2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
182 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
183 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
187 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
189 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
190 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
196 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
197 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
201 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
204 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
206 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
208 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
212 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
215 s->version = s->method->version;
218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
220 static int nid_list[] =
222 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
225 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
226 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
227 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
228 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
229 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
230 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
231 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
232 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
233 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
234 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
235 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
236 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
237 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
238 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
239 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
240 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
241 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
242 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
243 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
244 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
245 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
246 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
250 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
252 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
253 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
254 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
257 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
259 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
260 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
261 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
262 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
263 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
264 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
265 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
266 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
267 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
268 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
269 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
270 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
271 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
272 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
273 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
274 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
275 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
276 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
277 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
278 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
279 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
280 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
281 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
282 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
283 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
286 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
288 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
289 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
292 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
294 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
295 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
296 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
298 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
301 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
303 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
306 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
308 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
310 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
312 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
314 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
316 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
318 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
320 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
322 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
324 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
326 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
328 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
330 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
332 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
334 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
336 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
338 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
340 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
342 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
344 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
346 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
348 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
350 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
352 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
354 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
360 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
363 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
364 const unsigned char **pcurves,
369 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
370 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
373 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
374 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
376 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
377 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
378 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
381 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
382 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
386 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
387 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
391 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
392 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
396 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
397 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
400 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
401 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
403 const unsigned char *curves;
405 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
406 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
408 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
411 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
414 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
416 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
419 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
421 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
424 else /* Should never happen */
427 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
428 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
430 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
436 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
437 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
441 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
443 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
444 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
446 /* Can't do anything on client side */
453 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
454 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
457 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
458 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
459 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
460 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
461 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
462 /* Should never happen */
465 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
470 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
475 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
477 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
478 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
480 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
484 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
485 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
496 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
497 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
499 unsigned char *clist, *p;
501 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
502 * while curve ids < 32
504 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
505 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
508 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
510 unsigned long idmask;
512 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
514 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
525 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
529 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
534 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
537 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
539 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
543 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
545 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
547 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
549 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
550 if (nid == NID_undef)
551 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
552 if (nid == NID_undef)
553 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
554 if (nid == NID_undef)
556 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
557 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
559 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
562 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
563 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
568 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
572 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
574 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
575 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
581 const EC_METHOD *meth;
584 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
585 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
586 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
589 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
592 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
596 /* Determine curve ID */
597 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
598 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
599 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
603 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
615 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
618 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
620 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
623 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
627 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
628 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
629 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
631 const unsigned char *p;
634 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
635 * is supported (see RFC4492).
637 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
639 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
640 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
641 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
651 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
652 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
654 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
655 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
657 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
662 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
669 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
672 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
674 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
676 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
677 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
681 *pformats = ecformats_default;
682 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
684 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
686 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
690 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
691 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
693 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
695 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
698 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
701 /* If not EC nothing to do */
702 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
707 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
711 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
712 * supported curves extension.
714 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
717 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
718 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
720 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
727 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
728 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
729 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
730 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
731 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
733 return 0; /* Should never happen */
734 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
735 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
737 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
741 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
742 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
744 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
749 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
750 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
752 unsigned char curve_id[2];
753 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
754 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
755 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
756 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
759 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
760 * no other curves permitted.
764 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
765 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
766 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
767 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
768 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
772 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
773 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
775 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
776 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
778 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
781 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
784 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
786 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
792 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
794 /* Need a shared curve */
795 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
801 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
806 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
808 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
812 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
816 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
820 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
821 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
824 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
825 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
827 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
830 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
831 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
833 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
836 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
837 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
839 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
842 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
843 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
844 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
845 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
847 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
849 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
850 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
853 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
854 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
857 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
860 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
864 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
866 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
869 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
871 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
874 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
876 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
877 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
878 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
880 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
881 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
884 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
885 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
889 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
890 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
892 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
893 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
895 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
897 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
898 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
902 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
904 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
906 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
909 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
912 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
913 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
915 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
916 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
918 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
919 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
920 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
921 /* Should never happen */
924 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
925 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
930 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
932 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
933 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
934 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
936 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
941 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
946 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
948 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
951 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
955 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
957 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
960 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
968 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
971 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
972 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
973 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
975 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
978 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
979 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
984 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
990 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
993 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
994 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
997 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
998 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
999 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1000 * session and not global settings.
1003 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1006 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1007 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1008 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1011 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
1012 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1013 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1016 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1017 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1020 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1021 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1025 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1026 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1031 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1036 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1042 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1043 * signature algorithms.
1047 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1048 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1052 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1053 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1057 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1058 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1060 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1061 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1063 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1064 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1068 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1069 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1074 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1078 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1079 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1081 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1082 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1091 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1094 unsigned char *ret = p;
1095 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1096 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1098 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1101 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1102 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1104 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1106 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1108 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1109 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1110 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1111 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1120 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1121 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1122 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1127 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1129 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1131 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1132 unsigned long size_str;
1135 /* check for enough space.
1136 4 for the servername type and entension length
1137 2 for servernamelist length
1138 1 for the hostname type
1139 2 for hostname length
1143 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1144 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1147 /* extension type and length */
1148 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1149 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1151 /* length of servername list */
1152 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1154 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1155 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1157 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1161 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1166 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1172 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1174 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1177 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1187 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1188 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1189 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1191 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1192 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 /* check for enough space.
1199 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1200 1 for the srp user identity
1201 + srp user identity length
1203 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1205 /* fill in the extension */
1206 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1207 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1208 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1209 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1217 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1219 const unsigned char *plist;
1222 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1224 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1225 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1232 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1233 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1234 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1235 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1238 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1239 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1240 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1242 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1243 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1244 if (plistlen > 65532)
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1250 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1251 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1253 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1254 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1255 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1256 * resolves this to two bytes.
1259 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1262 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1264 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1267 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1268 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1269 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1270 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1272 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1273 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1274 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1276 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1277 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1279 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1283 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1284 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1286 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1289 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1290 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1294 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1300 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1303 const unsigned char *salg;
1304 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1305 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1307 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1308 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1310 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1314 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1315 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1316 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1318 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1320 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1322 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1328 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1334 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1337 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1341 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1343 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1344 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1350 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1352 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1359 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1360 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1361 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1363 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1364 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1366 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1368 /* save position of id len */
1369 unsigned char *q = ret;
1370 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1371 /* skip over id len */
1373 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1379 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1383 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1384 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1387 * 1: peer may send requests
1388 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1390 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1391 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1393 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1397 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1399 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1400 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1401 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1403 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1408 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1412 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1414 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1416 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1419 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1427 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1428 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1429 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1430 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1431 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1432 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1434 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1435 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1437 if (limit < ret + 6)
1440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1441 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1443 *(ret++) = list_len;
1444 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1447 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1454 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1457 unsigned char *ret = p;
1458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1459 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1461 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1462 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1463 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1464 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1466 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1467 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1471 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1473 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1475 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1481 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1485 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1491 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1493 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1496 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1506 if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1508 const unsigned char *plist;
1510 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1513 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1515 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1516 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1523 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1524 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1525 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1526 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1530 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1531 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1533 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1534 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1536 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1541 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1543 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1544 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1548 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1549 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1550 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1552 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1554 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1556 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1559 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1562 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1571 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1573 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1575 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1578 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1586 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1587 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1588 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1589 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1590 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1591 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1592 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1593 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1594 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1595 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1596 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1602 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1603 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1605 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1608 * 1: peer may send requests
1609 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1611 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1612 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1614 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1620 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1621 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1622 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1624 const unsigned char *npa;
1625 unsigned int npalen;
1628 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1629 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1631 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1632 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1634 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1636 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1641 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1643 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1645 size_t authz_length;
1646 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1647 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1648 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1649 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1650 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1652 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1654 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1655 * uint8_t authz_type
1657 * uint8_t data[length]
1659 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1660 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1662 unsigned short length;
1666 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1668 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1672 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1680 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1681 * 2 bytes for extension type
1682 * 2 bytes for extension length
1683 * 1 byte for the list length
1684 * n bytes for the list */
1685 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1687 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1688 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1690 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1691 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1695 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1697 unsigned short length;
1702 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1704 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1707 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1714 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1721 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1723 unsigned short type;
1724 unsigned short size;
1726 unsigned char *data = *p;
1727 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1730 s->servername_done = 0;
1731 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1733 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1737 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1738 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1740 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1741 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1743 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1744 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1746 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1747 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1749 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1750 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1752 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1753 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1755 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1756 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1759 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1763 if (data > (d+n-len))
1766 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1771 if (data+size > (d+n))
1774 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1776 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1777 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1778 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1779 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1781 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1782 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1783 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1784 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1785 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1786 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1787 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1788 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1789 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1790 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1791 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1792 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1793 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1794 the value of the Host: field.
1795 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1796 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1797 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1798 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1802 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1804 unsigned char *sdata;
1810 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1817 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1824 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1830 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1833 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1834 switch (servname_type)
1836 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1839 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1841 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1844 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1846 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1849 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1851 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1854 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1855 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1856 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1857 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1858 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1859 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1862 s->servername_done = 1;
1866 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1867 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1868 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1880 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1885 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1886 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1888 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1890 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1893 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1895 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1898 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1900 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1901 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1903 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1905 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1912 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1913 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1915 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1916 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1918 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1919 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1921 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1926 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1928 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1929 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1931 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1932 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1934 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1937 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1938 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1941 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1942 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1943 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1944 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1945 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1948 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1949 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1951 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1952 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1953 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1955 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1956 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1958 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1963 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1965 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1968 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1969 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1971 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1974 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1975 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1978 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1979 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1980 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1981 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1982 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1985 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1986 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1987 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1988 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1990 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1994 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1997 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1998 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2000 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2004 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2005 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2006 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2007 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2009 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2010 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2012 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2017 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2019 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2020 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2022 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2026 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2028 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2030 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2032 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2035 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2037 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2042 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2044 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2047 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2049 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2052 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2055 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2058 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2059 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2063 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2064 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2069 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2073 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2075 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2077 const unsigned char *sdata;
2079 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2084 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2093 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2097 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2101 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2106 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2110 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2115 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2116 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2119 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2120 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2121 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2123 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2124 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2127 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2128 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2130 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2131 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2136 /* Read in request_extensions */
2139 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2146 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2152 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2154 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2155 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2158 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2159 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2161 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2162 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2164 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2169 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2173 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2176 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2180 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2181 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2183 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2184 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2185 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2187 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2193 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2194 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2196 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2199 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2200 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2201 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2202 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2203 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2204 * anything like that, but this might change).
2206 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2207 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2208 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2209 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2210 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2211 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2215 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2216 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2218 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2223 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2225 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2226 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2230 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2234 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2236 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2238 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2242 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2243 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2244 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2247 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2248 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2249 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2250 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2251 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2253 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2257 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2258 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2259 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2261 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2263 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2264 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2265 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2266 1 /* element size */,
2269 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2272 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2273 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2275 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2289 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2291 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2292 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2294 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2296 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2299 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2300 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2301 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2306 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2309 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2311 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2315 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2324 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2325 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2326 * the length of the block. */
2327 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2329 unsigned int off = 0;
2343 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2345 unsigned short length;
2346 unsigned short type;
2347 unsigned short size;
2348 unsigned char *data = *p;
2349 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2350 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2353 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2357 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2358 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2361 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2365 if (data+length != d+n)
2367 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2371 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2376 if (data+size > (d+n))
2379 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2380 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2381 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2383 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2385 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2387 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2390 tlsext_servername = 1;
2393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2394 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2395 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2397 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2398 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2400 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2402 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2405 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2406 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2407 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2409 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2412 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2413 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2415 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2416 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2417 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2418 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2419 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2422 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2424 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2426 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2427 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2429 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2432 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2435 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2438 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2440 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2441 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2442 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2444 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2448 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2451 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2452 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2454 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2458 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2459 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2460 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2461 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2463 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2465 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2467 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2472 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2473 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2475 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2476 * a status request message.
2478 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2480 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2483 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2484 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2487 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2488 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2490 unsigned char *selected;
2491 unsigned char selected_len;
2493 /* We must have requested it. */
2494 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2496 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2499 /* The data must be valid */
2500 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2502 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2505 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2507 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2510 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2511 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2513 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2516 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2517 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2518 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2521 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2523 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2525 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2528 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2532 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2533 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2535 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2536 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2537 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2539 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2544 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2546 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2551 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2553 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2554 * an authz hello extension if the client
2555 * didn't request a proof. */
2556 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2557 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2559 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2561 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2567 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2571 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2572 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2574 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2578 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2579 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2580 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2581 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2583 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2587 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2595 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2599 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2601 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2603 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2605 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2606 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2608 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2614 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2624 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2625 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2626 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2627 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2628 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2629 * absence on initial connect only.
2631 if (!renegotiate_seen
2632 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2633 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2635 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2637 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2645 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2648 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2652 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2654 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2659 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2661 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2662 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2664 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2665 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2667 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2668 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2673 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2677 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2678 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2685 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2690 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2692 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2693 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2695 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2696 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2697 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2699 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2700 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2704 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2705 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2706 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2707 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2709 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2711 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2712 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2713 * so this has to happen here in
2714 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2718 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2720 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2723 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2724 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2729 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2730 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2731 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2733 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2735 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2736 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2738 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2739 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2741 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2742 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2744 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2745 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2747 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2748 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2751 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2755 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2757 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2758 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2759 * abort the handshake.
2761 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2762 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2770 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2771 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2774 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2775 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2778 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2779 s->servername_done=0;
2785 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2787 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2790 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2791 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2792 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2793 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2795 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2798 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2799 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2800 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2801 if (certpkey == NULL)
2803 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2806 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2807 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2809 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2810 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2813 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2814 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2815 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2817 /* status request response should be sent */
2818 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2819 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2820 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2822 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2824 /* something bad happened */
2825 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2826 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2827 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2832 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2837 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2838 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2841 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2842 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2850 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2852 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2853 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2856 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2857 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2858 * it must contain uncompressed.
2860 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2861 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2862 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2863 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2864 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2866 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2868 unsigned char *list;
2869 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2870 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2871 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2873 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2875 found_uncompressed = 1;
2879 if (!found_uncompressed)
2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2885 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2886 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2888 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2889 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2890 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2891 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2893 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2894 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2896 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2897 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2899 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2901 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2902 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2905 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2906 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2907 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2908 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2910 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2911 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2916 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2919 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2920 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2923 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2924 * there is no response.
2926 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2928 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2929 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2931 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2932 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2935 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2936 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2940 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2941 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2947 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2948 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2951 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2952 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2955 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2956 s->servername_done=0;
2962 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2965 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2967 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2969 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2973 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2981 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2982 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2983 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2985 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2986 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2987 * extension, if any.
2988 * len: the length of the session ID.
2989 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2990 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2991 * point to the resulting session.
2993 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2994 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2995 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2998 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2999 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3000 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3001 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3002 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3003 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3004 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3007 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3008 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3009 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3010 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3011 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3012 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3014 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3015 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3017 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3018 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3022 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3024 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3025 * to permit stateful resumption.
3027 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3029 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3033 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3041 /* Skip past cipher list */
3046 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3051 /* Now at start of extensions */
3052 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3055 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3057 unsigned short type, size;
3060 if (p + size > limit)
3062 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3067 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3068 * currently have one. */
3069 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3072 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3074 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3075 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3076 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3077 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3078 * calculate the master secret later. */
3081 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3084 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3085 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3087 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3089 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3090 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3092 default: /* fatal error */
3101 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3103 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3104 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3105 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3106 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3107 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3108 * point to the resulting session.
3111 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3112 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3113 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3114 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3116 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3117 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3118 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3121 unsigned char *sdec;
3122 const unsigned char *p;
3123 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3124 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3127 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3128 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3131 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3132 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3133 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3134 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3136 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3137 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3148 /* Check key name matches */
3149 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3151 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3152 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3153 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3154 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3156 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3157 * integrity checks on ticket.
3159 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3162 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3166 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3167 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3168 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3169 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3170 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3172 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3173 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3174 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3175 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3176 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3179 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3182 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3183 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3186 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3189 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3193 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3194 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3195 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3196 * as required by standard.
3199 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3200 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3208 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3213 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3221 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3222 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3223 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3224 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3225 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3226 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3227 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3230 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3231 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3232 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3233 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3236 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3239 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3241 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3247 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3250 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3252 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3253 return table[i].nid;
3258 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3263 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3264 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3267 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3270 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3271 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3275 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3277 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3278 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3281 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3286 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3293 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3294 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3298 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3299 return EVP_sha224();
3301 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3302 return EVP_sha256();
3304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3305 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3306 return EVP_sha384();
3308 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3309 return EVP_sha512();
3317 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3322 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3323 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3326 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3327 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3330 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3331 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3337 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3338 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3339 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3341 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3342 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3344 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3346 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3347 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3349 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3351 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3353 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3354 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3356 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3360 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3361 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3362 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3364 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3367 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3368 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3369 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3370 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3372 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3373 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3374 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3376 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3377 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3379 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3381 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3383 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3388 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3389 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3390 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3392 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3403 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3404 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3406 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3407 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3409 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3411 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3412 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3413 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3415 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3416 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3418 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3420 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3421 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3424 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3425 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3429 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3430 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3436 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3437 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3439 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3442 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3445 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3446 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3447 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3452 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3454 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3460 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3461 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3462 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3464 /* Should never happen */
3468 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3469 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3471 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3472 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3474 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3476 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3477 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3479 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3480 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3482 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3484 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3486 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3489 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3490 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3491 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3492 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3493 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3495 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3496 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3502 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3503 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3505 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3506 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3508 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3509 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3510 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3511 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3513 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3514 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3519 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3520 * use the certificate for signing.
3522 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3524 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3525 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3528 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3529 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3532 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3534 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3535 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3539 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3540 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3547 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3548 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3549 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3551 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3557 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3564 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3566 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3569 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3570 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3571 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3573 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3574 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3578 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3580 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3582 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3584 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3586 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3587 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3593 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3595 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3596 unsigned short hbtype;
3597 unsigned int payload;
3598 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3600 /* Read type and payload length first */
3605 if (s->msg_callback)
3606 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3607 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3608 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3610 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3612 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3615 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3616 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3617 * payload, plus padding
3619 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3622 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3623 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3625 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3627 /* Random padding */
3628 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3630 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3632 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3633 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3634 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3635 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3637 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3642 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3646 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3647 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3648 * sequence number */
3651 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3654 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3662 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3664 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3666 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3667 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3669 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3670 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3671 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3673 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3677 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3678 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3680 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3684 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3685 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3691 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3692 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3694 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3696 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3697 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3698 * some random stuff.
3699 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3700 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3701 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3702 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3705 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3708 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3709 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3711 /* Sequence number */
3712 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3713 /* 16 random bytes */
3714 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3716 /* Random padding */
3717 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3719 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3722 if (s->msg_callback)
3723 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3724 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3725 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3727 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3736 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3741 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3744 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3746 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3749 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3750 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3752 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3754 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3756 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3764 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3765 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3766 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3767 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3768 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3769 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3772 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3773 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3774 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3775 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3778 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3780 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3781 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3784 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3785 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3789 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3790 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3791 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3795 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3799 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3802 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3804 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3809 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3810 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3812 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3814 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3815 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3816 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3817 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3819 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3827 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3828 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3829 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3830 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3834 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3835 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3836 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3837 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3843 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3847 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3851 if (default_nid == -1)
3853 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3855 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3856 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3857 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3861 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3862 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3866 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3867 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3869 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3875 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3876 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3877 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3878 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3881 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3883 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3884 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3885 /* Strict mode flags */
3886 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3887 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3888 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3890 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3895 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3896 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3898 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3899 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3902 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3906 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3909 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3911 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3913 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3914 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3917 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3918 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3919 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3921 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3922 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3931 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3934 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3935 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3936 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3938 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3946 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3947 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3948 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
3951 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3957 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
3958 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
3961 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
3964 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3965 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3967 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3972 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3973 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3974 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3975 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3976 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3979 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3980 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3981 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3982 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3986 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3987 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3995 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
3996 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
3999 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4002 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4003 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4005 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4008 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4016 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4017 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4019 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4022 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4023 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4024 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4026 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4031 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4039 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4040 else if(check_flags)
4041 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4043 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4044 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4045 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4046 else if (!check_flags)
4049 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4050 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4051 else if (strict_mode)
4053 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4054 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4056 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4057 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4061 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4069 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4071 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4076 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4079 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4082 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4087 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4088 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4089 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4090 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4091 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4096 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4101 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4105 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4106 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4108 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4110 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4112 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4116 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4120 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4123 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4125 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4126 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4128 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4130 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4131 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4133 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4135 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4137 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4138 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4140 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4145 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4149 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4151 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4152 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4156 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4158 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4159 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4160 else if (cpk->digest)
4161 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4164 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4166 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4167 * if the chain is invalid.
4171 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4172 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4175 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4176 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4183 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4184 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4186 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4187 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4188 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4189 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4190 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4191 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4193 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4194 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4196 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);