2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
299 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
301 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
302 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
303 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
305 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
308 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
310 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
313 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
315 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
319 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
321 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
325 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
327 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
329 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
331 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
333 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
335 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
337 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
339 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
341 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
343 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
345 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
347 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
349 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
351 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
353 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
355 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
357 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
359 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
361 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
363 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
365 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
367 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
373 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
376 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
377 const unsigned char **pcurves,
382 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
383 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
386 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
387 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
389 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
390 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
391 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
394 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
395 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
399 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
400 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
404 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
405 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
409 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
410 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
413 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
414 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
416 const unsigned char *curves;
418 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
419 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
421 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
424 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
427 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
429 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
432 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
434 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
437 else /* Should never happen */
440 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
441 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
443 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
449 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
450 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
454 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
456 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
457 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
459 /* Can't do anything on client side */
466 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
467 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
470 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
472 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
473 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
475 /* Should never happen */
478 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
481 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
483 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
488 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
490 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
491 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
493 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
497 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
498 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
509 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
510 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
512 unsigned char *clist, *p;
514 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
515 * while curve ids < 32
517 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
518 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
521 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
523 unsigned long idmask;
525 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
527 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
538 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
542 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
547 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
550 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
552 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
556 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
558 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
560 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
562 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
563 if (nid == NID_undef)
564 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
565 if (nid == NID_undef)
566 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
569 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
570 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
572 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
575 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
576 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
581 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
585 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
587 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
588 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
593 const EC_METHOD *meth;
596 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
597 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
600 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
603 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
607 /* Determine curve ID */
608 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
610 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
614 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
626 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
628 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
631 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
633 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
640 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
641 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
642 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
644 const unsigned char *p;
647 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
648 * is supported (see RFC4492).
650 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
652 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
653 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
654 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
664 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
665 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
667 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
668 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
670 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
675 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
682 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
685 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
687 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
689 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
694 *pformats = ecformats_default;
695 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
697 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
699 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
703 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
704 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
708 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
711 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
714 /* If not EC nothing to do */
715 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
720 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
724 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
725 * supported curves extension.
727 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
730 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
731 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
733 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
740 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
741 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
742 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
743 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
744 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
746 return 0; /* Should never happen */
747 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
748 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
750 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
754 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
762 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
763 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
765 unsigned char curve_id[2];
766 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
767 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
768 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
769 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
772 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
773 * no other curves permitted.
777 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
778 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
779 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
780 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
781 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
785 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
786 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
788 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
789 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
791 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
794 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
797 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
799 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
805 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
807 /* Need a shared curve */
808 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
814 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
821 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
825 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
831 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
840 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
841 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
853 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
856 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
859 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
862 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
863 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
864 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
867 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
869 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
870 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
881 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
882 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
883 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
886 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
888 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
892 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
894 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
895 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
896 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
907 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
908 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
910 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
911 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
913 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
915 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
916 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
920 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
921 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
924 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
925 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
927 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
928 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
930 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
931 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
932 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
933 /* Should never happen */
936 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
937 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
943 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
945 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
946 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
947 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
949 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
954 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
959 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
961 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
964 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
968 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
970 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
973 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
981 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
985 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
986 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
989 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
992 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
993 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
998 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1004 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1007 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1008 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1011 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1012 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1013 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1014 * session and not global settings.
1017 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1020 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1021 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1022 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1025 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1026 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1027 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1030 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1031 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1034 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1040 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1045 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1050 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1056 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1057 * signature algorithms.
1061 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1066 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1067 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1075 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1077 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1078 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1082 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1083 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1085 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1086 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1088 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1092 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1095 unsigned char *ret = p;
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1097 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1099 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1102 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1103 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1105 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1107 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1109 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1110 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1111 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1112 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1121 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1122 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1123 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1128 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1130 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1132 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1133 unsigned long size_str;
1136 /* check for enough space.
1137 4 for the servername type and entension length
1138 2 for servernamelist length
1139 1 for the hostname type
1140 2 for hostname length
1144 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1145 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1148 /* extension type and length */
1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1150 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1152 /* length of servername list */
1153 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1155 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1156 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1158 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1162 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1167 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1175 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1178 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1188 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1189 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1190 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1192 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1193 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 /* check for enough space.
1200 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1201 1 for the srp user identity
1202 + srp user identity length
1204 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1206 /* fill in the extension */
1207 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1208 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1209 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1210 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1218 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1220 const unsigned char *plist;
1223 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1225 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1226 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1234 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1235 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1236 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1239 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1240 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1241 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1243 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1244 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > 65532)
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1252 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1254 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1255 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1256 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1257 * resolves this to two bytes.
1260 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1263 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1265 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1268 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1269 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1270 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1271 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1273 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1274 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1275 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1277 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1278 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1280 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1284 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1285 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1287 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1290 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1291 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1295 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1301 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1304 const unsigned char *salg;
1305 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1306 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1308 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1309 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1311 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1315 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1316 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1318 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1320 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1322 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1328 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1336 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1340 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1342 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1343 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1349 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1351 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1358 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1360 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1362 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1363 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1365 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1367 /* save position of id len */
1368 unsigned char *q = ret;
1369 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1370 /* skip over id len */
1372 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1378 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1382 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1383 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1386 * 1: peer may send requests
1387 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1389 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1390 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1392 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1396 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1398 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1399 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1400 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1407 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1409 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1411 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1412 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1413 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1414 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1415 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1416 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1419 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1423 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1425 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1427 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1430 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1438 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1439 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1442 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1444 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1446 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1447 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1449 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1450 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1451 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1455 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1459 return NULL; /* error */
1460 if (cb_retval == -1)
1461 continue; /* skip this extension */
1463 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1465 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1467 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1471 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1472 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1475 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
1476 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1477 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02
1479 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1480 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1483 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1484 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1485 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
1487 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1489 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1491 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1499 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1505 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1512 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1515 unsigned char *ret = p;
1517 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1518 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1519 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1522 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1523 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1524 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1525 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1527 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1528 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1532 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1534 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1536 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1538 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1542 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1546 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1552 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1554 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1557 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1569 const unsigned char *plist;
1571 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1574 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1576 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1577 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1584 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1585 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1586 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1587 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1591 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1592 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1594 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1595 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1597 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1598 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1602 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1604 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1605 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1609 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1610 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1612 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1614 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1616 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1619 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1622 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1631 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1633 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1635 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1638 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1646 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1647 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1648 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1649 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1650 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1651 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1652 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1653 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1654 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1655 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1656 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1662 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1663 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1665 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1668 * 1: peer may send requests
1669 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1671 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1672 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1674 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1680 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1681 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1682 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1684 const unsigned char *npa;
1685 unsigned int npalen;
1688 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1689 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1691 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1692 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1694 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1696 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1701 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
1703 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
1704 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1705 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1708 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1711 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1715 return NULL; /* error */
1716 if (cb_retval == -1)
1717 break; /* skip this extension */
1718 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1720 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1722 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1725 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1726 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1728 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1729 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1731 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1732 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1735 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1741 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1743 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1744 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1746 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1748 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1752 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1756 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1763 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1765 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1766 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1767 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1770 * returns: 0 on success. */
1771 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1772 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1776 const unsigned char *selected;
1777 unsigned char selected_len;
1780 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1786 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1787 * length-prefixed strings. */
1788 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1789 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1798 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1800 proto_len = data[i];
1806 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1812 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1813 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1814 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1815 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1816 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1817 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1818 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1820 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1823 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1824 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1829 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1834 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1835 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1836 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1841 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1842 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1843 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1844 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1846 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1847 unsigned short type, size;
1848 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1849 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1850 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1851 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1852 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1853 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1854 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1856 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1857 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1858 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1859 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1862 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1863 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1864 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1865 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1866 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1867 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1868 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1869 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1870 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1871 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1874 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1883 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1886 if (data+size > d+n)
1890 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1892 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1893 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1895 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1897 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1899 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1904 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1906 if (data + len != d+n)
1908 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1912 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1914 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1916 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1918 unsigned short type;
1919 unsigned short size;
1921 unsigned char *data = *p;
1922 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1925 s->servername_done = 0;
1926 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1928 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1931 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1933 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1934 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1937 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1938 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1939 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1941 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1942 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1946 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1947 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1951 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1952 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1953 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1955 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1956 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1958 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1959 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1961 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1962 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1964 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1965 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1967 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1968 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1970 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1971 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1974 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1975 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1978 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1982 if (data > (d+n-len))
1985 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1990 if (data+size > (d+n))
1993 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1995 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1996 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1997 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1998 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2000 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2001 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2002 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2003 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2004 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2005 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2006 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2007 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2008 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2009 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2010 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2011 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2012 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2013 the value of the Host: field.
2014 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2015 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2016 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2017 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2021 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2023 unsigned char *sdata;
2029 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2036 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2043 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2049 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2052 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2053 switch (servname_type)
2055 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2058 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2060 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2063 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2065 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2068 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2070 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2073 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2074 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2075 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2076 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2077 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2078 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2081 s->servername_done = 1;
2085 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2086 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2087 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2099 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2105 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2107 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2109 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2112 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2114 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2117 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2119 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2120 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2122 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2124 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2131 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2133 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2134 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2136 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2137 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2139 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2144 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2146 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2147 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2149 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2150 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2152 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2155 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2156 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2159 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2160 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2161 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2162 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2163 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2166 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2168 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2169 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2170 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2172 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2173 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2175 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2180 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2182 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2185 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2186 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2188 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2191 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2192 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2195 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2196 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2197 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2198 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2199 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2202 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2203 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2204 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2206 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2210 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2213 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2214 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2216 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2220 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2221 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2222 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2223 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2225 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2226 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2228 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2233 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2235 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2236 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2238 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2242 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2244 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2246 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2248 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2251 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2253 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2258 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2260 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2263 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2265 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2268 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2271 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2274 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2275 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2279 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2288 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2290 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2292 const unsigned char *sdata;
2294 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2299 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2308 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2312 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2316 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2321 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2325 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2330 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2331 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2334 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2335 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2336 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2338 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2339 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2342 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2343 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2345 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2346 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2351 /* Read in request_extensions */
2354 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2361 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2367 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2369 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2370 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2373 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2374 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2376 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2377 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2379 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2384 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2388 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2391 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2395 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2396 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2398 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2399 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2400 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2402 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2408 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2409 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2410 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2412 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2415 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2416 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2417 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2418 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2419 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2420 * anything like that, but this might change).
2422 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2423 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2424 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2425 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2426 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2427 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2431 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2432 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2433 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2435 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2438 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2439 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2443 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2444 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2446 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2450 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2451 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2452 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2453 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2454 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2456 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2458 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2460 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2462 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2463 if (type == record->ext_type)
2465 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2470 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2471 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2472 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2482 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2484 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2485 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2487 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2489 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2492 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2493 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2494 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2499 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2502 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2504 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2508 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2517 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2518 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2519 * the length of the block. */
2520 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2522 unsigned int off = 0;
2536 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2538 unsigned short length;
2539 unsigned short type;
2540 unsigned short size;
2541 unsigned char *data = *p;
2542 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2543 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2546 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2549 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2551 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2552 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2556 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2557 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2560 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2561 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2564 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2568 if (data+length != d+n)
2570 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2574 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2579 if (data+size > (d+n))
2582 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2583 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2584 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2586 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2588 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2590 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2593 tlsext_servername = 1;
2596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2597 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2599 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2600 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2602 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2604 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2607 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2608 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2609 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2611 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2614 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2615 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2617 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2618 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2619 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2620 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2621 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2624 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2626 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2628 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2629 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2631 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2634 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2637 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2640 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2642 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2643 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2645 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2649 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2652 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2653 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2655 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2659 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2660 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2661 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2662 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2664 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2666 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2668 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2673 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2675 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2676 * a status request message.
2678 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2680 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2683 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2684 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2687 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2688 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2690 unsigned char *selected;
2691 unsigned char selected_len;
2693 /* We must have requested it. */
2694 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2696 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2699 /* The data must be valid */
2700 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2702 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2705 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2707 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2710 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2711 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2713 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2716 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2717 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2718 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2722 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2726 /* We must have requested it. */
2727 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2729 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2734 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2737 /* The extension data consists of:
2738 * uint16 list_length
2739 * uint8 proto_length;
2740 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2744 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2746 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2750 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2752 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2755 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2756 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2757 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2758 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2760 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2763 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2764 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2767 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2769 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2771 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2774 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2778 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2779 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2781 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2782 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2783 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2785 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2790 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2792 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2796 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2797 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2799 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2802 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2804 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2806 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2807 if (record->ext_type == type)
2809 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2815 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2816 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2818 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2819 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2820 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2829 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2833 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2835 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2837 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2839 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2840 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2842 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2848 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2858 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2859 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2860 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2861 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2862 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2863 * absence on initial connect only.
2865 if (!renegotiate_seen
2866 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2867 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2869 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2871 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2879 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2882 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2886 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2888 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2893 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2895 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2896 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2898 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2899 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2901 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2902 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2907 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2911 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2912 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2919 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2924 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2926 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2927 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2930 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2931 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2933 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2934 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2938 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2939 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2940 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2941 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2943 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2945 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2946 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2947 * so this has to happen here in
2948 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2952 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2954 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2957 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2958 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2963 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2964 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2965 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2967 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2969 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2970 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2972 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2973 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2975 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2976 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2978 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2979 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2981 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2982 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2985 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2989 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2991 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2992 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2993 * abort the handshake.
2995 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2996 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3004 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3005 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3008 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3009 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3012 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3013 s->servername_done=0;
3019 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3021 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3024 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3025 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3026 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3027 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3029 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3032 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3033 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3034 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3035 if (certpkey == NULL)
3037 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3040 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3041 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3043 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3044 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3047 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3048 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3049 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3051 /* status request response should be sent */
3052 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3053 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3054 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3056 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3058 /* something bad happened */
3059 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3060 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3061 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3066 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3071 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3072 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3075 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3076 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3084 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3086 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3087 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3090 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3091 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3092 * it must contain uncompressed.
3094 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3095 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3096 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3097 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3098 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3100 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3102 unsigned char *list;
3103 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3104 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3105 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3107 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3109 found_uncompressed = 1;
3113 if (!found_uncompressed)
3115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3119 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3120 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3122 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3123 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3124 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3125 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3127 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3128 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3130 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3131 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3133 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3135 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3136 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3139 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3140 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3141 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3142 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3144 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3145 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3150 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3153 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3154 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3157 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3158 * there is no response.
3160 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3163 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3165 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3166 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3169 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3170 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3174 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3175 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3181 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3182 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3185 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3186 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3189 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3190 s->servername_done=0;
3196 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3199 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3201 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3203 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3207 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3215 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3216 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3217 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3219 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3220 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3221 * extension, if any.
3222 * len: the length of the session ID.
3223 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3224 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3225 * point to the resulting session.
3227 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3228 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3229 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3232 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3233 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3234 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3235 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3236 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3237 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3238 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3241 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3242 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3243 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3244 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3245 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3246 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3248 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3249 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3251 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3252 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3256 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3258 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3259 * to permit stateful resumption.
3261 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3263 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3267 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3275 /* Skip past cipher list */
3280 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3285 /* Now at start of extensions */
3286 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3289 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3291 unsigned short type, size;
3294 if (p + size > limit)
3296 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3301 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3302 * currently have one. */
3303 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3306 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3308 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3309 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3310 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3311 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3312 * calculate the master secret later. */
3315 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3318 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3319 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3321 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3323 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3324 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3326 default: /* fatal error */
3335 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3337 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3338 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3339 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3340 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3341 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3342 * point to the resulting session.
3345 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3346 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3347 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3348 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3350 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3351 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3352 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3355 unsigned char *sdec;
3356 const unsigned char *p;
3357 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3358 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3361 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3362 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3365 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3366 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3367 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3368 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3370 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3371 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3382 /* Check key name matches */
3383 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3385 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3386 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3387 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3388 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3390 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3391 * integrity checks on ticket.
3393 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3396 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3400 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3401 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3402 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3403 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3404 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3406 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3407 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3408 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3409 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3410 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3413 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3416 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3417 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3420 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3423 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3427 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3428 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3429 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3430 * as required by standard.
3433 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3434 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3442 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3447 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3455 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3456 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3457 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3458 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3459 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3460 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3461 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3464 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3465 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3466 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3467 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3470 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3473 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3475 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3481 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3484 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3486 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3487 return table[i].nid;
3492 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3497 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3498 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3501 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3504 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3505 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3509 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3511 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3512 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3515 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3520 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3528 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3532 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3533 return EVP_sha224();
3535 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3536 return EVP_sha256();
3538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3539 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3540 return EVP_sha384();
3542 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3543 return EVP_sha512();
3551 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3556 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3557 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3560 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3561 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3564 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3565 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3571 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3572 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3573 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3575 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3576 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3578 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3580 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3581 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3583 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3585 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3587 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3588 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3590 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3594 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3595 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3596 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3598 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3601 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3602 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3603 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3604 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3606 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3607 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3608 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3610 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3611 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3613 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3615 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3617 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3622 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3623 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3624 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3626 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3637 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3638 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3640 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3641 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3643 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3645 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3646 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3647 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3649 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3650 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3652 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3654 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3655 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3658 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3659 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3663 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3664 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3670 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3671 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3673 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3676 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3679 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3680 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3681 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3686 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3688 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3694 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3695 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3696 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3698 /* Should never happen */
3702 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3703 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3705 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3706 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3708 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3710 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3711 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3713 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3714 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3716 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3718 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3720 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3723 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3724 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3725 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3726 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3727 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3729 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3730 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3736 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3737 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3739 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3740 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3742 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3743 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3744 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3745 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3747 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3748 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3753 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3754 * use the certificate for signing.
3756 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3758 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3759 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3762 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3763 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3766 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3768 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3769 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3773 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3774 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3781 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3782 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3783 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3785 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3791 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3798 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3800 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3803 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3804 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3805 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3807 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3808 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3812 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3814 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3816 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3818 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3820 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3821 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3827 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3829 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3830 unsigned short hbtype;
3831 unsigned int payload;
3832 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3834 /* Read type and payload length first */
3839 if (s->msg_callback)
3840 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3841 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3842 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3844 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3846 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3849 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3850 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3851 * payload, plus padding
3853 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3856 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3857 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3859 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3861 /* Random padding */
3862 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3864 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3866 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3867 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3868 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3869 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3871 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3876 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3880 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3881 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3882 * sequence number */
3885 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3888 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3896 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3898 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3900 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3901 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3903 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3904 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3905 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3907 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3911 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3912 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3918 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3919 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3925 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3926 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3928 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3930 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3931 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3932 * some random stuff.
3933 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3934 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3935 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3936 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3939 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3942 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3943 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3945 /* Sequence number */
3946 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3947 /* 16 random bytes */
3948 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3950 /* Random padding */
3951 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3953 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3956 if (s->msg_callback)
3957 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3958 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3959 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3961 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3970 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3975 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3978 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3980 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3983 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3984 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3986 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3988 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3990 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3998 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3999 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4000 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4001 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4002 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4003 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4006 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4007 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4008 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4009 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4012 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4014 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4015 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4018 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4019 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4023 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4024 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4025 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4029 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4033 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4036 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4038 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4043 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4044 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4046 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4048 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4049 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4050 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4051 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4053 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4061 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4062 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4063 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4064 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4068 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4069 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4070 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4071 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4077 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4081 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4085 if (default_nid == -1)
4087 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4089 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4090 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4091 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4095 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4096 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4100 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4101 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4103 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4109 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4110 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4111 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4112 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4115 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4117 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4118 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4119 /* Strict mode flags */
4120 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4121 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4122 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4124 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4129 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4130 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4132 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4133 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4136 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4140 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4143 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4145 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4147 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4148 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4151 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4152 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4153 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4155 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4156 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4165 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4168 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4169 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4170 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4172 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4180 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4181 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4182 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4185 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4191 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4192 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4195 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4198 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4199 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4201 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4206 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4207 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4208 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4209 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4210 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4213 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4214 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4215 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4216 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4220 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4221 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4229 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4230 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4233 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4236 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4237 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4239 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4242 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4250 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4251 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4253 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4256 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4257 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4258 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4260 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4265 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4273 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4274 else if(check_flags)
4275 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4277 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4278 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4279 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4280 else if (!check_flags)
4283 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4284 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4285 else if (strict_mode)
4287 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4288 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4290 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4291 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4295 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4303 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4305 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4310 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4313 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4316 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4321 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4322 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4323 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4324 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4325 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4330 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4335 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4339 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4340 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4342 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4344 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4346 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4350 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4354 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4357 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4359 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4360 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4362 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4364 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4365 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4367 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4369 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4371 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4372 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4374 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4379 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4383 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4385 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4386 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4390 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4392 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4393 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4394 else if (cpk->digest)
4395 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4398 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4400 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4401 * if the chain is invalid.
4405 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4406 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4409 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4410 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4417 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4418 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4420 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4421 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4422 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4423 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4424 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4425 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4427 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4428 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4430 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);