2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 #define CHECKLEN(curr, val, limit) \
25 (((curr) >= (limit)) || (size_t)((limit) - (curr)) < (size_t)(val))
27 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
28 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
30 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
31 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
33 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
37 tls1_generate_master_secret,
38 tls1_change_cipher_state,
39 tls1_final_finish_mac,
40 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
41 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
44 tls1_export_keying_material,
46 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
47 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
51 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
55 tls1_generate_master_secret,
56 tls1_change_cipher_state,
57 tls1_final_finish_mac,
58 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
59 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
60 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
62 tls1_export_keying_material,
63 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
64 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
65 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
69 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
73 tls1_generate_master_secret,
74 tls1_change_cipher_state,
75 tls1_final_finish_mac,
76 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
77 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
78 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
80 tls1_export_keying_material,
81 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
82 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
83 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
84 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
88 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
91 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
92 * http, the cache would over fill
101 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
105 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
107 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
111 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
114 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
115 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
117 s->version = s->method->version;
120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
123 int nid; /* Curve NID */
124 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
125 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
129 * Table of curve information.
130 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
131 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
133 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
134 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
135 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
136 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
137 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
138 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
139 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
140 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
141 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
142 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
143 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
144 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
145 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
146 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
147 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
148 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
149 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
150 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
151 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
152 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
153 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
154 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
155 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
156 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
157 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
158 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
159 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
160 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
161 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
162 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
165 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
166 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
167 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
168 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
171 /* The default curves */
172 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
173 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
174 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
175 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
176 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
179 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
180 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
181 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
184 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
186 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
187 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
188 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
190 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
192 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
196 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
199 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
200 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
207 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
209 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
210 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
211 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
212 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
213 * lists in the first place.
214 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
215 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
216 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
218 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
219 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
221 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
224 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
225 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
227 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
228 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
229 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
230 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
231 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
234 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
235 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
239 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
240 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
244 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
245 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
248 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
249 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
253 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
254 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
255 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
259 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
263 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
264 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
266 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
269 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
271 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
272 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
273 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
276 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
279 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
280 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
282 const unsigned char *curves;
283 size_t num_curves, i;
284 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
285 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
287 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
289 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
292 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
293 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
295 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
296 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
298 } else /* Should never happen */
301 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
303 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
304 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
305 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
311 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
312 * if there is no match.
313 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
314 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
315 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
317 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
319 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
320 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
323 /* Can't do anything on client side */
327 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
329 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
330 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
332 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
334 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
335 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
336 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
337 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
338 /* Should never happen */
341 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
345 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
346 * but s->options is a long...
348 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
349 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
351 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
352 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
353 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
354 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
356 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
358 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
359 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
361 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
362 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
363 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
366 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
368 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
376 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
380 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
381 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
383 unsigned char *clist, *p;
386 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
389 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
390 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
393 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
394 unsigned long idmask;
396 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
398 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
407 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
411 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
415 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
418 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
420 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
426 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
428 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
430 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
432 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
433 if (nid == NID_undef)
434 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
435 if (nid == NID_undef)
436 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
437 if (nid == NID_undef)
439 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
440 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
442 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
446 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
447 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
451 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
455 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
458 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
459 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
466 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
467 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
470 /* Determine curve ID */
471 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
472 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
473 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
477 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
479 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
481 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
482 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
484 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
485 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
487 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
493 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
494 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
495 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
497 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
498 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
501 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
502 * supported (see RFC4492).
504 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
505 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
506 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
507 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
508 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
511 if (i == num_formats)
516 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
517 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
518 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
520 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
522 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
523 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
524 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
525 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
526 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
530 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
531 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
536 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
543 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
547 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
549 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
550 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
551 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
553 *pformats = ecformats_default;
554 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
556 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
558 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
563 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
564 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
566 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
568 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
571 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
574 /* If not EC nothing to do */
575 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
577 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
581 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
584 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
588 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
589 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
591 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
597 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
598 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
599 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
600 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
601 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
603 return 0; /* Should never happen */
604 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
605 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
607 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
609 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
610 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
611 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
613 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
619 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
621 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
623 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
625 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
626 * is compatible with the client extensions.
628 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
630 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
633 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
636 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
637 unsigned char curve_id[2];
638 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
639 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
640 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
641 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
642 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
646 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
647 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
651 /* Need a shared curve */
652 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
656 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
660 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
665 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
668 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
669 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
672 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
673 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
675 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
678 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
679 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
681 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
685 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
687 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
690 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
691 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
692 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
693 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
695 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
696 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
697 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
698 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
699 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
700 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
702 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
703 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
704 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
709 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
710 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
711 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
714 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned char **psigs)
717 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
721 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
722 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
723 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
724 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
726 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
727 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
730 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
731 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
735 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
736 if (s->server == sent && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
737 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
738 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
739 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
740 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
741 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
743 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
744 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
749 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
750 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
752 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
753 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
755 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
756 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
757 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
758 /* Should never happen */
761 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
762 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
768 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
769 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
770 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
772 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
776 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
777 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
781 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
782 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
783 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
786 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
787 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
789 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
795 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
799 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
800 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
801 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
802 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
805 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
806 if (i == sent_sigslen
807 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
808 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
812 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
814 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
817 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
818 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
819 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
824 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
826 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
831 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
832 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
833 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
835 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
838 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
840 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
842 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
843 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
844 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
845 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
847 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
848 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
849 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
850 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
852 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
854 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
855 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
856 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
862 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
863 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
864 * @c: cipher to check
865 * @op: Security check that you want to do
866 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
868 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
870 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
872 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
873 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
875 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
877 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
878 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
881 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
882 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
884 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
885 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
886 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
888 if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
891 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
892 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
895 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
898 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
900 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
902 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
905 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
907 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
908 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
918 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
919 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
920 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
921 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
922 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
925 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
927 PACKET extensions = *packet;
928 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
929 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
932 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
933 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
936 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
937 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
943 if (num_extensions <= 1)
946 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
947 if (extension_types == NULL) {
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
952 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
953 extensions = *packet;
954 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
956 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
957 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
958 /* This should not happen. */
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
964 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
968 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
969 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
970 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
971 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
976 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
980 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
981 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
984 unsigned char *orig = buf;
985 unsigned char *ret = buf;
986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
987 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
989 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
991 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
992 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
994 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
995 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
997 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
998 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
999 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1000 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1011 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1013 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1014 if (s->renegotiate) {
1017 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1022 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1025 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1028 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1035 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1036 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1039 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1040 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1044 * check for enough space.
1045 * 4 for the servername type and extension length
1046 * 2 for servernamelist length
1047 * 1 for the hostname type
1048 * 2 for hostname length
1051 size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname);
1052 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + size_str, limit))
1055 /* extension type and length */
1056 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1057 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1059 /* length of servername list */
1060 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1062 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1063 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1065 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1069 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1070 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1071 * Client Hello message */
1073 size_t login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1074 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1080 * check for enough space.
1081 * 4 for the srp type type and extension length
1082 * 1 for the srp user identity
1083 * + srp user identity length
1085 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + login_len, limit))
1088 /* fill in the extension */
1089 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1090 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1091 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1092 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1100 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1102 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1103 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1105 unsigned char *etmp;
1107 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1109 if (num_formats > 255) {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1114 * check for enough space.
1115 * 4 bytes for the ec point formats type and extension length
1116 * 1 byte for the length of the formats
1119 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + num_formats, limit))
1122 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1123 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1124 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1125 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1126 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1130 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1132 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1133 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1136 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1141 * check for enough space.
1142 * 4 bytes for the ec curves type and extension length
1143 * 2 bytes for the curve list length
1144 * + curve list length
1146 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + (num_curves * 2), limit))
1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1151 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1152 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1153 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1154 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1155 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1159 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1161 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1162 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1163 ret += curves_list_len;
1165 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1167 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1169 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1170 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1171 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1172 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1173 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1174 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1175 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1177 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1178 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1179 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1182 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1183 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1186 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1189 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + ticklen, limit))
1191 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1194 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1200 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1202 const unsigned char *salg;
1203 unsigned char *etmp;
1204 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
1207 * check for enough space.
1208 * 4 bytes for the sigalgs type and extension length
1209 * 2 bytes for the sigalg list length
1210 * + sigalg list length
1212 if (CHECKLEN(ret, salglen + 6, limit))
1214 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1216 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1218 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1219 /* Fill in lengths */
1220 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1225 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1227 size_t extlen, idlen;
1232 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1233 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1234 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1237 idlen += (size_t)lentmp + 2;
1240 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1241 lentmp = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1244 extlen = (size_t)lentmp;
1248 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1251 * 2 bytes for status request type
1252 * 2 bytes for status request len
1253 * 1 byte for OCSP request type
1254 * 2 bytes for length of ids
1255 * 2 bytes for length of extensions
1257 * + length of extensions
1259 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + idlen + extlen, limit))
1262 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1263 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1264 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1266 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1267 /* save position of id len */
1268 unsigned char *q = ret;
1269 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1270 /* skip over id len */
1272 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1278 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1282 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1283 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1286 * check for enough space.
1287 * 4 bytes for the heartbeat ext type and extension length
1288 * 1 byte for the mode
1290 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit))
1293 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1297 * 1: peer may send requests
1298 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1300 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1301 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1303 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1308 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1310 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1311 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1315 * check for enough space.
1316 * 4 bytes for the NPN ext type and extension length
1318 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1320 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1326 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1327 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1328 * (see longer comment below)
1330 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1332 * check for enough space.
1333 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length
1334 * 2 bytes for the ALPN protocol list length
1335 * + ALPN protocol list length
1337 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, limit))
1339 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1340 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1341 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1342 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1343 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1344 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1347 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1350 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1351 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1357 * check for enough space.
1358 * 4 bytes for the SRTP type and extension length
1359 * + SRTP profiles length
1361 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1364 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1367 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1374 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1375 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1376 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1379 * In 1.1.0 before 1.1.0c we negotiated EtM with DTLS, then just
1380 * silently failed to actually do it. It is fixed in 1.1.1 but to
1381 * ease the transition especially from 1.1.0b to 1.1.0c, we just
1382 * disable it in 1.1.0.
1384 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1386 * check for enough space.
1387 * 4 bytes for the ETM type and extension length
1389 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1391 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1396 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1398 * check for enough space.
1399 * 4 bytes for the SCT type and extension length
1401 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1404 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
1410 * check for enough space.
1411 * 4 bytes for the EMS type and extension length
1413 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1419 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1420 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1421 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1424 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1425 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1427 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1428 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1435 * check for enough space. Strictly speaking we know we've already
1436 * got enough space because to get here the message size is < 0x200,
1437 * but we know that we've allocated far more than that in the buffer
1438 * - but for consistency and robustness we're going to check anyway.
1440 * 4 bytes for the padding type and extension length
1443 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + hlen, limit))
1445 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1447 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1454 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1457 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1461 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1462 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1465 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1466 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1468 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1471 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1472 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1473 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1474 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1479 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1481 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1484 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1490 * check for enough space.
1491 * 4 bytes for the reneg type and extension length
1492 * + reneg data length
1494 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1500 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1508 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1509 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1512 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1513 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1515 * check for enough space.
1516 * 4 bytes for the server name type and extension length
1518 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1521 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1526 const unsigned char *plist;
1529 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1532 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1534 if (plistlen > 255) {
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1540 * check for enough space.
1541 * 4 bytes for the ec points format type and extension length
1542 * 1 byte for the points format list length
1543 * + length of points format list
1545 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + plistlen, limit))
1548 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1549 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1550 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1551 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1556 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1559 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1561 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1563 * check for enough space.
1564 * 4 bytes for the Ticket type and extension length
1566 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1568 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1572 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1575 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1578 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1580 * check for enough space.
1581 * 4 bytes for the Status request type and extension length
1583 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1585 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1589 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1592 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1593 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1598 * check for enough space.
1599 * 4 bytes for the SRTP profiles type and extension length
1600 * + length of the SRTP profiles list
1602 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1605 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1608 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1616 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1617 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1618 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1619 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1620 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1621 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1622 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1623 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1624 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1625 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1628 /* check for enough space. */
1629 if (CHECKLEN(ret, sizeof(cryptopro_ext), limit))
1631 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext));
1632 ret += sizeof(cryptopro_ext);
1635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1636 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1637 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1639 * check for enough space.
1640 * 4 bytes for the Heartbeat type and extension length
1641 * 1 byte for the mode
1643 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit))
1645 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1649 * 1: peer may send requests
1650 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1652 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1653 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1655 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1661 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1662 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1663 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1664 const unsigned char *npa;
1665 unsigned int npalen;
1668 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1670 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1671 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1673 * check for enough space.
1674 * 4 bytes for the NPN type and extension length
1675 * + length of protocols list
1677 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + npalen, limit))
1679 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1681 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1683 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1687 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1689 if (s->tlsext_use_etm) {
1691 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1692 * for other cases too.
1694 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1695 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1696 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1697 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1698 s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
1701 * check for enough space.
1702 * 4 bytes for the ETM type and extension length
1704 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1706 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1710 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1712 * check for enough space.
1713 * 4 bytes for the EMS type and extension length
1715 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1717 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1721 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1722 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1723 size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1726 * check for enough space.
1727 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length
1728 * 2 bytes for ALPN data length
1729 * 1 byte for selected protocol length
1730 * + length of the selected protocol
1732 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 7 + len, limit))
1734 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1738 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1744 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1747 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1752 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1753 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1754 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1755 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1757 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1759 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1761 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1763 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1764 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1768 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1770 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1771 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1772 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1775 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1777 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1778 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1779 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1787 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1788 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1789 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1791 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1793 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1794 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1796 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1797 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1798 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1799 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1800 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1802 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1803 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1804 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1805 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1806 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1809 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1811 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1812 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1814 } else if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
1815 /* Behave as if no callback was present. */
1818 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1828 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1829 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1830 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1835 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1836 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1837 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1838 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1840 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1846 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1847 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1848 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1849 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1850 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1851 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1852 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1854 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1855 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1856 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1857 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1858 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1859 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1860 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1861 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1862 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1863 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1864 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1865 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1866 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1869 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1870 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1874 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1875 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1876 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1880 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1883 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1884 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1886 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1889 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1892 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1893 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1895 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1896 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1899 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1900 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1902 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1905 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1908 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1909 s->servername_done = 0;
1910 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1912 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1915 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1916 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1917 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1918 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1919 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1920 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1922 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1923 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1927 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1928 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1929 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1931 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1932 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1933 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1934 s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
1936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1937 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1938 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1941 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1943 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1946 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1949 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1953 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1954 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1957 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1959 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1962 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1963 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1964 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1965 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1967 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1968 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1970 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1971 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1974 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1976 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1977 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1978 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1979 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1980 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1981 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1982 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1983 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1984 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1985 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1986 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1987 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1988 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1989 * the value of the Host: field.
1990 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1991 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1992 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1994 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1998 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1999 unsigned int servname_type;
2000 PACKET sni, hostname;
2002 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
2003 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
2004 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
2009 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
2010 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
2011 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
2013 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
2014 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
2015 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2017 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2018 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2020 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2021 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2022 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2027 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2028 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2032 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2033 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2037 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2038 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2042 s->servername_done = 1;
2045 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2046 * fall back to a full handshake.
2048 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2049 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2050 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2054 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2057 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
2060 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2064 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2065 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2067 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2068 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2075 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2076 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2078 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
2079 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2084 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2085 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2087 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2088 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2092 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2093 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
2095 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
2096 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
2097 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
2098 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
2103 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
2104 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2106 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2107 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2112 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2113 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2114 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2115 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
2116 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
2117 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2119 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2122 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2123 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2125 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2126 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2127 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2132 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2133 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2137 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2138 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2139 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2143 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2144 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2145 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2146 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2147 (&extension, &responder_id_list))
2151 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2152 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2154 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2156 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2157 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2158 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2159 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2163 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2166 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2168 PACKET responder_id;
2169 const unsigned char *id_data;
2171 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2173 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2177 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2178 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2179 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2183 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2184 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2188 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2189 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2190 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2195 /* Read in request_extensions */
2196 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2199 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2200 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2201 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2202 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2203 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2204 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2205 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2206 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2207 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2215 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2217 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2221 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2222 unsigned int hbtype;
2224 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2225 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2226 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2230 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2231 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2233 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2234 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2235 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2238 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2244 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2245 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2247 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2250 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2251 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2252 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2253 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2254 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2255 * anything like that, but this might change).
2257 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2258 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2259 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2260 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2261 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2263 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2267 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2268 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2269 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2273 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2275 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2276 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2277 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2281 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2282 s->tlsext_use_etm = 1;
2284 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2285 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2289 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2290 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2291 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2292 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2293 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2296 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2297 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2302 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2304 * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
2306 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2312 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2314 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2315 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2316 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2318 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2323 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2324 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2325 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2326 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2331 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2334 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2335 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2336 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2339 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2348 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2349 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2350 * fill the length of the block.
2352 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2354 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2356 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2357 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2358 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2366 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2368 unsigned int length, type, size;
2369 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2370 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2373 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2375 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2377 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2378 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2380 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2381 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2384 s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
2386 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2388 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2391 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2392 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2396 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2397 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2401 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2402 const unsigned char *data;
2405 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2406 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2409 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2410 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2412 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2413 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2415 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2416 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2417 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2418 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2419 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2422 tlsext_servername = 1;
2424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2425 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2426 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2427 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2428 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2429 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2433 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2434 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2435 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2436 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2437 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2440 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2441 ecpointformatlist_length;
2442 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2443 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2444 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2445 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2451 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2453 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2454 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2455 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2456 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2458 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2461 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2462 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2465 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2466 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2468 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2471 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2472 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2475 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2476 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2480 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2481 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2482 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2484 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2485 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2486 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2487 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2488 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2489 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2491 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2493 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2494 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2495 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2498 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2503 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2504 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2505 unsigned char *selected;
2506 unsigned char selected_len;
2507 /* We must have requested it. */
2508 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2509 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2512 /* The data must be valid */
2513 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2514 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2517 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2520 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2521 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2522 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2526 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2527 * a single Serverhello
2529 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2530 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2531 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2532 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2535 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2536 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2537 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2541 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2543 /* We must have requested it. */
2544 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2545 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2549 * The extension data consists of:
2550 * uint16 list_length
2551 * uint8 proto_length;
2552 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2554 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2555 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2556 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2557 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2560 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2561 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2562 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2563 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2566 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2567 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2570 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2573 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2574 unsigned int hbtype;
2575 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2576 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2580 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2581 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2583 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2584 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2585 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2588 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2594 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2595 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2599 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2600 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2601 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2602 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2603 s->tlsext_use_etm = 1;
2604 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2605 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2607 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2610 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2611 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2613 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2617 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2618 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2622 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2623 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2624 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2625 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2626 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2627 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2628 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2632 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2641 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2642 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2643 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2644 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2645 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2647 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2648 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2649 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2651 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2657 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2660 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2661 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2662 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2671 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2673 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2677 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2682 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2684 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2685 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2689 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2690 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2693 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2694 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2698 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2700 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2701 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2702 else if (s->session_ctx != NULL
2703 && s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2705 s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2707 session_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2710 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2711 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2714 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2715 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2718 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2719 s->servername_done = 0;
2726 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2727 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2729 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2731 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2734 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2735 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2737 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2738 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2741 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2744 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2745 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2746 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2750 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2755 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2756 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2757 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2758 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2759 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2760 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2761 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2762 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2765 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2766 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2767 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2769 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2772 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2773 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2774 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2775 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2776 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2780 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2784 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2789 * Upon success, returns 1.
2790 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2792 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2794 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2797 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2798 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2799 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2800 * influence which certificate is sent
2802 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2804 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2805 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2806 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2807 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2809 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2810 * et al can pick it up.
2812 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2813 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2815 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2816 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2817 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2819 /* status request response should be sent */
2820 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2821 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2822 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2824 /* something bad happened */
2825 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2827 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2833 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2840 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2842 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2843 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2847 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2848 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2849 * must contain uncompressed.
2851 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2852 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2853 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2854 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2855 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2856 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2857 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2858 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2860 unsigned char *list;
2861 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2862 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2863 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2864 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2865 found_uncompressed = 1;
2869 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2871 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2875 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2876 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2878 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2880 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2881 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2882 else if (s->session_ctx != NULL
2883 && s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2885 s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2887 session_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2890 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2891 * that we don't receive a status message
2893 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2894 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2895 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2898 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2899 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2902 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2903 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2906 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2907 s->servername_done = 0;
2914 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2917 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2919 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2920 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2924 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2925 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2932 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2933 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2934 * need to be handled at the same time.
2936 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2939 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2940 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2941 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2942 * point to the resulting session.
2944 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2945 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2946 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2949 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2950 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2951 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2952 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2953 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2954 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2955 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2958 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2959 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2960 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2961 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2962 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2963 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2965 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2968 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2969 const PACKET *session_id,
2973 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2976 int have_ticket = 0;
2977 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2980 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2981 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2984 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2987 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2990 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2994 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2995 unsigned int type, size;
2997 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2998 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2999 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3003 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
3007 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
3009 const unsigned char *etick;
3011 /* Duplicate extension */
3012 if (have_ticket != 0) {
3020 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3023 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3027 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3029 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3030 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3031 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3032 * calculate the master secret later.
3037 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
3038 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3042 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3043 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3045 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3046 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3049 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3052 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3053 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3056 default: /* fatal error */
3062 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
3063 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3064 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3070 if (have_ticket == 0)
3077 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3079 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3080 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
3081 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3082 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3083 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3084 * point to the resulting session.
3087 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3088 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3089 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3090 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3091 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3093 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3094 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3095 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3098 unsigned char *sdec;
3099 const unsigned char *p;
3100 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
3101 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3102 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3103 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3104 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3106 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3107 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3110 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3115 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3116 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3117 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3128 /* Check key name matches */
3129 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3130 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3134 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3135 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3136 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3137 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3138 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3139 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3145 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3148 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3152 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3154 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3159 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3160 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3161 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3164 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3165 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3166 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3169 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3170 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3171 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3172 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3173 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3174 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3175 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3179 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3180 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3185 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3189 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3193 /* Some additional consistency checks */
3194 if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) {
3195 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3199 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3200 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3201 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3205 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3206 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3215 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3219 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3220 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3224 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3231 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3232 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3233 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3234 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3235 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3236 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3237 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3238 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3239 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3240 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3243 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3244 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3245 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3246 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3247 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3248 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3249 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3252 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3255 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3256 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3262 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3265 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3266 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3267 return table[i].nid;
3272 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3277 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3280 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3283 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3284 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3288 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3290 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3297 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3300 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3301 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3302 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3303 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3304 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3305 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3306 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3307 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3308 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3309 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3310 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3311 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3314 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3320 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3321 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3322 return tls12_md_info + i;
3328 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3330 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3331 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3333 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3336 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3339 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3343 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3344 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3347 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3348 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3351 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3352 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3355 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3356 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3358 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3359 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3361 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3362 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3368 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3369 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3370 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3372 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3373 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3375 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3376 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3378 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3380 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3381 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3383 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3385 if (psignhash_nid) {
3386 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3387 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3388 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3392 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3393 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3395 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3396 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3397 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3399 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3400 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3402 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3403 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3407 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3408 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3412 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3414 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3415 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3416 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3418 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3419 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3420 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3422 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
3423 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3424 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3426 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3427 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3432 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3433 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3438 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3439 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3446 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3448 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3450 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3453 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3454 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3456 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3458 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3459 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3460 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3461 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3464 return tmpout - out;
3467 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3468 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3469 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3470 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3472 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3473 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3474 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3475 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3476 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3478 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3479 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3482 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3483 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3484 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3486 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3496 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3497 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3499 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3500 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3502 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3504 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3506 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3507 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3508 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3509 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3510 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3511 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3512 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3513 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3514 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3515 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3517 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
3518 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3521 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3522 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3526 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3527 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3529 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3531 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3534 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3538 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3539 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3543 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3545 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3548 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3549 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3551 /* Should never happen */
3555 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3556 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3557 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3559 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3560 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3564 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3569 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3570 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3572 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3573 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3576 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3577 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3578 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3579 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3580 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3582 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3583 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3584 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3585 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3591 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3592 * the certificate for signing.
3594 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3596 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3597 * supported it stays as NULL.
3599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3600 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3601 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3604 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3605 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3606 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3610 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3611 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3614 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3615 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3616 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3617 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3618 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3619 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3620 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3621 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3627 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3628 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3629 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3631 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3636 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3643 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3645 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3648 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3649 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3650 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3652 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3653 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3657 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3659 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3661 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3663 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3665 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3666 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3669 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3673 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3676 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3678 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3679 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3680 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3681 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3682 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3683 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3685 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3686 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3687 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3691 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3693 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3696 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3699 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3701 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3703 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3705 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3713 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3714 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3716 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3719 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3720 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3723 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3724 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3729 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3730 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3732 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3736 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3740 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3743 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3745 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3750 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3751 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3753 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3754 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3755 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3757 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3764 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3765 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3766 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3768 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3769 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3770 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3776 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3780 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3784 if (default_nid == -1)
3786 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3788 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3789 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3790 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3795 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3796 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3800 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3801 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3802 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3809 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3810 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3811 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3812 * attempting to use them.
3815 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
3817 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3818 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3819 /* Strict mode flags */
3820 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3821 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3822 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3824 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3829 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3830 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3833 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3834 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3836 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3839 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3841 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3842 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3844 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3846 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3847 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3853 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3856 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3858 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3859 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3861 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3868 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3869 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3870 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3871 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3872 else if (!check_flags)
3877 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3878 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3880 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3882 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3883 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3885 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3888 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3889 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3890 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3891 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3894 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3895 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3896 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3900 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3901 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3904 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3905 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3906 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3909 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3910 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3911 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3914 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3915 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3916 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3925 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3926 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3928 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3930 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3931 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3932 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3935 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3942 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3943 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3947 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3948 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3949 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3950 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3952 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3959 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3960 else if (check_flags)
3961 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3963 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3964 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3965 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3966 else if (!check_flags)
3969 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3970 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3971 else if (strict_mode) {
3972 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3973 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3974 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3975 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3977 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3984 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3985 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3987 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3989 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3992 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3995 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3999 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4003 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4005 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4006 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4008 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4009 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4010 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4014 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4017 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4019 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4021 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4022 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4024 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4025 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4026 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4028 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4029 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4030 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4031 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4032 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4037 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4040 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4042 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4043 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4047 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4048 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4049 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4050 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4051 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4053 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4056 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4060 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4063 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4064 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4071 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4072 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4074 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4075 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4076 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4077 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4078 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4079 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4080 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4083 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
4084 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4086 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4090 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4092 int dh_secbits = 80;
4093 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4094 return DH_get_1024_160();
4095 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4096 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4101 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4102 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4105 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4113 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4114 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4116 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4117 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4125 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4126 return DH_get_2048_224();
4127 return DH_get_1024_160();
4131 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4134 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4137 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4138 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4139 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4140 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4142 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4145 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4147 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4150 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4152 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4153 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4154 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4155 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4157 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4158 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4160 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4161 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4164 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4166 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4169 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4172 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4174 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4175 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4177 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4178 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4180 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4181 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4186 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
4187 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4188 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4191 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4193 int rv, start_idx, i;
4195 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4200 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4204 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4205 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4206 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);