2 * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
21 #include "ssl_local.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
26 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
30 tls1_generate_master_secret,
31 tls1_change_cipher_state,
32 tls1_final_finish_mac,
33 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
34 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
36 tls1_export_keying_material,
38 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
39 tls_close_construct_packet,
43 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
47 tls1_generate_master_secret,
48 tls1_change_cipher_state,
49 tls1_final_finish_mac,
50 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
51 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
53 tls1_export_keying_material,
54 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
55 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
56 tls_close_construct_packet,
60 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
64 tls1_generate_master_secret,
65 tls1_change_cipher_state,
66 tls1_final_finish_mac,
67 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
68 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
70 tls1_export_keying_material,
71 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
72 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
73 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
74 tls_close_construct_packet,
78 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
81 tls13_setup_key_block,
82 tls13_generate_master_secret,
83 tls13_change_cipher_state,
84 tls13_final_finish_mac,
85 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
86 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
88 tls13_export_keying_material,
89 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
90 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
91 tls_close_construct_packet,
95 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
98 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
99 * http, the cache would over fill
101 return (60 * 60 * 2);
108 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
114 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
116 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
120 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
128 s->version = s->method->version;
133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
136 * Table of curve information.
137 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
138 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
140 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
141 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
142 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
143 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
144 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
145 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
146 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
147 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
148 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
149 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
150 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
151 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
152 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
153 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
154 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
155 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
156 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
157 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
158 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
159 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
160 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
161 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
162 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
164 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
165 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
166 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
167 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
168 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
169 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
170 {EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X448 (30) */
173 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
174 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
175 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
176 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
179 /* The default curves */
180 static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
181 29, /* X25519 (29) */
182 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
184 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
185 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
188 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
193 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
195 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
196 if (group_id < 1 || group_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
198 return &nid_list[group_id - 1];
201 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
204 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
205 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
206 return (uint16_t)(i + 1);
212 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
213 * the number of groups supported.
215 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
219 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
220 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
221 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
222 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
223 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
226 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
227 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
231 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
232 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
237 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
238 *pgroups = eccurves_default;
239 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default);
241 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
242 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
248 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
249 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op)
251 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *cinfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(curve);
252 unsigned char ctmp[2];
256 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
257 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
260 ctmp[0] = curve >> 8;
261 ctmp[1] = curve & 0xff;
262 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)ctmp);
265 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
266 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
269 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
276 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
277 * if there is no match.
278 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
279 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
280 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
282 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
284 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
285 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
288 /* Can't do anything on client side */
292 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
294 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
295 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
297 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
299 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
300 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
301 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
302 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
303 /* Should never happen */
306 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
310 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
311 * otherwise peer decides.
313 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
314 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
315 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
317 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
318 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
321 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
322 uint16_t id = pref[i];
324 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
325 || !tls_curve_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
333 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
337 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
338 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
343 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
346 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
352 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
353 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
356 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
357 unsigned long idmask;
359 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
360 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
362 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
375 # define MAX_CURVELIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
379 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
382 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
384 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
390 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
392 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
394 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
396 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
397 if (nid == NID_undef)
398 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
399 if (nid == NID_undef)
400 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
401 if (nid == NID_undef)
403 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
404 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
406 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
410 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
411 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
415 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
419 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
421 /* Return group id of a key */
422 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
424 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
429 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
430 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp));
433 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
434 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
438 unsigned char comp_id;
441 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
442 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
444 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
445 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
447 /* Get required compression id */
448 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
449 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
450 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
452 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
457 int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
459 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
460 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
461 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
462 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
467 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
468 * supported (see RFC4492).
470 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
473 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
474 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
480 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
481 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
483 const uint16_t *groups;
489 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
490 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
491 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
493 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
494 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
496 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
497 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
500 /* Should never happen */
505 if (check_own_groups) {
506 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
507 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
508 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
512 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
515 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
519 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
520 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
523 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
524 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
525 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
526 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
530 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
533 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
537 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
539 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
540 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
541 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
543 *pformats = ecformats_default;
544 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
546 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
548 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
553 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
554 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
556 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
560 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
563 /* If not EC nothing to do */
564 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
566 /* Check compression */
567 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
569 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
571 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
574 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
577 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
580 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
584 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
585 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
586 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
587 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
588 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
590 return 0; /* Should never happen */
591 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
592 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
601 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
603 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
605 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
606 * is compatible with the client extensions.
608 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
610 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
612 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
614 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
616 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
619 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
620 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
621 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
622 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
629 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
634 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
636 /* Default sigalg schemes */
637 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
639 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
640 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
641 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
642 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
646 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
647 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
648 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
649 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
650 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
651 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
653 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
654 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
655 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
658 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
659 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
661 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
662 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
664 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
665 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
667 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
668 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
669 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
672 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
673 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
674 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
679 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
680 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
681 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
685 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
687 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
688 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
689 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
690 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
691 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
692 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
693 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
694 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
695 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
696 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
697 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
698 NID_undef, NID_undef},
699 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
700 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
701 NID_undef, NID_undef},
702 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
703 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
704 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
705 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
706 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
707 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
709 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
710 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
711 NID_undef, NID_undef},
712 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
713 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
714 NID_undef, NID_undef},
715 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
716 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
717 NID_undef, NID_undef},
718 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
719 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
720 NID_undef, NID_undef},
721 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
722 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
723 NID_undef, NID_undef},
724 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
725 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
726 NID_undef, NID_undef},
727 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
728 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
729 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
730 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
731 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
732 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
733 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
734 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
735 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
736 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
737 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
738 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
739 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
740 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
741 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
743 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
744 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
745 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
746 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
747 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
748 NID_undef, NID_undef},
749 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
750 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
751 NID_undef, NID_undef},
752 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
753 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
754 NID_undef, NID_undef},
755 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
756 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
757 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
760 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
761 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
762 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
763 NID_undef, NID_undef},
764 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
765 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
766 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
767 NID_undef, NID_undef},
768 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
769 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
770 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
771 NID_undef, NID_undef}
774 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
775 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
776 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
777 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
778 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
783 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
784 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
786 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
787 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
788 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
789 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
790 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
791 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
792 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
793 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
794 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
795 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
798 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
799 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
802 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
804 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
806 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
811 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
812 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
817 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
818 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
821 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
831 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
833 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
834 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
835 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
837 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
838 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA *rsa, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
844 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md) || md == NULL)
846 if (RSA_size(rsa) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
852 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
853 * is fixed by the certificate type.
855 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
861 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
862 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
863 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
865 if (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
872 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
874 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
877 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
879 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
886 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
889 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
891 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
892 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
894 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
898 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
900 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
901 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
904 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
906 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
908 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
911 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
915 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
918 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
922 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
923 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
924 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
925 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
927 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
928 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
931 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
932 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
937 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
938 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
939 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
941 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
942 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
943 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
944 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
945 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
948 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
949 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
955 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
956 * specified EC curve.
958 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
960 const uint16_t *sigs;
963 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
964 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
965 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
967 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
968 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
971 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
972 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs[i]);
976 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
977 && lu->curve != NID_undef
978 && curve == lu->curve)
987 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
988 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
991 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
993 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
994 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
996 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
997 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
998 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1000 /* Should never happen */
1003 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1004 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1005 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1006 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1007 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1010 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1011 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1012 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1014 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
1016 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1017 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1020 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1021 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1022 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1023 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1024 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1027 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1028 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1029 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1030 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1031 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1036 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1038 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1039 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1041 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1042 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1046 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1047 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1048 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
1049 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
1051 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1052 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1053 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1057 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1058 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1059 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1060 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1061 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1064 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1065 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1066 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1067 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1068 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1069 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1070 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1075 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1077 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1082 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1083 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1084 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1085 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1088 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1089 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1090 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1091 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1092 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1095 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
1096 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1097 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1102 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1103 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1105 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1106 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1107 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1108 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
1109 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1110 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1111 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1115 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1116 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1120 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1122 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1124 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1128 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1130 if (s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1132 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.sigalg->sig;
1137 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1138 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1139 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1141 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1144 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1146 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1148 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1149 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1150 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1151 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver,
1152 &s->s3->tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1155 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1156 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1157 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1158 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1160 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1162 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1163 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1164 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1171 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1172 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1173 * @c: cipher to check
1174 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1175 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1177 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1179 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1181 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1182 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1184 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1186 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1187 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1190 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1191 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1193 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1194 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1195 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1197 if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
1200 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1201 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1204 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1207 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1209 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1211 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1214 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1218 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1219 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1220 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1221 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1222 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1223 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1224 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1226 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1227 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1229 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1230 && s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1231 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1232 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1234 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1235 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1240 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1241 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1242 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1243 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1251 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1253 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1256 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1259 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1261 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1266 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1268 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1269 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1270 * point to the resulting session.
1272 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1276 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1279 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1282 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1283 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1286 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1287 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1289 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1290 if (!ticketext->present)
1291 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1293 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1295 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1296 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1300 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1302 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1303 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1304 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1305 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1308 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1309 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1310 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1311 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1312 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1313 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1315 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1316 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1317 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1318 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1319 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1320 * point to the resulting session.
1322 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1323 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1324 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1326 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1327 unsigned char *sdec;
1328 const unsigned char *p;
1329 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1330 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1332 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1333 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1334 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1335 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1337 if (eticklen == 0) {
1339 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1340 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1342 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1345 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1347 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1348 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1349 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1350 * calculate the master secret later.
1352 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1356 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1357 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1358 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1362 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1363 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1365 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1368 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1370 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1373 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1374 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1375 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1376 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1379 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1383 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1389 /* Check key name matches */
1390 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1391 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1392 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1395 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1396 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1397 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1398 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1399 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1400 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1401 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1404 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1408 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1411 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1413 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1417 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1419 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1420 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1424 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1425 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1426 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1427 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1431 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1432 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1435 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1436 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1437 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1438 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1439 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1440 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1441 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1443 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1446 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1448 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1454 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1458 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1460 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1462 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1466 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1467 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1468 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1472 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1473 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1476 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1478 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1483 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1485 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1488 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1489 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1492 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1493 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1494 * performs any action
1496 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1497 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1498 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1499 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1500 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1501 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1504 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1505 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1506 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1508 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1510 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1511 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1514 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1515 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1516 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1520 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
1521 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1522 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1523 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1524 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1528 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
1529 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
1530 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1531 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
1532 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1533 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
1534 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1536 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1540 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1544 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1546 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1547 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1548 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
1549 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1558 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1559 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1561 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1564 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1565 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
1567 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1568 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1570 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1571 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1572 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1573 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1574 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1577 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1578 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1581 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1582 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1583 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
1584 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1585 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1588 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1589 && s->s3->tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1591 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1594 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1595 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1596 * ciphersuites enabled.
1599 if (s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
1602 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1603 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
1604 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
1605 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1607 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1608 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
1609 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
1612 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST) != 0)
1620 if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
1622 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1623 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1624 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1625 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1626 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1627 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1631 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1632 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1636 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1638 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1639 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1640 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1642 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1645 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1646 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
1647 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1648 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1653 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1657 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1658 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1659 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1660 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1662 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1665 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1666 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1671 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1672 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1674 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1676 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1679 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1680 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1682 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1683 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1684 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1685 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1693 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1694 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1695 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1696 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1698 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1699 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1700 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1701 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1703 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1704 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1706 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1707 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1718 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1719 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1721 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1722 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1724 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1726 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1728 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1729 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1730 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1731 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1732 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1733 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1734 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1735 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1736 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1737 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1739 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1740 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1743 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1744 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1748 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1749 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1751 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1753 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1757 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1761 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1762 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1766 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1772 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1774 /* Invalid data length */
1775 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1780 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1784 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1792 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1799 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
1801 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1802 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1804 /* Should never happen */
1805 if (s->cert == NULL)
1809 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
1810 &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
1812 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1813 &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1817 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1819 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1822 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1824 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1827 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1830 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1831 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
1832 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1834 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1835 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1837 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1838 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1839 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1844 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1845 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1846 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1848 uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1849 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1850 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1853 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1855 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1859 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1861 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1862 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1864 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1866 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1867 if (psignhash != NULL)
1868 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1870 return (int)numsigalgs;
1873 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1874 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1875 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1877 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1878 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1880 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
1881 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1883 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1885 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1887 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1888 if (psignhash != NULL)
1889 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1891 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1893 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1894 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
1897 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1898 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1902 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
1903 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1906 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1908 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1909 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1910 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1911 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1912 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1913 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1914 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1915 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1917 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1918 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1919 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1922 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1923 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1925 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1927 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1929 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1930 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1931 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1934 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1936 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1938 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1940 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1942 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1943 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
1944 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
1945 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
1946 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
1947 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
1951 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1953 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1954 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
1958 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1965 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1966 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1967 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
1969 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1971 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
1972 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
1976 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1980 /* Reject duplicates */
1981 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
1982 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
1991 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1992 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1994 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1998 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2002 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2005 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2010 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2014 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2017 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2018 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2019 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2021 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2022 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2023 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2029 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2031 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2036 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2040 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2042 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2043 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2044 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2046 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2048 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2049 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2054 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2059 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2060 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2061 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2063 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2064 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2065 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2071 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2075 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2077 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2079 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2081 if (default_nid == -1)
2083 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2085 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2087 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2089 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2090 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2091 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2093 sigalgslen = s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2096 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2098 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2099 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2100 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2101 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2102 if (sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2108 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2109 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2113 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2114 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2115 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2122 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2123 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2124 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2125 * attempting to use them.
2128 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2130 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2131 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2132 /* Strict mode flags */
2133 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2134 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2135 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2137 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2142 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2143 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2146 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2147 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2149 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2152 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2154 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2155 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2157 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2159 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2160 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2169 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2172 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2174 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2175 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2177 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2184 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2185 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2186 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2187 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2188 else if (!check_flags)
2193 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2194 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2196 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2199 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2200 || s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2202 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2206 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2207 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2210 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2211 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2212 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2216 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2217 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2220 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2221 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2222 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2225 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2226 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2227 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2230 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2231 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2232 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2241 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2242 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2244 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2246 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2247 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2248 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
2250 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2253 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2260 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2261 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2263 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2264 * so check_flags is always set.
2266 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2267 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2268 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2272 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2273 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2274 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2275 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2277 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2284 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2285 else if (check_flags)
2286 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2288 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2289 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2290 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2291 else if (!check_flags)
2294 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2295 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2296 else if (strict_mode) {
2297 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2298 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2299 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2300 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2302 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2309 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2310 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2312 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2314 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2317 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2320 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2324 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2327 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2328 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2329 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2333 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2336 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2339 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names;
2341 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2342 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2344 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2345 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2346 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2348 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2349 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2350 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2351 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2352 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2357 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2360 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2362 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2363 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2367 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2368 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2370 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2373 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2377 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2380 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2381 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2388 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2389 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2391 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2392 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2393 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2394 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2395 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2396 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2397 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2398 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2399 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2402 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2403 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2405 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2409 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2411 int dh_secbits = 80;
2412 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2413 return DH_get_1024_160();
2414 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2415 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2420 if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
2422 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
2425 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2431 if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
2436 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2437 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2439 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2440 if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2448 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2449 return DH_get_2048_224();
2450 return DH_get_1024_160();
2454 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2457 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2460 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2461 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2462 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2463 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2465 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2468 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2470 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2473 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2475 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2476 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2477 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2478 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2480 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2482 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2483 if (nid == NID_undef)
2486 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2488 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2491 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2494 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2496 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2497 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2499 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2500 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2502 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2503 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2508 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2509 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2510 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2513 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2515 int rv, start_idx, i;
2517 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2522 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2526 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2527 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2528 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2536 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2537 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2540 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2542 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2543 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2545 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2547 || (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
2548 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
2549 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
2552 return s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2556 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
2557 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
2559 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
2561 static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
2564 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2565 int mdnid, pknid, default_mdnid;
2568 /* If the EVP_PKEY reports a mandatory digest, allow nothing else. */
2570 if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &default_mdnid) == 2 &&
2571 sig->hash != default_mdnid)
2574 /* If it didn't report a mandatory NID, for whatever reasons,
2575 * just clear the error and allow all hashes to be used. */
2578 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2579 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
2580 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
2582 || !X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
2585 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2586 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2587 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2588 * signing certificate.
2590 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
2599 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2600 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2601 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2602 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2603 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2605 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
2607 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2610 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2613 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
2614 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
2618 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
2619 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
2621 static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
2626 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
2629 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
2630 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
2633 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
2637 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
2638 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
2639 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
2641 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
2643 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2650 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
2651 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2652 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2654 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2655 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2656 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2657 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2658 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2660 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2661 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
2663 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
2664 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
2667 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
2668 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
2670 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2673 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(tmppkey);
2674 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2676 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
2681 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2682 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2683 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(tmppkey), lu))
2689 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
2696 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2697 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2699 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2700 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2702 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2703 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2704 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2706 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
2708 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2711 s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
2712 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2714 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2715 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
2719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2720 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2724 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2725 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2727 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2730 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2732 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2736 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2737 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2738 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2739 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2746 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2749 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2750 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2753 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2756 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2758 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2759 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
2762 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2763 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
2765 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2766 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2767 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
2769 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
2772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2773 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2777 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
2780 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2781 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2782 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2787 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2789 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2790 size_t sent_sigslen;
2792 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2795 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2796 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2800 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2801 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2802 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2803 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
2804 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
2807 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2811 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2812 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2817 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2821 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2827 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2828 s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
2829 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2830 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;
2834 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
2836 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2837 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2839 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2843 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2847 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
2849 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2850 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2852 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2856 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2860 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
2862 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;