2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
125 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
126 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
128 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
139 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
144 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
148 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
151 tls1_setup_key_block,
152 tls1_generate_master_secret,
153 tls1_change_cipher_state,
154 tls1_final_finish_mac,
155 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
156 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
157 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 tls1_export_keying_material,
160 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
161 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
162 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
166 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
169 tls1_setup_key_block,
170 tls1_generate_master_secret,
171 tls1_change_cipher_state,
172 tls1_final_finish_mac,
173 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
174 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
175 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
177 tls1_export_keying_material,
178 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
179 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
180 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
181 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
185 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
188 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
189 * http, the cache would over fill
191 return (60 * 60 * 2);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
208 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
211 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
212 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
214 s->version = s->method->version;
217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
220 int nid; /* Curve NID */
221 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
222 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
225 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
226 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
228 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
229 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
230 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
231 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
232 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
235 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
236 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
237 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
238 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
239 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
240 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
241 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
243 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
244 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
245 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
246 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
247 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
248 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
249 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
250 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
251 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
252 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
253 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
254 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
255 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
256 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
259 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
265 /* The default curves */
266 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
267 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
268 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
269 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
270 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
273 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
274 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
275 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
276 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
277 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
280 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
281 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
285 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
286 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
287 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
288 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
289 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
290 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
291 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
292 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
293 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
294 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
295 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
296 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
297 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
298 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
299 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
300 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
301 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
303 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
304 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
306 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
307 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
308 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
309 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
310 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
311 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
312 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
313 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
314 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
315 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
316 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
317 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
318 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
319 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
320 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
324 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
325 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
326 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
329 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
331 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
332 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
334 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
337 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
339 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
341 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
343 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
345 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
347 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
349 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
351 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
353 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
355 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
357 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
359 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
361 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
363 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
365 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
367 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
369 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
371 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
373 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
375 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
377 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
379 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
381 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
383 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
385 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
387 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
389 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
391 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
393 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
395 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
403 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
405 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
406 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
407 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
408 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
409 * lists in the first place.
410 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
411 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
412 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
414 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
415 const unsigned char **pcurves,
418 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
420 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
421 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
424 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
425 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
426 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
427 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
430 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
431 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
435 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
436 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
440 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
441 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
444 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
445 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
449 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
450 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
455 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
460 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
461 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
463 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
466 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
468 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
469 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
470 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
473 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
476 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
477 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
479 const unsigned char *curves;
480 size_t num_curves, i;
481 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
482 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
484 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
486 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
489 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
490 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
492 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
493 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
495 } else /* Should never happen */
498 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
500 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
501 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
502 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
508 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
509 * if there is no match.
510 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
511 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
512 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
514 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
516 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
517 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
519 /* Can't do anything on client side */
523 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
525 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
526 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
528 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
529 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
530 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
531 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
532 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
533 /* Should never happen */
536 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
540 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
541 * but s->options is a long...
543 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
544 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
546 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
547 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
548 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
549 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
551 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
554 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
557 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
559 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
560 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
561 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
563 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
567 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
568 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
569 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
570 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
571 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
574 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
575 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
583 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
587 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
588 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
590 unsigned char *clist, *p;
593 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
596 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
597 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
600 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
601 unsigned long idmask;
603 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
605 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
614 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
618 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
622 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
625 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
627 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
633 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
635 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
637 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
639 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
640 if (nid == NID_undef)
641 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
642 if (nid == NID_undef)
643 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
644 if (nid == NID_undef)
646 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
647 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
649 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
653 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
654 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
659 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
663 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
666 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
667 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
672 const EC_METHOD *meth;
675 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
676 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
679 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
682 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
686 /* Determine curve ID */
687 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
688 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
689 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
692 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
701 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
703 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
705 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
707 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
709 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
714 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
715 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
716 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
718 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
719 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
722 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
723 * supported (see RFC4492).
725 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
726 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
727 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
728 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
729 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
732 if (i == num_formats)
737 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
738 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
739 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
741 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
743 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
744 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
745 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
746 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
747 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
751 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
752 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
757 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
764 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
768 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
770 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
771 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
772 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
774 *pformats = ecformats_default;
775 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
777 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
779 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
784 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
785 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
787 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
789 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
792 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
795 /* If not EC nothing to do */
796 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
798 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
802 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
805 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
809 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
810 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
812 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
818 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
819 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
820 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
821 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
822 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
824 return 0; /* Should never happen */
825 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
826 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
828 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
830 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
831 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
832 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
834 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
840 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
842 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
844 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
846 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
847 * is compatible with the client extensions.
849 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
851 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
853 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
854 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
855 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
859 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
862 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
863 unsigned char curve_id[2];
864 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
865 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
866 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
867 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
868 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
872 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
873 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
877 /* Need a shared curve */
878 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
882 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
886 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
891 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
894 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
895 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
898 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
899 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
901 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
904 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
905 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
907 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
911 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
913 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
916 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
917 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
918 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
919 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
921 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
922 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
923 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
924 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
925 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
926 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
928 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
929 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
930 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
935 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
936 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
937 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
940 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
943 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
947 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
948 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
949 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
950 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
952 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
953 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
956 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
957 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
961 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
962 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
963 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
964 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
965 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
966 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
967 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
969 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
970 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
975 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
976 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
978 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
979 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
981 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
982 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
983 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
984 /* Should never happen */
987 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
988 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
993 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
994 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
995 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
996 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
998 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1002 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1003 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1006 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1007 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1009 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1012 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1013 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1015 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1021 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1025 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1026 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1027 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1028 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1031 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1032 if (i == sent_sigslen
1033 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1034 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1038 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1043 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1044 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1045 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1051 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1053 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1058 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1059 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1060 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1063 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1065 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1066 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1067 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1068 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1069 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1071 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1072 /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
1073 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1074 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1075 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1077 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1080 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1081 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
1082 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1083 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1084 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1085 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1086 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1087 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1090 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1092 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1093 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1094 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1099 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1101 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1102 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1103 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1105 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1108 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1110 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1112 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1115 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1116 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1119 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1120 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1124 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1126 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1127 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1129 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1130 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1132 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1133 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1134 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)
1135 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1146 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1148 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1149 if (s->renegotiate) {
1152 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1157 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1160 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1163 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1170 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1171 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1174 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1175 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1176 unsigned long size_str;
1180 * check for enough space.
1181 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1182 * 2 for servernamelist length
1183 * 1 for the hostname type
1184 * 2 for hostname length
1188 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1190 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1193 /* extension type and length */
1194 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1195 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1197 /* length of servername list */
1198 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1200 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1201 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1203 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1207 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1208 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1209 * Client Hello message */
1211 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1212 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1218 * check for enough space.
1219 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1220 * 1 for the srp user identity
1221 * + srp user identity length
1223 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1226 /* fill in the extension */
1227 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1228 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1229 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1230 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1235 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1238 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1241 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1242 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1244 unsigned char *etmp;
1246 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1248 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1250 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1252 if (num_formats > 255) {
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1257 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1258 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1259 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1260 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1261 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1265 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1267 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1268 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1271 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1273 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1275 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1280 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1282 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1283 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1284 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1285 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1286 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1290 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1292 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1293 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1294 ret += curves_list_len;
1296 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1298 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1300 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1301 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1302 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1303 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1304 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1305 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1306 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1308 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1309 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1310 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1313 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1314 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1317 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1320 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1322 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1325 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1331 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1333 const unsigned char *salg;
1334 unsigned char *etmp;
1335 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1336 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1338 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1340 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1342 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1343 /* Fill in lengths */
1344 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1349 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1351 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1355 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1356 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1357 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1363 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1364 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1370 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1372 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1373 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1375 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1376 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1378 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1379 /* save position of id len */
1380 unsigned char *q = ret;
1381 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1382 /* skip over id len */
1384 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1390 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1393 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1394 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1400 * 1: peer may send requests
1401 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1403 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1404 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1406 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1410 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1412 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1413 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1415 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1417 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1422 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1423 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1425 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1426 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1427 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1428 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1429 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1432 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1435 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1436 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1441 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1444 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1447 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1454 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1455 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1456 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1458 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1459 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1462 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1466 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1467 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1468 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1471 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1472 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1474 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1475 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1481 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1483 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1490 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1493 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1497 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1498 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1501 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1502 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1504 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1507 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1508 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1509 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1510 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1511 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1516 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1518 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1521 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1526 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1532 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1540 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1541 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1544 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1545 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1546 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1549 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1552 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1554 const unsigned char *plist;
1557 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1561 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1563 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1565 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1567 if (plistlen > 255) {
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1572 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1573 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1574 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1575 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1580 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1583 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1585 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1586 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1588 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1592 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1593 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1595 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1603 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1604 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1608 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1611 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1614 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1622 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1623 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1624 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1625 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1626 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1627 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1628 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1629 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1630 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1631 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1633 if (limit - ret < 36)
1635 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1640 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1641 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1642 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1644 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1648 * 1: peer may send requests
1649 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1651 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1652 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1654 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1660 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1661 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1662 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1663 const unsigned char *npa;
1664 unsigned int npalen;
1667 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1669 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1670 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1671 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1673 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1675 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1677 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1681 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1683 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1684 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1686 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1687 * for other cases too.
1689 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1690 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1691 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1692 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1693 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1695 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1700 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1701 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1705 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1706 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1707 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1709 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1711 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1715 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1721 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1724 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1729 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1730 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1731 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1732 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1735 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1737 unsigned int data_len;
1738 unsigned int proto_len;
1739 const unsigned char *selected;
1740 unsigned char *data;
1741 unsigned char selected_len;
1744 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1748 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1749 * length-prefixed strings.
1751 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
1752 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
1753 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
1757 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
1759 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
1761 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
1763 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1764 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1765 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1766 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1767 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1768 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1769 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1772 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1773 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1778 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1782 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1784 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1785 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1786 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1791 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1792 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1793 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1794 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1796 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1798 unsigned int type, size;
1799 unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
1802 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1803 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1804 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1805 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1806 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1807 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1808 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1810 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1811 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1812 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1813 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1816 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1817 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1818 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1819 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1820 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1821 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1822 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1823 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1824 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1825 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1830 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1831 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1832 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
1833 || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
1836 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1839 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1840 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1841 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1843 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
1844 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
1845 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1847 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1849 if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1852 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1854 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
1855 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1857 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1861 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1863 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1865 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1870 unsigned char *data;
1871 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1873 s->servername_done = 0;
1874 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1876 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1879 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1880 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1882 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1883 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1887 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1888 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1889 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1891 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1892 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1893 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1894 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1895 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1899 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1900 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1903 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1905 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1908 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
1911 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
1914 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1917 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
1920 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1921 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1923 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
1926 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1927 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
1929 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1930 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1933 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1935 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1936 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1937 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1938 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1939 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1940 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1941 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1942 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1943 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1944 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1945 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1946 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1947 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1948 * the value of the Host: field.
1949 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1950 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1951 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1953 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1957 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1958 unsigned char *sdata;
1959 unsigned int servname_type;
1963 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
1964 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
1967 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
1968 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
1969 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
1970 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
1973 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1974 switch (servname_type) {
1975 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1977 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1980 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1981 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1984 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1985 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1986 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1989 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
1990 (unsigned char *)s->session
1993 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1996 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
1997 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1998 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1999 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2000 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2003 s->servername_done = 1;
2006 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
2007 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2010 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2011 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2012 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2013 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2022 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
2023 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
2027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2028 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2029 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
2030 || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2033 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2035 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
2038 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2040 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
2041 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
2046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2047 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2048 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2050 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2051 || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
2055 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2056 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2057 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2058 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2059 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2060 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2063 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2064 ecpointformatlist_length;
2065 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2066 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2067 ecpointformatlist_length))
2069 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2072 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2073 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2074 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2077 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2078 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
2080 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2081 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
2082 || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
2083 || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
2087 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2090 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2091 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2092 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2093 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2096 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2097 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2098 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2099 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2100 ellipticcurvelist_length))
2102 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2105 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2106 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2110 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2111 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2112 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
2113 || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2114 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2115 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
2116 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2119 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2122 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
2123 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2126 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2127 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
2128 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2131 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2134 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
2135 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
2138 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2139 const unsigned char *sdata;
2141 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2142 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2143 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2146 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
2148 unsigned int idsize;
2150 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
2151 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
2152 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
2157 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2160 if (data != sdata) {
2161 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2164 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2165 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2166 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2167 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2168 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2171 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2172 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2173 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2178 /* Read in request_extensions */
2179 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2180 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2181 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2186 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2187 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2188 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2189 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2190 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2195 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2198 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2201 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2202 unsigned int hbtype;
2204 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
2205 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2206 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2210 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2211 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2213 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2214 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2215 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2218 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2224 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2225 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2226 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2228 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2231 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2232 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2233 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2234 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2235 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2236 * anything like that, but this might change).
2238 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2239 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2240 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2241 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2242 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2244 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2248 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2249 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2250 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
2252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2253 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2254 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2258 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2260 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2261 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2262 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
2266 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2267 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2268 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2271 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2272 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2276 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2277 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2278 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2279 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2280 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2283 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2288 /* Spurious data on the end */
2289 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
2294 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2296 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2297 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2298 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2300 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2306 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2310 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2313 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2314 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2315 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2319 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2328 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2329 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2330 * fill the length of the block.
2332 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2336 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2337 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2338 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2346 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2348 unsigned int length, type, size;
2349 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2350 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2353 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2355 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2357 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2358 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2360 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2361 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2364 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2365 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2368 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2370 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2373 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2374 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2378 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2379 unsigned char *data;
2382 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2383 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2386 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2387 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2389 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2390 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2392 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2393 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2394 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2395 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2396 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2399 tlsext_servername = 1;
2401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2402 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2403 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2404 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2405 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2406 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2410 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2411 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2412 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2413 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2414 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2417 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2418 ecpointformatlist_length;
2419 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2420 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2421 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2422 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2428 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2430 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2431 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2432 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2433 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2435 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2438 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2439 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2442 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2444 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2446 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2449 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2450 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2453 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2454 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2457 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2458 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2459 unsigned char *selected;
2460 unsigned char selected_len;
2461 /* We must have requested it. */
2462 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2463 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2466 /* The data must be valid */
2467 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2468 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2472 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2474 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2475 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2476 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2479 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2480 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2481 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2484 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2485 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2486 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2490 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2492 /* We must have requested it. */
2493 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2494 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2498 * The extension data consists of:
2499 * uint16 list_length
2500 * uint8 proto_length;
2501 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2503 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2504 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2505 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2506 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2507 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2510 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2511 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2512 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2513 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2516 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2517 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2520 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2523 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2524 unsigned int hbtype;
2525 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2526 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2530 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2531 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2533 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2534 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2535 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2538 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2544 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2545 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2549 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2550 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2551 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2552 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2553 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2554 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2557 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2558 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2560 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2563 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2564 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2566 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2570 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2571 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2575 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2576 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2577 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2578 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2579 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2580 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2584 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2593 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2594 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2595 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2596 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2597 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2598 * initial connect only.
2600 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2601 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2602 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2604 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2610 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2613 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2614 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2615 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2624 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2630 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2635 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2637 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2638 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2642 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2643 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2646 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2647 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2651 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2653 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2654 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2655 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2656 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2658 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2660 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2663 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2664 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2667 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2668 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2671 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2672 s->servername_done = 0;
2677 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2678 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2680 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2682 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2685 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2686 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2688 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2689 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2692 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2695 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2696 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2697 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2701 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2705 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2706 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2707 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2708 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2709 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2710 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2711 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2712 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2715 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2716 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2717 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2718 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2719 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2722 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2723 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2725 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2726 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2730 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2734 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2738 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2740 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2741 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2744 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2745 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2746 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2747 * influence which certificate is sent
2749 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2751 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2752 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2753 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2754 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2755 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2759 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2760 * et al can pick it up.
2762 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2763 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2765 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2766 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2767 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2769 /* status request response should be sent */
2770 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2771 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2772 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2774 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2776 /* something bad happened */
2777 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2778 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2779 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2783 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2787 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2788 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2791 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2792 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2800 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2802 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2803 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2807 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2808 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2809 * must contain uncompressed.
2811 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2812 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2813 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2814 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2815 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2816 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2817 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2818 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2819 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2821 unsigned char *list;
2822 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2823 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2824 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2825 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2826 found_uncompressed = 1;
2830 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2832 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2836 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2837 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2839 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2841 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2842 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2843 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2844 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2846 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2848 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2851 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2852 * that we don't receive a status message
2854 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2855 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2856 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2859 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2860 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2863 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2864 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2867 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2868 s->servername_done = 0;
2874 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2877 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2879 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2880 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2884 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2885 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2892 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2893 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2894 * need to be handled at the same time.
2896 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2899 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2900 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2901 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2902 * point to the resulting session.
2904 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2905 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2906 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2909 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2910 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2911 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2912 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2913 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2914 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2915 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2918 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2919 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2920 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2921 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2922 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2923 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2925 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2928 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2929 const PACKET *session_id,
2933 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2936 int have_ticket = 0;
2937 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2940 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2941 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2944 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2947 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2950 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2954 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2955 unsigned int type, size;
2957 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2958 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2959 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2963 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2967 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2969 unsigned char *etick;
2971 /* Duplicate extension */
2972 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2980 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2983 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2987 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2989 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2990 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2991 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2992 * calculate the master secret later.
2997 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2998 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3002 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3003 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3005 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3006 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3009 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3012 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3013 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3016 default: /* fatal error */
3022 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
3023 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3024 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3030 if (have_ticket == 0)
3037 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3039 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3040 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3041 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3042 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3043 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3044 * point to the resulting session.
3047 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3048 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3049 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3050 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3051 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3053 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3054 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3055 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3058 unsigned char *sdec;
3059 const unsigned char *p;
3060 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3061 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3062 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3064 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3065 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3068 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3069 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3072 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3073 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3074 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3075 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3084 /* Check key name matches */
3085 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3087 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3088 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3089 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3090 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3096 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3099 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3104 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3105 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3106 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3109 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3110 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3111 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3114 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3115 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3116 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3117 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3118 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3120 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3121 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3124 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3125 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3130 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3133 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3137 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3138 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3139 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3143 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3144 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3153 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3157 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3158 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3162 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3169 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3170 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3171 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3172 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3173 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3174 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3175 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3176 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3177 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3178 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3181 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3182 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3183 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3184 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3185 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3186 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3187 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3190 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3193 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3194 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3200 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3203 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3204 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3205 return table[i].nid;
3210 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3216 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3219 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3222 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3223 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3227 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3229 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3236 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3239 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3240 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3241 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3242 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3243 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3244 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3245 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3246 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3247 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3248 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3251 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3257 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3259 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3260 return tls12_md_info + i;
3266 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3268 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3269 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3271 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3274 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3277 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3281 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3282 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3285 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3286 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3289 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3290 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3292 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3293 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3294 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3296 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3297 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3299 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3300 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3306 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3307 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3308 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3310 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3311 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3313 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3314 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3316 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3318 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3319 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3321 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3323 if (psignhash_nid) {
3324 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3325 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3327 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3331 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3332 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3334 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3335 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3336 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3338 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3339 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3341 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3342 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3346 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3347 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3351 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3353 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3354 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3355 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3357 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3358 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3359 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3361 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3362 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3363 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3365 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3366 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3371 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3372 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3377 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3378 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3385 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3387 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3389 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3392 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3393 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3395 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3397 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3398 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3399 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3400 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3403 return tmpout - out;
3406 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3407 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3408 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3409 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3411 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3412 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3413 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3414 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3415 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3417 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3418 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3421 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3422 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3423 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3425 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3435 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3436 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3438 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3439 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3441 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3443 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3445 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3446 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3447 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3448 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3449 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3450 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3451 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3452 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3453 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3454 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3456 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3457 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3460 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3461 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3465 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3466 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3468 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3470 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3473 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3477 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3478 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3482 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3484 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3487 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3488 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3490 /* Should never happen */
3494 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3495 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3496 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3498 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3499 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3503 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3508 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3509 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3511 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3512 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3515 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3516 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3518 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3519 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3521 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3523 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3525 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3527 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3528 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3530 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3531 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3532 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3533 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3539 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3540 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3541 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3542 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3543 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3545 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3546 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3547 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3548 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3554 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3555 * the certificate for signing.
3557 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3559 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3560 * supported it stays as NULL.
3562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3563 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3564 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3567 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3568 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3569 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3573 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3574 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3576 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3577 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3578 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3579 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3580 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3581 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3582 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3588 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3589 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3590 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3592 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3597 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3604 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3606 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3609 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3610 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3611 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3613 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3614 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3618 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3620 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3622 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3624 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3626 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3627 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3631 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3634 unsigned short hbtype;
3635 unsigned int payload;
3636 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3638 if (s->msg_callback)
3639 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3641 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3643 /* Read type and payload length first */
3644 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3645 return 0; /* silently discard */
3648 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3649 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3652 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3653 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3657 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3658 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3660 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3661 if (buffer == NULL) {
3662 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3667 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3668 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3670 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3672 /* Random padding */
3673 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3674 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3678 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3679 3 + payload + padding);
3681 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3682 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3683 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3684 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3686 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3690 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3694 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3695 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3699 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3701 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3708 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3710 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3712 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3713 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3715 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3716 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3717 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3718 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3722 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3723 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3728 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3729 if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
3730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3735 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3736 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3737 * some random stuff.
3738 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3739 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3740 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3741 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3744 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3746 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3751 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3752 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3754 /* Sequence number */
3755 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3756 /* 16 random bytes */
3757 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3762 /* Random padding */
3763 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3768 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3770 if (s->msg_callback)
3771 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3772 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3773 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3775 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3784 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3788 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3791 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3793 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3794 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3795 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3796 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3797 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3798 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3800 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3801 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3802 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3806 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3808 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3811 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3814 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3816 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3818 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3820 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3828 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3829 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3831 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3834 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3835 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3838 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3839 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3844 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3845 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3847 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3851 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3855 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3858 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3861 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3866 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3867 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3869 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3870 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3871 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3873 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3880 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3881 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3882 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3884 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3885 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3886 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3892 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3896 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3900 if (default_nid == -1)
3902 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3904 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3905 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3906 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3911 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3912 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3916 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3917 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3918 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3925 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3926 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3927 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3928 * attempting to use them.
3931 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3933 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3934 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3935 /* Strict mode flags */
3936 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3937 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3938 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3940 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3945 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3946 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3949 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3950 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3952 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3955 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3957 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3958 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3960 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3962 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3963 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3966 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3967 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3968 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3969 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3970 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3978 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3981 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3983 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3984 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3986 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3993 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3994 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3995 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3996 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3997 else if (!check_flags)
4002 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4003 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4005 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4007 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4008 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
4010 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4013 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4014 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4015 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4016 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4019 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4020 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4021 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4025 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4026 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4029 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4030 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4031 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4034 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4035 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4036 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4039 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4040 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4041 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4050 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4051 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4053 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4055 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4056 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4057 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4060 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4067 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4068 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4072 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4073 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4074 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4075 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4077 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4084 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4085 else if (check_flags)
4086 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4088 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4089 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4090 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4091 else if (!check_flags)
4094 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4095 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4096 else if (strict_mode) {
4097 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4098 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4099 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4100 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4102 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4109 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4110 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4114 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4117 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4120 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4124 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4128 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4130 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4131 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4133 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4134 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4135 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4139 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4142 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4144 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4146 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4147 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4149 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4150 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4151 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4153 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4154 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4155 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4156 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4157 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4162 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4165 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4167 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4168 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4172 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4173 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4174 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4175 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4176 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4178 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4181 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4185 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4188 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4189 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4196 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4197 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4199 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4200 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4201 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4202 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4203 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4204 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4205 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4208 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4209 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4211 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4216 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4218 int dh_secbits = 80;
4219 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4220 return DH_get_1024_160();
4221 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4222 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4227 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4228 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4231 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4237 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4238 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4239 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4241 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4242 if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
4248 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4249 return DH_get_2048_224();
4250 return DH_get_1024_160();
4254 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4257 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4260 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4261 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4262 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4263 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4265 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4268 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4270 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4273 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4275 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4276 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4277 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4278 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4280 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4281 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4284 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4286 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4289 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4292 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4294 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4295 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4297 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4298 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4300 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4301 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4306 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4307 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4308 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4311 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4313 int rv, start_idx, i;
4315 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4320 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4324 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4325 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4326 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);