2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
195 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
196 * http, the cache would over fill
198 return (60 * 60 * 2);
205 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
209 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
212 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
213 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
215 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
219 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
222 s->version = s->method->version;
225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
228 int nid; /* Curve NID */
229 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
230 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
233 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
234 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
236 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
269 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
273 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
274 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
276 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
277 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
278 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
279 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
280 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
281 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
285 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
286 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
287 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
288 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
289 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
290 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
291 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
293 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
294 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
295 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
296 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
297 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
298 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
299 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
300 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
301 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
304 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
305 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
306 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
309 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
311 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
312 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
313 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
315 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
318 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
320 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
322 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
324 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
326 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
328 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
330 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
332 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
334 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
336 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
338 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
340 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
342 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
344 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
346 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
348 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
350 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
352 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
354 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
356 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
358 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
360 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
362 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
364 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
366 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
368 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
370 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
372 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
374 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
376 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
384 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
386 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
387 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
388 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
389 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
390 * lists in the first place.
391 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
392 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
393 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
395 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
396 const unsigned char **pcurves,
399 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
401 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
402 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
404 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
405 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
406 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
407 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
408 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
411 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
412 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
416 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
417 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
421 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
422 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
425 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
426 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
430 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
431 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
436 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
441 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
442 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
444 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
447 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
448 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
450 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
451 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
452 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
455 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
458 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
459 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
461 const unsigned char *curves;
462 size_t num_curves, i;
463 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
464 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
466 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
468 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
472 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
474 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
475 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
477 } else /* Should never happen */
480 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
482 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
483 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
484 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
490 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
491 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
492 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
493 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
495 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
497 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
498 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
500 /* Can't do anything on client side */
504 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
506 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
507 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
509 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
510 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
511 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
512 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
513 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
514 /* Should never happen */
517 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
521 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
522 * but s->options is a long...
524 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
525 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
527 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
528 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
529 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
530 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
532 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
534 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
535 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
536 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
537 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
538 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
541 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
542 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
550 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
554 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
555 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
557 unsigned char *clist, *p;
560 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
563 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
564 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
567 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
568 unsigned long idmask;
570 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
572 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
582 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
586 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
590 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
593 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
595 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
601 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
603 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
605 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
607 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
608 if (nid == NID_undef)
609 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
610 if (nid == NID_undef)
611 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
612 if (nid == NID_undef)
614 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
615 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
617 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
621 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
622 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
627 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
631 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
634 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
635 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
640 const EC_METHOD *meth;
643 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
644 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
647 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
650 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
654 /* Determine curve ID */
655 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
656 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
657 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
660 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
669 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
671 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
673 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
675 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
677 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
682 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
683 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
684 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
686 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
687 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
690 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
691 * supported (see RFC4492).
693 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
694 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
695 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
696 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
697 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
700 if (i == num_formats)
705 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
706 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
707 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
709 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
710 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
715 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
722 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
726 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
728 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
729 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
730 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
732 *pformats = ecformats_default;
733 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
735 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
737 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
742 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
743 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
745 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
747 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
750 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
753 /* If not EC nothing to do */
754 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
758 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
763 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
766 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
770 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
771 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
773 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
779 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
780 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
781 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
782 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
783 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
785 return 0; /* Should never happen */
786 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
787 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
789 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
791 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
792 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
793 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
795 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
801 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
802 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
803 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
805 unsigned char curve_id[2];
806 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
807 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
808 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
809 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
813 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
816 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
817 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
818 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
819 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
820 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
821 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
825 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
826 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
828 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
829 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
831 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
833 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
836 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
838 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
845 /* Need a shared curve */
846 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
852 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
857 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
859 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
863 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
866 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
870 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
875 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
880 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
881 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
884 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
885 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
887 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
890 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
891 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
893 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
896 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
897 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
900 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
903 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
904 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
905 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
906 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
908 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
909 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
910 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
911 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
912 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
913 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
916 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
917 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
918 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
919 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
922 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
925 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
928 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
929 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
930 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
931 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
932 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
934 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
935 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
938 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
939 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
943 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
944 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
945 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
947 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
948 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
949 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
951 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
952 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
957 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
958 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
960 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
961 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
963 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
964 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
965 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
966 /* Should never happen */
969 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
970 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
974 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
975 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
976 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
977 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
978 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
980 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
985 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
988 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
989 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
991 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
994 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
995 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
997 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1003 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1007 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1008 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1009 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1010 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1013 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1014 if (i == sent_sigslen
1015 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1016 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1020 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1025 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1026 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1027 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1033 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1035 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1036 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1041 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1042 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1043 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1046 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1051 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1052 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1053 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1056 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1058 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1061 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1063 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1064 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1065 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1066 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1067 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1068 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1069 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1070 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1073 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1074 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1075 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1076 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1077 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1079 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1080 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1081 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1082 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1083 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1089 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1092 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k
1093 || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1095 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1098 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1100 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1102 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1105 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1106 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1109 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1110 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1111 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1112 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1114 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1116 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1117 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1119 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1120 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1122 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1123 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1124 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1125 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1136 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1138 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1139 if (s->renegotiate) {
1142 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1147 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1150 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1153 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1160 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1161 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1164 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1165 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1166 unsigned long size_str;
1170 * check for enough space.
1171 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1172 * 2 for servernamelist length
1173 * 1 for the hostname type
1174 * 2 for hostname length
1178 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1180 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1183 /* extension type and length */
1184 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1185 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1187 /* length of servername list */
1188 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1190 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1191 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1193 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1196 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1197 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1198 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1199 * Client Hello message */
1201 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1202 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1208 * check for enough space.
1209 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1210 * 1 for the srp user identity
1211 * + srp user identity length
1213 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1216 /* fill in the extension */
1217 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1218 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1219 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1220 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1225 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1228 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1231 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1232 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1234 unsigned char *etmp;
1236 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1238 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1240 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1242 if (num_formats > 255) {
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1248 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1249 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1250 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1251 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1255 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1257 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1258 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1261 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1263 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1265 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1270 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1272 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1273 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1274 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1275 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1276 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1280 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1282 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1283 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1284 ret += curves_list_len;
1286 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1288 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1290 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1291 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1292 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1293 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1294 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1295 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1296 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1298 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1299 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1300 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1303 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1304 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1307 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1310 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1312 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1315 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1321 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1323 const unsigned char *salg;
1324 unsigned char *etmp;
1325 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1326 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1328 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1330 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1332 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1333 /* Fill in lengths */
1334 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1339 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1341 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1345 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1346 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1347 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1353 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1354 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1360 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1362 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1363 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1365 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1366 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1368 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1369 /* save position of id len */
1370 unsigned char *q = ret;
1371 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1372 /* skip over id len */
1374 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1380 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1382 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1383 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1384 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1386 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1390 * 1: peer may send requests
1391 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1393 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1394 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1396 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1399 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1400 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1402 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1403 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1405 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1407 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1412 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1413 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1416 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1417 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1418 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1419 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1421 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1422 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1425 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1427 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1430 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1433 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1440 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1441 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1442 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1444 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1445 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1450 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1451 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1452 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1455 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1456 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1458 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1459 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1462 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1464 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1465 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1471 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1473 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1480 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1483 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1487 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1488 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1491 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1492 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1493 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1494 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1496 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1497 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1498 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1499 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1500 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1501 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1506 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1508 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1511 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1516 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1519 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1522 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1530 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1531 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1534 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1535 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1536 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1539 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1542 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1544 const unsigned char *plist;
1547 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1551 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1553 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1555 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1557 if (plistlen > 255) {
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1562 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1563 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1564 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1565 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1570 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1573 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1575 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1576 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1578 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1582 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1583 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1585 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1589 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1590 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1593 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1595 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1598 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1601 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1609 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1610 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1611 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1612 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1613 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1614 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1615 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1616 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1617 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1618 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1620 if (limit - ret < 36)
1622 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1626 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1627 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1628 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1629 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1631 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1635 * 1: peer may send requests
1636 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1638 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1639 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1641 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1646 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1647 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1648 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1649 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1650 const unsigned char *npa;
1651 unsigned int npalen;
1654 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1656 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1657 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1658 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1660 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1662 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1664 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1668 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1670 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1671 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1673 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1674 * for other cases too.
1676 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1677 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1678 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1680 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1686 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1687 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1688 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1690 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1692 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1696 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1702 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1705 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1710 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1711 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1712 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1713 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1716 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1717 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1721 const unsigned char *selected;
1722 unsigned char selected_len;
1725 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1732 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1733 * length-prefixed strings.
1735 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1744 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1745 proto_len = data[i];
1751 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1757 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1758 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1759 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1760 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1761 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1762 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1763 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1764 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1767 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1768 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1773 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1777 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1779 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1780 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1781 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1786 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1787 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1788 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1789 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1791 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1792 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1794 unsigned short type, size;
1795 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1796 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1797 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1798 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1799 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1800 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1801 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1803 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1804 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1805 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1806 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1809 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1810 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1811 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1812 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1813 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1814 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1815 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1816 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1817 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1818 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1821 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1825 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1830 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1833 if (data + size > d + n)
1837 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1838 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1839 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1841 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1843 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1845 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1848 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1850 if (data + len != d + n)
1852 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1856 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1858 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1860 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1861 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1863 unsigned short type;
1864 unsigned short size;
1866 unsigned char *data = *p;
1867 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1869 s->servername_done = 0;
1870 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1871 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1872 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1875 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1876 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1877 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1879 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1880 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1881 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1884 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1885 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1886 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1887 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1889 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1890 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
1891 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1892 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1894 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1895 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1898 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1899 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1900 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1901 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1905 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1907 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1911 if (data > (d + n - len))
1914 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1918 if (data + size > (d + n))
1921 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
1923 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1924 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1925 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1926 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1928 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1929 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1932 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1934 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1935 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1936 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1937 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1938 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1939 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1940 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1941 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1942 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1943 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1944 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1945 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1946 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1947 * the value of the Host: field.
1948 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1949 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1950 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1952 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1956 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1957 unsigned char *sdata;
1962 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1968 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1974 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1979 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1982 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1983 switch (servname_type) {
1984 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1986 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1987 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1990 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1991 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1994 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1995 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1996 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1999 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2000 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2001 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2002 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2003 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2004 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2007 s->servername_done = 1;
2010 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2011 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2012 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2013 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2024 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2029 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2030 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2031 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2032 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2035 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2036 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2039 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2041 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2042 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2044 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2045 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2051 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2052 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2053 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2054 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2056 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2057 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2058 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2062 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2063 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2064 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2066 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2067 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2068 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2069 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2072 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2073 ecpointformatlist_length;
2074 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2075 ecpointformatlist_length);
2079 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
2080 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2081 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2082 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2083 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2084 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2086 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2087 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2088 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2089 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2091 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2092 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2093 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2094 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2095 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2099 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2100 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2103 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2104 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2105 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2106 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2109 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2110 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2111 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2112 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2116 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
2117 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2118 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2119 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2120 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2121 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2124 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2125 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2126 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2127 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2128 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2130 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2133 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2135 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2136 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2141 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2142 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2145 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2146 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2149 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2152 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2156 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2158 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2159 const unsigned char *sdata;
2161 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2165 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2172 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2176 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2179 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2184 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2186 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2189 if (data != sdata) {
2190 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2191 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2194 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2195 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2196 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2197 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2198 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2201 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2202 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2203 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2208 /* Read in request_extensions */
2210 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2215 if (dsize != size) {
2216 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2221 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2222 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2223 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2226 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2227 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2228 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2229 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2235 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2238 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2240 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2241 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2243 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2244 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2246 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2247 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2248 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2251 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2256 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2257 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2258 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2259 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2261 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2264 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2265 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2266 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2267 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2268 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2269 * anything like that, but this might change).
2271 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2272 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2273 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2274 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2275 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2277 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2281 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2282 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2283 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2285 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2286 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2287 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2291 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2292 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2293 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2294 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2295 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2299 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2300 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2301 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2304 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2305 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2306 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2307 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2308 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2311 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2322 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2324 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2325 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2326 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2328 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2335 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2339 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2340 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2341 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2345 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2352 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2354 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2355 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2356 * fill the length of the block.
2358 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2360 unsigned int off = 0;
2373 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2374 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2376 unsigned short length;
2377 unsigned short type;
2378 unsigned short size;
2379 unsigned char *data = *p;
2380 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2381 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2383 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2384 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2386 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2388 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2389 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2390 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2392 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2393 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2394 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2397 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2398 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2401 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2405 if (data + length != d + n) {
2406 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2410 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2414 if (data + size > (d + n))
2417 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2418 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2420 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2421 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2423 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2424 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2425 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2426 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2427 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2430 tlsext_servername = 1;
2432 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2433 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2434 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2435 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2437 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2438 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2442 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2443 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2444 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2445 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2446 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2447 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2450 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2451 ecpointformatlist_length;
2452 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2453 ecpointformatlist_length);
2457 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2458 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2459 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2460 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2461 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2464 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2466 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2467 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2468 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2469 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2471 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2474 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2475 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2478 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2480 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2482 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2485 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2486 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2489 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2490 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2492 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2493 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2494 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2495 unsigned char *selected;
2496 unsigned char selected_len;
2498 /* We must have requested it. */
2499 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2500 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2503 /* The data must be valid */
2504 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2505 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2509 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2511 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2512 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2513 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2516 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2517 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2518 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2521 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2522 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2523 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2527 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2530 /* We must have requested it. */
2531 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2532 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2536 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2540 * The extension data consists of:
2541 * uint16 list_length
2542 * uint8 proto_length;
2543 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2548 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2549 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2553 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2554 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2557 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2558 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2559 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2560 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2561 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2564 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2565 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2567 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2568 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2570 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2571 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2573 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2574 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2575 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2578 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2583 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2584 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2585 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2589 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2590 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2591 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2592 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2593 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2594 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2598 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2599 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2601 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2607 if (data != d + n) {
2608 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2612 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2613 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2614 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2615 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2616 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2617 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2621 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2632 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2633 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2634 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2635 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2636 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2637 * initial connect only.
2639 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2640 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2641 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2643 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2650 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2656 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2661 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2663 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2664 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2666 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2668 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2669 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2672 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2673 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2677 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2679 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2680 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2681 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2682 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2684 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2686 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2689 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2690 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2693 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2694 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2697 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2698 s->servername_done = 0;
2704 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2708 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2709 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2710 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2711 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2713 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2714 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2715 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2716 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2719 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2720 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2721 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2723 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2726 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2727 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2729 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2730 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2734 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2737 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2741 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2743 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2747 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2748 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2749 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2750 * influence which certificate is sent
2752 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2754 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2755 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2756 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2757 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2758 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2762 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2763 * et al can pick it up.
2765 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2766 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2768 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2769 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2770 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2772 /* status request response should be sent */
2773 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2774 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2775 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2777 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2779 /* something bad happened */
2780 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2781 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2782 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2786 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2790 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2791 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2794 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2795 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2803 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2805 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2806 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2808 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2810 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2811 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2812 * must contain uncompressed.
2814 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2815 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2816 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2817 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2818 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2819 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2820 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2821 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2822 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2824 unsigned char *list;
2825 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2826 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2827 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2828 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2829 found_uncompressed = 1;
2833 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2835 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2839 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2840 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2842 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2844 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2845 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2846 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2847 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2849 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2851 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2854 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2857 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2858 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2861 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2864 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2865 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2866 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2868 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2869 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2871 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2872 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2875 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2876 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2881 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2882 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2885 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2886 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2889 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2890 s->servername_done = 0;
2896 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2900 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2902 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2903 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2907 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2915 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2916 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2917 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2919 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2920 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2921 * extension, if any.
2922 * len: the length of the session ID.
2923 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2924 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2925 * point to the resulting session.
2927 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2928 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2929 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2932 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2933 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2934 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2935 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2936 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2937 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2938 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2941 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2942 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2943 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2944 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2945 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2946 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2948 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2949 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2951 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2952 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2956 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2959 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2962 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2964 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2968 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2969 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2975 /* Skip past cipher list */
2980 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2985 /* Now at start of extensions */
2986 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2989 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
2990 unsigned short type, size;
2993 if (p + size > limit)
2995 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2999 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3002 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3005 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3007 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3008 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3009 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3010 * calculate the master secret later.
3014 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3016 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3017 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3019 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3021 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3022 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3024 default: /* fatal error */
3034 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3036 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3037 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3038 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3039 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3040 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3041 * point to the resulting session.
3044 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3045 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3046 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3047 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3049 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3050 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3051 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3054 unsigned char *sdec;
3055 const unsigned char *p;
3056 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3057 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3060 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3061 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3064 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3065 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3066 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3067 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3068 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3069 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3078 /* Check key name matches */
3079 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3081 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3082 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3083 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3084 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3087 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3090 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3092 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3096 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3097 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3098 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3099 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3100 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3101 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3104 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3105 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3106 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3107 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3108 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3110 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3113 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3114 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3115 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3120 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3123 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3127 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3128 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3129 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3133 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3134 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3143 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3148 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3155 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3156 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3157 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3158 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3159 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3160 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3161 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3164 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3165 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3166 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3167 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3170 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3173 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3174 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3180 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3183 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3184 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3185 return table[i].nid;
3190 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3196 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3197 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3200 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3203 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3204 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3208 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3210 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3211 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3217 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3220 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3221 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3224 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3226 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3227 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3228 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3229 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3230 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3233 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3237 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info) / sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3239 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3242 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3244 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3245 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3247 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3248 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3250 return inf->mfunc();
3253 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3256 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3257 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3258 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3260 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3261 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3262 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3264 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3265 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3266 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3272 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3273 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3274 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3276 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3277 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3279 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3280 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3281 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3283 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3285 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3286 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3287 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3289 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3291 if (psignhash_nid) {
3292 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3293 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3295 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3299 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3300 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3302 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3303 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3304 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3306 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3307 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3309 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3310 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3314 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3315 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3319 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3321 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3322 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3323 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3325 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3326 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3327 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3329 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3330 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3331 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3332 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3333 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3334 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3338 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3339 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3340 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3344 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3345 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3346 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3353 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3355 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3357 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3360 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3361 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3363 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3365 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3366 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3367 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3368 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3371 return tmpout - out;
3374 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3375 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3376 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3377 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3379 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3380 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3381 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3382 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3383 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3385 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3386 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3389 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3390 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3391 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3393 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3403 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3404 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3406 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3407 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3409 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3411 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3412 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3413 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3414 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3416 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3417 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3418 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3419 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3420 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3421 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3422 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3424 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3425 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3428 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3429 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3433 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3434 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3436 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3439 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3442 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3443 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3444 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3448 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3450 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3453 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3454 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3456 /* Should never happen */
3460 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3461 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3462 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3463 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3465 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3466 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3470 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3476 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3477 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3480 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3481 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3483 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3484 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3486 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3488 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3490 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3492 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3493 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3494 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3495 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3496 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3497 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3498 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3499 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3505 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3506 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3507 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3508 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3509 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3510 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3511 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3512 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3513 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3514 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3515 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3521 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3522 * the certificate for signing.
3524 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3526 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3527 * supported it stays as NULL.
3529 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3530 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3531 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3533 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3534 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3535 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3536 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3539 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3540 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3541 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3547 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3548 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3549 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3551 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3556 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3563 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3565 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3568 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3569 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3570 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3572 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3573 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3577 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3579 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3581 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3583 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3585 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3586 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3589 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3590 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3592 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3593 unsigned short hbtype;
3594 unsigned int payload;
3595 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3597 if (s->msg_callback)
3598 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3599 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3600 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3602 /* Read type and payload length first */
3603 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3604 return 0; /* silently discard */
3607 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3608 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3611 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3612 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3616 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3617 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3619 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3620 if (buffer == NULL) {
3621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3626 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3627 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3629 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3631 /* Random padding */
3632 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3634 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3635 3 + payload + padding);
3637 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3638 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3639 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3640 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3642 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3646 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3650 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3651 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3655 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3657 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3664 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3666 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3668 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3669 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3671 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3672 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3673 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3674 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3678 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3679 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3680 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3684 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3685 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3691 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3692 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3694 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3697 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3698 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3699 * some random stuff.
3700 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3701 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3702 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3703 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3706 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3708 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3713 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3714 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3716 /* Sequence number */
3717 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3718 /* 16 random bytes */
3719 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3721 /* Random padding */
3722 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3724 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3726 if (s->msg_callback)
3727 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3728 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3729 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3731 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3740 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3744 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3747 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3749 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3752 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3755 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3757 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3759 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3761 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3769 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3770 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3771 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3772 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3773 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3774 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3778 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3779 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3780 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3781 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3784 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3785 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3788 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3789 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3794 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3795 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3797 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3801 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3805 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3808 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3811 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3816 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3817 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3819 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3820 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3821 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3822 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3823 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3825 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3832 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3833 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3834 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3835 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3837 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3838 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3839 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3840 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3846 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3850 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3854 if (default_nid == -1)
3856 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3858 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3859 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3860 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3865 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3866 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3870 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3871 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3872 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3879 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3880 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3881 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3882 * attempting to use them.
3885 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3887 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3888 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3889 /* Strict mode flags */
3890 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3891 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3892 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3894 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3899 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3900 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3902 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3903 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3905 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3908 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3910 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3912 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3914 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3915 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3918 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3919 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3920 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3921 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3922 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3923 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3930 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3933 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3934 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3935 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3937 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3944 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3945 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3946 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3947 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3948 else if (!check_flags)
3953 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3954 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3956 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3958 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3959 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3961 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3964 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3965 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3966 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3967 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3968 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3971 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3972 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3973 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3974 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3978 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3979 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3988 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3989 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3991 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3993 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3994 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3995 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3998 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4005 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4006 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4010 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4011 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4012 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4013 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4015 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4022 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4023 else if (check_flags)
4024 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4026 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4027 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4028 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4029 else if (!check_flags)
4032 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4033 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4034 else if (strict_mode) {
4035 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4036 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4037 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4038 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4040 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4047 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4048 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4052 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4055 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4058 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4063 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4064 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4065 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4066 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4067 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4071 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4075 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4077 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4078 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4080 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4081 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4082 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4086 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4089 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4091 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4093 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4094 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4096 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4097 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4098 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4100 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4101 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4102 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4103 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4104 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4109 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4112 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4114 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4115 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4119 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4120 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4121 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4122 else if (cpk->digest)
4123 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4125 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4128 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4132 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4133 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4135 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4136 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4143 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4144 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4146 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4147 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4148 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4149 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4150 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4151 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4154 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4155 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4157 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4163 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4165 int dh_secbits = 80;
4166 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4167 return DH_get_1024_160();
4168 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4169 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4174 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4175 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4178 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4184 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4185 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4186 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4188 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4189 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4195 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4196 return DH_get_2048_224();
4197 return DH_get_1024_160();
4201 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4204 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4206 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4207 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4211 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4213 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4216 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4218 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4219 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4220 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4221 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4223 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4224 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4227 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4229 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4232 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4235 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4237 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4238 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4240 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4241 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4243 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4244 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4249 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4250 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4251 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4254 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4256 int rv, start_idx, i;
4258 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4263 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4267 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4268 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4269 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);