1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include <openssl/dh.h>
119 #include <openssl/bn.h>
120 #include "ssl_locl.h"
121 #include <openssl/ct.h>
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
129 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
132 tls1_setup_key_block,
133 tls1_generate_master_secret,
134 tls1_change_cipher_state,
135 tls1_final_finish_mac,
136 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
142 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
143 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
147 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
150 tls1_setup_key_block,
151 tls1_generate_master_secret,
152 tls1_change_cipher_state,
153 tls1_final_finish_mac,
154 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
155 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
156 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
158 tls1_export_keying_material,
159 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
160 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
161 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
165 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
168 tls1_setup_key_block,
169 tls1_generate_master_secret,
170 tls1_change_cipher_state,
171 tls1_final_finish_mac,
172 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
173 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
174 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
176 tls1_export_keying_material,
177 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
178 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
179 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
180 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
184 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
187 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
188 * http, the cache would over fill
190 return (60 * 60 * 2);
197 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
201 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
203 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
207 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
210 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
211 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
213 s->version = s->method->version;
216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
219 int nid; /* Curve NID */
220 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
221 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
224 /* Mask for curve type */
225 # define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3
226 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
227 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
228 # define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2
231 * Table of curve information.
232 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
233 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
235 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
236 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
240 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
241 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
242 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
243 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
244 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
245 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
246 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
247 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
248 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
249 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
250 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
251 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
252 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
253 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
254 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
255 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
256 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
257 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
258 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
259 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
260 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
261 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
265 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM},
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
269 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
274 /* The default curves */
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
276 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
277 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
278 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
279 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
282 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
283 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
284 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
286 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
287 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
289 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
292 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
293 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
295 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
296 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
297 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
298 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
299 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
300 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
301 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
302 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
303 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
304 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
305 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
306 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
307 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
308 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
309 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
310 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
311 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
312 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
313 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
314 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
315 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
316 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
320 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
321 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
322 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
325 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
327 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
328 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
330 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
333 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
336 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
337 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
344 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
346 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
347 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
348 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
349 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
350 * lists in the first place.
351 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
352 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
353 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
355 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
356 const unsigned char **pcurves,
359 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
361 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
362 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
364 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
365 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
366 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
367 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
368 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
371 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
372 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
376 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
377 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
381 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
382 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
385 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
386 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
390 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
391 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
396 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
401 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
402 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
404 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
407 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
409 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
410 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
411 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
414 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
417 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
418 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
420 const unsigned char *curves;
421 size_t num_curves, i;
422 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
423 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
425 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
427 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
430 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
431 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
433 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
434 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
436 } else /* Should never happen */
439 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
441 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
442 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
443 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
449 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
450 * if there is no match.
451 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
452 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
453 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
455 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
457 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
458 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
460 /* Can't do anything on client side */
464 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
466 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
467 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
469 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
470 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
471 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
472 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
473 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
474 /* Should never happen */
477 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
481 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
482 * but s->options is a long...
484 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
485 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
487 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
488 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
489 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
490 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
492 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
495 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
498 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
500 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
501 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
502 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
504 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
508 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
509 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
510 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
511 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
512 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
515 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
516 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
524 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
528 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
529 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
531 unsigned char *clist, *p;
534 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
537 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
538 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
541 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
542 unsigned long idmask;
544 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
546 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
555 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
559 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
563 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
566 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
568 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
574 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
576 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
578 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
580 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
581 if (nid == NID_undef)
582 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
583 if (nid == NID_undef)
584 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
585 if (nid == NID_undef)
587 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
588 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
590 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
594 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
595 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
600 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
604 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
607 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
608 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
615 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
616 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
619 /* Determine curve ID */
620 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
621 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
622 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
626 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
628 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
630 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
631 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
633 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
634 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
642 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
643 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
644 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
646 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
647 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
650 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
651 * supported (see RFC4492).
653 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
654 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
655 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
656 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
657 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
660 if (i == num_formats)
665 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
666 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
667 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
669 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
671 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
672 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
673 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
674 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
675 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
679 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
680 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
685 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
692 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
696 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
698 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
699 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
700 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
702 *pformats = ecformats_default;
703 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
705 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
707 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
712 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
713 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
715 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
717 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
720 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
723 /* If not EC nothing to do */
724 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
726 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
730 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
733 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
737 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
738 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
740 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
746 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
747 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
748 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
749 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
750 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
752 return 0; /* Should never happen */
753 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
754 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
756 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
758 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
759 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
760 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
762 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
768 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
770 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
772 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
774 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
775 * is compatible with the client extensions.
777 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
779 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
782 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
785 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
786 unsigned char curve_id[2];
787 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
788 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
789 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
790 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
791 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
795 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
796 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
800 /* Need a shared curve */
801 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
805 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
809 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
814 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
817 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
818 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
821 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
822 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
824 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
827 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
828 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
830 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
834 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
836 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
839 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
840 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
841 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
842 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
844 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
845 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
846 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
847 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
848 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
849 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
850 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
851 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
852 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
853 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
858 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
859 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
860 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
863 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
866 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
870 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
871 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
872 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
873 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
875 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
876 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
879 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
880 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
884 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
885 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
886 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
887 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
888 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
889 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
890 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
892 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
893 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
898 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
899 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
901 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
902 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
904 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
905 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
906 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
907 /* Should never happen */
910 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
911 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
912 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
916 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
917 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
918 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
919 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
921 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
925 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
926 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
929 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
930 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
932 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
935 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
936 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
938 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
944 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
948 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
949 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
950 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
951 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
954 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
955 if (i == sent_sigslen
956 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
957 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
958 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
961 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
966 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
967 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
968 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
970 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
974 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
976 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
981 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
982 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
983 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
985 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
988 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
990 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
992 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
993 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
994 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
995 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
996 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
997 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
998 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
999 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1000 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1002 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1004 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1005 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1006 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1012 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1013 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1014 * @c: cipher to check
1015 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1017 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1019 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1021 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1022 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1024 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1026 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1027 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1029 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1030 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1033 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1036 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1038 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1040 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1043 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
1044 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
1045 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
1055 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
1056 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
1057 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
1058 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
1059 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
1062 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) {
1063 PACKET extensions = *packet;
1064 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
1065 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
1068 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
1069 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
1072 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
1073 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1079 if (num_extensions <= 1)
1082 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
1083 if (extension_types == NULL) {
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1088 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
1089 extensions = *packet;
1090 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1092 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1093 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1094 /* This should not happen. */
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1100 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1104 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1105 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1106 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1107 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1112 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1116 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1117 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1120 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1121 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1123 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1125 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1127 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1128 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1130 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1131 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1133 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1134 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1135 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1136 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1147 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1149 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1150 if (s->renegotiate) {
1153 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1158 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1161 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1164 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1171 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1172 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1175 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1176 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1177 unsigned long size_str;
1181 * check for enough space.
1182 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1183 * 2 for servernamelist length
1184 * 1 for the hostname type
1185 * 2 for hostname length
1189 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1191 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1194 /* extension type and length */
1195 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1196 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1198 /* length of servername list */
1199 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1201 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1202 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1204 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1208 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1209 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1210 * Client Hello message */
1212 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1213 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1219 * check for enough space.
1220 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1221 * 1 for the srp user identity
1222 * + srp user identity length
1224 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1227 /* fill in the extension */
1228 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1229 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1230 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1231 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1239 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1242 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1243 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1245 unsigned char *etmp;
1247 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1249 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1251 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1253 if (num_formats > 255) {
1254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1258 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1259 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1260 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1261 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1262 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1266 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1268 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1269 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1272 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1274 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1276 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1281 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1283 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1284 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1285 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1286 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1287 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1291 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1293 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1294 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1295 ret += curves_list_len;
1297 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1299 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1301 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1302 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1303 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1304 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1305 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1306 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1307 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1309 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1310 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1311 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1314 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1315 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1318 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1321 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1323 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1326 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1332 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1334 const unsigned char *salg;
1335 unsigned char *etmp;
1336 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1337 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1339 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1341 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1343 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1344 /* Fill in lengths */
1345 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1351 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1353 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1357 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1358 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1359 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1365 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1366 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1372 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1374 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1375 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1377 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1378 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1380 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1381 /* save position of id len */
1382 unsigned char *q = ret;
1383 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1384 /* skip over id len */
1386 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1392 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1396 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1397 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1398 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1400 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1404 * 1: peer may send requests
1405 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1407 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1408 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1410 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1415 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1417 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1418 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1420 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1422 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1428 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1429 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1430 * (see longer comment below)
1432 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1433 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1435 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1436 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1437 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1438 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1439 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1440 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1442 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1443 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1446 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1447 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1452 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1455 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1458 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1465 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1466 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1467 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1469 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1470 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1474 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1475 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
1479 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1483 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1484 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1485 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1488 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1489 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1491 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1492 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1498 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1500 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1507 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1510 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1514 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1515 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1518 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1519 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1521 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1523 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1524 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1525 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1526 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1527 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1532 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1534 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1537 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1545 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1548 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1556 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1557 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1560 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1561 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1562 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1565 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1570 const unsigned char *plist;
1573 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1577 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1579 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1581 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1583 if (plistlen > 255) {
1584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1588 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1589 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1590 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1591 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1596 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1599 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1601 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1602 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1604 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1608 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1609 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1611 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1616 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1619 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1620 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1624 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1627 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1630 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1638 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1639 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1640 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1641 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1642 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1643 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1644 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1645 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1646 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1647 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1649 if (limit - ret < 36)
1651 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1656 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1657 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1658 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1660 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1664 * 1: peer may send requests
1665 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1667 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1668 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1670 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1676 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1677 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1678 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1679 const unsigned char *npa;
1680 unsigned int npalen;
1683 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1685 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1686 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1687 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1689 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1691 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1693 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1697 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1699 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1700 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1702 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1703 * for other cases too.
1705 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1706 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1707 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1708 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1709 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1711 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1716 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1717 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1721 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1722 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1723 unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1725 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1727 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1731 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1737 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1740 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1745 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1746 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1747 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1748 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1750 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1752 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1754 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1756 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1757 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1761 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1763 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1764 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1765 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1768 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1770 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1771 &s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1772 &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1773 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1781 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1782 * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_*
1783 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1784 * returns 1 on success, 0
1786 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al)
1788 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1789 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1791 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1792 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1793 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1794 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1795 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1797 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1798 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1799 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1800 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1801 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1802 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1805 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1807 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1808 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1811 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1812 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1822 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1823 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1824 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1829 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1830 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1831 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1832 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1834 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1840 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1841 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1842 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1843 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1844 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1845 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1846 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1848 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1849 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1850 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1851 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1852 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1853 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1854 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1855 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1856 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1857 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1858 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1859 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1860 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1863 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1864 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1868 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1869 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1870 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1874 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1877 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1878 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1880 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1883 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1886 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1887 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1889 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1890 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1893 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1894 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1896 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1899 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1902 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1903 s->servername_done = 0;
1904 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1905 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1906 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1909 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1910 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1911 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1912 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1913 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1914 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1916 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1917 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1921 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1922 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1923 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1925 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1926 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1927 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1928 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1929 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1932 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1933 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1934 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1937 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1939 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1942 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1945 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1949 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1950 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1953 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1955 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1958 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1959 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1960 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1961 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1963 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1964 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1966 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1967 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1970 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1972 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1973 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1974 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1975 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1976 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1977 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1978 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1979 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1980 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1981 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1982 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1983 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1984 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1985 * the value of the Host: field.
1986 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1987 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1988 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1990 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1994 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1995 unsigned int servname_type;
1996 PACKET sni, hostname;
1998 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1999 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
2000 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
2005 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
2006 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
2007 * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
2009 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
2010 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
2011 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2013 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2014 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2016 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2017 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2018 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2023 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2024 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2028 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2029 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2033 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2034 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2038 s->servername_done = 1;
2041 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2042 * fall back to a full handshake.
2044 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2045 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2046 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2050 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2053 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
2056 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2060 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2061 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2063 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2064 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2071 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2072 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2074 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension,
2075 &ec_point_format_list)
2076 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2081 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2082 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2083 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2084 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2088 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2089 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
2091 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
2092 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension,
2093 &elliptic_curve_list)
2094 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
2095 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
2100 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
2101 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2102 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2103 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2108 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2109 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2110 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2111 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
2112 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
2113 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2114 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2117 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2118 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2120 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2121 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2122 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2127 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2128 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2132 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2133 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2134 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2139 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2140 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2141 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2142 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list))
2145 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2147 PACKET responder_id;
2148 const unsigned char *id_data;
2150 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2152 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2156 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
2157 && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2158 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
2159 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2163 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2164 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2165 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2169 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2170 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2174 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2175 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2176 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2181 /* Read in request_extensions */
2182 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2185 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2186 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2187 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2188 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2189 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2190 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2191 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2192 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2193 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2201 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2203 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2207 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2208 unsigned int hbtype;
2210 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2211 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2212 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2216 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2217 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2219 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2220 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2221 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2224 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2230 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2231 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2233 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2236 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2237 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2238 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2239 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2240 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2241 * anything like that, but this might change).
2243 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2244 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2245 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2246 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2247 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2249 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2253 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2254 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2255 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2259 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2260 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2261 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2262 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2263 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2267 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2268 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2269 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2272 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2273 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2277 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2278 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2279 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2280 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2281 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2284 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2285 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2290 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2291 /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */
2292 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2298 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2300 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2301 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2302 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2304 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2309 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2310 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2311 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2312 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2317 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2320 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2321 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2322 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2325 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2334 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2335 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2336 * fill the length of the block.
2338 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2342 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2343 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2344 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2352 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2354 unsigned int length, type, size;
2355 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2356 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2359 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2361 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2363 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2364 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2366 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2367 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2370 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2371 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2374 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2376 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2379 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2380 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2384 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2385 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2389 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2390 const unsigned char *data;
2393 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2394 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2397 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2398 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2400 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2401 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2403 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2404 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2405 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2406 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2407 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2410 tlsext_servername = 1;
2412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2413 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2414 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2415 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2416 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2417 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2421 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2422 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2423 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2424 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2425 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2428 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2429 ecpointformatlist_length;
2430 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2431 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2432 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2433 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2439 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2441 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2442 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2443 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2444 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2446 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2449 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2450 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2453 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2455 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2457 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2460 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2461 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2464 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2465 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2469 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2470 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2471 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2473 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2474 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2475 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2476 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2477 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2478 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2480 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2482 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2483 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2484 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2487 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2492 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2493 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2494 unsigned char *selected;
2495 unsigned char selected_len;
2496 /* We must have requested it. */
2497 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2498 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2501 /* The data must be valid */
2502 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2503 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2507 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2509 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2510 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2511 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2514 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2515 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2516 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2519 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2520 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2521 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2525 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2527 /* We must have requested it. */
2528 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2529 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2533 * The extension data consists of:
2534 * uint16 list_length
2535 * uint8 proto_length;
2536 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2538 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2539 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2540 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2541 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2542 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2545 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2546 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2547 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2548 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2551 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2552 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2555 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2558 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2559 unsigned int hbtype;
2560 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2561 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2565 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2566 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2568 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2569 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2570 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2573 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2579 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2580 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2584 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2585 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2586 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2587 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2588 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2589 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2592 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2593 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2595 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2598 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2599 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2601 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2605 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2606 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2610 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2611 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2612 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2613 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2614 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2615 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2619 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2628 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2629 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2630 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2631 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2632 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2633 * initial connect only.
2635 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2636 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2637 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2639 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2645 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2648 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2649 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2650 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2659 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2661 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2665 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2670 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2672 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2673 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2677 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2678 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2681 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2682 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2686 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2688 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2689 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2690 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2691 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2693 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2695 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2698 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2699 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2702 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2703 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2706 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2707 s->servername_done = 0;
2712 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2713 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2715 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2717 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2720 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2721 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2723 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2724 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2727 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2730 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2731 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2732 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2736 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2740 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2741 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2742 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2743 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2744 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2745 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2746 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2747 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2750 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2751 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2752 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2754 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2757 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2758 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2760 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2761 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2765 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2769 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2773 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2775 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2776 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2779 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2780 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2781 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2782 * influence which certificate is sent
2784 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2786 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2787 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2788 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2789 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2790 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2794 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2795 * et al can pick it up.
2797 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2798 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2800 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2801 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2802 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2804 /* status request response should be sent */
2805 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2806 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2807 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2809 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2811 /* something bad happened */
2812 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2813 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2814 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2818 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2820 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) {
2826 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2827 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2830 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2831 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2839 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2841 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2842 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2846 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2847 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2848 * must contain uncompressed.
2850 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2851 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2852 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2853 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2854 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2855 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2856 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2857 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2859 unsigned char *list;
2860 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2861 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2862 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2863 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2864 found_uncompressed = 1;
2868 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2870 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2874 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2875 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2877 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2879 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2880 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2881 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2882 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2884 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2886 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2889 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2890 * that we don't receive a status message
2892 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2893 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2894 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2897 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2898 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2901 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2902 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2905 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2906 s->servername_done = 0;
2912 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2915 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2917 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2918 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2922 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2930 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2931 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2932 * need to be handled at the same time.
2934 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2937 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2938 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2939 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2940 * point to the resulting session.
2942 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2943 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2944 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2947 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2948 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2949 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2950 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2951 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2952 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2953 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2956 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2957 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2958 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2959 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2960 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2961 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2963 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2966 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2967 const PACKET *session_id,
2971 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2974 int have_ticket = 0;
2975 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2978 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2979 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2982 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2985 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2988 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2992 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2993 unsigned int type, size;
2995 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2996 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2997 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3001 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
3005 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
3007 const unsigned char *etick;
3009 /* Duplicate extension */
3010 if (have_ticket != 0) {
3018 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3021 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3025 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3027 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3028 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3029 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3030 * calculate the master secret later.
3035 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
3036 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3040 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3041 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3043 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3044 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3047 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3050 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3051 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3054 default: /* fatal error */
3060 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
3061 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3062 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3068 if (have_ticket == 0)
3075 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3077 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3078 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3079 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3080 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3081 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3082 * point to the resulting session.
3085 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3086 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3087 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3088 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3089 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3091 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3092 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3093 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3096 unsigned char *sdec;
3097 const unsigned char *p;
3098 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
3099 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3100 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3101 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3102 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3103 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3106 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3107 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3110 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3115 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3116 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3117 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3128 /* Check key name matches */
3129 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) {
3133 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3134 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3135 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3136 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3142 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3145 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3150 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3151 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3152 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3155 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3156 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3157 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3160 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3161 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3162 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3163 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3164 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3166 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3167 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3171 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3172 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3177 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3181 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3185 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3186 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3187 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3191 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3192 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3201 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3205 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3206 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3210 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3217 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3218 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3219 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3220 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3221 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3222 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3223 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3224 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3225 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3226 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3229 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3230 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3231 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3232 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3233 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3234 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3235 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3238 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3241 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3242 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3248 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3251 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3252 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3253 return table[i].nid;
3258 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3264 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3267 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3270 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3271 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3275 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3277 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3284 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3287 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3288 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3289 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3290 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3291 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3292 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3293 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3294 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3295 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3296 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3299 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3305 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3307 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3308 return tls12_md_info + i;
3314 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3316 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3317 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3319 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3322 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3325 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3329 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3330 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3333 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3334 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3337 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3338 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3340 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3341 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3342 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3344 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3345 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3347 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3348 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3354 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3355 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3356 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3358 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3359 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3361 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3362 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3364 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3366 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3367 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3369 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3371 if (psignhash_nid) {
3372 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3373 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3375 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3379 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3380 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3382 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3383 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3384 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3386 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3387 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3389 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3390 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3394 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3395 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3399 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3401 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3402 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3403 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3405 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3406 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3407 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3409 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3410 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3411 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3413 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3414 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3419 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3420 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3425 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3426 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3433 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3435 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3437 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3440 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3441 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3443 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3445 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3446 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3447 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3448 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3451 return tmpout - out;
3454 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3455 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3456 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3457 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3459 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3460 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3461 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3462 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3463 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3465 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3466 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3469 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3470 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3471 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3473 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3483 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3484 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3486 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3487 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3489 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3491 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3493 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3494 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3495 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3496 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3497 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3498 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3499 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3500 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3501 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3502 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3504 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3505 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3508 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3509 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3513 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3514 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3516 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3518 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3521 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3525 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3526 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3530 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3532 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3535 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3536 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3538 /* Should never happen */
3542 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3543 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3544 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3546 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3547 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3551 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3556 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3557 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3559 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3560 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3563 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3564 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3565 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3566 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3567 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3569 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3570 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3571 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3572 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3578 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3579 * the certificate for signing.
3581 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3583 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3584 * supported it stays as NULL.
3586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3587 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3588 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3591 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3592 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3593 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3597 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3598 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3600 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3601 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3602 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3603 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3604 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3605 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3606 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3612 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3613 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3614 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3616 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3621 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3628 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3630 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3633 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3634 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3635 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3637 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3638 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3642 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3644 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3646 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3648 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3650 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3651 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3654 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3658 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3661 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3663 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3664 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3665 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3666 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3667 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3668 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3670 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3671 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3672 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3676 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3678 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3681 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3684 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3686 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3688 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3690 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3698 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3699 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3701 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3704 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3705 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3708 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3709 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3714 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3715 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3717 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3721 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3725 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3728 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3731 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3736 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3737 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3739 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3740 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3741 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3743 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3750 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3751 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3752 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3754 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3755 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3756 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3762 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3766 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3770 if (default_nid == -1)
3772 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3774 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3775 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3776 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3781 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3782 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3786 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3787 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3788 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3795 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3796 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3797 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3798 * attempting to use them.
3801 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3803 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3804 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3805 /* Strict mode flags */
3806 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3807 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3808 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3810 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3815 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3816 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3819 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3820 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3822 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3825 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3827 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3828 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3830 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3832 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3833 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3839 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3842 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3844 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3845 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3847 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3854 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3855 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3856 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3857 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3858 else if (!check_flags)
3863 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3864 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3866 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3868 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3869 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3871 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3874 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3875 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3876 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3877 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3880 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3881 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3882 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3886 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3887 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3890 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3891 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3892 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3895 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3896 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3897 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3900 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3901 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3902 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3911 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3912 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3914 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3916 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3917 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3918 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3921 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3928 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3929 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3933 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3934 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3935 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3936 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3938 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3945 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3946 else if (check_flags)
3947 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3949 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3950 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3951 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3952 else if (!check_flags)
3955 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3956 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3957 else if (strict_mode) {
3958 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3959 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3960 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3961 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3963 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3970 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3971 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3973 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3975 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3978 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3981 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3985 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3989 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3991 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3992 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3994 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3995 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3996 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4000 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4003 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4005 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4007 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4008 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4010 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4011 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4012 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4014 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4015 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4016 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4017 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4018 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4023 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4026 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4028 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4029 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4033 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4034 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4035 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4036 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4037 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4039 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4042 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4046 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4049 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4050 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4057 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4058 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4060 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4061 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4062 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4063 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4064 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4065 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4066 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4069 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4070 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4072 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4077 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4079 int dh_secbits = 80;
4080 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4081 return DH_get_1024_160();
4082 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4083 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4088 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4089 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4092 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4100 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4101 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4103 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4104 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4112 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4113 return DH_get_2048_224();
4114 return DH_get_1024_160();
4118 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4121 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4124 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4125 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4126 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4127 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4129 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4132 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4134 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4137 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4139 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4140 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4141 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4142 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4144 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4145 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4147 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4148 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4151 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4153 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4156 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4159 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4161 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4162 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4164 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4165 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4167 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4168 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4173 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4174 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4175 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4178 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4180 int rv, start_idx, i;
4182 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4187 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4191 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4192 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4193 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);