2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
125 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
126 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
128 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
191 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
192 * http, the cache would over fill
194 return (60 * 60 * 2);
201 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
205 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
211 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
214 s->version = s->method->version;
217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
220 int nid; /* Curve NID */
221 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
222 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
225 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
226 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
228 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
229 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
230 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
231 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
232 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
235 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
236 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
237 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
238 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
239 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
240 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
241 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
243 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
244 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
245 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
246 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
247 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
248 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
249 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
250 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
251 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
252 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
253 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
254 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
255 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
256 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
259 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
265 /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
266 static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
267 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
268 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
269 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
270 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
273 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
274 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
275 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
276 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
277 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
280 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
281 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
285 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
286 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
287 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
288 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
289 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
290 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
291 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
292 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
293 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
294 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
295 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
296 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
297 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
298 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
299 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
300 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
301 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
303 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
304 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
306 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
307 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
308 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
309 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
310 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
311 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
312 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
313 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
314 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
315 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
316 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
317 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
318 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
319 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
320 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
324 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
325 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
326 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
329 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
331 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
332 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
334 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
337 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
339 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
341 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
343 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
345 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
347 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
349 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
351 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
353 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
355 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
357 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
359 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
361 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
363 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
365 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
367 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
369 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
371 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
373 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
375 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
377 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
379 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
381 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
383 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
385 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
387 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
389 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
391 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
393 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
395 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
403 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
405 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
406 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
407 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
408 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
409 * lists in the first place.
410 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
411 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
412 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
414 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
415 const unsigned char **pcurves,
418 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
420 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
421 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
424 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
425 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
426 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
427 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
430 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
431 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
435 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
436 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
440 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
441 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
444 if (!s->server || (s->cert && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)) {
445 *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
446 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
448 *pcurves = eccurves_all;
449 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
454 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
455 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
460 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
465 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
466 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
468 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
471 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
473 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
474 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
475 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
478 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
481 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
482 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
484 const unsigned char *curves;
485 size_t num_curves, i;
486 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
487 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
489 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
491 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
494 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
495 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
497 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
498 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
500 } else /* Should never happen */
503 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
505 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
506 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
507 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
513 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
514 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
515 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
516 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
518 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
520 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
521 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
523 /* Can't do anything on client side */
527 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
529 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
530 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
532 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
533 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
534 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
535 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
536 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
537 /* Should never happen */
540 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
544 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
545 * but s->options is a long...
547 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
548 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
550 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
551 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
552 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
553 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
555 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
558 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
561 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
563 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
564 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
565 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
567 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
571 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
572 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
573 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
574 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
575 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
578 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
579 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
587 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
591 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
592 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
594 unsigned char *clist, *p;
597 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
600 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
601 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
604 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
605 unsigned long idmask;
607 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
609 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
618 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
622 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
626 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
629 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
631 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
637 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
639 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
641 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
643 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
644 if (nid == NID_undef)
645 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
646 if (nid == NID_undef)
647 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
648 if (nid == NID_undef)
650 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
651 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
653 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
657 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
658 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
663 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
667 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
670 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
671 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
676 const EC_METHOD *meth;
679 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
680 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
683 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
686 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
690 /* Determine curve ID */
691 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
692 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
693 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
696 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
705 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
707 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
709 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
711 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
713 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
718 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
719 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
720 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
722 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
723 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
726 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
727 * supported (see RFC4492).
729 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
730 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
731 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
732 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
733 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
736 if (i == num_formats)
741 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
742 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
743 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
745 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
747 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
748 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
749 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
750 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
751 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
755 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
756 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
761 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
768 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
772 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
774 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
775 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
776 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
778 *pformats = ecformats_default;
779 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
781 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
783 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
788 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
789 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
791 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
793 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
796 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
799 /* If not EC nothing to do */
800 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
804 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
809 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
812 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
816 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
817 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
819 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
825 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
826 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
827 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
828 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
829 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
831 return 0; /* Should never happen */
832 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
833 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
835 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
837 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
838 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
839 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
841 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
847 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
848 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
849 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
851 unsigned char curve_id[2];
852 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
853 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
854 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
855 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
859 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
862 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
863 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
864 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
865 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
866 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
867 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
871 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
872 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
874 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
875 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
877 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
879 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
882 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
884 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
890 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
891 /* Need a shared curve */
892 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
898 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
903 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
905 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
909 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
912 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
916 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
921 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
924 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
925 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
928 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
929 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
931 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
934 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
935 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
937 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
941 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
943 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
946 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
947 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
948 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
949 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
951 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
952 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
953 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
954 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
955 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
956 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
960 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
961 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
962 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
965 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
968 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
971 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
972 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
973 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
974 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
975 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
977 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
978 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
981 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
982 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
986 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
987 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
988 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
989 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
990 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
991 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
992 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
994 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
995 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1000 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1001 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1003 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1004 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1006 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1007 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1008 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1009 /* Should never happen */
1012 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1013 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1017 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1018 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1019 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1020 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1021 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1023 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1027 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1028 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1031 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1032 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1034 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1037 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1038 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1040 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1046 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1050 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1051 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1052 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1053 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1056 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1057 if (i == sent_sigslen
1058 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1059 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1063 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1068 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1069 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1070 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1076 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1078 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1083 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1084 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1085 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1088 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1090 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1091 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1092 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1093 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1094 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1096 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1097 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1099 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1102 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1103 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1104 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1105 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1106 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1107 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1108 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1109 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1110 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1111 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1112 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1114 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1116 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1117 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1118 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1123 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1125 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1126 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1127 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1129 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1132 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1134 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1136 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1139 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1140 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1143 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1144 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1146 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1148 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1150 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1151 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1153 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1154 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1156 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1157 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1158 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)
1159 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1170 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1172 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1173 if (s->renegotiate) {
1176 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1181 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1184 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1187 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1194 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1195 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1198 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1199 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1200 unsigned long size_str;
1204 * check for enough space.
1205 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1206 * 2 for servernamelist length
1207 * 1 for the hostname type
1208 * 2 for hostname length
1212 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1214 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1217 /* extension type and length */
1218 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1219 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1221 /* length of servername list */
1222 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1224 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1225 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1227 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1230 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1231 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1232 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1233 * Client Hello message */
1235 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1236 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1242 * check for enough space.
1243 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1244 * 1 for the srp user identity
1245 * + srp user identity length
1247 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1250 /* fill in the extension */
1251 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1252 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1253 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1254 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1262 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1265 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1266 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1268 unsigned char *etmp;
1270 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1272 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1274 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1276 if (num_formats > 255) {
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1281 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1282 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1283 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1284 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1285 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1289 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1291 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1292 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1295 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1297 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1299 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1304 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1306 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1307 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1308 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1309 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1310 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1314 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1316 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1317 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1318 ret += curves_list_len;
1320 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1322 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1324 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1325 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1326 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1327 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1328 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1329 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1330 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1332 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1333 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1334 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1337 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1338 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1341 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1344 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1346 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1349 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1355 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1357 const unsigned char *salg;
1358 unsigned char *etmp;
1359 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1360 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1362 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1364 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1366 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1367 /* Fill in lengths */
1368 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1373 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1375 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1379 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1380 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1381 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1387 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1388 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1394 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1397 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1399 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1400 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1402 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1403 /* save position of id len */
1404 unsigned char *q = ret;
1405 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1406 /* skip over id len */
1408 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1414 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1417 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1418 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1420 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1424 * 1: peer may send requests
1425 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1427 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1428 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1430 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1434 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1436 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1437 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1439 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1441 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1446 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1447 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1449 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1450 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1451 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1452 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1453 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1456 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1459 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1460 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1465 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1468 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1471 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1478 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1479 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1480 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1482 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1483 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1486 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1490 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1491 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1492 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1495 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1496 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1498 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1499 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1505 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1507 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1514 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1517 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1521 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1522 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1525 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1526 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1528 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1531 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1532 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1533 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1534 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1535 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1540 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1542 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1545 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1550 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1553 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1556 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1565 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1568 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1569 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1570 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1573 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1578 const unsigned char *plist;
1581 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1585 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1587 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1589 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1591 if (plistlen > 255) {
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1596 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1597 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1598 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1599 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1604 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1607 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1609 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1610 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1612 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1616 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1617 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1619 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1624 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1627 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1628 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1632 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1635 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1638 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1646 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1647 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1648 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1649 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1650 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1651 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1652 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1653 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1654 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1655 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1657 if (limit - ret < 36)
1659 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1664 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1665 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1666 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1668 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1672 * 1: peer may send requests
1673 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1675 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1676 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1678 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1684 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1685 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1686 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1687 const unsigned char *npa;
1688 unsigned int npalen;
1691 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1693 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1694 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1695 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1697 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1699 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1701 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1705 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1707 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1708 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1710 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1711 * for other cases too.
1713 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1714 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1715 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1717 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1722 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1723 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1727 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1728 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1729 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1731 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1733 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1737 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1743 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1746 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1751 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1752 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1753 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1754 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1757 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1759 unsigned int data_len;
1760 unsigned int proto_len;
1761 const unsigned char *selected;
1762 unsigned char *data;
1763 unsigned char selected_len;
1766 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1770 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1771 * length-prefixed strings.
1773 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
1774 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
1775 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
1779 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
1781 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
1783 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
1785 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1786 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1787 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1788 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1789 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1790 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1791 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1794 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1795 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1800 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1806 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1807 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1808 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1813 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1814 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1815 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1816 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1818 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1820 unsigned int type, size;
1821 unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
1824 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1825 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1826 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1827 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1828 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1829 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1830 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1832 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1833 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1834 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1835 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1838 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1839 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1840 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1841 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1842 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1843 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1844 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1845 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1846 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1847 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1852 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1853 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1854 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
1855 || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
1858 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1861 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1862 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1863 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1865 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
1866 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
1867 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1869 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1871 if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1874 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1876 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
1877 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1879 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1883 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1885 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1887 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1892 unsigned char *data;
1893 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1895 s->servername_done = 0;
1896 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1898 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1901 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1902 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1904 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1905 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1909 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1910 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1911 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1913 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1914 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1915 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1916 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1917 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1921 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1922 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1925 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1927 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1930 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
1933 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
1936 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1939 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
1942 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1943 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1945 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
1948 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1949 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
1951 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1952 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1955 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1957 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1958 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1959 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1960 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1961 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1962 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1963 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1964 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1965 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1966 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1967 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1968 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1969 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1970 * the value of the Host: field.
1971 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1972 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1973 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1975 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1979 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1980 unsigned char *sdata;
1981 unsigned int servname_type;
1985 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
1986 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
1989 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
1990 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
1991 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
1992 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
1995 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1996 switch (servname_type) {
1997 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1999 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2002 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2003 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2006 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2007 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2008 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2011 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
2012 (unsigned char *)s->session
2015 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2018 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2019 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2020 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2021 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2022 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2025 s->servername_done = 1;
2028 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
2029 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2032 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2033 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2034 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2035 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2044 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
2045 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
2049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2050 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2051 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
2052 || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2055 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2057 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
2060 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2062 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
2063 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
2068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2069 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2070 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2072 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2073 || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
2077 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2078 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2079 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2080 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2081 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2082 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2085 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2086 ecpointformatlist_length;
2087 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2088 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2089 ecpointformatlist_length))
2091 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2094 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2095 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2096 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2099 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2100 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
2102 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2103 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
2104 || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
2105 || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
2109 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2112 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2113 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2114 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2115 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2118 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2119 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2120 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2121 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2122 ellipticcurvelist_length))
2124 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2127 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2128 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2132 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2133 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2134 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
2135 || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2136 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2137 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
2138 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2141 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2144 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
2145 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2148 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2149 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
2150 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2153 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2156 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
2157 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
2160 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2161 const unsigned char *sdata;
2163 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2164 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2165 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2168 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
2170 unsigned int idsize;
2172 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
2173 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
2174 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
2179 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2182 if (data != sdata) {
2183 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2186 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2187 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2188 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2189 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2190 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2193 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2194 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2195 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2200 /* Read in request_extensions */
2201 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2202 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2203 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2208 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2209 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2210 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2211 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2212 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2217 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2220 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2223 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2224 unsigned int hbtype;
2226 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
2227 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2228 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2232 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2233 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2235 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2236 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2237 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2240 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2246 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2247 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2248 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2250 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2253 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2254 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2255 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2256 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2257 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2258 * anything like that, but this might change).
2260 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2261 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2262 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2263 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2264 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2266 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2270 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2271 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2272 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
2274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2275 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2276 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2280 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2282 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2283 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2284 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
2288 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2289 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2290 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2292 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2294 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2297 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2298 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2299 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2300 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2301 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2304 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2309 /* Spurious data on the end */
2310 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
2315 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2317 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2318 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2319 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2321 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2327 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2331 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2334 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2335 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2336 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2340 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2349 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2350 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2351 * fill the length of the block.
2353 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2357 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2358 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2359 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2367 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2369 unsigned int length, type, size;
2370 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2371 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2374 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2376 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2378 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2379 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2380 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2381 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2382 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2385 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2386 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2389 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2392 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2393 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2397 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2398 unsigned char *data;
2401 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2402 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2405 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2406 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2408 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2409 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2411 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2412 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2413 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2414 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2415 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2418 tlsext_servername = 1;
2420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2421 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2422 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2423 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2424 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2425 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2429 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2430 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2431 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2432 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2433 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2436 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2437 ecpointformatlist_length;
2438 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2439 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2440 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2441 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2447 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2449 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2450 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2451 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2452 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2454 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2457 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2458 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2461 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2463 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2465 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2468 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2469 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2472 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2473 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2476 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2477 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2478 unsigned char *selected;
2479 unsigned char selected_len;
2480 /* We must have requested it. */
2481 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2482 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2485 /* The data must be valid */
2486 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2487 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2491 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2493 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2494 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2495 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2498 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2499 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2500 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2503 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2504 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2505 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2509 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2511 /* We must have requested it. */
2512 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2513 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2517 * The extension data consists of:
2518 * uint16 list_length
2519 * uint8 proto_length;
2520 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2522 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2523 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2524 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2525 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2526 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2529 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2530 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2531 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2532 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2535 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2536 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2539 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2542 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2543 unsigned int hbtype;
2544 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2545 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2549 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2550 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2552 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2553 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2554 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2557 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2563 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2564 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2568 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2569 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2570 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2571 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2572 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2573 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2576 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2578 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2581 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2582 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2584 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2588 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2589 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2593 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2594 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2595 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2596 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2597 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2598 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2602 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2611 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2612 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2613 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2614 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2615 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2616 * initial connect only.
2618 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2619 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2620 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2622 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2629 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2635 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2640 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2642 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2643 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2647 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2648 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2651 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2652 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2656 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2658 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2659 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2660 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2661 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2663 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2665 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2668 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2669 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2672 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2673 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2676 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2677 s->servername_done = 0;
2682 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2683 static void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2685 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2687 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2689 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2690 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2691 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
2693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2694 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
2698 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2702 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2703 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2704 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2705 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2706 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2707 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2708 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2709 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2712 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2713 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2714 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2716 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2719 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2720 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2722 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2723 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2727 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2731 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2735 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2737 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2738 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2741 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2742 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2743 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2744 * influence which certificate is sent
2746 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2748 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2749 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2750 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2751 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2752 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2756 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2757 * et al can pick it up.
2759 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2760 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2762 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2763 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2764 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2766 /* status request response should be sent */
2767 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2768 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2769 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2771 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2773 /* something bad happened */
2774 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2775 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2776 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2780 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2784 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2785 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2788 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2789 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2797 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2799 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2800 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2804 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2805 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2806 * must contain uncompressed.
2808 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2809 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2810 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2811 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2812 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2813 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2814 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2815 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2816 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2818 unsigned char *list;
2819 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2820 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2821 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2822 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2823 found_uncompressed = 1;
2827 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2829 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2833 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2834 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2836 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2838 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2839 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2840 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2841 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2843 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2845 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2848 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2851 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2852 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2855 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2858 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2859 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2860 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2861 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2863 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2864 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2867 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2868 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2873 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2874 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2877 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2878 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2881 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2882 s->servername_done = 0;
2888 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2891 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2893 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2894 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2898 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2906 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2907 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2908 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2910 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2911 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2912 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2913 * point to the resulting session.
2915 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2916 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2917 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2920 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2921 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2922 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2923 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2924 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2925 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2926 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2929 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2930 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2931 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2932 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2933 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2934 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2936 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id,
2940 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2944 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2947 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2950 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2952 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2955 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2959 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2960 unsigned int type, size;
2962 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2963 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2964 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2968 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2972 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2974 unsigned char *etick;
2978 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2981 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2985 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2987 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2988 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2989 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2990 * calculate the master secret later.
2995 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2996 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3000 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3001 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3003 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3004 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3007 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3010 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3011 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3014 default: /* fatal error */
3020 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3032 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3034 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3035 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3036 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3037 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3038 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3039 * point to the resulting session.
3042 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3043 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3044 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3045 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3047 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3048 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3049 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3052 unsigned char *sdec;
3053 const unsigned char *p;
3054 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3055 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3058 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3059 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3062 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3063 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3064 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3065 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3066 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3067 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3076 /* Check key name matches */
3077 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3079 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3080 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3081 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3082 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3085 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3088 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3090 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3094 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3095 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3096 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3097 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3098 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3099 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3102 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3103 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3104 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3105 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3106 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3108 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3111 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3112 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3113 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3118 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3121 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3125 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3126 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3127 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3131 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3132 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3141 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3146 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3153 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3154 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3155 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3156 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3157 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3158 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3159 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3162 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3163 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3164 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3165 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3168 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3171 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3172 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3178 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3181 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3182 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3183 return table[i].nid;
3188 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3194 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3197 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3200 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3201 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3205 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3207 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3213 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3216 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3217 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3220 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3222 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3223 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3224 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3225 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3226 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3229 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3233 if (hash_alg > OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info))
3235 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3238 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3240 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3241 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3243 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3244 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3246 return inf->mfunc();
3249 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3253 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3254 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3257 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3258 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3260 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3261 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3262 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3268 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3269 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3270 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3272 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3273 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3275 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3276 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3278 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3280 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3281 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3283 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3285 if (psignhash_nid) {
3286 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3287 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3289 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3293 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3294 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3296 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3297 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3298 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3300 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3301 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3303 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3304 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3308 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3309 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3313 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3315 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3316 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3317 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3319 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3320 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3321 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3323 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3324 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3325 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3327 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3328 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3333 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3334 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3339 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3340 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3347 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3349 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3351 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3354 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3355 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3357 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3359 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3360 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3361 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3362 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3365 return tmpout - out;
3368 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3369 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3370 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3371 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3373 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3374 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3375 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3376 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3377 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3379 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3380 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3383 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3384 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3385 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3387 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3397 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3398 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3400 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3401 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3403 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3405 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3407 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3408 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3409 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3410 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3411 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3412 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3413 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3414 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3415 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3416 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3418 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3419 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3422 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3423 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3427 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3428 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3430 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3432 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3435 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3439 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3440 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3444 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3446 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3449 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3450 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3452 /* Should never happen */
3456 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3457 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3458 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3460 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3461 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3465 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3470 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3471 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3473 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3474 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3477 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3478 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3480 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3481 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3483 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3485 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3487 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3489 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3490 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3492 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3493 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3494 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3495 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3501 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3502 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3503 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3504 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3505 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3507 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3508 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3509 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3510 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3516 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3517 * the certificate for signing.
3519 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3521 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3522 * supported it stays as NULL.
3524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3525 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3526 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3528 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3529 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3530 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3531 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3535 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3536 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3542 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3543 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3544 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3546 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3551 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3558 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3560 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3563 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3564 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3565 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3567 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3568 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3572 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3574 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3576 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3578 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3580 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3581 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3585 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3588 unsigned short hbtype;
3589 unsigned int payload;
3590 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3592 if (s->msg_callback)
3593 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3595 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3597 /* Read type and payload length first */
3598 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3599 return 0; /* silently discard */
3602 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3603 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3606 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3607 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3611 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3612 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3614 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3615 if (buffer == NULL) {
3616 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3621 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3622 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3624 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3626 /* Random padding */
3627 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3628 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3632 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3633 3 + payload + padding);
3635 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3636 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3637 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3638 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3640 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3644 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3648 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3649 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3653 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3655 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3662 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3664 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3666 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3667 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3669 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3670 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3671 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3676 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3677 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3682 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3683 if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
3684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3689 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3690 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3691 * some random stuff.
3692 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3693 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3694 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3695 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3698 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3705 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3706 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3708 /* Sequence number */
3709 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3710 /* 16 random bytes */
3711 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3716 /* Random padding */
3717 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3718 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3722 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3724 if (s->msg_callback)
3725 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3726 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3727 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3729 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3738 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3742 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3745 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3747 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3748 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3749 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3750 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3751 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3752 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3754 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3755 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3756 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3760 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3762 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3765 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3768 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3770 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3772 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3774 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3782 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3783 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3785 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3788 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3789 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3792 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3793 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3798 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3799 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3801 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3805 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3809 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3812 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3815 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3820 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3821 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3823 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3824 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3825 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3827 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3834 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3835 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3836 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3838 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3839 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3840 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3846 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3850 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3854 if (default_nid == -1)
3856 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3858 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3859 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3860 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3865 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3866 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3870 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3871 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3872 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3879 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3880 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3881 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3882 * attempting to use them.
3885 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3887 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3888 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3889 /* Strict mode flags */
3890 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3891 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3892 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3894 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3899 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3900 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3903 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3904 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3906 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3909 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3911 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3912 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3914 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3916 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3917 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3920 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3921 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3922 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3923 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3924 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3932 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3935 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3937 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3938 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3940 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3947 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3948 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3949 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3950 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3951 else if (!check_flags)
3956 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3957 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3959 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3961 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3962 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3964 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3967 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3968 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3969 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3970 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3971 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3974 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3975 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3976 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3977 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3981 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3982 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3991 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3992 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3994 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3996 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3997 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3998 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4001 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4008 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4009 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4013 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4014 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4015 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4016 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4018 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4025 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4026 else if (check_flags)
4027 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4029 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4030 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4031 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4032 else if (!check_flags)
4035 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4036 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4037 else if (strict_mode) {
4038 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4039 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4040 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4041 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4043 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4050 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4051 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4055 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4058 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4061 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4066 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4067 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4068 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4069 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4070 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4074 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4078 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4080 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4081 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4083 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4084 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4085 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4089 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4092 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4094 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4096 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4097 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4099 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4100 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4101 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4103 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4104 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4105 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4106 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4107 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4112 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4115 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4117 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4118 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4122 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4123 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4124 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4125 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4126 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4128 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4131 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4135 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4138 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4139 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4146 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4147 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4149 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4150 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4151 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4152 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4153 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4154 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4157 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4158 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4160 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4165 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4167 int dh_secbits = 80;
4168 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4169 return DH_get_1024_160();
4170 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4171 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4176 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4177 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4180 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4186 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4187 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4188 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4190 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4191 if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
4197 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4198 return DH_get_2048_224();
4199 return DH_get_1024_160();
4203 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4206 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4208 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4209 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4213 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4215 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4218 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4220 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4221 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4222 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4223 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4225 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4226 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4229 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4231 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4234 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4237 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4239 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4240 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4242 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4243 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4245 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4246 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4251 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4252 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4253 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4256 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4258 int rv, start_idx, i;
4260 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4265 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4269 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4270 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4271 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);