2 * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
28 tls1_generate_master_secret,
29 tls1_change_cipher_state,
30 tls1_final_finish_mac,
31 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
32 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
34 tls1_export_keying_material,
36 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
37 tls_close_construct_packet,
41 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
45 tls1_generate_master_secret,
46 tls1_change_cipher_state,
47 tls1_final_finish_mac,
48 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
49 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
51 tls1_export_keying_material,
52 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
53 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
54 tls_close_construct_packet,
58 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
62 tls1_generate_master_secret,
63 tls1_change_cipher_state,
64 tls1_final_finish_mac,
65 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
66 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
68 tls1_export_keying_material,
69 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
70 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
71 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
72 tls_close_construct_packet,
76 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
79 tls13_setup_key_block,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
86 tls13_export_keying_material,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
89 tls_close_construct_packet,
93 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
106 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
112 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
114 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
118 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
123 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
124 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
126 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 * Table of curve information.
135 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
136 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
138 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
139 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
140 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
141 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
142 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
143 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
144 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
145 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
146 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
147 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
148 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
149 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
150 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
151 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
152 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
153 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
154 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
155 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
156 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
157 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
158 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
159 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
160 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
161 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
162 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
163 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
166 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
167 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
170 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
171 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
173 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
176 /* The default curves */
177 static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
178 29, /* X25519 (29) */
179 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
180 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
181 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
184 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
189 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
191 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
192 if (group_id < 1 || group_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
194 return &nid_list[group_id - 1];
197 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
200 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
201 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
208 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
209 * the number of groups supported.
211 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
215 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
216 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
217 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
218 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
219 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
222 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
223 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
227 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
228 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
233 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
234 *pgroups = eccurves_default;
235 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default);
237 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
238 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
244 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
245 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op)
247 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *cinfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(curve);
248 unsigned char ctmp[2];
252 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
253 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
256 ctmp[0] = curve >> 8;
257 ctmp[1] = curve & 0xff;
258 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)ctmp);
261 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
262 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
265 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
271 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
272 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
274 const uint16_t *curves;
278 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
280 curve_id = (p[1] << 8) | p[2];
281 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
282 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
283 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
284 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
285 if (curve_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
287 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
288 if (curve_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
290 } else /* Should never happen */
293 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &curves, &num_curves);
294 if (!tls1_in_list(curve_id, curves, num_curves))
296 return tls_curve_allowed(s, curve_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
300 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
301 * if there is no match.
302 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
303 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
304 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
306 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
308 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
309 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
312 /* Can't do anything on client side */
316 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
318 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
319 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
321 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
323 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
324 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
325 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
326 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
327 /* Should never happen */
330 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
334 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
335 * otherwise peer decides.
337 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
338 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
339 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
341 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
342 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
345 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
346 uint16_t id = pref[i];
348 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
349 || !tls_curve_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
357 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
361 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
362 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
367 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
370 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
371 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist));
374 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
375 unsigned long idmask;
377 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
378 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
380 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
393 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
397 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
400 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
402 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
408 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
410 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
412 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
414 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
415 if (nid == NID_undef)
416 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
417 if (nid == NID_undef)
418 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
419 if (nid == NID_undef)
421 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
422 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
424 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
428 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
429 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
433 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
437 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
439 /* Return group id of a key */
440 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
442 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
447 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
448 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp));
451 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
452 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
456 unsigned char comp_id;
459 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
460 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
462 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
463 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
465 /* Get required compression id */
466 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
467 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
468 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
469 /* Compression not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
472 int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
474 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
475 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
476 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
477 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
482 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
483 * supported (see RFC4492).
485 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL)
488 for (i = 0; i < s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len; i++) {
489 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
495 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
496 static int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id)
498 const uint16_t *groups;
504 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
507 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
508 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
509 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
512 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
516 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
517 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
520 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
521 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
522 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
523 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
527 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
530 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
534 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
536 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
537 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
538 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
540 *pformats = ecformats_default;
541 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
543 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
545 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
550 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
551 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
553 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
557 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
560 /* If not EC nothing to do */
561 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
563 /* Check compression */
564 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
566 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
567 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id))
570 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
573 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
578 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
579 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
580 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
581 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
582 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
584 return 0; /* Should never happen */
585 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
586 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
595 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
597 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
599 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
600 * is compatible with the client extensions.
602 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
604 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
606 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
608 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
610 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
613 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
614 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256);
615 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
616 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384);
623 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
628 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
630 /* Default sigalg schemes */
631 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
633 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
634 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
635 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
636 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
639 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
640 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
641 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
643 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
644 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
645 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
648 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
649 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
651 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
652 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
654 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
655 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
657 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
658 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
659 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
664 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
665 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
666 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
670 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
672 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
673 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
674 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
675 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
676 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
677 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
678 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
679 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
680 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
681 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
682 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
683 NID_undef, NID_undef},
684 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
685 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
686 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
687 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
688 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
689 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
691 {"rsa_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
692 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
693 NID_undef, NID_undef},
694 {"rsa_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
695 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
696 NID_undef, NID_undef},
697 {"rsa_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
698 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
699 NID_undef, NID_undef},
700 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
701 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
702 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
703 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
704 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
705 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
706 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
707 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
708 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
709 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
710 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
711 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
712 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
713 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
714 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
716 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
717 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
718 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
719 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
720 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
721 NID_undef, NID_undef},
722 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
723 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
724 NID_undef, NID_undef},
725 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
726 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
727 NID_undef, NID_undef},
728 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
729 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
730 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
733 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
734 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
735 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
736 NID_undef, NID_undef},
737 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
738 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
739 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
740 NID_undef, NID_undef},
741 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
742 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
743 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
744 NID_undef, NID_undef}
747 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
748 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
749 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
750 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
751 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
756 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
757 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
759 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
760 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
761 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
762 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
763 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
764 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
765 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
766 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
767 0 /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
770 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
771 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
774 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
776 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
778 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
783 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
784 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
789 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
790 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
793 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
803 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
804 * is fixed by the certificate type.
806 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
812 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
813 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
814 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
816 if (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
822 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
825 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
827 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
828 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
830 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
834 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
836 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
837 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
840 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
842 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
844 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
847 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
851 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
854 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
858 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
859 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
860 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
861 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
863 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
864 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
867 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
868 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
873 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
874 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
875 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
877 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
878 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
879 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
880 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
881 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
882 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
884 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
885 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
890 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
891 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
894 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
896 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
897 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
899 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
900 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
901 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
903 /* Should never happen */
906 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
907 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
908 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
909 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
912 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
913 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
914 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
916 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
918 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
919 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
922 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
923 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
924 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
925 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
929 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
931 /* Check point compression is permitted */
932 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
934 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
938 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
939 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
940 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
941 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
943 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
948 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
949 /* Check curve matches extensions */
950 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey))) {
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
954 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
955 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
956 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
957 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
958 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
959 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
964 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
969 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
970 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
971 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
972 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
975 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
976 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
977 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
978 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
981 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
987 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
988 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
990 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
991 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
992 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
993 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
994 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
999 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1000 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1004 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1006 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1008 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1013 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1014 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1015 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1017 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1020 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1022 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1024 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1025 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1026 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1027 ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1029 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1030 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1031 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1032 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1034 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1036 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1037 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1038 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1044 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1045 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1046 * @c: cipher to check
1047 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1048 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1050 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1052 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1054 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1055 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1057 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1059 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1060 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1063 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1064 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1066 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1067 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1068 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1070 if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
1073 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1074 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1077 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1080 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1082 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1084 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1087 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1092 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1093 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1094 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1095 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1096 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1097 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1098 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1100 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1101 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1103 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1104 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1105 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1107 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1108 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1113 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1114 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1115 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1116 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1124 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1126 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1129 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1131 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1133 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1135 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1140 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1142 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1143 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1144 * point to the resulting session.
1146 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1147 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1148 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1151 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1152 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1153 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1154 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1155 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1156 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1157 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1160 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1161 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1162 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1163 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1164 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1165 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1167 TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1172 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1175 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1178 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1179 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1182 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1185 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1186 if (!ticketext->present)
1189 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1192 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1195 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1196 return TICKET_EMPTY;
1198 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1200 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1201 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1202 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1203 * calculate the master secret later.
1205 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1208 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1209 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1211 case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1212 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1213 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1215 case TICKET_SUCCESS:
1216 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1218 case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1219 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1220 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1223 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1228 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1230 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1231 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1232 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1233 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1234 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1235 * point to the resulting session.
1237 TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1238 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1239 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1242 unsigned char *sdec;
1243 const unsigned char *p;
1244 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1245 TICKET_RETURN ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1247 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1248 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1249 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
1250 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1252 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1253 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1255 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1256 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1258 ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1261 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1262 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1263 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1268 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1274 /* Check key name matches */
1275 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1276 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
1277 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1280 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
1281 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
1282 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1283 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1284 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
1286 + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
1291 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1294 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1298 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1300 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1301 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1305 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1306 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1307 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1310 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1311 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1312 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1313 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1315 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1316 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1317 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1318 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1319 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1320 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1321 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1322 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1324 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1326 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1327 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1329 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1332 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1336 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1340 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1341 if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) {
1342 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1343 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1346 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1347 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1348 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1352 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1353 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1356 return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1358 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1362 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1364 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1366 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1367 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1371 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1372 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1374 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1377 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1378 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
1380 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1381 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1383 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1384 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1385 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1386 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1387 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1389 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1390 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1392 if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
1394 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1395 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1396 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1397 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1398 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1399 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1403 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1404 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1408 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1410 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1411 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1412 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1414 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1417 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1418 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
1419 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1420 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1425 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1427 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1428 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1429 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1430 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1432 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1435 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1436 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1441 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1442 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1444 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1446 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1449 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1450 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1452 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1453 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1454 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1455 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1463 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1464 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1465 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1466 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1468 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1469 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1470 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1471 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1473 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1474 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1476 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1477 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1488 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1489 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1491 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1492 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1494 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1496 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1498 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1499 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1500 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1501 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1502 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1503 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1504 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1505 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1506 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1507 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1509 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1510 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1513 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1514 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1518 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1519 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1521 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1523 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs));
1526 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1530 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1531 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1535 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1541 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1543 /* Invalid data length */
1544 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1549 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf));
1552 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1560 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1567 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1569 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1570 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1572 /* Should never happen */
1573 if (s->cert == NULL)
1576 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1577 &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1582 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1584 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1587 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1590 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1593 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1596 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1597 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
1598 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1600 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1601 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1603 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1604 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1605 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1610 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1611 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1612 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1614 uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1615 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1616 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1619 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1621 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1625 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1627 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1628 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1630 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1632 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1633 if (psignhash != NULL)
1634 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1636 return (int)numsigalgs;
1639 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1640 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1641 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1643 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1644 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1646 || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1647 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1649 shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1651 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1653 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1654 if (psignhash != NULL)
1655 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1657 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1659 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1660 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1663 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1664 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1668 int sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1671 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1673 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1674 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1675 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1676 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1677 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1678 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1679 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1680 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1682 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1683 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1684 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1687 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1688 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1690 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1692 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1694 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1695 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1698 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1700 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1702 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1704 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1705 /* See if we have a match for TLS 1.3 names */
1707 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1709 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1711 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1722 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1723 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1726 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || (p != NULL && hash_alg == NID_undef))
1729 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
1730 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
1733 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
1734 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
1739 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1740 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1742 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1746 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1750 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1753 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1755 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
1760 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1761 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1763 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1765 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1766 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
1767 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
1769 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1771 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1772 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
1777 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1782 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1783 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1784 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1786 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1787 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1788 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1794 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
1798 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
1802 if (default_nid == -1)
1804 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
1806 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
1807 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
1808 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
1813 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1814 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
1818 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1819 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1820 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
1827 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1828 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1829 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1830 * attempting to use them.
1833 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
1835 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1836 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1837 /* Strict mode flags */
1838 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1839 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1840 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1842 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
1847 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
1848 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
1851 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
1852 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1854 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1857 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
1859 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
1860 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1862 pk = cpk->privatekey;
1864 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
1865 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1874 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
1877 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1879 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1880 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
1882 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
1889 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1890 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
1891 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
1892 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1893 else if (!check_flags)
1898 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1899 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1901 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
1904 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
1906 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1910 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1911 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
1914 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1915 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1916 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
1920 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1921 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
1924 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1925 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
1926 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
1929 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1930 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
1931 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
1934 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1935 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
1936 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
1945 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
1946 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
1948 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
1950 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
1951 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
1952 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
1954 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
1957 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
1964 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
1965 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
1969 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
1970 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
1971 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1972 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
1974 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
1981 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
1982 else if (check_flags)
1983 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
1985 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
1986 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
1987 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
1988 else if (!check_flags)
1991 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
1992 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
1993 else if (strict_mode) {
1994 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
1995 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1996 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1997 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
1999 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2006 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2007 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2009 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2011 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2014 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2017 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2021 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2024 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2025 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2026 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2030 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2033 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2036 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names;
2038 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2039 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2041 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2042 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2043 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2045 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2046 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2047 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2048 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2049 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2054 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2057 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2059 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2060 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2064 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2065 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2067 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2070 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2074 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2077 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2078 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2085 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2086 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2088 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2089 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2090 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2091 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2092 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2093 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2094 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2095 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2098 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2099 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2101 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2105 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2107 int dh_secbits = 80;
2108 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2109 return DH_get_1024_160();
2110 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2111 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2116 if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
2118 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
2121 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2129 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2130 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2132 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2133 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2141 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2142 return DH_get_2048_224();
2143 return DH_get_1024_160();
2147 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2150 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2153 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2154 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2155 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2156 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2158 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2161 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2163 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2166 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2168 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2169 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2170 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2171 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2173 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2175 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2176 if (nid == NID_undef)
2179 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2181 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2184 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2187 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2189 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2190 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2192 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2193 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2195 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2196 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2201 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2202 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2203 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2206 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2208 int rv, start_idx, i;
2210 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2215 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2219 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2220 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2221 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2229 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2230 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2233 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2235 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2236 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2238 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2239 if (clu == NULL || !(clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth))
2242 /* If PSS and we have no PSS cert use RSA */
2243 if (sig_idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN && !ssl_has_cert(s, sig_idx))
2244 sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
2246 return s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2250 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2251 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2253 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error
2254 * and an appropriate error code is set and the TLS alert set in *al.
2256 * For clients al is set to NULL. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2257 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2258 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2260 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int *al)
2262 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2265 s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
2266 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2268 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2271 int curve = -1, skip_ec = 0;
2274 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2275 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2276 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2278 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2279 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2280 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2281 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2282 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2284 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
2286 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, lu->sig_idx)) {
2287 if (lu->sig_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
2288 || !ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_RSA))
2290 sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
2292 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2293 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2295 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2297 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2298 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec)
2299 != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
2302 if (skip_ec || (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve))
2310 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2313 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2315 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2319 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2320 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2322 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2325 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2326 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2331 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2332 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2333 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2334 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2341 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2344 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2345 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2348 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2351 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2353 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2354 if (cc_idx != sig_idx) {
2355 if (sig_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
2356 || cc_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA)
2358 sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
2361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2362 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2366 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2369 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2370 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2375 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2377 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2378 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
2380 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2383 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2388 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2389 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2390 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2391 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs)
2394 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2398 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2403 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2406 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2413 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2414 s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
2415 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2416 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;