2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
127 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
128 SSL_SESSION **psess);
129 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
130 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
132 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
135 tls1_setup_key_block,
136 tls1_generate_master_secret,
137 tls1_change_cipher_state,
138 tls1_final_finish_mac,
139 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
140 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
141 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 tls1_export_keying_material,
146 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
147 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
151 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
154 tls1_setup_key_block,
155 tls1_generate_master_secret,
156 tls1_change_cipher_state,
157 tls1_final_finish_mac,
158 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
159 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
160 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 tls1_export_keying_material,
164 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
165 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
166 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
170 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
173 tls1_setup_key_block,
174 tls1_generate_master_secret,
175 tls1_change_cipher_state,
176 tls1_final_finish_mac,
177 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
178 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
179 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 tls1_export_keying_material,
183 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
184 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
185 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
186 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
190 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
193 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
194 * http, the cache would over fill
196 return (60 * 60 * 2);
203 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
207 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
209 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
222 int nid; /* Curve NID */
223 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
224 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
227 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
228 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
230 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
231 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
232 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
233 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
234 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
235 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
236 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
237 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
238 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
239 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
240 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
241 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
242 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
243 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
244 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
245 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
246 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
247 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
248 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
249 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
250 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
251 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
252 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
253 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
254 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
255 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
256 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
257 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
258 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
261 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
263 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
264 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
267 /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
268 static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
269 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
270 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
271 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
272 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
273 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
274 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
275 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
276 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
277 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
278 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
279 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
280 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
281 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
284 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
288 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
289 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
291 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
292 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
293 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
294 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
295 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
296 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
297 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
298 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
299 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
300 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
301 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
302 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
303 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
305 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
306 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
308 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
309 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
310 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
311 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
312 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
313 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
314 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
315 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
316 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
317 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
318 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
319 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
320 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
321 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
322 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
326 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
327 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
328 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
331 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
333 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
334 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
336 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
339 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
341 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
343 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
345 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
347 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
349 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
351 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
353 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
355 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
357 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
359 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
361 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
363 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
365 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
367 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
369 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
371 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
373 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
375 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
377 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
379 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
381 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
383 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
385 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
387 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
389 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
391 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
393 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
395 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
397 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
405 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
407 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
408 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
409 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
410 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
411 * lists in the first place.
412 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
413 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
414 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
416 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
417 const unsigned char **pcurves,
420 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
422 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
423 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
425 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
426 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
427 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
428 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
429 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
432 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
433 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
437 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
438 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
442 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
443 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
446 if (!s->server || (s->cert && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)) {
447 *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
448 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
450 *pcurves = eccurves_all;
451 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
456 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
457 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
462 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
467 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
468 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
470 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
473 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
475 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
476 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
477 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
480 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
483 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
484 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
486 const unsigned char *curves;
487 size_t num_curves, i;
488 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
489 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
491 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
493 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
496 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
497 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
499 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
500 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
502 } else /* Should never happen */
505 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
507 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
508 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
509 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
515 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
516 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
517 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
518 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
520 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
522 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
523 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
525 /* Can't do anything on client side */
529 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
531 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
532 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
534 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
535 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
536 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
537 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
538 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
539 /* Should never happen */
542 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
546 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
547 * but s->options is a long...
549 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
550 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
552 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
553 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
554 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
555 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
557 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
559 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
560 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
561 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
562 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
563 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
566 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
567 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
575 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
579 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
580 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
582 unsigned char *clist, *p;
585 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
588 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
589 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
592 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
593 unsigned long idmask;
595 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
597 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
606 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
610 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
614 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
617 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
619 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
625 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
627 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
629 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
631 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
632 if (nid == NID_undef)
633 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
634 if (nid == NID_undef)
635 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
636 if (nid == NID_undef)
638 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
639 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
641 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
645 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
646 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
651 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
655 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
658 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
659 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
664 const EC_METHOD *meth;
667 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
668 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
671 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
674 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
678 /* Determine curve ID */
679 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
680 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
681 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
684 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
693 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
695 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
697 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
699 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
701 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
706 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
707 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
708 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
710 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
711 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
714 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
715 * supported (see RFC4492).
717 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
718 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
719 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
720 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
721 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
724 if (i == num_formats)
729 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
730 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
731 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
733 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
735 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
736 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
737 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
738 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
739 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
743 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
744 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
749 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
756 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
760 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
762 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
763 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
764 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
766 *pformats = ecformats_default;
767 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
769 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
771 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
776 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
777 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
779 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
781 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
784 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
787 /* If not EC nothing to do */
788 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
792 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
797 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
800 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
804 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
805 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
807 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
813 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
814 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
815 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
816 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
817 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
819 return 0; /* Should never happen */
820 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
821 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
823 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
825 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
826 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
827 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
829 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
835 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
836 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
837 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
839 unsigned char curve_id[2];
840 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
841 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
842 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
843 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
847 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
850 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
851 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
852 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
853 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
854 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
855 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
859 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
860 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
862 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
863 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
865 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
867 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
870 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
872 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
878 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
879 /* Need a shared curve */
880 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
886 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
891 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
893 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
897 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
900 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
904 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
909 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
912 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
913 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
916 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
917 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
919 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
922 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
923 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
925 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
929 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
931 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
934 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
935 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
936 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
937 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
939 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
940 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
941 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
942 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
943 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
944 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
948 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
949 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
950 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
953 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
956 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
960 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
961 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
962 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
963 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
965 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
966 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
969 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
970 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
974 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
975 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
976 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
977 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
978 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
979 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
980 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
982 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
983 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
988 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
989 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
991 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
992 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
994 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
995 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
996 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
997 /* Should never happen */
1000 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1001 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1006 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1007 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1008 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1009 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1011 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1015 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1016 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1019 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1020 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1022 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1025 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1026 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1028 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1034 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1038 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1039 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1040 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1041 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1044 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1045 if (i == sent_sigslen
1046 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1047 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1051 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1056 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1057 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1058 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1064 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1066 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1071 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1072 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1073 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1076 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1078 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1079 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1080 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1081 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1082 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1084 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1085 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1087 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1090 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1091 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1092 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1093 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1094 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1095 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1096 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1097 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1098 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1099 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1100 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1102 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1104 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1105 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1106 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1111 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1113 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1114 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1115 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1117 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1120 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1122 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1124 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1127 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1128 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1131 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1132 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1134 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1136 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1138 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1139 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1141 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1142 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1144 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1145 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1146 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1147 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1158 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1160 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1161 if (s->renegotiate) {
1164 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1169 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1172 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1175 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1182 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1183 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1186 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1187 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1188 unsigned long size_str;
1192 * check for enough space.
1193 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1194 * 2 for servernamelist length
1195 * 1 for the hostname type
1196 * 2 for hostname length
1200 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1202 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1205 /* extension type and length */
1206 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1207 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1209 /* length of servername list */
1210 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1212 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1213 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1215 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1219 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1220 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1221 * Client Hello message */
1223 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1224 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1230 * check for enough space.
1231 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1232 * 1 for the srp user identity
1233 * + srp user identity length
1235 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1238 /* fill in the extension */
1239 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1240 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1241 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1242 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1250 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1253 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1254 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1256 unsigned char *etmp;
1258 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1260 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1262 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1264 if (num_formats > 255) {
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1269 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1270 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1271 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1272 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1273 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1277 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1279 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1280 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1283 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1285 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1287 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1292 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1294 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1295 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1296 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1297 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1298 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1302 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1304 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1305 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1306 ret += curves_list_len;
1308 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1310 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1312 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1313 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1314 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1315 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1316 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1317 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1318 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1320 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1321 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1322 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1325 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1326 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1329 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1332 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1334 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1337 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1343 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1345 const unsigned char *salg;
1346 unsigned char *etmp;
1347 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1348 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1350 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1352 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1354 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1355 /* Fill in lengths */
1356 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1361 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1363 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1367 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1368 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1369 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1375 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1376 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1382 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1384 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1385 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1387 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1388 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1390 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1391 /* save position of id len */
1392 unsigned char *q = ret;
1393 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1394 /* skip over id len */
1396 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1402 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1405 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1406 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1408 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1412 * 1: peer may send requests
1413 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1415 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1416 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1418 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1422 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1424 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1425 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1427 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1434 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1435 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1437 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1438 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1439 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1440 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1441 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1444 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1447 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1448 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1453 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1456 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1459 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1466 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1467 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1468 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1470 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1471 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1474 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1478 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1479 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1480 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1483 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1484 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1486 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1487 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1493 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1495 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1502 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1505 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1509 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1510 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1513 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1514 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1516 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1518 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1519 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1520 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1521 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1522 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1523 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1528 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1530 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1533 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1538 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1541 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1544 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1552 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1553 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1556 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1557 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1558 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1561 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1566 const unsigned char *plist;
1569 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1573 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1575 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1577 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1579 if (plistlen > 255) {
1580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1584 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1585 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1586 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1587 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1592 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1595 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1597 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1598 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1600 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1604 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1605 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1607 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1612 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1615 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1616 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1620 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1623 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1626 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1634 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1635 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1636 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1637 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1638 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1639 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1640 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1641 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1642 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1643 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1645 if (limit - ret < 36)
1647 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1652 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1653 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1654 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1656 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1660 * 1: peer may send requests
1661 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1663 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1664 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1666 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1672 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1673 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1674 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1675 const unsigned char *npa;
1676 unsigned int npalen;
1679 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1681 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1682 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1683 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1685 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1687 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1689 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1693 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1695 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1696 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1698 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1699 * for other cases too.
1701 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1702 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1703 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1705 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1710 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1711 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1715 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1716 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1717 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1719 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1721 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1725 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1731 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1734 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1739 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1740 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1741 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1742 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1745 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1746 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1750 const unsigned char *selected;
1751 unsigned char selected_len;
1754 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1761 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1762 * length-prefixed strings.
1764 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1773 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1774 proto_len = data[i];
1780 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1786 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1787 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1788 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1789 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1790 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1791 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1792 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1795 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1796 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1801 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1807 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1808 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1809 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1814 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1815 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1816 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1817 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1819 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1820 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1822 unsigned short type, size;
1823 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1824 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1825 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1826 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1827 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1828 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1829 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1831 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1832 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1833 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1834 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1837 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1838 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1839 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1840 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1841 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1842 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1843 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1844 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1845 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1846 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1849 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1853 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1858 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1861 if (data + size > d + n)
1865 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1866 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1867 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1869 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1871 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1873 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1876 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1878 if (data + len != d + n)
1880 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1884 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1886 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1888 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1889 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1891 unsigned short type;
1892 unsigned short size;
1894 unsigned char *data = *p;
1895 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1897 s->servername_done = 0;
1898 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1900 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1903 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1904 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1905 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1906 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1907 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1911 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1912 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1913 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1915 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1916 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1917 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1918 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1919 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1923 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1924 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1927 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1929 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1933 if (data > (d + n - len))
1936 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1940 if (data + size > (d + n))
1942 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1943 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1944 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1945 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1947 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1948 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1951 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1953 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1954 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1955 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1956 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1957 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1958 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1959 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1960 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1961 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1962 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1963 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1964 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1965 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1966 * the value of the Host: field.
1967 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1968 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1969 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1971 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1975 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1976 unsigned char *sdata;
1981 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1987 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1993 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1998 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2001 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2002 switch (servname_type) {
2003 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2005 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2006 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2009 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2010 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2013 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2014 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2015 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2018 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2019 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2020 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2021 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2022 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2023 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2026 s->servername_done = 1;
2029 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2030 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2031 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2032 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2043 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2049 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2050 if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2051 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2054 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2055 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2058 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2060 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2061 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2063 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2064 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2071 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2072 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2073 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2075 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2076 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2077 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2081 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2082 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2083 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2084 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2085 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2086 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2089 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2090 ecpointformatlist_length;
2091 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2092 ecpointformatlist_length);
2094 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2095 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2096 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2097 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2099 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2100 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2101 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2102 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2103 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2107 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2108 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2111 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2112 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2113 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2114 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2117 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2118 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2119 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2120 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2123 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2124 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2125 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2126 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2127 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2129 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2132 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2134 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2135 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2140 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2141 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2144 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2145 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2148 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2151 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2155 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2157 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2158 const unsigned char *sdata;
2160 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2164 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2171 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2175 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2178 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2183 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2185 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2188 if (data != sdata) {
2189 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2190 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2193 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2194 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2195 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2196 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2197 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2200 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2201 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2202 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2207 /* Read in request_extensions */
2209 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2214 if (dsize != size) {
2215 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2220 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2221 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2222 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2223 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2224 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2225 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2231 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2234 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2237 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2239 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2240 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2242 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2243 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2244 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2247 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2253 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2254 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2255 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2257 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2260 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2261 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2262 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2263 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2264 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2265 * anything like that, but this might change).
2267 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2268 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2269 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2270 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2271 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2273 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2277 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2278 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2279 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2282 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2283 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2287 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2289 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2290 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2291 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2295 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2296 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2297 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2299 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2301 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2304 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2305 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2306 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2307 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2308 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2311 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2322 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2324 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2325 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2326 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2328 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2335 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2339 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2340 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2341 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2345 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2354 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2355 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2356 * fill the length of the block.
2358 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2360 unsigned int off = 0;
2373 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2374 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2376 unsigned short length;
2377 unsigned short type;
2378 unsigned short size;
2379 unsigned char *data = *p;
2380 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2381 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2384 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2386 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2388 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2389 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2391 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2392 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2395 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2396 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2399 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2403 if (data + length != d + n) {
2404 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2408 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2412 if (data + size > (d + n))
2415 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2416 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2418 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2419 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2421 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2422 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2423 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2424 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2425 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2428 tlsext_servername = 1;
2430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2431 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2432 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2433 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2435 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2436 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2440 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2441 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2442 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2443 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2444 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2447 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2448 ecpointformatlist_length;
2449 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2450 ecpointformatlist_length);
2453 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2455 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2456 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2457 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2458 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2460 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2463 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2464 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2467 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2469 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2471 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2474 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2475 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2478 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2479 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2482 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2483 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2484 unsigned char *selected;
2485 unsigned char selected_len;
2487 /* We must have requested it. */
2488 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2489 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2492 /* The data must be valid */
2493 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2494 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2498 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2500 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2501 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2502 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2505 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2506 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2507 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2510 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2511 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2512 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2516 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2519 /* We must have requested it. */
2520 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2521 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2525 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2529 * The extension data consists of:
2530 * uint16 list_length
2531 * uint8 proto_length;
2532 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2537 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2538 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2542 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2543 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2546 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2547 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2548 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2549 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2552 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2553 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2556 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2558 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2559 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2561 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2562 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2563 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2566 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2572 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2573 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2577 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2578 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2579 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2580 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2581 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2582 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2585 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2587 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2590 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2591 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2593 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2599 if (data != d + n) {
2600 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2604 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2605 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2606 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2607 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2608 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2609 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2613 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2624 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2625 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2626 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2627 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2628 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2629 * initial connect only.
2631 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2632 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2633 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2635 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2642 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2648 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2653 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2655 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2656 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2660 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2661 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2664 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2665 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2669 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2671 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2672 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2673 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2674 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2676 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2678 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2681 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2682 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2685 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2686 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2689 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2690 s->servername_done = 0;
2695 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2696 static void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2698 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2700 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2703 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2704 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
2706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2707 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
2711 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2715 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2716 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2717 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2718 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2719 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2720 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2721 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2722 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2725 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2726 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2727 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2729 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2732 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2733 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2735 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2736 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2740 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2744 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2748 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2750 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2751 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2754 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2755 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2756 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2757 * influence which certificate is sent
2759 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2761 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2762 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2763 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2764 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2765 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2769 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2770 * et al can pick it up.
2772 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2773 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2775 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2776 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2777 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2779 /* status request response should be sent */
2780 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2781 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2782 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2784 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2786 /* something bad happened */
2787 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2788 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2789 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2793 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2797 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2798 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2801 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2802 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2810 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2812 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2813 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2817 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2818 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2819 * must contain uncompressed.
2821 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2822 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2823 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2824 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2825 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2826 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2827 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2828 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2829 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2831 unsigned char *list;
2832 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2833 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2834 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2835 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2836 found_uncompressed = 1;
2840 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2842 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2846 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2847 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2849 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2851 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2852 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2853 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2854 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2856 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2858 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2861 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2864 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2865 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2868 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2871 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2872 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2873 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2874 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2876 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2877 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2880 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2881 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2886 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2887 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2890 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2891 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2894 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2895 s->servername_done = 0;
2901 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2905 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2907 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2908 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2912 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2920 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2921 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2922 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2924 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2925 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2926 * extension, if any.
2927 * len: the length of the session ID.
2928 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2929 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2930 * point to the resulting session.
2932 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2933 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2934 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2937 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2938 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2939 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2940 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2941 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2942 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2943 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2946 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2947 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2948 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2949 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2950 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2951 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2953 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2954 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2956 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2957 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2961 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2964 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2967 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2969 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2973 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2974 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2980 /* Skip past cipher list */
2985 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2990 /* Now at start of extensions */
2991 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2994 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
2995 unsigned short type, size;
2998 if (p + size > limit)
3000 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3004 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3007 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3010 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3012 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3013 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3014 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3015 * calculate the master secret later.
3019 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3021 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3022 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3024 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3026 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3027 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3029 default: /* fatal error */
3039 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3041 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3042 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3043 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3044 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3045 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3046 * point to the resulting session.
3049 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3050 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3051 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3052 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3054 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3055 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3056 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3059 unsigned char *sdec;
3060 const unsigned char *p;
3061 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3062 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3065 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3066 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3069 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3070 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3071 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3072 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3073 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3074 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3083 /* Check key name matches */
3084 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3086 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3087 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3088 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3089 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3092 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3095 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3097 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3101 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3102 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3103 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3104 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3105 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3106 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3109 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3110 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3111 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3112 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3113 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3115 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3118 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3119 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3120 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3125 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3128 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3132 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3133 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3134 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3138 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3139 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3148 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3153 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3160 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3161 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3162 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3163 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3164 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3165 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3166 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3169 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3170 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3171 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3172 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3175 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3178 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3179 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3185 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3188 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3189 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3190 return table[i].nid;
3195 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3201 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3204 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3207 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3208 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3212 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3214 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3220 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3223 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3224 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3227 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3229 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3230 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3231 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3232 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3233 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3236 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3240 if (hash_alg > OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info))
3242 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3245 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3247 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3248 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3250 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3251 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3253 return inf->mfunc();
3256 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3260 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3261 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3264 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3265 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3268 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3269 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3275 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3276 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3277 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3279 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3280 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3282 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3283 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3285 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3287 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3288 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3290 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3292 if (psignhash_nid) {
3293 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3294 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3296 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3300 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3301 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3303 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3304 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3305 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3307 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3308 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3310 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3311 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3315 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3316 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3320 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3322 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3323 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3324 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3326 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3327 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3328 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3330 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3331 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3332 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3334 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3335 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3340 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3341 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3346 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3347 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3354 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3356 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3358 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3361 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3362 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3364 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3366 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3367 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3368 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3369 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3372 return tmpout - out;
3375 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3376 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3377 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3378 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3380 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3381 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3382 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3383 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3384 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3386 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3387 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3390 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3391 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3392 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3394 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3404 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3405 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3407 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3408 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3410 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3412 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3414 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3415 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3416 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3417 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3418 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3419 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3420 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3421 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3422 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3423 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3425 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3426 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3429 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3430 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3434 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3435 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3437 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3439 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3442 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3446 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3447 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3451 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3453 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3456 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3457 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3459 /* Should never happen */
3463 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3464 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3465 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3467 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3468 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3472 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3477 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3478 int *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3480 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3481 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3484 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3485 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3487 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3488 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3490 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3492 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3494 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3496 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3497 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3499 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3500 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3501 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3502 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3508 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3509 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3510 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3511 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3512 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3514 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3515 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3516 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3517 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3523 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3524 * the certificate for signing.
3526 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3528 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3529 * supported it stays as NULL.
3531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3532 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3533 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3536 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3537 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3538 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3542 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3543 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3549 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3550 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3551 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3553 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3558 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3565 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3567 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3570 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3571 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3572 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3574 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3575 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3579 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3581 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3583 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3585 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3587 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3588 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3592 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3595 unsigned short hbtype;
3596 unsigned int payload;
3597 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3599 if (s->msg_callback)
3600 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3602 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3604 /* Read type and payload length first */
3605 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3606 return 0; /* silently discard */
3609 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3610 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3613 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3614 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3618 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3619 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3621 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3622 if (buffer == NULL) {
3623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3628 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3629 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3631 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3633 /* Random padding */
3634 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3635 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3639 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3640 3 + payload + padding);
3642 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3643 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3644 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3645 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3647 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3651 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3655 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3656 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3660 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3662 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3669 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3671 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3673 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3674 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3676 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3677 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3678 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3683 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3684 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3689 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3690 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3696 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3697 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3699 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3702 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3703 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3704 * some random stuff.
3705 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3706 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3707 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3708 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3711 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3718 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3719 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3721 /* Sequence number */
3722 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3723 /* 16 random bytes */
3724 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3729 /* Random padding */
3730 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3731 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3735 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3737 if (s->msg_callback)
3738 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3739 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3740 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3742 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3751 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3755 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3758 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3760 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3763 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3766 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3768 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3770 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3772 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3780 if (strcmp(etmp, "RSA") == 0)
3781 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3782 else if (strcmp(etmp, "DSA") == 0)
3783 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3784 else if (strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA") == 0)
3785 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3789 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3790 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3791 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3792 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3795 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3796 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3799 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3800 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3805 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3806 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3808 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3812 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3816 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3819 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3822 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3827 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3828 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3830 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3831 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3832 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3834 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3841 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3842 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3843 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3845 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3846 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3847 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3853 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3857 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3861 if (default_nid == -1)
3863 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3865 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3866 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3867 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3872 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3873 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3877 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3878 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3879 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3886 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3887 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3888 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3889 * attempting to use them.
3892 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3894 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3895 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3896 /* Strict mode flags */
3897 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3898 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3899 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3901 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3906 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3907 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3910 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3911 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3913 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3916 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3918 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3919 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3921 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3923 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3924 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3927 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3928 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3929 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3930 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3931 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3939 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3942 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3943 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3945 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3946 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3948 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3955 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3956 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3957 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3958 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3959 else if (!check_flags)
3964 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3965 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3967 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3969 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3970 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3972 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3975 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3976 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3977 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3978 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3979 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3982 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3983 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3984 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3985 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3989 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3990 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3999 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4000 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4002 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4004 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4005 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4006 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4009 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4016 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4017 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4021 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4022 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4023 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4024 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4026 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4033 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4034 else if (check_flags)
4035 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4037 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4038 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4039 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4040 else if (!check_flags)
4043 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4044 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4045 else if (strict_mode) {
4046 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4047 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4048 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4049 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4051 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4058 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4059 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4063 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4066 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4069 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4074 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4075 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4076 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4077 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4078 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4082 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4086 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4088 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4089 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4091 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4092 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4093 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4097 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4100 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4102 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4104 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4105 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4107 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4108 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4109 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4111 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4112 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4113 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4114 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4115 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4120 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4123 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4125 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4126 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4130 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4131 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4132 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4133 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4134 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4136 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4139 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4143 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4146 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4147 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4154 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4155 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4157 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4158 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4159 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4160 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4161 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4162 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4165 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4166 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4168 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4173 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4175 int dh_secbits = 80;
4176 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4177 return DH_get_1024_160();
4178 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4179 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4184 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4185 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4188 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4194 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4195 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4196 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4198 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4199 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4205 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4206 return DH_get_2048_224();
4207 return DH_get_1024_160();
4211 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4214 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4216 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4217 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4221 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4223 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4226 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4228 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4229 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4230 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4231 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4233 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4234 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4237 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4239 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4242 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4245 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4247 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4248 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4250 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4251 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4253 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4254 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4259 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4260 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4261 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4264 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4266 int rv, start_idx, i;
4268 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4273 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4277 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4278 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4279 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);