2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* We need access to the deprecated low level HMAC APIs */
11 #define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
15 #include <openssl/objects.h>
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
19 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
20 #include <openssl/conf.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include "internal/nelem.h"
25 #include "internal/evp.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
36 tls1_generate_master_secret,
37 tls1_change_cipher_state,
38 tls1_final_finish_mac,
39 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42 tls1_export_keying_material,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59 tls1_export_keying_material,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
62 tls_close_construct_packet,
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
70 tls1_generate_master_secret,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 tls1_export_keying_material,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
79 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
80 tls_close_construct_packet,
84 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
87 tls13_setup_key_block,
88 tls13_generate_master_secret,
89 tls13_change_cipher_state,
90 tls13_final_finish_mac,
91 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
92 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
94 tls13_export_keying_material,
95 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
96 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
97 tls_close_construct_packet,
101 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
104 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
105 * http, the cache would over fill
107 return (60 * 60 * 2);
114 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
120 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
122 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
126 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
131 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
132 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
134 s->version = s->method->version;
140 * Table of group information.
142 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
143 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
144 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0001}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0002}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0003}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0004}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0005}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0006}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0007}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0008}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0009}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000A}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000B}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000C}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000D}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000E}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x000F}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0010}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0011}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0012}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0013}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0014}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0015}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0016}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0017}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0018}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0019}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001A}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001B}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001C}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001D}, /* X25519 (29) */
174 {EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001E}, /* X448 (30) */
175 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
176 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
177 /* Security bit values for FFDHE groups are updated as per RFC 7919 */
178 {NID_ffdhe2048, 103, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0100}, /* ffdhe2048 (0x0100) */
179 {NID_ffdhe3072, 125, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0101}, /* ffdhe3072 (0x0101) */
180 {NID_ffdhe4096, 150, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0102}, /* ffdhe4096 (0x0102) */
181 {NID_ffdhe6144, 175, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0103}, /* ffdhe6144 (0x0103) */
182 {NID_ffdhe8192, 192, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0104}, /* ffdhe8192 (0x0104) */
183 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
188 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
189 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
190 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
191 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
193 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
195 /* The default curves */
196 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
197 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
198 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
199 29, /* X25519 (29) */
200 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
202 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
203 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
205 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
206 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
207 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
208 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
209 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
210 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
213 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
216 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
222 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
224 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
227 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 FFDHE group from RFC 8446 */
228 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
229 if (nid_list[i].group_id == group_id)
232 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) */
236 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
237 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id)
239 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
241 return ginf == NULL ? NID_undef : ginf->nid;
244 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
248 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
249 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
250 return nid_list[i].group_id;
254 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
257 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
258 * the number of groups supported.
260 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
263 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
264 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
265 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
266 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
267 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
268 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
269 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
272 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
273 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
277 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
278 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
284 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
285 *pgroups = supported_groups_default;
286 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default);
288 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
289 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
296 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
299 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int version)
301 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
303 if (version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
304 if ((ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_ONLY_FOR_TLS1_3) != 0)
310 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
311 int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
313 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group);
314 unsigned char gtmp[2];
318 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
319 if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2)
323 if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_FFDHE)
326 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
327 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
328 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits, ginfo->nid, (void *)gtmp);
331 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
332 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
335 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
342 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
343 * if there is no match.
344 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
345 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
346 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
348 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
350 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
351 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
354 /* Can't do anything on client side */
358 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
360 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
361 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
363 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
365 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
366 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
367 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
368 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
369 /* Should never happen */
372 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
376 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
377 * otherwise peer decides.
379 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
380 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
381 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
383 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
384 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
387 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
388 uint16_t id = pref[i];
390 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
391 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
399 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
403 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
404 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
406 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
410 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
411 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
413 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
414 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
415 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
418 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
421 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
425 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
426 unsigned long idmask;
428 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
429 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
431 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
432 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
433 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
447 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
450 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
451 # define MAX_GROUPLIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
455 int nid_arr[MAX_GROUPLIST];
458 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
460 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
466 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_GROUPLIST)
468 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
470 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
472 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
473 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
475 if (nid == NID_undef)
476 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
477 if (nid == NID_undef)
478 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
479 if (nid == NID_undef)
481 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
482 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
484 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
487 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
489 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
490 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
492 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
495 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
499 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
505 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
506 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
508 const uint16_t *groups;
514 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
515 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
516 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
518 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
519 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
521 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
522 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
525 /* Should never happen */
530 if (check_own_groups) {
531 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
532 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
533 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
537 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
540 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
544 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
545 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
548 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
549 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
550 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
551 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
555 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
559 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
563 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
565 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
566 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
567 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
569 *pformats = ecformats_default;
570 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
572 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
574 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
578 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
579 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
583 unsigned char comp_id;
586 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
587 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
589 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
590 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
592 /* Get required compression id */
593 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
594 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
595 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
597 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
602 int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
604 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
605 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
606 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
607 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
612 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
613 * supported (see RFC4492).
615 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
618 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
619 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
625 /* Return group id of a key */
626 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
628 int curve_nid = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
630 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
632 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
636 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
637 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
639 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
643 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
646 /* If not EC nothing to do */
647 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
649 /* Check compression */
650 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
652 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
654 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
657 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
660 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
663 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
667 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
668 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
669 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
670 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
671 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
673 return 0; /* Should never happen */
674 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
675 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
684 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
686 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
688 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
689 * is compatible with the client extensions.
691 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
693 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
695 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
697 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
699 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
702 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
703 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
704 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
705 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
712 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
717 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
719 /* Default sigalg schemes */
720 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
722 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
723 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
724 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
725 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
729 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
730 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
731 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
732 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
733 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
734 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
736 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
737 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
738 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
741 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
742 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
744 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
745 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
747 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
748 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
750 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
751 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
752 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
755 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
756 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
757 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
762 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
763 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
764 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
768 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
770 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
771 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
772 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
773 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
774 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
775 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
776 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
777 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
778 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
779 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
780 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
781 NID_undef, NID_undef},
782 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
783 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
784 NID_undef, NID_undef},
785 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
786 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
787 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
788 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
789 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
790 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
792 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
793 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
794 NID_undef, NID_undef},
795 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
796 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
797 NID_undef, NID_undef},
798 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
799 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
800 NID_undef, NID_undef},
801 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
802 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
803 NID_undef, NID_undef},
804 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
805 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
806 NID_undef, NID_undef},
807 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
808 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
809 NID_undef, NID_undef},
810 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
811 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
812 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
813 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
814 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
815 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
816 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
817 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
818 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
819 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
820 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
821 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
822 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
823 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
824 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
826 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
827 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
828 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
829 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
830 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
831 NID_undef, NID_undef},
832 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
833 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
834 NID_undef, NID_undef},
835 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
836 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
837 NID_undef, NID_undef},
838 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
839 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
840 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
843 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
844 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
845 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
846 NID_undef, NID_undef},
847 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
848 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
849 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
850 NID_undef, NID_undef},
851 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
852 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
853 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
854 NID_undef, NID_undef}
857 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
858 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
859 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
860 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
861 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
866 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
867 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
869 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
870 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
871 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
872 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
873 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
874 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
875 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
876 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
877 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
878 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
881 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
882 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
885 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
887 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
889 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
894 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
895 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
900 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
901 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
904 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
914 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
916 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
917 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
918 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
920 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
921 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
922 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
928 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
930 if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
936 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
937 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
938 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
939 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
940 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
942 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
948 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
949 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
950 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
952 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
959 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
961 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
964 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
966 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
973 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
976 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
978 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
979 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
981 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
983 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
987 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
989 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
991 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
992 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
995 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
997 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
999 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1002 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1006 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1009 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1012 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1013 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1014 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1015 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1016 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1018 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1019 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1022 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1023 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1028 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1029 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1030 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1032 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1033 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1034 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1035 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1036 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1037 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1039 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1040 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1046 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1047 * specified EC curve.
1049 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1051 const uint16_t *sigs;
1054 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1055 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1056 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1058 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1059 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1062 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1063 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs[i]);
1067 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1068 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1069 && curve == lu->curve)
1078 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1081 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1083 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1086 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1090 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1091 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
1093 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1094 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1096 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1103 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1104 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1107 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1109 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1110 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1112 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1114 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1118 * TODO(3.0) Remove this when we adapted this function for provider
1119 * side keys. We know that EVP_PKEY_get0() downgrades an EVP_PKEY
1120 * to contain a legacy key.
1124 EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
1125 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_NONE)
1128 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
1129 /* Should never happen */
1132 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1133 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1134 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1135 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1136 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1139 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1140 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1141 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1143 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
1145 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1146 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1149 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1150 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1151 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1153 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1156 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1157 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1158 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1160 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1165 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1167 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1168 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1169 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1170 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1171 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1175 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1176 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1177 int curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
1179 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1180 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1181 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1185 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1186 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1187 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1189 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1192 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1193 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1194 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1195 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1197 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1198 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1203 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1205 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1210 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1211 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1212 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1213 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1216 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1217 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1218 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1219 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1220 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1223 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
1224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1225 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1229 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1230 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1232 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1233 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1234 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1236 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1237 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_type(md) : NID_undef,
1238 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1240 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1243 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1244 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1248 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1250 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1252 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1256 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1258 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1260 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1265 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1266 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1267 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1269 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1272 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1274 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1276 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1277 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1278 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1279 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1280 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1283 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1284 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1285 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1286 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1288 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1290 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1291 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1292 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1299 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1300 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1301 * @c: cipher to check
1302 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1303 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1305 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1307 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1309 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1310 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1312 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1314 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1315 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1318 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1319 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1321 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1322 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1323 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1325 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1328 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1329 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1332 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1335 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1337 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1339 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1342 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1346 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1347 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1348 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1349 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1350 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1351 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1352 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1354 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1355 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1357 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1358 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1359 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1360 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1362 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1363 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1368 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1369 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1370 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1371 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1379 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1381 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1384 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1387 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1389 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1394 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1396 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1397 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1398 * point to the resulting session.
1400 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1404 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1407 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1410 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1411 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1414 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1415 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1417 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1418 if (!ticketext->present)
1419 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1421 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1423 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1424 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1428 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1430 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1431 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1432 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1433 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1436 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1437 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1438 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1439 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1440 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1441 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1443 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1444 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1445 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1446 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1447 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1448 * point to the resulting session.
1450 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1451 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1452 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1454 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1455 unsigned char *sdec;
1456 const unsigned char *p;
1457 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1458 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1460 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1461 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1462 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1463 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1465 if (eticklen == 0) {
1467 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1468 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1470 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1473 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1475 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1476 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1477 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1478 * calculate the master secret later.
1480 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1484 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1485 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1486 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1490 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1491 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1493 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1496 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1498 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1502 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1504 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1507 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1510 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1511 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
1512 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1514 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1517 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1518 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1519 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1520 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1521 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1524 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1528 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1534 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1536 /* Check key name matches */
1537 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1538 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1539 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1543 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1545 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1546 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1547 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1549 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1550 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1551 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1552 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1553 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1556 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1557 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1561 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1564 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1566 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1570 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1572 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1573 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1577 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1578 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1579 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1580 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1584 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1585 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1588 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1589 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1590 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1591 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1592 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1593 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1594 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1596 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1599 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1601 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1607 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1611 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1613 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1615 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1619 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1620 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1621 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1625 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1626 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1629 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1631 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1636 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1638 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1641 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1642 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
1645 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1646 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1647 * performs any action
1649 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1650 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1651 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1652 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1653 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1654 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1657 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1658 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1659 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1661 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1663 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1664 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1667 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1668 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1669 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1673 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
1674 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1675 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1676 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1677 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1681 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
1682 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
1683 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1684 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
1685 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1686 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
1687 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1689 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1693 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1697 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1699 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1700 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1701 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
1702 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1711 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1712 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1714 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1717 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1718 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
1720 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1721 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1723 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1724 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1725 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1726 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1727 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1730 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1731 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1734 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1735 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1736 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
1737 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1738 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1741 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1742 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1744 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1747 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1748 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1749 * ciphersuites enabled.
1752 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
1755 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1756 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
1757 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
1758 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1760 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1761 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
1762 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
1765 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST) != 0)
1773 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1774 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1775 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1776 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1777 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1781 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1782 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1786 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1788 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1789 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1790 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1792 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1795 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1796 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
1797 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1798 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1803 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1807 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1808 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1809 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1810 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1812 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1815 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1816 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1821 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1822 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1824 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1826 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1829 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1830 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1832 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1833 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1834 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1835 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1843 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1844 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1845 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1846 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1848 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1849 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1850 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1851 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1853 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1854 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1856 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1857 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1868 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1869 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1871 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1872 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1874 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1876 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1878 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1879 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1880 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1881 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1882 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1883 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1884 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1885 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1886 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1887 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1889 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1890 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1893 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1894 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1898 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1899 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1901 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1903 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
1904 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1907 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1911 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1912 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1916 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1922 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1924 /* Invalid data length */
1925 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1930 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
1931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1934 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1942 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1949 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
1951 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1952 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1954 /* Should never happen */
1955 if (s->cert == NULL)
1959 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
1960 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
1962 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1963 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1967 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1969 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1972 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
1974 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1977 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1980 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1981 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
1982 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1984 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1985 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1987 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1988 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1989 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1994 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1995 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1996 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1998 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1999 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2000 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2003 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2005 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2009 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2011 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2012 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
2014 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2016 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2017 if (psignhash != NULL)
2018 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2020 return (int)numsigalgs;
2023 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2024 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2025 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2027 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2028 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2030 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
2031 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2033 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2035 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2037 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2038 if (psignhash != NULL)
2039 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2041 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2043 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2044 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
2047 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2048 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2052 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2053 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2056 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2058 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2059 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2060 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2061 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2062 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2063 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2064 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2065 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2067 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2068 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2069 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2072 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2073 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2075 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2077 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2079 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2080 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2081 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2084 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2086 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2088 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2090 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2092 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2093 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2094 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2095 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2096 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2097 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2101 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2103 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2104 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2108 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2115 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2116 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2117 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2119 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2121 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2122 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2126 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2130 /* Reject duplicates */
2131 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2132 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2141 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2142 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2144 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2148 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2152 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2155 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2160 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2164 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2167 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2168 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2169 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2171 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2172 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2173 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2179 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2181 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2186 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2190 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2192 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2193 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2194 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2196 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2198 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2199 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2204 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2209 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2210 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2211 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2213 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2214 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2215 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2221 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2225 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2227 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2229 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2231 if (default_nid == -1)
2233 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2235 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2237 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2239 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2240 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2241 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2243 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2246 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2248 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2249 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2250 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2251 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2252 if (sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2258 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2259 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2261 const X509_NAME *nm;
2263 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2264 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2265 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2272 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2273 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2274 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2275 * attempting to use them.
2278 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2280 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2281 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2282 /* Strict mode flags */
2283 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2284 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2285 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2287 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2292 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2293 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2296 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2297 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2299 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2302 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2304 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2305 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2307 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2309 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2310 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2319 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2322 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2324 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2325 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2327 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2334 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2335 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2336 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2337 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2338 else if (!check_flags)
2343 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2344 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2346 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2349 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2350 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2352 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2356 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2357 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2360 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2361 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2362 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2366 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2367 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2370 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2371 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2372 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2375 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2376 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2377 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2380 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2381 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2382 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2391 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2392 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2394 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2396 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2397 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2398 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
2400 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2403 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2410 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2411 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2413 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2414 * so check_flags is always set.
2416 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2417 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2418 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2422 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2423 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2424 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2425 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2427 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2434 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2435 else if (check_flags)
2436 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2438 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2439 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2440 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2441 else if (!check_flags)
2444 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2445 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2446 else if (strict_mode) {
2447 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2448 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2449 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2450 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2452 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2459 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2460 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2463 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2464 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2465 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2466 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2467 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2468 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2471 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2474 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2475 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2476 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2480 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2483 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2486 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2488 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2489 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2491 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2492 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2493 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2495 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2496 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2497 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2498 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2499 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2504 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2507 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2509 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2510 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2514 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2515 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2517 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2520 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2524 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2527 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2528 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2535 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2536 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2538 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2539 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2540 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2541 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2542 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2543 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2544 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2545 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2546 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2549 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2550 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2552 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2556 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2558 int dh_secbits = 80;
2559 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2560 return DH_get_1024_160();
2561 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2562 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2567 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2569 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2572 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2578 if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
2583 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2584 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2586 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2587 if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2595 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2596 return DH_get_2048_224();
2597 return DH_get_1024_160();
2601 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2604 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2607 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2608 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2609 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2610 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2612 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2615 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2617 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2620 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2622 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2623 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2624 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2625 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2627 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2629 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2630 if (nid == NID_undef)
2633 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2635 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2638 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2641 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2643 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2644 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2646 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2647 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2649 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2650 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2655 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2656 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2657 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2660 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2662 int rv, start_idx, i;
2664 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2669 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2673 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2674 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2675 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2683 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2684 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2687 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2689 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2690 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2692 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2694 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
2695 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
2696 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
2699 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2703 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
2704 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
2706 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
2708 static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
2711 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2712 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
2716 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
2717 * the answer is simply 'no'.
2720 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey, sig->hash);
2726 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
2727 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
2729 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2730 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
2732 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
2733 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
2738 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2739 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2740 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2741 * signing certificate.
2743 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
2750 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
2751 * a viable public key is permitted.
2757 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2758 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2759 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2760 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2761 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2763 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
2765 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2768 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2771 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
2772 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
2776 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
2777 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
2779 static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
2784 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
2787 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
2788 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
2791 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
2795 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
2796 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
2797 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
2799 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
2801 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2808 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
2809 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2810 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2812 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2813 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2814 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2815 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2816 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2818 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2819 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
2821 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
2822 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
2825 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
2826 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
2828 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2831 curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(tmppkey);
2832 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
2837 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2838 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2839 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
2845 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
2852 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2853 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2855 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2856 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2858 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2859 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2860 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2862 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
2864 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2867 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
2868 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2870 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2871 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
2875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2876 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2880 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2881 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2883 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2886 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2888 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2892 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2895 evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
2900 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2903 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2904 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2907 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2910 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2912 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2913 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
2916 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2917 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
2919 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2920 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2921 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
2923 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
2926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2927 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2933 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
2934 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
2935 * we have to assume GOST support.
2937 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
2938 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2941 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2942 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2943 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2947 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2951 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
2954 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2955 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2956 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2961 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2963 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2964 size_t sent_sigslen;
2966 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2969 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2970 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2974 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2975 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2976 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2977 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
2978 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
2981 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2984 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2985 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2986 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2991 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2995 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3001 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3002 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3003 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3004 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3008 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3010 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3011 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
3013 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3017 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3021 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3023 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3024 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
3026 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3030 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3034 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3036 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3040 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3042 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3044 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3045 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3050 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3051 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3052 ret->old_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3053 if (ret->old_ctx == NULL)
3058 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", NULL);
3059 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
3064 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
3070 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3073 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
3074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3075 HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->old_ctx);
3081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3082 HMAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3084 return ctx->old_ctx;
3088 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3093 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3095 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
3097 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3098 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3099 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, key, len);
3100 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3101 if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx->ctx, params) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx))
3104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3105 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3106 return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->old_ctx, key, len,
3107 EVP_get_digestbyname(md), NULL);
3112 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3114 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3115 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3117 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3118 return HMAC_Update(ctx->old_ctx, data, len);
3123 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3126 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3127 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3129 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL) {
3132 if (HMAC_Final(ctx->old_ctx, md, &l) > 0) {
3142 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3144 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3145 return EVP_MAC_size(ctx->ctx);
3146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3147 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3148 return HMAC_size(ctx->old_ctx);