2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
125 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
126 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
128 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
139 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
144 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
148 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
151 tls1_setup_key_block,
152 tls1_generate_master_secret,
153 tls1_change_cipher_state,
154 tls1_final_finish_mac,
155 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
156 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
157 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 tls1_export_keying_material,
160 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
161 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
162 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
166 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
169 tls1_setup_key_block,
170 tls1_generate_master_secret,
171 tls1_change_cipher_state,
172 tls1_final_finish_mac,
173 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
174 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
175 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
177 tls1_export_keying_material,
178 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
179 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
180 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
181 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
185 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
188 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
189 * http, the cache would over fill
191 return (60 * 60 * 2);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
208 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
211 s->version = s->method->version;
214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
217 int nid; /* Curve NID */
218 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
219 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
222 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
223 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
225 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
226 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
230 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
231 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
232 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
233 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
234 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
235 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
237 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
238 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
239 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
240 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
241 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
242 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
243 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
244 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
245 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
246 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
247 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
248 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
249 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
250 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
252 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
253 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
256 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
259 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
262 /* The default curves */
263 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
264 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
265 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
266 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
267 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
268 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
269 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
272 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
273 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
274 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
276 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
277 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
278 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
279 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
283 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
284 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
286 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
287 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
288 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
289 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
290 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
291 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
292 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
293 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
294 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
295 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
296 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
297 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
298 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
300 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
301 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
303 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
305 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
306 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
307 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
308 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
309 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
310 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
311 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
312 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
313 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
314 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
315 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
316 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
321 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
322 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
323 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
326 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
328 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
329 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
331 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
334 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
336 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
338 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
340 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
342 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
344 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
346 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
348 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
350 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
352 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
354 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
356 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
358 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
360 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
362 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
364 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
366 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
368 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
370 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
372 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
374 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
376 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
378 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
380 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
382 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
384 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
386 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
388 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
390 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
392 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
400 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
402 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
403 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
404 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
405 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
406 * lists in the first place.
407 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
408 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
409 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
411 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
412 const unsigned char **pcurves,
415 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
417 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
418 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
420 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
421 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
422 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
423 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
424 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
427 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
428 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
432 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
433 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
437 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
438 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
441 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
442 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
446 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
447 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
452 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
457 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
458 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
460 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
463 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
465 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
466 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
467 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
470 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
473 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
474 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
476 const unsigned char *curves;
477 size_t num_curves, i;
478 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
479 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
481 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
483 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
486 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
487 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
489 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
490 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
492 } else /* Should never happen */
495 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
497 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
498 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
499 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
505 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
506 * if there is no match.
507 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
508 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
509 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
511 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
513 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
514 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
516 /* Can't do anything on client side */
520 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
522 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
523 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
525 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
526 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
527 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
528 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
529 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
530 /* Should never happen */
533 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
537 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
538 * but s->options is a long...
540 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
541 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
543 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
544 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
545 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
546 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
548 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
551 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
554 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
556 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
557 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
558 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
560 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
564 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
565 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
566 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
567 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
568 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
571 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
572 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
580 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
584 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
585 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
587 unsigned char *clist, *p;
590 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
593 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
594 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
597 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
598 unsigned long idmask;
600 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
602 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
611 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
615 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
619 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
622 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
624 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
630 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
632 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
634 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
636 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
637 if (nid == NID_undef)
638 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
639 if (nid == NID_undef)
640 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
641 if (nid == NID_undef)
643 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
644 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
646 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
650 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
651 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
656 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
660 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
663 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
664 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
669 const EC_METHOD *meth;
672 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
673 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
676 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
679 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
683 /* Determine curve ID */
684 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
685 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
686 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
689 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
698 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
700 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
702 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
704 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
706 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
711 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
712 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
713 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
715 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
716 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
719 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
720 * supported (see RFC4492).
722 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
723 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
724 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
725 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
726 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
729 if (i == num_formats)
734 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
735 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
736 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
738 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
740 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
741 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
742 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
743 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
744 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
748 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
749 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
754 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
761 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
765 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
767 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
768 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
769 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
771 *pformats = ecformats_default;
772 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
774 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
776 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
781 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
782 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
784 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
786 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
789 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
792 /* If not EC nothing to do */
793 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
797 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
802 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
805 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
809 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
810 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
812 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
818 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
819 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
820 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
821 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
822 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
824 return 0; /* Should never happen */
825 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
826 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
828 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
830 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
831 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
832 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
834 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
840 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
842 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
844 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
846 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
847 * is compatible with the client extensions.
849 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
851 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
853 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
854 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
855 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
859 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
862 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
863 unsigned char curve_id[2];
864 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
865 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
866 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
867 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
868 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
872 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
873 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
877 /* Need a shared curve */
878 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
882 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
886 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
891 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
894 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
895 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
898 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
899 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
901 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
904 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
905 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
907 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
911 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
913 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
916 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
917 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
918 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
919 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
921 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
922 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
923 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
924 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
925 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
926 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
928 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
929 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
930 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
935 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
936 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
937 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
940 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
943 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
947 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
948 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
949 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
950 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
952 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
953 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
956 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
957 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
961 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
962 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
963 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
964 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
965 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
966 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
967 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
969 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
970 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
975 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
976 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
978 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
979 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
981 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
982 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
983 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
984 /* Should never happen */
987 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
988 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
993 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
994 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
995 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
996 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
998 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1002 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1003 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1006 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1007 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1009 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1012 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1013 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1015 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1021 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1025 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1026 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1027 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1028 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1031 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1032 if (i == sent_sigslen
1033 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1034 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1038 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1043 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1044 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1045 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1051 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1053 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1058 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1059 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1060 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1063 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1065 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1066 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1067 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1068 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1069 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1071 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1072 /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
1073 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1074 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1075 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1077 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1080 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1081 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1082 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1083 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1084 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1085 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1086 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1087 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1088 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1089 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1090 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1092 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1094 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1095 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1096 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1101 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1103 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1104 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1105 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1107 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1110 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1112 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1114 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1117 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1118 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1121 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1122 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1124 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1126 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1128 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1129 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1131 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1132 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1134 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1135 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1136 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)
1137 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1148 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1150 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1151 if (s->renegotiate) {
1154 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1159 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1162 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1165 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1172 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1173 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1176 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1177 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1178 unsigned long size_str;
1182 * check for enough space.
1183 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1184 * 2 for servernamelist length
1185 * 1 for the hostname type
1186 * 2 for hostname length
1190 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1192 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1195 /* extension type and length */
1196 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1197 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1199 /* length of servername list */
1200 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1202 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1203 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1205 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1209 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1210 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1211 * Client Hello message */
1213 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1214 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 * check for enough space.
1221 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1222 * 1 for the srp user identity
1223 * + srp user identity length
1225 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1228 /* fill in the extension */
1229 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1230 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1231 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1232 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1240 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1243 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1244 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1246 unsigned char *etmp;
1248 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1250 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1252 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1254 if (num_formats > 255) {
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1259 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1260 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1261 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1262 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1263 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1267 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1269 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1270 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1273 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1275 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1277 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1282 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1284 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1285 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1286 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1287 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1288 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1292 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1294 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1295 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1296 ret += curves_list_len;
1298 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1300 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1302 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1303 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1304 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1305 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1306 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1307 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1308 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1310 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1311 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1312 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1315 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1316 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1319 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1322 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1324 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1327 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1333 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1335 const unsigned char *salg;
1336 unsigned char *etmp;
1337 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1338 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1342 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1344 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1345 /* Fill in lengths */
1346 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1351 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1353 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1357 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1358 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1359 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1365 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1366 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1372 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1374 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1375 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1377 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1378 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1380 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1381 /* save position of id len */
1382 unsigned char *q = ret;
1383 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1384 /* skip over id len */
1386 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1392 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1395 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1396 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1398 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1402 * 1: peer may send requests
1403 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1405 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1406 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1408 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1412 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1414 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1415 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1417 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1419 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1424 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1425 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1427 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1428 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1429 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1430 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1431 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1434 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1437 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1438 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1443 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1446 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1449 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1456 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1457 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1458 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1460 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1461 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1464 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1468 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1469 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1470 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1473 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1474 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1476 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1477 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1483 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1485 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1492 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1495 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1499 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1500 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1503 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1504 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1506 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1509 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1510 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1511 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1512 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1513 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1518 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1520 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1523 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1528 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1531 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1534 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1543 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1546 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1547 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1548 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1556 const unsigned char *plist;
1559 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1563 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1565 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1567 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1569 if (plistlen > 255) {
1570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1574 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1575 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1576 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1577 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1582 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1585 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1587 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1588 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1590 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1594 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1595 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1597 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1602 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1605 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1606 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1610 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1613 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1616 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1624 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1625 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1626 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1627 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1628 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1629 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1630 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1631 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1632 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1633 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1635 if (limit - ret < 36)
1637 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1642 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1643 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1644 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1646 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1650 * 1: peer may send requests
1651 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1653 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1654 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1656 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1662 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1663 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1664 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1665 const unsigned char *npa;
1666 unsigned int npalen;
1669 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1671 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1672 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1673 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1675 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1677 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1679 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1683 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1685 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1686 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1688 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1689 * for other cases too.
1691 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1692 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1693 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1694 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1695 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1697 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1702 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1703 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1707 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1708 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1709 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1711 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1713 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1717 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1723 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1726 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1731 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1732 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1733 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1734 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1737 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1739 unsigned int data_len;
1740 unsigned int proto_len;
1741 const unsigned char *selected;
1742 unsigned char *data;
1743 unsigned char selected_len;
1746 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1750 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1751 * length-prefixed strings.
1753 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
1754 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
1755 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
1759 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
1761 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
1763 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
1765 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1766 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1767 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1768 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1769 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1770 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1771 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1774 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1775 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1780 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1786 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1787 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1788 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1793 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1794 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1795 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1796 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1798 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1800 unsigned int type, size;
1801 unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
1804 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1805 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1806 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1807 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1808 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1809 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1810 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1812 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1813 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1814 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1815 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1818 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1819 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1820 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1821 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1822 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1823 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1824 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1825 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1826 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1827 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1832 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1833 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1834 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
1835 || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
1838 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1841 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1842 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1843 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1845 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
1846 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
1847 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1849 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1851 if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1854 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1856 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
1857 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1859 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1863 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1865 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1867 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1872 unsigned char *data;
1873 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1875 s->servername_done = 0;
1876 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1878 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1881 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1882 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1884 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1885 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1889 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1890 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1891 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1893 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1894 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1895 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1896 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1897 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1901 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1902 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1905 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1907 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1910 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
1913 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
1916 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1919 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
1922 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1923 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1925 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
1928 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1929 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
1931 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1932 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1935 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1937 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1938 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1939 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1940 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1941 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1942 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1943 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1944 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1945 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1946 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1947 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1948 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1949 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1950 * the value of the Host: field.
1951 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1952 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1953 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1955 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1959 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1960 unsigned char *sdata;
1961 unsigned int servname_type;
1965 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
1966 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
1969 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
1970 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
1971 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
1972 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
1975 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1976 switch (servname_type) {
1977 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1979 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1982 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1983 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1986 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1987 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1988 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1991 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
1992 (unsigned char *)s->session
1995 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1998 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
1999 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2000 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2001 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2002 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2005 s->servername_done = 1;
2008 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
2009 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2012 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2013 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2014 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2015 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2024 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
2025 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
2029 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2030 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2031 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
2032 || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2035 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2037 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
2040 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2042 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
2043 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
2048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2049 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2050 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2052 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2053 || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
2057 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2058 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2059 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2060 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2061 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2062 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2065 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2066 ecpointformatlist_length;
2067 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2068 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2069 ecpointformatlist_length))
2071 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2074 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2075 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2076 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2079 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2080 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
2082 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2083 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
2084 || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
2085 || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
2089 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2092 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2093 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2094 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2095 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2098 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2099 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2100 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2101 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2102 ellipticcurvelist_length))
2104 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2107 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2108 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2112 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2113 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2114 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
2115 || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2116 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2117 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
2118 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2121 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2124 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
2125 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2128 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2129 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
2130 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2133 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2136 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
2137 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
2140 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2141 const unsigned char *sdata;
2143 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2144 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2145 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2148 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
2150 unsigned int idsize;
2152 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
2153 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
2154 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
2159 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2162 if (data != sdata) {
2163 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2166 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2167 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2168 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2169 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2170 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2173 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2174 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2175 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2180 /* Read in request_extensions */
2181 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2182 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2183 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2188 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2189 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2190 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2191 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2192 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2197 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2200 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2203 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2204 unsigned int hbtype;
2206 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
2207 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2208 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2212 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2213 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2215 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2216 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2217 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2220 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2226 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2227 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2228 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2230 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2233 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2234 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2235 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2236 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2237 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2238 * anything like that, but this might change).
2240 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2241 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2242 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2243 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2244 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2246 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2250 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2251 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2252 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
2254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2255 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2256 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2260 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2262 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2263 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2264 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
2268 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2269 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2270 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2272 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2274 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2277 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2278 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2279 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2280 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2281 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2284 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2289 /* Spurious data on the end */
2290 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
2295 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2297 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2298 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2299 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2301 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2307 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2311 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2314 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2315 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2316 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2320 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2329 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2330 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2331 * fill the length of the block.
2333 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2337 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2338 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2339 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2347 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2349 unsigned int length, type, size;
2350 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2351 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2354 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2356 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2358 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2359 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2361 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2362 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2365 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2366 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2369 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2372 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2373 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2377 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2378 unsigned char *data;
2381 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2382 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2385 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2386 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2388 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2389 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2391 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2392 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2393 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2394 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2395 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2398 tlsext_servername = 1;
2400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2401 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2402 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2403 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2404 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2405 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2409 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2410 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2411 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2412 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2413 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2416 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2417 ecpointformatlist_length;
2418 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2419 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2420 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2421 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2427 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2429 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2430 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2431 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2432 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2434 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2437 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2438 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2441 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2443 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2445 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2448 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2449 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2452 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2453 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2456 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2457 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2458 unsigned char *selected;
2459 unsigned char selected_len;
2460 /* We must have requested it. */
2461 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2462 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2465 /* The data must be valid */
2466 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2467 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2471 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2473 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2474 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2475 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2478 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2479 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2480 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2483 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2484 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2485 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2489 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2491 /* We must have requested it. */
2492 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2493 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2497 * The extension data consists of:
2498 * uint16 list_length
2499 * uint8 proto_length;
2500 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2502 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2503 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2504 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2505 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2506 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2509 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2510 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2511 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2512 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2515 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2516 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2519 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2522 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2523 unsigned int hbtype;
2524 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2525 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2529 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2530 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2532 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2533 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2534 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2537 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2543 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2544 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2548 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2549 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2550 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2551 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2552 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2553 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2556 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2558 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2561 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2562 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2564 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2568 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2569 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2573 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2574 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2575 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2576 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2577 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2578 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2582 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2591 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2592 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2593 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2594 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2595 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2596 * initial connect only.
2598 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2599 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2600 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2602 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2609 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2615 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2620 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2622 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2623 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2627 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2628 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2631 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2632 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2636 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2638 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2639 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2640 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2641 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2643 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2645 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2648 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2649 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2652 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2653 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2656 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2657 s->servername_done = 0;
2662 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2663 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2665 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2667 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2670 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2671 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2673 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2674 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2677 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2680 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2681 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2682 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2686 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2690 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2691 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2692 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2693 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2694 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2695 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2696 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2697 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2700 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2701 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2702 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2704 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2707 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2708 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2709 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2710 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2711 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2715 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2719 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2723 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2725 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2726 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2729 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2730 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2731 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2732 * influence which certificate is sent
2734 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2736 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2737 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2738 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2739 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2740 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2744 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2745 * et al can pick it up.
2747 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2748 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2750 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2751 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2752 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2754 /* status request response should be sent */
2755 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2756 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2757 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2759 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2761 /* something bad happened */
2762 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2763 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2764 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2768 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2772 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2773 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2776 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2777 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2785 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2787 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2788 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2792 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2793 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2794 * must contain uncompressed.
2796 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2797 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2798 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2799 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2800 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2801 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2802 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2803 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2804 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2806 unsigned char *list;
2807 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2808 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2809 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2810 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2811 found_uncompressed = 1;
2815 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2817 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2821 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2822 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2824 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2826 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2827 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2828 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2829 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2831 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2833 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2836 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2839 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2840 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2843 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2846 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2847 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2848 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2849 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2851 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2852 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2855 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2856 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2861 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2862 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2865 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2866 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2869 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2870 s->servername_done = 0;
2876 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2879 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2881 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2882 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2886 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2894 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2895 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2896 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2898 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2899 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2900 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2901 * point to the resulting session.
2903 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2904 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2905 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2908 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2909 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2910 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2911 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2912 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2913 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2914 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2917 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2918 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2919 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2920 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2921 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2922 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2924 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id,
2928 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2932 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2935 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2938 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2940 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2943 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2947 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2948 unsigned int type, size;
2950 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2951 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2952 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2956 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2960 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2962 unsigned char *etick;
2966 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2969 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2973 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2975 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2976 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2977 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2978 * calculate the master secret later.
2983 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2984 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2988 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2989 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2991 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2992 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2995 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2998 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2999 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3002 default: /* fatal error */
3008 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3020 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3022 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3023 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3024 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3025 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3026 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3027 * point to the resulting session.
3030 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3031 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3032 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3033 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3034 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3036 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3037 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3038 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3041 unsigned char *sdec;
3042 const unsigned char *p;
3043 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3044 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3045 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3047 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3048 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3051 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3052 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3055 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3056 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3057 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3058 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3067 /* Check key name matches */
3068 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3070 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3071 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3072 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3073 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3079 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3082 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3087 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3088 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3089 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3092 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3093 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3094 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3097 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3098 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3099 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3100 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3101 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3103 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3104 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3107 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3108 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3113 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3116 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3120 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3121 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3122 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3126 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3127 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3136 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3140 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3141 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3145 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3152 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3153 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3154 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3155 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3156 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3157 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3158 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3159 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3160 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3161 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3164 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3165 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3166 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3167 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3168 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3169 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3170 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3173 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3176 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3177 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3183 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3186 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3187 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3188 return table[i].nid;
3193 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3199 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3202 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3205 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3206 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3210 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3212 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3219 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3222 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3223 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3224 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3225 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3226 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3227 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3228 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3229 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3230 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3231 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3234 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3240 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3242 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3243 return tls12_md_info + i;
3249 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3251 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3252 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3254 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3257 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3260 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3264 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3265 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3268 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3269 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3272 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3273 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3275 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3276 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3277 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3279 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3280 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3282 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3283 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3289 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3290 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3291 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3293 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3294 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3296 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3297 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3299 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3301 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3302 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3304 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3306 if (psignhash_nid) {
3307 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3308 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3310 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3314 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3315 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3317 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3318 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3319 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3321 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3322 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3324 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3325 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3329 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3330 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3334 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3336 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3337 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3338 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3340 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3341 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3342 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3344 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3345 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3346 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3348 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3349 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3354 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3355 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3360 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3361 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3368 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3370 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3372 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3375 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3376 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3378 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3380 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3381 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3382 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3383 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3386 return tmpout - out;
3389 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3390 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3391 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3392 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3394 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3395 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3396 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3397 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3398 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3400 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3401 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3404 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3405 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3406 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3408 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3418 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3419 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3421 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3422 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3424 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3426 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3428 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3429 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3430 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3431 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3432 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3433 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3434 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3435 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3436 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3437 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3439 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3440 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3443 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3444 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3448 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3449 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3451 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3453 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3456 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3460 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3461 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3465 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3467 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3470 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3471 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3473 /* Should never happen */
3477 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3478 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3479 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3481 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3482 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3486 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3491 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3492 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3494 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3495 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3498 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3499 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3501 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3502 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3504 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3506 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3508 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3510 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3511 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3513 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3514 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3515 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3516 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3522 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3523 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3524 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3525 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3526 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3528 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3529 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3530 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3531 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3537 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3538 * the certificate for signing.
3540 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3542 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3543 * supported it stays as NULL.
3545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3546 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3547 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3550 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3551 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3552 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3556 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3557 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3559 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3560 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3561 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3562 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3563 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3564 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3565 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3571 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3572 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3573 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3575 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3580 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3587 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3589 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3592 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3593 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3594 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3596 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3597 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3601 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3603 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3605 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3607 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3609 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3610 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3614 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3617 unsigned short hbtype;
3618 unsigned int payload;
3619 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3621 if (s->msg_callback)
3622 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3624 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3626 /* Read type and payload length first */
3627 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3628 return 0; /* silently discard */
3631 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3632 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3635 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3636 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3640 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3641 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3643 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3644 if (buffer == NULL) {
3645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3650 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3651 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3653 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3655 /* Random padding */
3656 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3657 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3661 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3662 3 + payload + padding);
3664 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3665 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3666 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3667 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3669 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3673 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3677 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3678 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3682 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3684 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3691 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3693 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3695 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3696 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3698 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3699 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3700 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3705 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3706 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3711 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3712 if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
3713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3718 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3719 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3720 * some random stuff.
3721 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3722 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3723 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3724 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3727 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3729 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3734 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3735 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3737 /* Sequence number */
3738 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3739 /* 16 random bytes */
3740 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3741 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3745 /* Random padding */
3746 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3747 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3751 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3753 if (s->msg_callback)
3754 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3755 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3756 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3758 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3767 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3771 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3774 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3776 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3777 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3778 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3779 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3780 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3781 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3783 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3784 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3785 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3789 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3791 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3794 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3797 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3799 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3801 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3803 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3811 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3812 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3814 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3817 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3818 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3821 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3822 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3827 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3828 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3830 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3834 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3838 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3841 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3844 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3849 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3850 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3852 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3853 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3854 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3856 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3863 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3864 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3865 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3867 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3868 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3869 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3875 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3879 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3883 if (default_nid == -1)
3885 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3887 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3888 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3889 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3894 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3895 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3899 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3900 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3901 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3908 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3909 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3910 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3911 * attempting to use them.
3914 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3916 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3917 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3918 /* Strict mode flags */
3919 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3920 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3921 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3923 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3928 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3929 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3932 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3933 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3935 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3938 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3940 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3941 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3943 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3945 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3946 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3949 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3950 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3951 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3952 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3953 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3961 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3964 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3966 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3967 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3969 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3976 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3977 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3978 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3979 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3980 else if (!check_flags)
3985 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3986 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3988 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3990 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3991 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3993 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3996 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3997 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3998 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3999 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4000 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4003 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4004 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4005 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4006 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4010 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4011 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4014 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4015 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4016 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4019 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4020 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4021 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4024 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4025 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4026 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4035 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4036 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4038 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4040 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4041 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4042 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4045 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4052 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4053 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4057 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4058 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4059 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4060 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4062 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4069 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4070 else if (check_flags)
4071 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4073 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4074 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4075 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4076 else if (!check_flags)
4079 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4080 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4081 else if (strict_mode) {
4082 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4083 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4084 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4085 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4087 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4094 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4095 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4099 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4102 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4105 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4110 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4111 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4112 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4113 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4114 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4118 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4122 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4124 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4125 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4127 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4128 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4129 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4133 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4136 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4138 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4140 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4141 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4143 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4144 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4145 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4147 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4148 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4149 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4150 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4151 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4156 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4159 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4161 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4162 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4166 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4167 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4168 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4169 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4170 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4172 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4175 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4179 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4182 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4183 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4190 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4191 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4193 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4194 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4195 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4196 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4197 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4198 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4199 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4200 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4201 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4204 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4205 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4207 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4212 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4214 int dh_secbits = 80;
4215 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4216 return DH_get_1024_160();
4217 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4218 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4223 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4224 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4227 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4233 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4234 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4235 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4237 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4238 if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
4244 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4245 return DH_get_2048_224();
4246 return DH_get_1024_160();
4250 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4253 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4255 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4256 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4260 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4262 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4265 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4267 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4268 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4269 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4270 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4272 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4273 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4276 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4278 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4281 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4284 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4286 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4287 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4289 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4290 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4292 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4293 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4298 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4299 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4300 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4303 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4305 int rv, start_idx, i;
4307 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4312 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4316 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4317 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4318 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);