2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] =
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
246 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
247 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
250 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
252 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
253 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
254 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
256 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
259 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
261 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
264 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
266 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
268 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
270 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
272 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
274 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
276 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
278 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
280 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
288 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
290 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
292 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
294 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
296 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
298 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
300 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
302 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
306 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
308 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
310 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
312 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
318 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
321 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
322 const unsigned char **pcurves,
327 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
328 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
331 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
332 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
334 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
335 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
336 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
337 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
340 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
341 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
345 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
346 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
350 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
351 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
354 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
355 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
357 const unsigned char *curves;
359 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
360 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
362 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
365 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
368 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
370 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
373 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
375 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
378 else /* Should never happen */
381 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
382 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
384 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
390 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
391 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
395 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
397 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
398 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
400 /* Can't do anything on client side */
407 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
408 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
411 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
412 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
413 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
414 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
415 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
416 /* Should never happen */
419 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
422 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
424 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
429 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
431 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
432 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
434 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
438 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
439 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
450 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
451 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
453 unsigned char *clist, *p;
455 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
456 * while curve ids < 32
458 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
459 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
462 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
464 unsigned long idmask;
466 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
468 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
479 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
483 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
488 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
491 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
493 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
497 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
499 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
501 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
503 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
504 if (nid == NID_undef)
505 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
506 if (nid == NID_undef)
507 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
508 if (nid == NID_undef)
510 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
511 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
513 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
516 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
517 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
522 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
526 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
528 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
529 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
535 const EC_METHOD *meth;
538 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
539 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
540 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
543 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
546 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
550 /* Determine curve ID */
551 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
552 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
553 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
557 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
569 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
572 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
574 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
577 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
581 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
582 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
583 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
585 const unsigned char *p;
588 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
589 * is supported (see RFC4492).
591 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
593 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
594 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
595 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
605 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
606 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
608 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
609 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
611 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
616 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
623 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
626 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
628 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
630 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
631 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
635 *pformats = ecformats_default;
636 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
638 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
640 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
644 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
645 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
647 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
649 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
652 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
655 /* If not EC nothing to do */
656 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
661 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
665 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
666 * supported curves extension.
668 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
671 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
672 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
674 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
681 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
682 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
683 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
684 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
685 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
687 return 0; /* Should never happen */
688 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
689 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
691 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
695 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
696 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
698 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
703 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
704 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
706 unsigned char curve_id[2];
707 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
708 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
709 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
710 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
713 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
714 * no other curves permitted.
718 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
719 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
720 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
721 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
722 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
726 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
727 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
729 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
730 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
732 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
735 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
738 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
740 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
746 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
748 /* Need a shared curve */
749 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
755 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
760 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
762 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
766 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
770 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
774 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
775 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
778 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
779 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
781 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
784 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
785 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
787 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
790 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
791 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
793 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
796 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
797 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
798 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
799 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
801 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
803 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
804 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
807 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
808 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
811 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
814 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
818 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
819 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
820 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
823 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
825 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
828 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
830 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
831 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
832 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
834 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
835 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
838 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
839 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
843 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
844 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
846 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
847 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
849 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
851 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
852 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
856 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
858 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
860 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
863 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
866 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
867 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
869 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
870 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
872 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
873 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
874 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
875 /* Should never happen */
878 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
879 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
884 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
886 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
887 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
888 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
890 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
892 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
895 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
900 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
902 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
905 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
909 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
911 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
914 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
922 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
925 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
926 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
927 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
929 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
932 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
933 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
938 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
944 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
947 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
948 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
951 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
952 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
953 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
954 * session and not global settings.
957 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
960 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
961 size_t i, sigalgslen;
962 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
965 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
966 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
967 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
970 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
971 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
974 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
975 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
980 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
985 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
990 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
996 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
997 * signature algorithms.
1001 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1002 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1006 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1007 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1011 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1012 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1014 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1015 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1017 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1018 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1022 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1023 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1025 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1026 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1028 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1032 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1033 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1035 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1036 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1045 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1048 unsigned char *ret = p;
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1050 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1052 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1055 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1056 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1058 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1060 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1062 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1063 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1064 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1065 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1074 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1075 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1076 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1081 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1083 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1085 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1086 unsigned long size_str;
1089 /* check for enough space.
1090 4 for the servername type and entension length
1091 2 for servernamelist length
1092 1 for the hostname type
1093 2 for hostname length
1097 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1098 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1101 /* extension type and length */
1102 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1103 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1105 /* length of servername list */
1106 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1108 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1109 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1111 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1115 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1120 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1126 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1128 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1131 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1141 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1142 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1143 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1145 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1146 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1152 /* check for enough space.
1153 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1154 1 for the srp user identity
1155 + srp user identity length
1157 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1159 /* fill in the extension */
1160 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1161 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1162 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1163 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1171 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1173 const unsigned char *plist;
1176 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1178 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1179 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1186 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1187 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1188 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1189 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1192 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1193 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1194 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1196 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1197 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1198 if (plistlen > 65532)
1200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1204 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1205 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1207 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1208 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1209 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1210 * resolves this to two bytes.
1213 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1216 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1218 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1221 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1222 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1223 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1224 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1226 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1227 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1228 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1230 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1231 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1233 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1237 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1238 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1240 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1243 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1244 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1248 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1254 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1257 const unsigned char *salg;
1258 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1259 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1261 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1262 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1264 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1268 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1269 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1270 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1272 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1274 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1276 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1279 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1282 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1287 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1288 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1291 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1295 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1297 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1298 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1304 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1306 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1313 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1314 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1315 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1317 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1318 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1320 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1322 /* save position of id len */
1323 unsigned char *q = ret;
1324 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1325 /* skip over id len */
1327 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1333 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1337 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1338 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1341 * 1: peer may send requests
1342 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1344 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1345 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1347 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1351 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1353 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1354 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1355 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1357 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1362 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1366 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1368 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1370 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1373 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1381 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1382 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1383 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1384 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1385 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1386 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1389 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1390 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1392 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1394 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1395 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1397 *(ret++) = list_len;
1398 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1401 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1408 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1411 unsigned char *ret = p;
1412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1413 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1415 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1416 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1417 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1418 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1420 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1421 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1425 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1427 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1429 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1431 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1435 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1439 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1445 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1450 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1460 if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1462 const unsigned char *plist;
1464 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1467 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1469 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1470 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1478 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1479 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1480 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1484 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1485 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1487 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1488 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1490 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1491 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1495 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1497 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1498 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1502 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1503 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1504 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1506 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1508 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1510 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1516 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1525 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1527 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1532 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1540 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1541 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1542 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1543 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1544 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1545 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1546 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1547 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1548 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1549 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1550 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1556 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1557 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1559 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1562 * 1: peer may send requests
1563 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1565 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1566 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1568 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1573 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1574 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1575 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1576 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1578 const unsigned char *npa;
1579 unsigned int npalen;
1582 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1583 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1585 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1586 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1588 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1590 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1595 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1597 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1599 size_t authz_length;
1600 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1601 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1602 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1603 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1604 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1606 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1608 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1609 * uint8_t authz_type
1611 * uint8_t data[length]
1613 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1614 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1616 unsigned short length;
1620 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1622 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1626 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1634 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1635 * 2 bytes for extension type
1636 * 2 bytes for extension length
1637 * 1 byte for the list length
1638 * n bytes for the list */
1639 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1641 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1642 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1644 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1645 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1649 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1651 unsigned short length;
1656 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1658 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1661 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1668 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1675 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1677 unsigned short type;
1678 unsigned short size;
1680 unsigned char *data = *p;
1681 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1684 s->servername_done = 0;
1685 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1687 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1691 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1692 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1694 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1695 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1697 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1698 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1700 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1701 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1703 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1704 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1706 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1707 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1709 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1710 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1713 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1717 if (data > (d+n-len))
1720 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1725 if (data+size > (d+n))
1728 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1730 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1731 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1732 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1733 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1735 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1736 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1737 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1738 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1739 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1740 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1741 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1742 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1743 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1744 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1745 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1746 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1747 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1748 the value of the Host: field.
1749 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1750 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1751 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1752 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1756 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1758 unsigned char *sdata;
1764 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1771 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1778 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1784 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1787 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1788 switch (servname_type)
1790 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1793 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1795 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1798 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1800 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1803 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1805 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1808 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1809 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1810 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1811 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1812 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1813 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1816 s->servername_done = 1;
1820 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1821 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1822 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1834 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1840 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1842 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1844 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1847 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1849 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1852 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1854 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1855 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1857 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1859 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1865 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1866 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1867 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1869 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1870 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1872 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1873 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1875 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1880 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1882 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1883 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1885 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1886 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1888 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1891 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1892 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1895 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1896 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1897 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1898 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1899 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1902 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1903 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1905 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1906 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1907 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1909 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1910 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1912 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1917 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1919 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1922 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1923 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1925 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1928 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1929 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1932 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1933 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1934 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1935 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1936 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1939 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1940 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1941 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1942 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1944 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1948 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1951 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1952 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1954 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1958 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1959 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1960 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1961 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1963 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1964 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1966 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1971 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1973 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1974 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1976 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1980 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1982 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1984 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1986 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1989 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
1991 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1996 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
1998 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2001 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2003 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2006 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2009 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2012 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2013 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2017 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2018 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2023 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2027 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2029 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2031 const unsigned char *sdata;
2033 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2038 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2047 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2051 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2055 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2060 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2064 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2069 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2070 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2073 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2074 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2075 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2077 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2078 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2081 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2082 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2084 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2085 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2090 /* Read in request_extensions */
2093 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2100 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2106 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2108 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2109 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2112 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2113 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2115 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2116 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2118 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2123 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2127 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2130 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2134 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2135 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2137 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2138 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2139 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2141 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2147 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2148 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2150 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2153 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2154 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2155 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2156 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2157 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2158 * anything like that, but this might change).
2160 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2161 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2162 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2163 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2164 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2165 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2169 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2170 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2172 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2177 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2179 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2180 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2184 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2188 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2190 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2192 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2196 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2197 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2198 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2201 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2202 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2203 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2204 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2205 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2207 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2211 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2212 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2213 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2215 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2217 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2218 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2219 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2220 1 /* element size */,
2223 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2226 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2227 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2229 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2243 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2245 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2246 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2248 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2250 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2253 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2254 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2255 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2260 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2263 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2265 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2269 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2278 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2279 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2280 * the length of the block. */
2281 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2283 unsigned int off = 0;
2297 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2299 unsigned short length;
2300 unsigned short type;
2301 unsigned short size;
2302 unsigned char *data = *p;
2303 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2304 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2307 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2311 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2312 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2315 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2319 if (data+length != d+n)
2321 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2325 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2330 if (data+size > (d+n))
2333 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2334 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2335 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2337 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2339 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2341 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2344 tlsext_servername = 1;
2347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2348 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2349 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2351 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2352 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2354 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2356 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2359 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2360 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2361 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2363 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2366 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2367 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2369 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2370 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2371 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2372 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2373 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2376 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2378 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2380 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2381 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2383 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2386 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2389 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2392 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2394 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2395 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2396 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2398 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2402 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2405 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2406 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2408 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2412 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2413 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2414 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2415 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2417 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2419 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2421 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2426 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2427 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2429 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2430 * a status request message.
2432 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2434 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2437 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2438 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2441 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2442 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2444 unsigned char *selected;
2445 unsigned char selected_len;
2447 /* We must have requested it. */
2448 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
2450 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2453 /* The data must be valid */
2454 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2456 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2459 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2461 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2464 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2465 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2467 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2470 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2471 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2472 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2475 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2477 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2479 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2482 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2486 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2487 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2489 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2490 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2491 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2493 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2498 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2500 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2505 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2507 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2508 * an authz hello extension if the client
2509 * didn't request a proof. */
2510 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2511 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2513 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2515 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2521 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2525 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2526 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2528 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2532 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2533 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2534 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2535 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2537 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2541 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2549 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2553 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2555 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2557 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2559 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2560 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2562 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2568 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2578 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2579 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2580 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2581 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2582 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2583 * absence on initial connect only.
2585 if (!renegotiate_seen
2586 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2587 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2589 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2591 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2599 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2602 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2606 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2608 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2613 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2615 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2616 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2618 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2619 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2621 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2622 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2627 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2631 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2632 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2639 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2644 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2646 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2647 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2650 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2651 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2653 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2654 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2658 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2659 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2660 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2661 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2663 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2665 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2666 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2667 * so this has to happen here in
2668 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2672 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2674 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2677 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2678 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2683 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2684 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2685 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2687 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2689 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2690 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2692 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2693 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2695 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2696 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2698 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2699 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2701 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2702 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2705 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2709 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2711 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2712 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2713 * abort the handshake.
2715 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2716 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2724 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2725 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2728 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2729 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2732 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2733 s->servername_done=0;
2739 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2741 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2744 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2745 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2746 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2747 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2749 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2752 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2753 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2754 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2755 if (certpkey == NULL)
2757 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2760 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2761 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2763 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2764 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2767 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2768 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2769 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2771 /* status request response should be sent */
2772 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2773 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2774 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2776 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2778 /* something bad happened */
2779 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2780 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2781 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2786 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2791 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2792 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2795 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2796 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2804 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2806 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2807 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2810 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2811 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2812 * it must contain uncompressed.
2814 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2815 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2816 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2817 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2818 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2820 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2822 unsigned char *list;
2823 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2824 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2825 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2827 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2829 found_uncompressed = 1;
2833 if (!found_uncompressed)
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2839 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2840 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2842 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2843 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2844 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2845 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2847 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2848 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2850 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2851 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2853 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2855 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2856 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2859 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2860 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2861 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2862 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2864 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2865 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2870 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2873 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2874 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2877 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2878 * there is no response.
2880 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2882 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2883 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2885 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2886 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2889 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2890 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2894 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2895 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2901 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2902 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2905 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2906 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2909 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2910 s->servername_done=0;
2916 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2919 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2921 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2923 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2927 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2935 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2936 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2937 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2939 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2940 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2941 * extension, if any.
2942 * len: the length of the session ID.
2943 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2944 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2945 * point to the resulting session.
2947 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2948 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2949 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2952 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2953 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2954 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2955 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2956 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2957 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2958 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2961 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2962 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2963 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2964 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2965 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2966 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2968 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2969 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2971 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2972 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2976 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2978 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2979 * to permit stateful resumption.
2981 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2983 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2987 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2988 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2995 /* Skip past cipher list */
3000 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3005 /* Now at start of extensions */
3006 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3009 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3011 unsigned short type, size;
3014 if (p + size > limit)
3016 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3021 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3022 * currently have one. */
3023 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3026 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3028 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3029 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3030 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3031 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3032 * calculate the master secret later. */
3035 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3038 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3039 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3041 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3043 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3044 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3046 default: /* fatal error */
3055 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3057 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3058 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3059 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3060 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3061 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3062 * point to the resulting session.
3065 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3066 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3067 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3068 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3070 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3071 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3072 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3075 unsigned char *sdec;
3076 const unsigned char *p;
3077 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3078 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3081 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3082 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3085 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3086 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3087 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3088 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3090 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3091 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3102 /* Check key name matches */
3103 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3105 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3106 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3107 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3108 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3110 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3111 * integrity checks on ticket.
3113 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3116 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3120 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3121 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3122 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3123 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3124 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3126 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3127 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3128 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3129 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3130 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3133 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3136 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3137 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3140 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3143 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3147 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3148 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3149 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3150 * as required by standard.
3153 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3154 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3162 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3167 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3175 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3176 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3177 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3178 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3179 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3180 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3181 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3184 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3185 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3186 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3187 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3190 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3193 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3195 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3201 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3204 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3206 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3207 return table[i].nid;
3212 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3217 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3218 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3221 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3224 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3225 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3229 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3231 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3232 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3235 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3240 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3248 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3252 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3253 return EVP_sha224();
3255 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3256 return EVP_sha256();
3258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3259 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3260 return EVP_sha384();
3262 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3263 return EVP_sha512();
3271 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3276 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3277 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3280 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3281 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3284 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3285 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3291 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3292 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3293 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3295 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3296 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3298 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3300 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3301 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3303 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3305 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3307 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3308 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3310 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3314 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3315 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3316 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3318 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3321 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3322 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3323 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3324 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3326 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3327 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3328 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3330 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3331 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3333 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3335 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3337 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3342 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3343 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3344 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3346 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3357 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3358 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3360 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3361 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3363 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3365 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3366 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3367 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3369 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3370 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3372 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3374 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3375 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3378 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3379 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3383 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3384 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3390 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3391 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3393 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3396 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3399 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3400 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3401 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3406 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3408 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3414 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3415 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3416 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3418 /* Should never happen */
3422 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3423 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3425 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3426 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3428 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3430 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3431 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3433 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3434 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3436 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3438 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3440 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3443 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3444 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3445 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3446 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3447 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3449 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3450 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3456 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3457 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3459 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3460 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3462 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3463 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3464 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3465 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3467 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3468 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3473 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3474 * use the certificate for signing.
3476 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3478 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3479 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3482 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3483 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3486 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3488 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3489 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3492 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3493 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3494 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3501 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3502 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3503 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3505 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3511 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3518 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3520 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3523 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3524 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3525 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3527 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3528 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3532 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3534 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3536 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3538 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3540 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3541 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3547 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3549 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3550 unsigned short hbtype;
3551 unsigned int payload;
3552 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3554 /* Read type and payload length first */
3559 if (s->msg_callback)
3560 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3561 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3562 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3564 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3566 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3569 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3570 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3571 * payload, plus padding
3573 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3576 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3577 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3579 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3581 /* Random padding */
3582 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3584 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3586 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3587 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3588 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3589 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3591 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3596 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3600 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3601 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3602 * sequence number */
3605 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3608 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3616 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3618 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3620 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3621 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3623 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3624 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3625 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3627 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3631 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3632 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3634 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3638 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3639 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3645 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3646 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3648 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3650 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3651 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3652 * some random stuff.
3653 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3654 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3655 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3656 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3659 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3662 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3663 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3665 /* Sequence number */
3666 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3667 /* 16 random bytes */
3668 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3670 /* Random padding */
3671 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3673 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3676 if (s->msg_callback)
3677 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3678 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3679 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3681 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3690 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3695 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3698 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3700 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3703 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3704 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3706 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3708 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3710 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3718 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3719 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3720 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3721 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3722 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3723 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3726 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3727 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3728 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3729 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3732 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3734 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3735 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3738 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3739 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3743 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3744 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3745 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3749 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3753 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3756 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3758 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3763 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3764 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3766 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3768 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3769 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3770 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3771 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3773 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3781 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3782 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3783 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3784 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3788 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3789 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3790 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3791 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3797 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3801 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3805 if (default_nid == -1)
3807 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3809 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3810 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3811 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3815 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3816 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3820 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3821 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3823 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3829 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3830 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3831 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3832 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3835 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3837 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3838 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3839 /* Strict mode flags */
3840 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3841 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3842 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3844 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3849 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3850 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3852 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3853 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3856 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3860 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3863 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3865 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3867 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3868 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3871 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3872 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3873 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3875 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3876 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3885 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3888 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3889 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3890 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3892 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3900 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3901 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3902 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
3905 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3911 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
3912 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
3915 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
3918 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3919 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3921 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3926 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3927 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3928 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3929 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3930 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3933 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3934 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3935 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3936 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3940 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3941 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3949 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
3950 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
3953 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
3956 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3957 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
3959 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3962 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
3970 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3971 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
3973 if (!check_flags) goto end;
3976 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3977 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3978 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3980 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
3985 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3993 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3994 else if(check_flags)
3995 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3997 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3998 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3999 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4000 else if (!check_flags)
4003 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4004 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4005 else if (strict_mode)
4007 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4008 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4010 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4011 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4015 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4023 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4025 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4030 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4033 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4036 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4041 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4042 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4043 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4044 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4045 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4050 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4055 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4059 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4060 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4062 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4064 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4066 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4070 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4074 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4077 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4079 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4080 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4082 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4084 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4085 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4087 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4089 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4091 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4092 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4094 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4099 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4103 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4105 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4106 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4110 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4112 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4113 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4114 else if (cpk->digest)
4115 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4118 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4120 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4121 * if the chain is invalid.
4125 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4126 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4129 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4130 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4137 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4138 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4140 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4141 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4142 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4143 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4144 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4145 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4147 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4148 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4150 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);