2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* We need access to the deprecated low level HMAC APIs */
11 #define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
15 #include <openssl/objects.h>
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
19 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
20 #include <openssl/conf.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include "internal/nelem.h"
25 #include "internal/evp.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
36 tls1_generate_master_secret,
37 tls1_change_cipher_state,
38 tls1_final_finish_mac,
39 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42 tls1_export_keying_material,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59 tls1_export_keying_material,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
62 tls_close_construct_packet,
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
70 tls1_generate_master_secret,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 tls1_export_keying_material,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
79 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
80 tls_close_construct_packet,
84 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
87 tls13_setup_key_block,
88 tls13_generate_master_secret,
89 tls13_change_cipher_state,
90 tls13_final_finish_mac,
91 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
92 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
94 tls13_export_keying_material,
95 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
96 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
97 tls_close_construct_packet,
101 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
104 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
105 * http, the cache would over fill
107 return (60 * 60 * 2);
114 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
120 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
122 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
126 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
131 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
132 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
134 s->version = s->method->version;
140 * Table of group information.
142 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
143 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
144 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
145 {NID_sect163k1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0001}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0002}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0003}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0004}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0005}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, "EC", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0006}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, "EC", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0007}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, "EC", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0008}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, "EC", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0009}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, "EC", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000A}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, "EC", 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000B}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, "EC", 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000C}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, "EC", 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000D}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, "EC", 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000E}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x000F}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0010}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0011}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0012}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0013}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, "EC", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0014}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, "EC", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0015}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, "EC", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0016}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, "EC", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0017}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, "EC", 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0018}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, "EC", 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0019}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, "EC", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001A}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, "EC", 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001B}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, "EC", 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001C}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, "X25519", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001D}, /* X25519 (29) */
174 {EVP_PKEY_X448, "X448", 224, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001E}, /* X448 (30) */
175 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
176 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
177 /* Security bit values for FFDHE groups are updated as per RFC 7919 */
178 {NID_ffdhe2048, "DH", 103, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0100}, /* ffdhe2048 (0x0100) */
179 {NID_ffdhe3072, "DH", 125, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0101}, /* ffdhe3072 (0x0101) */
180 {NID_ffdhe4096, "DH", 150, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0102}, /* ffdhe4096 (0x0102) */
181 {NID_ffdhe6144, "DH", 175, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0103}, /* ffdhe6144 (0x0103) */
182 {NID_ffdhe8192, "DH", 192, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0104}, /* ffdhe8192 (0x0104) */
183 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
188 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
189 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
190 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
191 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
193 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
195 /* The default curves */
196 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
197 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
198 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
199 29, /* X25519 (29) */
200 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
202 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
203 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
205 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
206 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
207 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
208 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
209 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
210 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
213 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
216 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
222 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
224 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
227 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 FFDHE group from RFC 8446 */
228 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
229 if (nid_list[i].group_id == group_id)
232 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) */
236 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
237 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id)
239 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
241 return ginf == NULL ? NID_undef : ginf->nid;
244 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
248 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
249 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
250 return nid_list[i].group_id;
254 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
257 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
258 * the number of groups supported.
260 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
263 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
264 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
265 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
266 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
267 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
268 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
269 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
272 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
273 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
277 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
278 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
284 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
285 *pgroups = supported_groups_default;
286 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default);
288 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
289 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
296 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
299 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int version)
301 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
303 if (version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
304 if ((ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_ONLY_FOR_TLS1_3) != 0)
310 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
311 int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
313 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group);
314 unsigned char gtmp[2];
318 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
319 if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2)
323 if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_FFDHE)
326 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
327 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
328 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits, ginfo->nid, (void *)gtmp);
331 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
332 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
335 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
342 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
343 * if there is no match.
344 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
345 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
346 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
348 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
350 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
351 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
354 /* Can't do anything on client side */
358 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
360 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
361 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
363 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
365 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
366 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
367 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
368 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
369 /* Should never happen */
372 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
376 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
377 * otherwise peer decides.
379 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
380 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
381 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
383 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
384 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
387 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
388 uint16_t id = pref[i];
390 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
391 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
399 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
403 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
404 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
406 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
410 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
411 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
413 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
414 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
415 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
418 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
421 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
425 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
426 unsigned long idmask;
428 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
429 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
431 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
432 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
433 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
447 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
450 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
451 # define MAX_GROUPLIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
455 int nid_arr[MAX_GROUPLIST];
458 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
460 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
466 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_GROUPLIST)
468 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
470 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
472 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
473 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
475 if (nid == NID_undef)
476 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
477 if (nid == NID_undef)
478 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
479 if (nid == NID_undef)
481 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
482 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
484 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
487 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
489 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
490 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
492 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
495 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
499 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
505 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
506 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
508 const uint16_t *groups;
514 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
515 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
516 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
518 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
519 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
521 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
522 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
525 /* Should never happen */
530 if (check_own_groups) {
531 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
532 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
533 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
537 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
540 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
544 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
545 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
548 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
549 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
550 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
551 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
555 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
559 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
563 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
565 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
566 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
567 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
569 *pformats = ecformats_default;
570 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
572 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
574 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
578 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
579 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
583 unsigned char comp_id;
586 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
587 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
589 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
590 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
592 /* Get required compression id */
593 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
594 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
595 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
597 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
602 int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
604 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
605 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
606 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
607 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
612 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
613 * supported (see RFC4492).
615 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
618 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
619 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
625 /* Return group id of a key */
626 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
628 int curve_nid = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
630 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
632 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
636 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
637 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
639 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
643 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
646 /* If not EC nothing to do */
647 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
649 /* Check compression */
650 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
652 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
654 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
657 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
660 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
663 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
667 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
668 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
669 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
670 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
671 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
673 return 0; /* Should never happen */
674 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
675 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
684 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
686 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
688 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
689 * is compatible with the client extensions.
691 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
693 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
695 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
697 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
699 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
702 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
703 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
704 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
705 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
712 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
717 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
719 /* Default sigalg schemes */
720 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
722 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
723 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
724 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
725 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
729 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
730 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
731 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
732 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
733 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
734 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
736 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
737 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
738 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
741 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
742 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
744 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
745 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
747 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
748 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
750 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
751 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
752 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
755 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
756 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
757 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
758 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
759 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
764 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
765 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
766 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
770 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
772 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
773 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
774 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
775 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
776 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
777 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
778 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
779 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
780 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
781 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
782 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
783 NID_undef, NID_undef},
784 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
785 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
786 NID_undef, NID_undef},
787 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
788 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
789 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
790 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
791 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
792 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
794 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
795 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
796 NID_undef, NID_undef},
797 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
798 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
799 NID_undef, NID_undef},
800 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
801 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
802 NID_undef, NID_undef},
803 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
804 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
805 NID_undef, NID_undef},
806 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
807 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
808 NID_undef, NID_undef},
809 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
810 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
811 NID_undef, NID_undef},
812 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
813 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
814 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
815 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
816 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
817 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
818 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
819 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
820 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
821 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
822 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
823 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
824 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
825 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
826 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
828 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
829 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
830 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
831 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
832 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
833 NID_undef, NID_undef},
834 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
835 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
836 NID_undef, NID_undef},
837 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
838 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
839 NID_undef, NID_undef},
840 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
841 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
842 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
845 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
846 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
847 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
848 NID_undef, NID_undef},
849 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
850 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
851 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
852 NID_undef, NID_undef},
853 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
854 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
855 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
856 NID_undef, NID_undef},
857 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
858 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
859 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
860 NID_undef, NID_undef},
861 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
862 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
863 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
864 NID_undef, NID_undef}
867 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
868 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
869 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
870 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
871 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
876 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
877 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
879 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
880 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
881 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
882 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
883 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
884 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
885 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
886 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
887 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
888 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
891 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
892 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
895 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
897 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
899 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
904 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
905 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
910 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
911 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
914 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
924 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
926 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
927 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
928 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
930 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
931 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
932 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
938 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
940 if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
946 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
947 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
948 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
949 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
950 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
952 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
958 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
959 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
960 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
962 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
969 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
971 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
974 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
976 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
983 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
986 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
988 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
989 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
991 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
993 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
997 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
999 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1001 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1002 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1005 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1007 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1009 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1012 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1016 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1019 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1023 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1024 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1025 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1026 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1028 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1029 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1032 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1033 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1038 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1039 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1040 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1042 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1043 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1044 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1045 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1046 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1047 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1049 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1050 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1054 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1056 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1057 * specified EC curve.
1059 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1061 const uint16_t *sigs;
1064 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1065 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1066 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1068 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1069 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1072 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1073 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs[i]);
1077 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1078 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1079 && curve == lu->curve)
1088 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1091 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1093 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1096 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1100 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1101 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
1103 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1104 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1106 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1113 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1114 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1117 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1119 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1120 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1122 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1124 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1128 * TODO(3.0) Remove this when we adapted this function for provider
1129 * side keys. We know that EVP_PKEY_get0() downgrades an EVP_PKEY
1130 * to contain a legacy key.
1134 EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
1135 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_NONE)
1138 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
1139 /* Should never happen */
1142 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1143 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1144 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1145 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1146 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1149 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1150 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1151 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1153 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
1155 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1156 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1159 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1160 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1161 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1163 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1166 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1167 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1168 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1169 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1170 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1175 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1177 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1178 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1179 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1180 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1181 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1185 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1186 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1187 int curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
1189 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1191 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1195 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1196 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1197 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1198 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1199 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1202 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1203 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1204 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1205 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1207 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1208 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1213 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1214 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1215 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1220 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1221 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1222 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1223 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1226 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1227 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1228 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1229 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1230 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1233 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
1234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1235 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1239 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1240 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1242 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1243 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1244 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1246 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1247 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_type(md) : NID_undef,
1248 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1249 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1250 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1253 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1254 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1258 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1260 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1262 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1266 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1268 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1270 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1275 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1276 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1277 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1279 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1282 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1284 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1286 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1287 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1288 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1289 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1290 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1293 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1294 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1295 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1296 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1298 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1300 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1301 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1302 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1309 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1310 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1311 * @c: cipher to check
1312 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1313 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1315 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1317 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1319 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1320 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1322 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1324 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1325 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1328 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1329 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1331 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1332 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1333 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1335 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1338 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1339 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1342 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1345 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1347 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1349 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1352 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1356 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1357 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1358 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1359 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1360 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1361 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1362 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1364 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1365 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1367 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1368 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1369 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1370 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1372 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1373 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1378 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1379 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1380 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1381 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1389 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1391 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1394 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1397 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1399 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1404 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1406 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1407 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1408 * point to the resulting session.
1410 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1414 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1417 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1420 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1421 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1424 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1425 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1427 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1428 if (!ticketext->present)
1429 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1431 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1433 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1434 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1438 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1440 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1441 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1442 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1443 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1446 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1447 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1448 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1449 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1450 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1451 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1453 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1454 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1455 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1456 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1457 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1458 * point to the resulting session.
1460 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1461 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1462 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1464 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1465 unsigned char *sdec;
1466 const unsigned char *p;
1467 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1468 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1470 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1471 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1472 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1473 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1475 if (eticklen == 0) {
1477 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1478 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1480 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1483 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1485 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1486 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1487 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1488 * calculate the master secret later.
1490 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1494 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1495 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1496 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1500 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1501 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1503 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1506 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1508 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1512 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1514 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1517 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1520 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1521 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
1522 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1524 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1526 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1527 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1528 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1529 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1530 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1531 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1534 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1538 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1544 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1546 /* Check key name matches */
1547 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1548 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1549 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1553 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1555 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1556 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1557 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1559 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1560 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1561 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1562 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1563 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1566 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1567 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1571 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1574 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1576 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1580 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1582 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1583 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1587 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1588 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1589 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1590 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1594 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1595 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1598 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1599 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1600 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1601 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1602 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1603 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1604 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1606 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1609 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1611 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1617 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1621 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1623 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1625 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1629 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1630 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1631 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1635 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1636 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1639 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1641 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1646 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1648 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1651 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1652 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
1655 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1656 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1657 * performs any action
1659 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1660 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1661 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1662 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1663 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1664 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1667 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1668 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1669 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1671 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1673 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1674 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1677 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1678 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1679 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1683 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
1684 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1685 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1686 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1687 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1691 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
1692 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
1693 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1694 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
1695 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1696 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
1697 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1699 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1703 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1707 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1709 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1710 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1711 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
1712 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1721 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1722 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1724 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1727 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1728 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
1730 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1731 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1733 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1734 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1735 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1736 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1737 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1740 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1741 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1744 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1745 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1746 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
1747 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1748 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1751 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1752 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1754 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1757 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1758 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1759 * ciphersuites enabled.
1762 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
1765 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1766 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
1767 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
1768 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1770 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1771 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
1772 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
1775 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST) != 0)
1783 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1784 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1785 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1786 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1787 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1791 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1792 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1796 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1798 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1799 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1800 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1802 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1805 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1806 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
1807 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1808 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1813 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1817 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1818 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1819 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1820 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1822 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1825 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1826 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1831 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1832 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1834 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1836 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1839 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1840 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1842 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1843 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1844 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1845 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1853 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1854 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1855 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1856 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1858 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1859 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1860 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1861 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1863 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1864 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1866 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1867 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1878 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1879 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1881 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1882 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1884 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1886 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1888 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1889 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1890 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1891 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1892 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1893 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1894 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1895 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1896 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1897 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1899 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1900 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1903 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1904 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1908 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1909 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1911 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1913 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
1914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1917 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1921 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1922 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1926 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1932 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1934 /* Invalid data length */
1935 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1940 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
1941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1944 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1952 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1959 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
1961 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1962 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1964 /* Should never happen */
1965 if (s->cert == NULL)
1969 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
1970 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
1972 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1973 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1977 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1979 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1982 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
1984 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1987 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1990 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1991 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
1992 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1994 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1995 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1997 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1998 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1999 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2004 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2005 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2006 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2008 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2009 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2010 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2013 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2015 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2019 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2021 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2022 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
2024 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2026 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2027 if (psignhash != NULL)
2028 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2030 return (int)numsigalgs;
2033 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2034 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2035 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2037 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2038 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2040 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
2041 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2043 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2045 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2047 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2048 if (psignhash != NULL)
2049 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2051 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2053 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2054 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
2057 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2058 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2062 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2063 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2066 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2068 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2069 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2070 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2071 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2072 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2073 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2074 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2075 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2077 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2078 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2079 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2082 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2083 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2085 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2087 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2089 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2090 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2091 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2094 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2096 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2098 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2100 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2102 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2103 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2104 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2105 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2106 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2107 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2111 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2113 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2114 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2118 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2125 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2126 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2127 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2129 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2131 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2132 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2136 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2140 /* Reject duplicates */
2141 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2142 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2151 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2152 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2154 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2158 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2162 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2165 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2170 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2174 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2177 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2178 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2179 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2181 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2182 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2183 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2189 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2191 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2196 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2200 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2202 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2203 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2204 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2206 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2208 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2209 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2214 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2219 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2220 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2221 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2223 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2224 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2225 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2231 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2235 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2237 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2239 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2241 if (default_nid == -1)
2243 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2245 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2247 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2249 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2250 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2251 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2253 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2256 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2258 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2259 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2260 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2261 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2262 if (sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2268 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2269 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2271 const X509_NAME *nm;
2273 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2274 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2275 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2282 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2283 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2284 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2285 * attempting to use them.
2288 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2290 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2291 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2292 /* Strict mode flags */
2293 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2294 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2295 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2297 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2302 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2303 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2306 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2307 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2309 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2312 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2314 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2315 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2317 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2319 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2320 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2329 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2332 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2334 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2335 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2337 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2344 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2345 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2346 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2347 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2348 else if (!check_flags)
2353 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2354 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2356 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2359 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2360 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2362 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2366 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2367 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2370 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2371 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2372 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2376 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2377 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2380 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2381 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2382 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2385 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2386 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2387 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2390 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2391 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2392 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2401 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2402 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2404 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2406 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2407 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2408 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
2410 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2413 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2420 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2421 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2423 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2424 * so check_flags is always set.
2426 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2427 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2428 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2432 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2433 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2434 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2435 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2437 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2444 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2445 else if (check_flags)
2446 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2448 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2449 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2450 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2451 else if (!check_flags)
2454 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2455 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2456 else if (strict_mode) {
2457 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2458 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2459 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2460 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2462 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2469 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2470 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2473 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2474 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2475 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2476 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2477 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2478 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2481 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2484 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2485 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2486 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2490 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2493 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2496 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2498 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2499 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2501 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2502 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2503 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2505 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2506 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2507 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2508 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2509 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2514 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2517 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2519 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2520 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2524 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2525 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2527 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2530 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2534 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2537 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2538 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2545 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2546 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2548 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2549 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2550 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2551 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2552 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2553 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2554 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2555 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2556 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2559 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2560 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2562 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2566 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2568 int dh_secbits = 80;
2569 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2570 return DH_get_1024_160();
2571 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2572 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2577 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2579 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2582 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2588 if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
2593 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2594 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2596 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2597 if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2605 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2606 return DH_get_2048_224();
2607 return DH_get_1024_160();
2611 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2614 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2617 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2618 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2619 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2620 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2622 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2625 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2627 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2630 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2632 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2633 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2634 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2635 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2637 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2639 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2640 if (nid == NID_undef)
2643 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2645 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2648 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2651 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2653 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2654 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2656 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2657 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2659 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2660 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2665 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2666 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2667 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2670 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2672 int rv, start_idx, i;
2674 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2679 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2683 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2684 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2685 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2693 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2694 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2697 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2699 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2700 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2702 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2704 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
2705 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
2706 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
2709 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2713 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
2714 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
2716 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
2718 static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
2721 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2722 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
2726 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
2727 * the answer is simply 'no'.
2730 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey, sig->hash);
2736 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
2737 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
2739 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2740 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
2742 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
2743 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
2748 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2749 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2750 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2751 * signing certificate.
2753 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
2760 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
2761 * a viable public key is permitted.
2767 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2768 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2769 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2770 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2771 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2773 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
2775 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2778 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2781 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
2782 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
2786 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
2787 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
2789 static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
2794 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
2797 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
2798 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
2801 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
2805 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
2806 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
2807 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
2809 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
2811 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2818 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
2819 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2820 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2822 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2823 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2824 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2825 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2826 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2828 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2829 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
2831 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
2832 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
2835 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
2836 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
2838 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2841 curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(tmppkey);
2842 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
2847 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2848 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2849 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
2855 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
2862 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2863 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2865 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2866 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2868 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2869 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2870 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2872 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
2874 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2877 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
2878 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2880 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2881 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
2885 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2886 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2890 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2891 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2893 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2896 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2898 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2902 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2905 evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
2910 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2913 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2914 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2917 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2920 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2922 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2923 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
2926 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2927 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
2929 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2930 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2931 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
2933 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
2936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2937 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2943 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
2944 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
2945 * we have to assume GOST support.
2947 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
2948 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2952 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2953 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2957 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2961 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
2964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2965 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2966 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2971 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2973 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2974 size_t sent_sigslen;
2976 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2979 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2980 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2984 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2985 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2986 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2987 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
2988 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
2991 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2995 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2996 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3001 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3004 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3005 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3011 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3012 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3013 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3014 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3018 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3020 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3021 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
3023 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3027 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3031 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3033 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3034 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
3036 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3040 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3044 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3046 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3050 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3052 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3054 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3055 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3059 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3060 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3061 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3062 ret->old_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3063 if (ret->old_ctx == NULL)
3068 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", NULL);
3069 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
3074 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
3080 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3083 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
3084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3085 HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->old_ctx);
3091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3092 HMAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3094 return ctx->old_ctx;
3098 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3103 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3105 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
3107 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3108 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3109 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, key, len);
3110 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3111 if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx->ctx, params) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx))
3114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3115 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3116 return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->old_ctx, key, len,
3117 EVP_get_digestbyname(md), NULL);
3122 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3124 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3125 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3127 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3128 return HMAC_Update(ctx->old_ctx, data, len);
3133 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3136 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3137 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3139 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL) {
3142 if (HMAC_Final(ctx->old_ctx, md, &l) > 0) {
3152 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3154 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3155 return EVP_MAC_size(ctx->ctx);
3156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3157 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3158 return HMAC_size(ctx->old_ctx);