2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 #define CHECKLEN(curr, val, limit) \
25 (((curr) >= (limit)) || (size_t)((limit) - (curr)) < (size_t)(val))
27 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
28 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
30 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
31 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
33 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
37 tls1_generate_master_secret,
38 tls1_change_cipher_state,
39 tls1_final_finish_mac,
40 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
41 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
44 tls1_export_keying_material,
46 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
47 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
51 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
55 tls1_generate_master_secret,
56 tls1_change_cipher_state,
57 tls1_final_finish_mac,
58 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
59 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
60 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
62 tls1_export_keying_material,
63 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
64 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
65 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
69 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
73 tls1_generate_master_secret,
74 tls1_change_cipher_state,
75 tls1_final_finish_mac,
76 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
77 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
78 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
80 tls1_export_keying_material,
81 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
82 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
83 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
84 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
88 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
91 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
92 * http, the cache would over fill
101 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
105 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
107 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
111 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
114 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
115 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
117 s->version = s->method->version;
120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
123 int nid; /* Curve NID */
124 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
125 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
129 * Table of curve information.
130 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
131 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
133 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
134 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
135 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
136 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
137 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
138 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
139 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
140 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
141 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
142 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
143 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
144 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
145 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
146 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
147 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
148 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
149 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
150 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
151 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
152 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
153 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
154 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
155 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
156 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
157 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
158 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
159 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
160 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
161 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
162 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
165 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
166 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
167 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
168 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
171 /* The default curves */
172 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
173 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
174 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
175 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
176 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
179 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
180 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
181 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
184 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
186 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
187 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
188 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
190 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
192 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
196 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
199 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
200 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
207 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
209 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
210 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
211 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
212 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
213 * lists in the first place.
214 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
215 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
216 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
218 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
219 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
221 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
224 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
225 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
227 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
228 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
229 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
230 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
231 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
234 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
235 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
239 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
240 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
244 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
245 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
248 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
249 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
253 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
254 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
255 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
259 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
263 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
264 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
266 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
269 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
271 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
272 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
273 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
276 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
279 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
280 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
282 const unsigned char *curves;
283 size_t num_curves, i;
284 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
285 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
287 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
289 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
292 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
293 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
295 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
296 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
298 } else /* Should never happen */
301 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
303 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
304 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
305 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
311 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
312 * if there is no match.
313 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
314 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
315 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
317 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
319 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
320 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
323 /* Can't do anything on client side */
327 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
329 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
330 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
332 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
334 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
335 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
336 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
337 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
338 /* Should never happen */
341 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
345 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
346 * but s->options is a long...
348 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
349 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
351 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
352 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
353 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
354 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
356 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
358 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
359 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
361 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
362 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
363 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
366 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
368 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
376 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
380 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
381 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
383 unsigned char *clist, *p;
386 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
389 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
390 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
393 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
394 unsigned long idmask;
396 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
398 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
407 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
411 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
415 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
418 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
420 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
426 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
428 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
430 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
432 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
433 if (nid == NID_undef)
434 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
435 if (nid == NID_undef)
436 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
437 if (nid == NID_undef)
439 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
440 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
442 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
446 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
447 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
451 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
455 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
458 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
459 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
466 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
467 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
470 /* Determine curve ID */
471 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
472 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
473 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
477 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
479 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
481 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
482 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
484 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
485 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
487 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
493 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
494 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
495 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
497 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
498 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
501 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
502 * supported (see RFC4492).
504 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
505 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
506 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
507 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
508 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
511 if (i == num_formats)
516 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
517 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
518 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
520 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
522 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
523 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
524 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
525 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
526 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
530 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
531 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
536 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
543 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
547 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
549 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
550 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
551 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
553 *pformats = ecformats_default;
554 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
556 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
558 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
563 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
564 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
566 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
568 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
571 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
574 /* If not EC nothing to do */
575 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
577 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
581 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
584 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
588 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
589 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
591 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
597 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
598 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
599 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
600 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
601 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
603 return 0; /* Should never happen */
604 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
605 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
607 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
609 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
610 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
611 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
613 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
619 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
621 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
623 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
625 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
626 * is compatible with the client extensions.
628 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
630 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
633 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
636 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
637 unsigned char curve_id[2];
638 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
639 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
640 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
641 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
642 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
646 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
647 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
651 /* Need a shared curve */
652 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
656 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
660 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
665 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
668 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
669 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
672 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
673 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
675 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
678 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
679 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
681 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
685 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
687 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
690 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
691 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
692 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
693 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
695 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
696 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
697 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
698 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
699 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
700 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
702 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
703 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
704 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
709 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
710 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
711 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
714 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned char **psigs)
717 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
721 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
722 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
723 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
724 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
726 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
727 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
730 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
731 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
735 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
736 if (s->server == sent && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
737 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
738 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
739 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
740 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
741 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
743 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
744 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
749 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
750 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
752 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
753 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
755 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
756 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
757 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
758 /* Should never happen */
761 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
762 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
768 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
769 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
770 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
772 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
776 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
777 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
781 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
782 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
783 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
786 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
787 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
789 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
795 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
799 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
800 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
801 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
802 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
805 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
806 if (i == sent_sigslen
807 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
808 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
812 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
814 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
817 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
818 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
819 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
824 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
826 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
831 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
832 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
833 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
835 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
838 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
840 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
842 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
843 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
844 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
845 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
847 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
848 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
849 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
850 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
852 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
854 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
855 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
856 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
862 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
863 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
864 * @c: cipher to check
865 * @op: Security check that you want to do
867 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
869 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
871 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
872 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
874 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
876 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
877 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
879 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
880 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
883 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
886 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
888 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
890 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
893 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
895 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
896 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
906 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
907 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
908 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
909 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
910 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
913 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
915 PACKET extensions = *packet;
916 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
917 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
920 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
921 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
924 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
925 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
931 if (num_extensions <= 1)
934 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
935 if (extension_types == NULL) {
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
940 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
941 extensions = *packet;
942 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
944 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
945 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
946 /* This should not happen. */
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
952 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
956 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
957 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
958 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
959 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
964 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
968 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
969 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
972 unsigned char *orig = buf;
973 unsigned char *ret = buf;
974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
975 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
977 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
979 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
980 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
982 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
983 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
985 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
986 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
987 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
988 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
999 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1001 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1002 if (s->renegotiate) {
1005 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1010 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1013 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1016 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1023 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1024 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1027 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1028 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1032 * check for enough space.
1033 * 4 for the servername type and extension length
1034 * 2 for servernamelist length
1035 * 1 for the hostname type
1036 * 2 for hostname length
1039 size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname);
1040 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + size_str, limit))
1043 /* extension type and length */
1044 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1045 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1047 /* length of servername list */
1048 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1050 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1051 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1053 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1056 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1057 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1058 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1059 * Client Hello message */
1061 size_t login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1062 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1068 * check for enough space.
1069 * 4 for the srp type type and extension length
1070 * 1 for the srp user identity
1071 * + srp user identity length
1073 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + login_len, limit))
1076 /* fill in the extension */
1077 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1078 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1079 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1080 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1088 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1090 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1091 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1093 unsigned char *etmp;
1095 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1097 if (num_formats > 255) {
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1102 * check for enough space.
1103 * 4 bytes for the ec point formats type and extension length
1104 * 1 byte for the length of the formats
1107 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + num_formats, limit))
1110 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1111 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1112 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1113 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1114 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1118 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1120 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1121 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1124 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1129 * check for enough space.
1130 * 4 bytes for the ec curves type and extension length
1131 * 2 bytes for the curve list length
1132 * + curve list length
1134 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + (num_curves * 2), limit))
1137 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1139 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1140 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1141 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1142 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1143 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1147 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1149 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1150 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1151 ret += curves_list_len;
1153 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1155 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1157 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1158 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1159 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1160 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1161 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1162 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1163 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1165 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1166 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1167 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1170 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1171 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1174 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1177 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + ticklen, limit))
1179 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1182 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1188 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1190 const unsigned char *salg;
1191 unsigned char *etmp;
1192 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
1195 * check for enough space.
1196 * 4 bytes for the sigalgs type and extension length
1197 * 2 bytes for the sigalg list length
1198 * + sigalg list length
1200 if (CHECKLEN(ret, salglen + 6, limit))
1202 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1204 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1206 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1207 /* Fill in lengths */
1208 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1213 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1215 size_t extlen, idlen;
1220 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1221 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1222 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1225 idlen += (size_t)lentmp + 2;
1228 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1229 lentmp = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1232 extlen = (size_t)lentmp;
1236 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1239 * 2 bytes for status request type
1240 * 2 bytes for status request len
1241 * 1 byte for OCSP request type
1242 * 2 bytes for length of ids
1243 * 2 bytes for length of extensions
1245 * + length of extensions
1247 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + idlen + extlen, limit))
1250 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1251 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1252 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1254 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1255 /* save position of id len */
1256 unsigned char *q = ret;
1257 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1258 /* skip over id len */
1260 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1266 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1270 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1271 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1274 * check for enough space.
1275 * 4 bytes for the heartbeat ext type and extension length
1276 * 1 byte for the mode
1278 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit))
1281 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1285 * 1: peer may send requests
1286 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1288 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1289 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1291 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1296 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1298 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1299 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1303 * check for enough space.
1304 * 4 bytes for the NPN ext type and extension length
1306 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1308 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1314 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1315 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1316 * (see longer comment below)
1318 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1320 * check for enough space.
1321 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length
1322 * 2 bytes for the ALPN protocol list length
1323 * + ALPN protocol list length
1325 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, limit))
1327 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1328 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1329 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1330 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1331 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1332 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1335 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1338 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1339 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1345 * check for enough space.
1346 * 4 bytes for the SRTP type and extension length
1347 * + SRTP profiles length
1349 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1352 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1355 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1362 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1363 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1364 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1367 * In 1.1.0 before 1.1.0c we negotiated EtM with DTLS, then just
1368 * silently failed to actually do it. It is fixed in 1.1.1 but to
1369 * ease the transition especially from 1.1.0b to 1.1.0c, we just
1370 * disable it in 1.1.0.
1372 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1374 * check for enough space.
1375 * 4 bytes for the ETM type and extension length
1377 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1379 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1384 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1386 * check for enough space.
1387 * 4 bytes for the SCT type and extension length
1389 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1392 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
1398 * check for enough space.
1399 * 4 bytes for the EMS type and extension length
1401 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1403 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1407 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1408 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1409 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1412 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1413 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1415 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1416 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1423 * check for enough space. Strictly speaking we know we've already
1424 * got enough space because to get here the message size is < 0x200,
1425 * but we know that we've allocated far more than that in the buffer
1426 * - but for consistency and robustness we're going to check anyway.
1428 * 4 bytes for the padding type and extension length
1431 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + hlen, limit))
1433 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1435 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1442 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1445 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1449 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1450 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1453 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1454 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1456 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1459 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1460 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1461 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1462 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1467 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1469 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1472 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1478 * check for enough space.
1479 * 4 bytes for the reneg type and extension length
1480 * + reneg data length
1482 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1485 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1488 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1496 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1497 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1500 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1501 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1503 * check for enough space.
1504 * 4 bytes for the server name type and extension length
1506 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1509 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1514 const unsigned char *plist;
1517 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1520 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1522 if (plistlen > 255) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1528 * check for enough space.
1529 * 4 bytes for the ec points format type and extension length
1530 * 1 byte for the points format list length
1531 * + length of points format list
1533 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + plistlen, limit))
1536 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1537 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1538 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1539 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1544 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1547 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1549 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1551 * check for enough space.
1552 * 4 bytes for the Ticket type and extension length
1554 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1556 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1560 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1563 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1566 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1568 * check for enough space.
1569 * 4 bytes for the Status request type and extension length
1571 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1573 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1577 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1580 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1581 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1582 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1586 * check for enough space.
1587 * 4 bytes for the SRTP profiles type and extension length
1588 * + length of the SRTP profiles list
1590 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1593 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1596 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1604 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1605 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1606 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1607 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1608 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1609 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1610 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1611 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1612 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1613 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1616 /* check for enough space. */
1617 if (CHECKLEN(ret, sizeof(cryptopro_ext), limit))
1619 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext));
1620 ret += sizeof(cryptopro_ext);
1623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1624 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1625 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1627 * check for enough space.
1628 * 4 bytes for the Heartbeat type and extension length
1629 * 1 byte for the mode
1631 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit))
1633 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1637 * 1: peer may send requests
1638 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1640 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1641 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1643 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1649 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1650 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1651 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1652 const unsigned char *npa;
1653 unsigned int npalen;
1656 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1658 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1659 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1661 * check for enough space.
1662 * 4 bytes for the NPN type and extension length
1663 * + length of protocols list
1665 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + npalen, limit))
1667 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1669 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1671 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1675 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1677 if (s->tlsext_use_etm) {
1679 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1680 * for other cases too.
1682 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1683 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1684 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1685 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1686 s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
1689 * check for enough space.
1690 * 4 bytes for the ETM type and extension length
1692 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1694 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1698 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1700 * check for enough space.
1701 * 4 bytes for the EMS type and extension length
1703 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1705 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1709 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1710 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1711 size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1714 * check for enough space.
1715 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length
1716 * 2 bytes for ALPN data length
1717 * 1 byte for selected protocol length
1718 * + length of the selected protocol
1720 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 7 + len, limit))
1722 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1726 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1732 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1735 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1740 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1741 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1742 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1743 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1745 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1747 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1749 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1751 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1752 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1756 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1758 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1759 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1760 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1763 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1765 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1766 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1767 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1775 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1776 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1777 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1779 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1781 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1782 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1784 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1785 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1786 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1787 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1788 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1790 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1791 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1792 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1793 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1794 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1797 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1798 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1799 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1800 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1803 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1813 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1814 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1815 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1820 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1821 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1822 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1823 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1825 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1831 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1832 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1833 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1834 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1835 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1836 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1837 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1839 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1840 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1841 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1842 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1843 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1844 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1845 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1846 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1847 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1848 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1849 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1850 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1851 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1854 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1855 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1859 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1860 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1861 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1865 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1868 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1869 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1871 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1874 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1877 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1878 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1880 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1881 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1884 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1885 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1887 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1890 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1893 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1894 s->servername_done = 0;
1895 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1897 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1900 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1901 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1902 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1903 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1904 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1905 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1907 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1908 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1912 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1913 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1914 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1916 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1917 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1918 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1919 s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
1921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1922 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1923 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1926 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1928 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1931 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1934 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1938 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1939 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1942 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1944 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1947 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1948 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1949 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1950 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1952 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1953 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1955 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1956 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1959 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1961 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1962 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1963 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1964 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1965 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1966 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1967 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1968 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1969 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1970 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1971 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1972 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1973 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1974 * the value of the Host: field.
1975 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1976 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1977 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1979 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1983 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1984 unsigned int servname_type;
1985 PACKET sni, hostname;
1987 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1988 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1989 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1994 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1995 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1996 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1998 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1999 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
2000 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2002 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2003 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2005 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2006 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2007 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2012 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2013 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2017 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2018 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2022 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2023 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2027 s->servername_done = 1;
2030 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2031 * fall back to a full handshake.
2033 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2034 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2035 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2039 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2042 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
2045 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2049 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2050 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2052 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2053 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2059 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2060 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2061 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2063 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
2064 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2069 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2070 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2072 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2073 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2077 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2078 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
2080 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
2081 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
2082 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
2083 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
2088 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
2089 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2091 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2092 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2097 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2098 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2099 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2100 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
2101 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
2102 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2104 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2107 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2108 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2110 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2111 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2112 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2117 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2118 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2122 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2123 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2124 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2128 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2129 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2130 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2131 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2132 (&extension, &responder_id_list))
2136 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2137 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2139 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2141 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2142 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2143 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2144 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2148 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2151 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2153 PACKET responder_id;
2154 const unsigned char *id_data;
2156 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2158 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2162 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2163 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2164 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2168 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2169 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2173 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2174 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2175 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2180 /* Read in request_extensions */
2181 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2184 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2185 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2186 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2187 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2188 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2189 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2190 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2191 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2192 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2200 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2202 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2206 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2207 unsigned int hbtype;
2209 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2210 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2211 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2215 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2216 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2218 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2219 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2220 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2223 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2229 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2230 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2232 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2235 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2236 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2237 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2238 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2239 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2240 * anything like that, but this might change).
2242 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2243 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2244 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2245 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2246 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2248 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2252 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2253 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2254 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2258 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2260 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2261 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2262 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2266 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2267 s->tlsext_use_etm = 1;
2269 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2270 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2274 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2275 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2276 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2277 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2278 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2281 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2282 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2287 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2289 * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
2291 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2297 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2299 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2300 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2301 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2303 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2308 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2309 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2310 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2311 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2316 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2319 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2320 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2321 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2324 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2333 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2334 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2335 * fill the length of the block.
2337 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2339 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2341 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2342 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2343 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2351 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2353 unsigned int length, type, size;
2354 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2355 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2358 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2360 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2362 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2363 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2365 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2366 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2369 s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
2371 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2373 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2376 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2377 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2381 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2382 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2386 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2387 const unsigned char *data;
2390 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2391 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2394 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2395 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2397 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2398 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2400 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2401 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2402 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2403 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2404 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2407 tlsext_servername = 1;
2409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2410 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2411 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2412 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2413 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2414 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2418 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2419 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2420 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2421 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2422 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2425 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2426 ecpointformatlist_length;
2427 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2428 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2429 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2430 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2436 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2438 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2439 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2440 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2441 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2443 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2446 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2447 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2450 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2451 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2453 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2456 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2457 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2460 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2461 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2465 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2466 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2467 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2469 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2470 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2471 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2472 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2473 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2474 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2476 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2478 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2479 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2480 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2483 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2488 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2489 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2490 unsigned char *selected;
2491 unsigned char selected_len;
2492 /* We must have requested it. */
2493 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2494 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2497 /* The data must be valid */
2498 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2499 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2502 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2505 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2506 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2507 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2511 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2512 * a single Serverhello
2514 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2515 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2516 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2517 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2520 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2521 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2522 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2526 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2528 /* We must have requested it. */
2529 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2530 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2534 * The extension data consists of:
2535 * uint16 list_length
2536 * uint8 proto_length;
2537 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2539 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2540 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2541 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2542 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2545 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2546 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2547 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2548 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2551 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2552 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2555 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2558 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2559 unsigned int hbtype;
2560 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2561 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2565 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2566 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2568 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2569 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2570 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2573 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2579 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2580 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2584 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2585 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2586 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2587 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2588 s->tlsext_use_etm = 1;
2589 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2590 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2592 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2595 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2596 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2598 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2602 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2603 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2607 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2608 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2609 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2610 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2611 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2612 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2613 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2617 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2626 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2627 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2628 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2629 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2630 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2632 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2633 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2634 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2636 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2642 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2645 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2646 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2647 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2656 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2658 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2662 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2667 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2669 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2670 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2674 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2675 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2678 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2679 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2683 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2685 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2686 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2687 else if (s->session_ctx != NULL
2688 && s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2690 s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2692 session_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2695 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2696 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2699 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2700 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2703 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2704 s->servername_done = 0;
2710 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2711 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2713 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2715 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2718 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2719 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2721 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2722 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2725 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2728 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2729 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2730 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2734 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2739 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2740 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2741 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2742 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2743 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2744 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2745 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2746 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2749 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2750 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2751 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2753 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2756 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2757 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2759 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2760 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2764 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2768 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2773 * Upon success, returns 1.
2774 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2776 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2778 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2781 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2782 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2783 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2784 * influence which certificate is sent
2786 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2788 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2789 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2790 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2791 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2793 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2794 * et al can pick it up.
2796 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2797 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2799 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2800 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2801 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2803 /* status request response should be sent */
2804 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2805 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2806 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2808 /* something bad happened */
2809 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2811 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2817 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2824 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2826 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2827 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2831 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2832 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2833 * must contain uncompressed.
2835 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2836 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2837 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2838 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2839 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2840 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2841 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2842 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2844 unsigned char *list;
2845 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2846 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2847 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2848 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2849 found_uncompressed = 1;
2853 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2855 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2859 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2860 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2862 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2864 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2865 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2866 else if (s->session_ctx != NULL
2867 && s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2869 s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2871 session_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2874 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2875 * that we don't receive a status message
2877 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2878 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2879 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2882 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2883 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2886 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2887 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2890 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2891 s->servername_done = 0;
2897 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2900 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2902 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2903 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2907 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2915 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2916 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2917 * need to be handled at the same time.
2919 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2922 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2923 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2924 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2925 * point to the resulting session.
2927 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2928 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2929 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2932 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2933 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2934 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2935 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2936 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2937 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2938 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2941 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2942 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2943 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2944 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2945 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2946 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2948 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2951 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2952 const PACKET *session_id,
2956 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2959 int have_ticket = 0;
2960 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2963 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2964 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2967 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2970 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2973 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2977 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2978 unsigned int type, size;
2980 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2981 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2982 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2986 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2990 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2992 const unsigned char *etick;
2994 /* Duplicate extension */
2995 if (have_ticket != 0) {
3003 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3006 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3010 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3012 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3013 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3014 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3015 * calculate the master secret later.
3020 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
3021 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3025 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3026 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3028 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3029 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3032 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3035 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3036 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3039 default: /* fatal error */
3045 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
3046 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3047 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3053 if (have_ticket == 0)
3060 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3062 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3063 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
3064 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3065 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3066 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3067 * point to the resulting session.
3070 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3071 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3072 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3073 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3074 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3076 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3077 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3078 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3081 unsigned char *sdec;
3082 const unsigned char *p;
3083 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
3084 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3085 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3086 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3087 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3089 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3090 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3093 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3098 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3099 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3100 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3111 /* Check key name matches */
3112 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3113 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3117 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3118 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3119 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3120 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3121 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3122 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3128 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3131 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3135 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3137 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3142 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3143 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3144 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3147 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3148 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3149 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3152 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3153 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3154 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3155 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3156 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3157 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3158 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3162 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3163 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3168 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3172 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3176 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3177 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3178 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3182 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3183 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3192 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3196 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3197 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3201 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3208 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3209 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3210 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3211 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3212 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3213 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3214 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3215 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3216 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3217 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3220 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3221 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3222 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3223 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3224 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3225 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3226 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3229 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3232 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3233 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3239 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3242 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3243 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3244 return table[i].nid;
3249 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3254 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3257 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3260 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3261 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3265 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3267 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3274 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3277 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3278 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3279 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3280 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3281 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3282 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3283 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3284 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3285 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3286 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3287 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3288 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3291 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3297 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3298 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3299 return tls12_md_info + i;
3305 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3307 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3308 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3310 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3313 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3316 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3320 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3321 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3324 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3325 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3328 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3329 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3332 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3333 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3335 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3336 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3338 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3339 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3345 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3346 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3347 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3349 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3350 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3352 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3353 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3355 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3357 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3358 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3360 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3362 if (psignhash_nid) {
3363 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3364 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3365 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3369 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3370 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3372 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3373 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3374 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3376 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3377 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3379 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3380 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3384 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3385 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3389 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3391 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3392 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3393 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3395 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3396 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3397 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3399 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
3400 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3401 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3403 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3404 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3409 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3410 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3415 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3416 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3423 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3425 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3427 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3430 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3431 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3433 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3435 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3436 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3437 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3438 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3441 return tmpout - out;
3444 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3445 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3446 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3447 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3449 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3450 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3451 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3452 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3453 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3455 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3456 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3459 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3460 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3461 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3463 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3473 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3474 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3476 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3477 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3479 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3481 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3483 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3484 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3485 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3486 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3487 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3488 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3489 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3490 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3491 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3492 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3494 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
3495 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3498 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3499 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3503 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3504 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3506 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3508 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3511 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3515 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3516 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3520 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3522 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3525 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3526 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3528 /* Should never happen */
3532 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3533 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3534 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3536 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3537 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3541 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3546 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3547 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3549 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3550 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3553 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3554 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3555 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3556 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3557 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3559 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3560 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3561 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3562 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3568 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3569 * the certificate for signing.
3571 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3573 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3574 * supported it stays as NULL.
3576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3577 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3578 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3581 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3582 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3583 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3587 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3588 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3591 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3592 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3593 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3594 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3595 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3596 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3597 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3598 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3604 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3605 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3606 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3608 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3613 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3620 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3622 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3625 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3626 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3627 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3629 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3630 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3634 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3636 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3638 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3640 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3642 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3643 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3646 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3650 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3653 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3655 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3656 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3657 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3658 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3659 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3660 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3662 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3663 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3664 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3668 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3670 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3673 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3676 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3678 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3680 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3682 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3690 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3691 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3693 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3696 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3697 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3700 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3701 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3706 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3707 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3709 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3713 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3717 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3720 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3722 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3727 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3728 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3730 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3731 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3732 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3734 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3741 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3742 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3743 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3745 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3746 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3747 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3753 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3757 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3761 if (default_nid == -1)
3763 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3765 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3766 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3767 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3772 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3773 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3777 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3778 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3779 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3786 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3787 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3788 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3789 * attempting to use them.
3792 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3794 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3795 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3796 /* Strict mode flags */
3797 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3798 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3799 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3801 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3806 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3807 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3810 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3811 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3813 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3816 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3818 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3819 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3821 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3823 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3824 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3830 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3833 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3835 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3836 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3838 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3845 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3846 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3847 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3848 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3849 else if (!check_flags)
3854 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3855 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3857 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3859 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3860 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3862 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3865 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3866 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3867 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3868 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3871 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3872 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3873 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3877 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3878 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3881 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3882 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3883 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3886 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3887 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3888 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3891 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3892 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3893 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3902 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3903 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3905 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3907 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3908 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3909 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3912 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3919 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3920 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3924 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3925 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3926 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3927 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3929 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3936 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3937 else if (check_flags)
3938 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3940 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3941 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3942 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3943 else if (!check_flags)
3946 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3947 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3948 else if (strict_mode) {
3949 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3950 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3951 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3952 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3954 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3961 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3962 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3964 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3966 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3969 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3972 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3976 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3980 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3982 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3983 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3985 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3986 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3987 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3991 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3994 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3996 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3998 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3999 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4001 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4002 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4003 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4005 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4006 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4007 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4008 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4009 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4014 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4017 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4019 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4020 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4024 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4025 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4026 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4027 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4028 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4030 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4033 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4037 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4040 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4041 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4048 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4049 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4051 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4052 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4053 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4054 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4055 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4056 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4057 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4060 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4061 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4063 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4067 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4069 int dh_secbits = 80;
4070 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4071 return DH_get_1024_160();
4072 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4073 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4078 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4079 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4082 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4090 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4091 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4093 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4094 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4102 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4103 return DH_get_2048_224();
4104 return DH_get_1024_160();
4108 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4111 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4114 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4115 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4116 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4117 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4119 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4122 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4124 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4127 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4129 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4130 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4131 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4132 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4134 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4135 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4137 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4138 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4141 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4143 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4146 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4149 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4151 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4152 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4154 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4155 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4157 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4158 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4163 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4164 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4165 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4168 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4170 int rv, start_idx, i;
4172 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4177 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4181 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4182 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4183 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);