 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2597 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2598 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2599 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2600 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2604 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2615 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2616 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2617 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2618 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2619 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2620 * initial connect only.
2622 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2623 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2624 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2626 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2633 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2639 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2644 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2646 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2647 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2651 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2652 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2655 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2656 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2660 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2662 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2663 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2664 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2665 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2667 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2669 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2672 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2673 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2676 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2677 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2680 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2681 s->servername_done = 0;
2686 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2687 static void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2689 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2691 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2694 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2695 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
2697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2698 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
2702 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2706 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2707 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2708 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2709 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2710 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2711 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2712 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2713 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2716 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2717 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2718 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2720 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2723 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2724 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2726 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2727 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2731 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2735 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2739 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2741 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2742 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2745 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2746 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2747 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2748 * influence which certificate is sent
2750 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2752 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2753 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2754 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2755 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2756 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2760 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2761 * et al can pick it up.
2763 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2764 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2766 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2767 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2768 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2770 /* status request response should be sent */
2771 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2772 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2773 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2775 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2777 /* something bad happened */
2778 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2779 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2780 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2784 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2788 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2789 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2792 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2793 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2801 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2803 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2804 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2808 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2809 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2810 * must contain uncompressed.
2812 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2813 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2814 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2815 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2816 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2817 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2818 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2819 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2820 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2822 unsigned char *list;
2823 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2824 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2825 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2826 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2827 found_uncompressed = 1;
2831 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2833 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2837 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2838 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2840 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2842 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2843 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2844 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2845 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2847 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2849 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2852 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2855 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2856 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2859 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2862 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2863 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2864 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2865 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2867 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2868 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2871 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2872 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2877 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2878 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2881 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2882 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2885 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2886 s->servername_done = 0;
2892 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2896 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2898 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2899 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2903 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2911 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2912 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2913 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2915 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2916 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2917 * extension, if any.
2918 * len: the length of the session ID.
2919 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2920 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2921 * point to the resulting session.
2923 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2924 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2925 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2928 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2929 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2930 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2931 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2932 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2933 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2934 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2937 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2938 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2939 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2940 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2941 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2942 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2944 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned char *session_id,
2945 int len, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2948 size_t bookmark = 0;
2952 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2955 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2958 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2960 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2963 if (!PACKET_get_bookmark(pkt, &bookmark)) {
2967 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2968 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2969 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i)
2970 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, i)) {
2975 /* Skip past cipher list and compression algorithm list */
2976 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2977 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, i)
2978 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i)
2979 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, i)) {
2984 /* Now at start of extensions */
2985 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)) {
2989 while (PACKET_remaining (pkt) >= 4) {
2990 unsigned int type, size;
2992 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type)
2993 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2994 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2998 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < size) {
3002 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3004 unsigned char *etick;
3008 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3011 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3015 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3017 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3018 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3019 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3020 * calculate the master secret later.
3025 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &etick, size)) {
3026 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3030 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, session_id, len, ret);
3032 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3033 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3036 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3039 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3040 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3043 default: /* fatal error */
3052 if (!PACKET_goto_bookmark(pkt, bookmark))
3058 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3060 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3061 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3062 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3063 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3064 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3065 * point to the resulting session.
3068 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3069 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3070 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3071 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3073 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3074 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3075 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3078 unsigned char *sdec;
3079 const unsigned char *p;
3080 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3081 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3084 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3085 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3088 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3089 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3090 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3091 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3092 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3093 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3102 /* Check key name matches */
3103 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3105 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3106 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3107 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3108 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3111 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3114 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3116 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3120 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3121 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3122 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3123 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3124 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3125 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3128 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3129 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3130 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3131 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3132 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3134 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3137 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3138 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3139 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3144 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3147 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3151 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3152 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3153 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3157 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3158 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3167 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3172 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3179 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3180 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3181 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3182 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3183 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3184 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3185 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3188 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3189 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3190 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3191 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3194 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3197 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3198 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3204 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3207 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3208 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3209 return table[i].nid;
3214 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3220 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3223 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3226 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3227 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3231 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3233 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3239 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3242 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3243 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3246 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3248 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3249 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3250 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3251 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3252 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3255 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3259 if (hash_alg > OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info))
3261 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3264 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3266 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3267 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3269 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3270 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3272 return inf->mfunc();
3275 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3279 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3280 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3283 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3284 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3286 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3287 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3288 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3294 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3295 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3296 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3298 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3299 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3301 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3302 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3304 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3306 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3307 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3309 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3311 if (psignhash_nid) {
3312 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3313 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3315 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3319 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3320 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3322 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3323 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3324 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3326 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3327 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3329 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3330 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3334 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3335 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3339 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3341 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3342 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3343 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3345 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3346 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3347 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3349 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3350 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3351 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3353 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3354 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3359 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3360 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3365 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3366 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3373 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3375 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3377 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3380 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3381 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3383 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3385 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3386 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3387 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3388 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3391 return tmpout - out;
3394 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3395 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3396 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3397 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3399 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3400 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3401 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3402 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3403 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3405 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3406 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3409 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3410 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3411 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3413 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3423 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3424 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3426 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3427 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3429 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3431 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3433 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3434 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3435 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3436 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3437 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3438 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3439 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3440 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3441 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3442 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3444 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3445 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3448 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3449 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3453 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3454 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3456 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3458 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3461 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3465 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3466 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3470 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3472 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3475 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3476 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3478 /* Should never happen */
3482 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3483 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3484 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3486 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3487 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3491 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3496 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3497 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3499 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3500 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3503 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3504 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3506 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3507 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3509 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3511 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3513 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3515 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3516 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3518 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3519 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3520 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3521 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3527 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3528 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3529 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3530 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3531 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3533 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3534 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3535 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3536 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3542 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3543 * the certificate for signing.
3545 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3547 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3548 * supported it stays as NULL.
3550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3551 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3552 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3555 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3556 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3557 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3561 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3562 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3568 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3569 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3570 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3572 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3577 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3584 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3586 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3589 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3590 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3591 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3593 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3594 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3598 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3600 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3602 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3604 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3606 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3607 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3611 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3614 unsigned short hbtype;
3615 unsigned int payload;
3616 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3618 if (s->msg_callback)
3619 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3621 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3623 /* Read type and payload length first */
3624 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3625 return 0; /* silently discard */
3628 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3629 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3632 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3633 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3637 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3638 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3640 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3641 if (buffer == NULL) {
3642 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3647 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3648 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3650 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3652 /* Random padding */
3653 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3654 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3658 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3659 3 + payload + padding);
3661 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3662 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3663 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3664 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3666 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3670 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3674 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3675 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3679 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3681 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3688 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3690 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3692 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3693 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3695 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3696 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3697 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3702 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3703 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3704 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3708 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3709 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3715 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3716 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3718 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3721 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3722 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3723 * some random stuff.
3724 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3725 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3726 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3727 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3730 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3737 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3738 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3740 /* Sequence number */
3741 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3742 /* 16 random bytes */
3743 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3748 /* Random padding */
3749 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3754 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3756 if (s->msg_callback)
3757 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3758 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3759 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3761 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3770 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3774 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3777 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3779 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3780 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3781 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3782 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3783 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3784 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3786 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3787 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3788 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3792 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3794 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3797 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3800 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3802 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3804 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3806 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3814 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3815 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3817 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3820 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3821 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3824 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3825 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3830 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3831 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3833 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3837 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3841 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3844 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3847 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3852 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3853 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3855 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3856 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3857 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3859 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3866 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3867 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3868 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3870 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3871 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3872 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3878 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3882 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3886 if (default_nid == -1)
3888 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3890 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3891 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3892 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3897 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3898 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3902 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3903 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3904 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3911 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3912 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3913 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3914 * attempting to use them.
3917 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3919 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3920 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3921 /* Strict mode flags */
3922 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3923 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3924 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3926 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3931 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3932 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3935 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3936 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3938 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3941 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3943 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3944 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3946 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3948 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3949 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3952 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3953 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3954 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3955 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3956 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3964 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3967 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3968 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3970 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3971 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3973 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3980 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3981 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3982 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3983 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3984 else if (!check_flags)
3989 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3990 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3992 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3994 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3995 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3997 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4000 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4001 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4002 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4003 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4004 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4007 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4008 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4009 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4010 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4014 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4015 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4024 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4025 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4027 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4029 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4030 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4031 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4034 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4041 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4042 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4046 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4047 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4048 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4049 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4051 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4058 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4059 else if (check_flags)
4060 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4062 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4063 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4064 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4065 else if (!check_flags)
4068 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4069 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4070 else if (strict_mode) {
4071 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4072 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4073 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4074 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4076 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4083 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4084 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4088 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4091 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4094 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4099 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4100 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4101 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4102 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4103 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4107 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4111 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4113 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4114 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4116 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4117 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4118 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4122 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4125 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4127 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4129 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4130 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4132 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4133 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4134 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4136 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4137 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4138 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4139 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4140 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4145 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4148 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4150 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4151 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4155 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4156 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4157 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4158 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4159 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4161 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4164 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4168 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4171 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4172 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4179 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4180 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4182 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4183 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4184 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4185 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4186 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4187 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4190 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4191 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4193 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4198 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4200 int dh_secbits = 80;
4201 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4202 return DH_get_1024_160();
4203 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4204 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4209 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4210 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4213 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4219 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4220 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4221 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4223 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4224 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4230 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4231 return DH_get_2048_224();
4232 return DH_get_1024_160();
4236 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4239 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4241 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4242 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4246 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4248 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4251 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4253 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4254 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4255 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4256 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4258 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4259 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4262 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4264 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4267 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4270 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4272 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4273 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4275 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4276 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4278 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4279 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4284 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4285 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4286 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4289 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4291 int rv, start_idx, i;
4293 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4298 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4302 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4303 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4304 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);