2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
25 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
27 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
28 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
30 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
34 tls1_generate_master_secret,
35 tls1_change_cipher_state,
36 tls1_final_finish_mac,
37 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
38 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
39 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
41 tls1_export_keying_material,
43 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
48 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
52 tls1_generate_master_secret,
53 tls1_change_cipher_state,
54 tls1_final_finish_mac,
55 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59 tls1_export_keying_material,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
61 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
62 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
70 tls1_generate_master_secret,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac,
73 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
74 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
75 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
77 tls1_export_keying_material,
78 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
79 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
80 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
81 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
85 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
88 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
89 * http, the cache would over fill
98 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
102 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
104 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
108 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
111 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
112 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
114 s->version = s->method->version;
117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
120 int nid; /* Curve NID */
121 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
122 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
125 /* Mask for curve type */
126 # define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3
127 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
128 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
129 # define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2
132 * Table of curve information.
133 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
134 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
136 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
137 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
138 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
139 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
140 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
141 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
142 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
143 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
144 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
145 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
146 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
147 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
148 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
149 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
150 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
151 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
152 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
153 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
154 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
155 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
156 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
157 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
158 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
159 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
160 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
161 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
162 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
166 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM},
169 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
171 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
175 /* The default curves */
176 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
177 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
178 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
179 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
180 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
183 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
188 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
189 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
190 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
193 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
194 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
196 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
197 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
198 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
199 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
200 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
201 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
202 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
203 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
204 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
205 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
206 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
207 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
208 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
209 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
210 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
211 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
212 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
213 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
214 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
215 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
216 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
217 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
221 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
222 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
223 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
226 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
228 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
229 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
231 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
234 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
237 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
238 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
245 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
247 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
248 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
249 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
250 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
251 * lists in the first place.
252 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
253 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
254 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
256 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
257 const unsigned char **pcurves,
260 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
262 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
263 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
265 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
266 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
267 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
268 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
269 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
272 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
273 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
277 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
278 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
282 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
283 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
286 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
287 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
291 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
292 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
297 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
302 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
303 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
305 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
308 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
310 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
311 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
312 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
315 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
318 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
319 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
321 const unsigned char *curves;
322 size_t num_curves, i;
323 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
324 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
326 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
328 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
331 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
332 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
334 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
335 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
337 } else /* Should never happen */
340 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
342 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
343 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
344 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
350 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
351 * if there is no match.
352 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
353 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
354 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
356 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
358 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
359 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
361 /* Can't do anything on client side */
365 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
367 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
368 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
370 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
371 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
372 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
373 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
374 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
375 /* Should never happen */
378 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
382 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
383 * but s->options is a long...
385 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
386 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
388 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
389 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
390 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
391 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
393 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
396 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
399 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
401 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
402 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
403 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
405 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
409 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
410 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
411 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
412 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
413 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
416 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
417 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
425 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
429 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
430 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
432 unsigned char *clist, *p;
435 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
438 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
439 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
442 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
443 unsigned long idmask;
445 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
447 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
456 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
460 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
464 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
467 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
469 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
475 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
477 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
479 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
481 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
482 if (nid == NID_undef)
483 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
484 if (nid == NID_undef)
485 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
486 if (nid == NID_undef)
488 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
489 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
491 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
495 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
496 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
501 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
505 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
508 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
509 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
516 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
517 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
520 /* Determine curve ID */
521 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
522 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
523 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
527 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
529 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
531 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
532 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
534 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
535 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
537 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
543 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
544 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
545 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
547 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
548 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
551 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
552 * supported (see RFC4492).
554 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
555 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
556 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
557 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
558 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
561 if (i == num_formats)
566 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
567 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
568 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
570 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
572 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
573 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
574 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
575 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
576 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
580 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
581 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
586 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
593 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
597 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
599 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
600 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
601 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
603 *pformats = ecformats_default;
604 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
606 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
608 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
613 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
614 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
616 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
618 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
621 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
624 /* If not EC nothing to do */
625 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
627 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
631 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
634 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
638 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
639 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
641 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
647 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
648 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
649 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
650 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
651 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
653 return 0; /* Should never happen */
654 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
655 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
657 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
659 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
660 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
661 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
663 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
669 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
671 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
673 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
675 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
676 * is compatible with the client extensions.
678 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
680 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
683 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
686 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
687 unsigned char curve_id[2];
688 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
689 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
690 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
691 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
692 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
696 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
697 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
701 /* Need a shared curve */
702 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
706 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
710 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
715 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
718 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
719 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
722 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
723 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
725 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
728 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
729 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
731 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
735 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
737 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
740 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
741 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
742 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
743 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
745 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
746 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
747 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
748 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
749 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
750 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
752 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
753 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
754 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
759 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
760 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
761 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
764 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
767 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
770 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
771 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
772 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
773 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
774 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
776 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
777 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
780 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
781 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
785 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
786 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
787 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
788 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
789 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
790 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
791 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
793 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
794 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
799 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
800 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
802 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
803 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
805 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
806 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
807 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
808 /* Should never happen */
811 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
812 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
813 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
817 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
818 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
819 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
820 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
822 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
823 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
826 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
827 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
830 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
831 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
832 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
833 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
836 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
837 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
838 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
839 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
845 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
849 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
850 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
851 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
852 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
855 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
856 if (i == sent_sigslen
857 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
858 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
859 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
862 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
867 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
868 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
869 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
875 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
877 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
882 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
883 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
884 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
886 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
889 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
891 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
893 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
894 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
895 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
896 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
897 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
898 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
899 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
903 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
905 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
906 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
913 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
914 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
915 * @c: cipher to check
916 * @op: Security check that you want to do
918 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
920 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
922 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
923 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
925 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
927 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
928 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
930 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
931 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
934 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
937 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
939 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
941 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
944 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
945 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
946 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
956 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
957 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
958 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
959 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
960 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
963 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) {
964 PACKET extensions = *packet;
965 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
966 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
969 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
970 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
973 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
974 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
980 if (num_extensions <= 1)
983 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
984 if (extension_types == NULL) {
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
989 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
990 extensions = *packet;
991 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
993 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
994 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
995 /* This should not happen. */
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1001 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1005 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1006 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1007 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1008 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1013 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1017 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1018 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1021 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1022 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1023 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1024 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1026 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1028 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1029 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1031 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1032 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1034 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1035 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1036 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1037 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1048 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1050 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1051 if (s->renegotiate) {
1054 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1059 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1062 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1065 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1072 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1073 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1076 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1077 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1078 unsigned long size_str;
1082 * check for enough space.
1083 * 4 for the servername type and extension length
1084 * 2 for servernamelist length
1085 * 1 for the hostname type
1086 * 2 for hostname length
1090 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1092 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1095 /* extension type and length */
1096 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1097 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1099 /* length of servername list */
1100 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1102 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1103 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1105 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1108 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1109 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1110 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1111 * Client Hello message */
1113 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1114 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1120 * check for enough space.
1121 * 4 for the srp type type and extension length
1122 * 1 for the srp user identity
1123 * + srp user identity length
1125 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1128 /* fill in the extension */
1129 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1130 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1131 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1132 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1140 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1143 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1144 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1146 unsigned char *etmp;
1148 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1150 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1152 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1154 if (num_formats > 255) {
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1159 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1160 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1161 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1162 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1163 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1167 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1169 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1170 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1173 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1175 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1177 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1182 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1184 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1185 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1186 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1187 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1188 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1192 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1194 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1195 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1196 ret += curves_list_len;
1198 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1200 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1202 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1203 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1204 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1205 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1206 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1207 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1208 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1210 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1211 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1212 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1215 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1216 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1219 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1222 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1224 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1227 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1233 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1235 const unsigned char *salg;
1236 unsigned char *etmp;
1237 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1238 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1240 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1242 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1244 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1245 /* Fill in lengths */
1246 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1252 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1254 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1258 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1259 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1260 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1266 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1267 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1273 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1275 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1276 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1278 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1279 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1281 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1282 /* save position of id len */
1283 unsigned char *q = ret;
1284 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1285 /* skip over id len */
1287 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1293 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1296 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1297 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1298 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1299 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1301 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1305 * 1: peer may send requests
1306 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1308 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1309 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1311 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1316 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1318 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1319 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1321 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1323 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1329 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1330 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1331 * (see longer comment below)
1333 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1334 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1336 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1337 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1338 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1339 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1340 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1341 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1344 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1347 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1348 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1353 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1356 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1359 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1366 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1367 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1368 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1370 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1373 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1374 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
1378 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1382 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1383 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1384 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1387 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1388 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1390 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1391 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1397 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1399 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1406 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1409 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1413 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1414 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1417 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1418 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1420 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1423 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1424 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1425 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1426 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1431 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1433 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1436 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1441 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1444 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1447 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1455 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1456 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1459 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1460 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1461 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1464 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1469 const unsigned char *plist;
1472 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1476 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1478 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1480 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1482 if (plistlen > 255) {
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1487 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1488 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1489 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1490 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1495 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1498 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1500 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1501 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1503 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1506 /* if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket later */
1507 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1510 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1511 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1517 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1518 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1521 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1522 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1526 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1532 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1540 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1541 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1542 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1543 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1544 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1545 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1546 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1547 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1548 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1549 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1551 if (limit - ret < 36)
1553 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1558 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1559 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1560 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1562 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1566 * 1: peer may send requests
1567 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1569 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1570 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1572 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1578 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1579 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1580 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1581 const unsigned char *npa;
1582 unsigned int npalen;
1585 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1587 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1588 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1589 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1591 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1593 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1595 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1599 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1601 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1603 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1604 * for other cases too.
1606 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1607 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1608 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1609 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1610 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1612 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1616 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1617 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1621 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1622 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1623 unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1625 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1627 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1631 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1637 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1640 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1645 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1646 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1647 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1648 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1650 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1652 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1654 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1656 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1657 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1661 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1663 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1664 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1665 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1668 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1670 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1671 &s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1672 &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1673 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1681 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1682 * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_*
1683 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1684 * returns 1 on success, 0
1686 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al)
1688 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1689 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1691 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1692 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1693 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1694 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1695 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1697 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1698 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1699 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1700 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1701 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1702 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1705 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1707 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1708 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1711 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1712 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1722 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1723 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1724 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1729 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1730 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1731 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1732 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1734 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1740 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1741 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1742 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1743 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1744 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1745 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1746 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1748 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1749 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1750 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1751 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1752 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1753 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1754 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1755 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1756 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1757 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1758 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1759 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1760 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1763 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1764 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1768 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1769 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1770 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1774 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1777 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1778 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1780 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1783 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1786 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1787 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1789 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1790 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1793 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1794 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1796 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1799 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1802 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1803 s->servername_done = 0;
1804 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1806 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1809 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1810 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1811 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1812 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1813 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1814 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1816 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1817 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1821 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1822 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1823 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1825 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1826 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1827 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1828 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1831 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1832 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1835 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1837 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1840 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1843 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1847 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1848 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1851 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1853 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1856 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1857 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1858 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1859 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1861 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1862 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1864 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1865 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1868 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1870 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1871 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1872 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1873 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1874 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1875 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1876 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1877 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1878 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1879 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1880 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1881 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1882 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1883 * the value of the Host: field.
1884 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1885 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1886 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1888 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1892 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1893 unsigned int servname_type;
1894 PACKET sni, hostname;
1896 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1897 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1898 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1903 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1904 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1905 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1907 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1908 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1909 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1911 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1912 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1914 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1915 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1916 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1921 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1922 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1926 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1927 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1931 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1932 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1936 s->servername_done = 1;
1939 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1940 * fall back to a full handshake.
1942 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1943 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1944 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1948 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1951 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1954 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1958 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1959 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1961 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1962 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1969 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1970 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1972 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension,
1973 &ec_point_format_list)
1974 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1979 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1980 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1981 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1982 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1986 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1987 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1989 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1990 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension,
1991 &elliptic_curve_list)
1992 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1993 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1998 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1999 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2000 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2001 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2006 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2007 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2008 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2009 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
2010 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
2011 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2012 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2015 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2016 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2018 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2019 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2020 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2025 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2026 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2030 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2031 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2032 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2037 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2038 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2039 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2040 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list))
2043 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2045 PACKET responder_id;
2046 const unsigned char *id_data;
2048 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2050 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2054 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
2055 && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2056 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
2057 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2061 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2062 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2063 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2067 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2068 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2072 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2073 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2074 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2079 /* Read in request_extensions */
2080 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2083 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2084 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2085 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2086 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2087 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2088 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2089 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2090 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2091 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2099 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2101 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2105 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2106 unsigned int hbtype;
2108 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2109 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2110 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2114 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2115 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2117 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2118 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2119 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2122 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2128 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2129 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2131 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2134 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2135 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2136 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2137 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2138 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2139 * anything like that, but this might change).
2141 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2142 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2143 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2144 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2145 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2147 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2151 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2152 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2153 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2157 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2158 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2159 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2160 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2161 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2165 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2166 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2168 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2169 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2173 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2174 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2175 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2176 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2177 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2180 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2181 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2186 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2187 /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */
2188 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2194 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2196 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2197 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2198 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2200 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2205 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2206 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2207 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2208 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2213 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2216 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2217 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2218 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2221 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2230 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2231 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2232 * fill the length of the block.
2234 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2236 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2238 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2239 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2240 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2248 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2250 unsigned int length, type, size;
2251 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2252 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2255 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2257 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2259 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2260 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2262 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2263 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2266 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2268 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2270 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2273 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2274 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2278 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2283 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2284 const unsigned char *data;
2287 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2288 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2291 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2292 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2294 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2295 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2297 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2298 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2299 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2300 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2301 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2304 tlsext_servername = 1;
2306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2307 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2308 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2309 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2310 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2311 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2315 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2316 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2317 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2318 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2319 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2322 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2323 ecpointformatlist_length;
2324 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2325 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2326 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2327 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2333 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2335 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2336 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2337 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2338 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2340 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2343 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2344 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2347 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2349 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2351 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2354 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2355 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2358 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2359 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2363 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2364 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2365 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2367 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2368 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2369 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2370 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2371 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2372 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2374 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2376 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2377 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2378 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2381 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2386 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2387 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2388 unsigned char *selected;
2389 unsigned char selected_len;
2390 /* We must have requested it. */
2391 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2392 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2395 /* The data must be valid */
2396 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2397 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2401 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2403 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2404 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2405 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2408 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2409 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2410 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2413 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2414 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2415 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2419 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2421 /* We must have requested it. */
2422 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2423 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2427 * The extension data consists of:
2428 * uint16 list_length
2429 * uint8 proto_length;
2430 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2432 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2433 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2434 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2435 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2436 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2439 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2440 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2441 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2442 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2445 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2446 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2449 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2452 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2453 unsigned int hbtype;
2454 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2455 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2459 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2460 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2462 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2463 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2464 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2467 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2473 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2474 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2478 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2479 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2480 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2481 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2482 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2484 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2485 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2487 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2490 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2491 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2493 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2497 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2498 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2502 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2503 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2504 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2505 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2506 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2507 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2511 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2520 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2521 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2522 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2523 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2524 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2526 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2527 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2528 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2530 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2536 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2539 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2540 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2541 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2550 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2552 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2556 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2561 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2563 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2564 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2568 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2569 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2572 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2573 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2577 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2579 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2580 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2581 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2582 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2584 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2586 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2589 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2590 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2593 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2594 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2597 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2598 s->servername_done = 0;
2603 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2604 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2606 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2608 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2611 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2612 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2614 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2615 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2618 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2621 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2622 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2623 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2627 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2632 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2633 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2634 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2635 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2636 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2637 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2638 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2639 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2642 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2643 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2644 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2646 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2649 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2650 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2652 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2653 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2657 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2661 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2665 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2667 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2668 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2671 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2672 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2673 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2674 * influence which certificate is sent
2676 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2678 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2679 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2680 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2681 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2682 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2686 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2687 * et al can pick it up.
2689 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2690 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2692 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2693 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2694 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2696 /* status request response should be sent */
2697 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2698 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2699 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2701 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2703 /* something bad happened */
2704 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2705 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2706 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2710 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2712 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) {
2718 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2719 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2722 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2723 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2731 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2733 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2734 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2738 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2739 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2740 * must contain uncompressed.
2742 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2743 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2744 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2745 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2746 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2747 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2748 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2749 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2751 unsigned char *list;
2752 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2753 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2754 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2755 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2756 found_uncompressed = 1;
2760 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2762 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2766 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2767 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2769 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2771 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2772 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2773 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2774 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2776 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2778 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2781 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2782 * that we don't receive a status message
2784 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2785 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2786 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2789 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2790 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2793 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2794 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2797 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2798 s->servername_done = 0;
2804 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2807 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2809 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2810 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2814 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2822 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2823 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2824 * need to be handled at the same time.
2826 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2829 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2830 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2831 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2832 * point to the resulting session.
2834 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2835 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2836 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2839 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2840 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2841 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2842 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2843 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2844 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2845 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2848 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2849 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2850 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2851 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2852 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2853 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2855 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2858 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2859 const PACKET *session_id,
2863 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2866 int have_ticket = 0;
2867 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2870 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2871 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2874 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2877 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2880 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2884 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2885 unsigned int type, size;
2887 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2888 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2889 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2893 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2897 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2899 const unsigned char *etick;
2901 /* Duplicate extension */
2902 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2910 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2913 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2917 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2919 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2920 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2921 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2922 * calculate the master secret later.
2927 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2928 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2932 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2933 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2935 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2936 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2939 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2942 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2943 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2946 default: /* fatal error */
2952 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2953 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2954 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2960 if (have_ticket == 0)
2967 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2969 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2970 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2971 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2972 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2973 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2974 * point to the resulting session.
2977 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2978 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2979 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2980 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2981 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2983 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2984 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2985 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2988 unsigned char *sdec;
2989 const unsigned char *p;
2990 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2991 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2992 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2993 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2994 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2995 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2998 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2999 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3002 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3007 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3008 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3009 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3020 /* Check key name matches */
3021 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3022 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3026 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3027 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3028 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3029 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3030 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3031 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
3036 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3039 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3044 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3045 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3046 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3049 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3050 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3051 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3054 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3055 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3056 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3057 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3058 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3060 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3061 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3065 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3066 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3071 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3075 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3079 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3080 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3081 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3085 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3086 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3095 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3099 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3100 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3104 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3111 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3112 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3113 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3114 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3115 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3116 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3117 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3118 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3119 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3120 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3123 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3124 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3125 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3126 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3127 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3128 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3129 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3132 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3135 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3136 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3142 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3145 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3146 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3147 return table[i].nid;
3152 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3158 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3161 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3164 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3165 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3169 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3171 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3178 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3181 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3182 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3183 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3184 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3185 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3186 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3187 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3188 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3189 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3190 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3193 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3199 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3201 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3202 return tls12_md_info + i;
3208 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3210 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3211 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3213 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3216 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3219 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3223 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3224 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3227 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3228 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3230 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3231 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3232 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3234 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3235 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3236 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3238 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3239 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3241 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3242 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3248 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3249 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3250 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3252 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3253 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3255 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3256 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3258 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3260 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3261 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3263 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3265 if (psignhash_nid) {
3266 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3267 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3269 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3273 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3274 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3276 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3277 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3278 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3280 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3281 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3283 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3284 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3288 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3289 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3293 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3295 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3296 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3297 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3299 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3300 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3301 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3303 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3304 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3305 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3307 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3308 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3313 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3314 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3319 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3320 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3327 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3329 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3331 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3334 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3335 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3337 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3339 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3340 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3341 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3342 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3345 return tmpout - out;
3348 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3349 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3350 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3351 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3353 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3354 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3355 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3356 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3357 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3359 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3360 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3363 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3364 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3365 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3367 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3377 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3378 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3380 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3381 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3383 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3385 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3387 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3388 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3389 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3390 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3391 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3392 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3393 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3394 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3395 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3396 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3398 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3399 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3402 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3403 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3407 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3408 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3410 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3412 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3415 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3419 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3420 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3424 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3426 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3429 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3430 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3432 /* Should never happen */
3436 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3437 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3438 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3440 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3441 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3445 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3450 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3451 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3453 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3454 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3457 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3458 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3459 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3460 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3461 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3463 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3464 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3465 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3466 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3472 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3473 * the certificate for signing.
3475 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3477 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3478 * supported it stays as NULL.
3480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3481 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3482 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3485 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3486 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3487 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3491 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3492 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3494 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3495 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3496 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3497 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3498 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3499 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3500 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3506 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3507 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3508 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3510 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3515 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3522 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3524 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3527 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3528 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3529 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3531 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3532 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3536 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3538 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3540 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3542 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3544 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3545 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3548 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3552 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3555 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3557 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3558 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3559 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3560 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3561 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3562 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3564 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3565 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3566 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3570 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3572 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3575 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3578 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3580 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3582 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3584 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3592 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3593 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3595 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3598 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3599 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3602 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3603 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3608 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3609 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3611 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3615 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3619 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3622 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3625 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3630 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3631 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3633 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3634 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3635 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3637 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3644 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3645 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3646 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3648 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3649 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3650 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3656 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3660 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3664 if (default_nid == -1)
3666 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3668 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3669 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3670 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3675 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3676 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3680 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3681 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3682 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3689 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3690 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3691 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3692 * attempting to use them.
3695 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3697 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3698 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3699 /* Strict mode flags */
3700 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3701 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3702 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3704 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3709 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3710 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3713 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3714 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3716 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3719 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3721 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3722 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3724 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3726 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3727 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3733 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3736 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3738 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3739 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3741 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3748 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3749 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3750 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3751 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3752 else if (!check_flags)
3757 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3758 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3760 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3762 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3763 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3765 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3768 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3769 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3770 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3771 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3774 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3775 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3776 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3780 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3781 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3784 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3785 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3786 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3789 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3790 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3791 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3794 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3795 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3796 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3805 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3806 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3808 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3810 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3811 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3812 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3815 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3822 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3823 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3827 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3828 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3829 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3830 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3832 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3839 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3840 else if (check_flags)
3841 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3843 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3844 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3845 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3846 else if (!check_flags)
3849 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3850 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3851 else if (strict_mode) {
3852 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3853 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3854 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3855 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3857 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3864 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3865 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3867 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3869 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3872 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3875 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3879 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3883 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3885 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3886 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3888 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3889 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3890 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3894 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3897 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3899 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3901 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3902 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3904 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3905 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3906 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3908 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3909 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3910 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3911 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3912 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3917 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3920 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3922 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3923 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3927 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3928 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3929 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3930 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3931 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3933 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3936 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3940 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3943 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3944 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3951 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3952 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3954 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3955 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3956 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3957 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3958 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3959 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3960 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3963 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3964 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3966 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3971 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3973 int dh_secbits = 80;
3974 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3975 return DH_get_1024_160();
3976 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3977 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3982 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3983 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3986 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
3994 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3995 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3997 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3998 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4006 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4007 return DH_get_2048_224();
4008 return DH_get_1024_160();
4012 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4015 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4018 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4019 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4020 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4021 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4023 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4026 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4028 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4031 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4033 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4034 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4035 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4036 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4038 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4039 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4041 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4042 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4045 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4047 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4050 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4053 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4055 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4056 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4058 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4059 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4061 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4062 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4067 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4068 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4069 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4072 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4074 int rv, start_idx, i;
4076 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4081 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4085 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4086 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4087 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);