2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* We need access to the deprecated low level HMAC APIs */
11 #define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
15 #include <openssl/objects.h>
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
19 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
20 #include <openssl/conf.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include "internal/nelem.h"
25 #include "internal/evp.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(SSL_CIPHER)
31 DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
33 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
34 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
36 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
40 tls1_generate_master_secret,
41 tls1_change_cipher_state,
42 tls1_final_finish_mac,
43 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
44 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
46 tls1_export_keying_material,
48 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
49 tls_close_construct_packet,
53 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
57 tls1_generate_master_secret,
58 tls1_change_cipher_state,
59 tls1_final_finish_mac,
60 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
61 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
63 tls1_export_keying_material,
64 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
65 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
66 tls_close_construct_packet,
70 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
74 tls1_generate_master_secret,
75 tls1_change_cipher_state,
76 tls1_final_finish_mac,
77 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
78 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
80 tls1_export_keying_material,
81 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
82 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
83 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
84 tls_close_construct_packet,
88 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
91 tls13_setup_key_block,
92 tls13_generate_master_secret,
93 tls13_change_cipher_state,
94 tls13_final_finish_mac,
95 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
96 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
98 tls13_export_keying_material,
99 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
100 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
101 tls_close_construct_packet,
105 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
108 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
109 * http, the cache would over fill
111 return (60 * 60 * 2);
118 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
124 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
126 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
130 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
135 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
136 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
138 s->version = s->method->version;
144 * Table of group information.
146 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
147 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
148 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
149 {NID_sect163k1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0001}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
150 {NID_sect163r1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0002}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
151 {NID_sect163r2, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0003}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
152 {NID_sect193r1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0004}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
153 {NID_sect193r2, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0005}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
154 {NID_sect233k1, "EC", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0006}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
155 {NID_sect233r1, "EC", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0007}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
156 {NID_sect239k1, "EC", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0008}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
157 {NID_sect283k1, "EC", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0009}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
158 {NID_sect283r1, "EC", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000A}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
159 {NID_sect409k1, "EC", 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000B}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
160 {NID_sect409r1, "EC", 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000C}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
161 {NID_sect571k1, "EC", 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000D}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
162 {NID_sect571r1, "EC", 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000E}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
163 {NID_secp160k1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x000F}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
164 {NID_secp160r1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0010}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
165 {NID_secp160r2, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0011}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
166 {NID_secp192k1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0012}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0013}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
168 {NID_secp224k1, "EC", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0014}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
169 {NID_secp224r1, "EC", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0015}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
170 {NID_secp256k1, "EC", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0016}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
171 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, "EC", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0017}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
172 {NID_secp384r1, "EC", 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0018}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
173 {NID_secp521r1, "EC", 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0019}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
174 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, "EC", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001A}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
175 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, "EC", 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001B}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
176 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, "EC", 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001C}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
177 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, "X25519", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001D}, /* X25519 (29) */
178 {EVP_PKEY_X448, "X448", 224, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001E}, /* X448 (30) */
179 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
180 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
181 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, "GOST_2012_256", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0022}, /* GC256A (34) */
182 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, "GOST_2012_256", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0023}, /* GC256B (35) */
183 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, "GOST_2012_256", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0024}, /* GC256C (36) */
184 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, "GOST_2012_256", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0025}, /* GC256D (37) */
185 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, "GOST_2012_512", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0026}, /* GC512A (38) */
186 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, "GOST_2012_512", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0027}, /* GC512B (39) */
187 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, "GOST_2012_512", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0028}, /* GC512C (40) */
188 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_GOST */
189 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
190 /* Security bit values for FFDHE groups are updated as per RFC 7919 */
191 {NID_ffdhe2048, "DH", 103, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0100}, /* ffdhe2048 (0x0100) */
192 {NID_ffdhe3072, "DH", 125, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0101}, /* ffdhe3072 (0x0101) */
193 {NID_ffdhe4096, "DH", 150, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0102}, /* ffdhe4096 (0x0102) */
194 {NID_ffdhe6144, "DH", 175, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0103}, /* ffdhe6144 (0x0103) */
195 {NID_ffdhe8192, "DH", 192, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0104}, /* ffdhe8192 (0x0104) */
196 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
201 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
202 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
203 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
204 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
206 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
208 /* The default curves */
209 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
210 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
211 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
212 29, /* X25519 (29) */
213 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
215 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
216 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
218 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
219 34, /* GC256A (34) */
220 35, /* GC256B (35) */
221 36, /* GC256C (36) */
222 37, /* GC256D (37) */
223 38, /* GC512A (38) */
224 39, /* GC512B (39) */
225 40, /* GC512C (40) */
227 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
228 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
229 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
230 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
231 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
232 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
235 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
238 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
244 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
246 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
249 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 FFDHE group from RFC 8446 */
250 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
251 if (nid_list[i].group_id == group_id)
254 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) */
258 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
259 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id)
261 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
263 return ginf == NULL ? NID_undef : ginf->nid;
266 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
270 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
271 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
272 return nid_list[i].group_id;
276 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
279 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
280 * the number of groups supported.
282 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
285 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
286 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
287 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
288 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
289 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
290 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
291 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
294 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
295 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
299 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
300 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
306 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
307 *pgroups = supported_groups_default;
308 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default);
310 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
311 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
318 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
321 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int version)
323 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
325 if (version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
326 if ((ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_ONLY_FOR_TLS1_3) != 0)
332 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
333 int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
335 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group);
336 unsigned char gtmp[2];
340 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
341 if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2)
345 if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_FFDHE)
348 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
349 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
350 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits, ginfo->nid, (void *)gtmp);
353 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
354 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
357 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
364 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
365 * if there is no match.
366 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
367 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
368 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
370 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
372 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
373 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
376 /* Can't do anything on client side */
380 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
382 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
383 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
385 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
387 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
388 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
389 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
390 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
391 /* Should never happen */
394 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
398 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
399 * otherwise peer decides.
401 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
402 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
403 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
405 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
406 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
409 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
410 uint16_t id = pref[i];
412 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
413 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
421 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
425 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
426 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
428 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
432 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
433 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
435 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
436 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
437 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
440 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
443 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
444 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
447 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
448 unsigned long idmask;
450 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
451 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
453 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
454 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
455 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
469 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
472 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
473 # define MAX_GROUPLIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
477 int nid_arr[MAX_GROUPLIST];
480 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
482 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
488 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_GROUPLIST)
490 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
492 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
494 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
495 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
497 if (nid == NID_undef)
498 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
499 if (nid == NID_undef)
500 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
501 if (nid == NID_undef)
503 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
504 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
506 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
509 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
511 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
512 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
514 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
517 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
521 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
527 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
528 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
530 const uint16_t *groups;
536 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
537 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
538 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
540 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
541 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
543 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
544 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
547 /* Should never happen */
552 if (check_own_groups) {
553 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
554 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
555 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
559 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
562 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
566 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
567 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
570 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
571 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
572 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
573 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
577 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
581 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
585 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
587 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
588 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
589 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
591 *pformats = ecformats_default;
592 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
594 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
596 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
600 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
601 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
605 unsigned char comp_id;
608 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
609 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
611 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
612 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
614 /* Get required compression id */
615 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
616 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
617 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
619 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
624 int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
626 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
627 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
628 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
629 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
634 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
635 * supported (see RFC4492).
637 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
640 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
641 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
647 /* Return group id of a key */
648 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
650 int curve_nid = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
652 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
654 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
658 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
659 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
661 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
665 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
668 /* If not EC nothing to do */
669 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
671 /* Check compression */
672 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
674 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
676 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
679 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
682 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
685 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
689 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
690 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
691 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
692 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
693 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
695 return 0; /* Should never happen */
696 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
697 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
706 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
708 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
710 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
711 * is compatible with the client extensions.
713 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
715 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
717 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
719 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
721 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
724 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
725 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
726 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
727 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
734 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
739 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
741 /* Default sigalg schemes */
742 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
744 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
745 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
746 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
747 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
751 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
752 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
753 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
754 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
755 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
756 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
758 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
759 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
760 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
763 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
764 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
766 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
767 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
768 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
769 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
770 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
772 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
773 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
774 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
777 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
778 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
779 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
780 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
781 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
786 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
787 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
788 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
792 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
794 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
795 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
796 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
797 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
798 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
799 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
800 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
801 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
802 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
803 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
804 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
805 NID_undef, NID_undef},
806 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
807 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
808 NID_undef, NID_undef},
809 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
810 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
811 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
812 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
813 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
814 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
816 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
817 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
818 NID_undef, NID_undef},
819 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
820 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
821 NID_undef, NID_undef},
822 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
823 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
824 NID_undef, NID_undef},
825 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
826 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
827 NID_undef, NID_undef},
828 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
829 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
830 NID_undef, NID_undef},
831 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
832 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
833 NID_undef, NID_undef},
834 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
835 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
836 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
837 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
838 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
839 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
840 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
841 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
842 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
843 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
844 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
845 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
846 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
847 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
848 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
850 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
851 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
852 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
853 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
854 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
855 NID_undef, NID_undef},
856 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
857 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
858 NID_undef, NID_undef},
859 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
860 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
861 NID_undef, NID_undef},
862 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
863 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
864 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
867 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
868 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
869 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
870 NID_undef, NID_undef},
871 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
872 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
873 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
874 NID_undef, NID_undef},
875 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
876 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
877 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
878 NID_undef, NID_undef},
879 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
880 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
881 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
882 NID_undef, NID_undef},
883 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
884 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
885 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
886 NID_undef, NID_undef}
889 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
890 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
891 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
892 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
893 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
898 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
899 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
901 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
902 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
903 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
904 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
905 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
906 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
907 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
908 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
909 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
910 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
913 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
914 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
917 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
919 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
921 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
926 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
927 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
932 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
933 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
936 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
946 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
948 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
949 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
950 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
952 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
953 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
954 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
960 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
962 if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
968 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
969 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
970 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
971 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
972 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
974 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
980 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
981 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
982 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
984 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
991 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
993 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
996 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
998 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1005 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1008 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1010 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1011 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1013 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
1015 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1019 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1021 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1023 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1024 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1027 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1029 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1031 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1034 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1038 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1041 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1045 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1046 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1047 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1048 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1050 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1051 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1054 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1055 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1060 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1061 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1062 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1064 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1065 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1066 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1067 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1068 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1069 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1071 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1072 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1078 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1079 * specified EC curve.
1081 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1083 const uint16_t *sigs;
1086 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1087 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1088 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1090 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1091 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1094 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1095 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs[i]);
1099 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1100 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1101 && curve == lu->curve)
1110 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1113 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1115 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1118 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1122 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1123 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
1125 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1126 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1128 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1135 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1136 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1139 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1141 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1142 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1144 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1146 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1150 * TODO(3.0) Remove this when we adapted this function for provider
1151 * side keys. We know that EVP_PKEY_get0() downgrades an EVP_PKEY
1152 * to contain a legacy key.
1156 EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
1157 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_NONE)
1160 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
1161 /* Should never happen */
1164 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1165 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1166 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1167 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1168 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1171 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1172 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1173 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1175 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
1177 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1178 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1181 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1182 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1183 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1184 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1185 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1188 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1189 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1190 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1192 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1197 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1199 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1200 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1201 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1202 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1203 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1207 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1208 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1209 int curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
1211 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1212 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1213 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1217 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1218 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1219 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1220 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1221 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1224 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1225 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1226 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1227 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1229 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1230 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1235 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1236 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1237 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1242 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1243 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1244 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1245 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1248 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1249 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1250 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1252 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1255 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
1256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1257 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1261 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1262 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1264 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1265 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1266 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1268 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1269 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_type(md) : NID_undef,
1270 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1272 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1275 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1276 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1280 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1282 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1284 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1288 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1290 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1292 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1297 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1298 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1299 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1301 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1304 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1306 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1308 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1309 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1310 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1311 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1312 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1315 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1316 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1317 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1318 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1320 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1322 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1323 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1324 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1331 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1332 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1333 * @c: cipher to check
1334 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1335 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1337 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1339 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1341 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1342 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1344 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1346 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1347 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1350 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1351 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1353 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1354 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1355 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1357 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1360 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1361 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1364 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1367 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1369 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1371 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1374 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1378 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1379 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1380 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1381 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1382 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1383 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1384 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1386 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1387 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1389 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1390 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1391 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1392 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1394 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1395 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1400 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1401 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1402 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1403 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1411 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1413 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1416 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1419 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1420 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1421 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1426 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1428 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1429 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1430 * point to the resulting session.
1432 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1436 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1439 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1442 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1443 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1446 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1447 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1449 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1450 if (!ticketext->present)
1451 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1453 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1455 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1456 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1460 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1462 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1463 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1464 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1465 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1468 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1469 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1470 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1471 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1472 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1473 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1475 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1476 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1477 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1478 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1479 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1480 * point to the resulting session.
1482 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1483 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1484 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1486 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1487 unsigned char *sdec;
1488 const unsigned char *p;
1489 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1490 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1492 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1493 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1494 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1495 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1497 if (eticklen == 0) {
1499 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1500 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1502 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1505 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1507 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1508 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1509 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1510 * calculate the master secret later.
1512 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1516 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1517 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1518 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1522 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1523 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1525 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1528 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1530 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1533 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1534 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1536 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1539 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1542 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1543 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
1544 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1546 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1549 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1550 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1551 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1552 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1553 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1556 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1560 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1566 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1568 /* Check key name matches */
1569 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1570 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1571 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1575 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1577 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1578 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1579 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1581 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1582 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1583 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1584 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1585 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1588 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1589 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1593 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1596 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1598 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1602 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1604 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1605 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1609 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1610 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1611 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1612 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1616 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1617 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1620 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1621 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1622 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1623 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1624 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1625 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1626 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1628 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1631 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1633 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1639 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1643 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1645 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1647 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1651 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1652 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1653 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1657 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1658 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1661 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1663 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1668 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1670 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1673 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1674 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
1677 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1678 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1679 * performs any action
1681 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1682 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1683 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1684 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1685 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1686 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1689 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1690 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1691 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1693 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1695 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1696 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1699 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1700 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1701 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1705 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
1706 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1707 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1708 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1709 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1713 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
1714 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
1715 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1716 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
1717 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1718 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
1719 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1721 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1725 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1729 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1731 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1732 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1733 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
1734 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1743 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1744 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1746 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1749 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1750 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
1752 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1753 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1755 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1756 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1757 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1758 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1759 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1762 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1763 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1766 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1767 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1768 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
1769 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1770 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1773 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1774 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1776 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1779 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1780 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1781 * ciphersuites enabled.
1784 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
1787 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1788 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
1789 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
1790 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1792 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1793 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
1794 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
1797 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST) != 0)
1805 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1806 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1807 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1808 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1809 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1813 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1814 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1818 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1820 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1821 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1822 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1824 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1827 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1828 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
1829 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1830 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1835 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1839 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1840 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1841 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1842 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1844 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1847 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1848 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1853 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1854 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1856 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1858 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1861 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1862 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1864 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1865 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1866 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1867 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1875 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1876 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1877 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1878 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1880 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1881 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1882 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1883 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1885 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1886 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1888 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1889 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1900 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1901 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1903 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1904 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1906 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1908 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1910 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1911 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1912 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1913 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1914 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1915 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1916 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1917 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1918 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1919 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1921 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1922 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1925 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1926 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1930 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1931 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1933 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1935 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
1936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1939 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1943 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1944 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1948 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1954 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1956 /* Invalid data length */
1957 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1962 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
1963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1966 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1974 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1981 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
1983 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1984 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1986 /* Should never happen */
1987 if (s->cert == NULL)
1991 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
1992 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
1994 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1995 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1999 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2001 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2004 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2006 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2009 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2012 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2013 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2014 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2016 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2017 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2019 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2020 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
2021 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2026 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2027 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2028 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2030 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2031 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2032 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2035 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2037 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2041 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2043 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2044 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
2046 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2048 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2049 if (psignhash != NULL)
2050 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2052 return (int)numsigalgs;
2055 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2056 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2057 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2059 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2060 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2062 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
2063 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2065 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2067 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2069 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2070 if (psignhash != NULL)
2071 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2073 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2075 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2076 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
2079 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2080 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2084 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2085 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2088 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2090 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2091 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2092 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2093 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2094 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2095 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2096 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2097 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2099 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2100 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2101 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2104 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2105 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2107 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2109 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2111 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2112 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2113 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2116 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2118 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2120 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2122 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2124 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2125 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2126 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2127 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2128 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2129 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2133 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2135 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2136 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2140 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2147 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2148 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2149 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2151 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2153 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2154 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2158 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2162 /* Reject duplicates */
2163 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2164 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2173 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2174 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2176 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2180 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2184 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2187 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2192 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2196 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2199 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2200 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2201 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2203 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2204 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2205 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2211 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2213 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2218 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2219 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2222 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2224 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2225 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2226 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2228 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2230 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2231 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2236 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2241 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2242 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2243 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2245 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2246 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2247 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2253 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2257 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2259 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2261 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2263 if (default_nid == -1)
2265 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2267 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2269 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2271 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2272 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2273 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2275 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2278 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2280 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2281 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2282 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2283 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2284 if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2290 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2291 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2293 const X509_NAME *nm;
2295 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2296 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2297 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2304 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2305 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2306 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2307 * attempting to use them.
2310 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2312 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2313 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2314 /* Strict mode flags */
2315 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2316 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2317 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2319 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2324 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2325 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2328 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2329 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2331 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2334 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2336 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2337 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2339 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2341 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2342 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2351 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2354 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2356 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2357 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2359 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2366 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2367 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2368 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2369 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2370 else if (!check_flags)
2375 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2376 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2378 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2381 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2382 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2384 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2388 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2389 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2392 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2393 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2394 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2398 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2399 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2402 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2403 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2404 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2407 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2408 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2409 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2412 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2413 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2414 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2423 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2424 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2426 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2428 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2429 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2430 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
2432 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2435 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2442 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2443 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2445 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2446 * so check_flags is always set.
2448 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2449 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2450 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2454 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2455 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2456 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2457 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2459 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2466 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2467 else if (check_flags)
2468 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2470 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2471 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2472 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2473 else if (!check_flags)
2476 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2477 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2478 else if (strict_mode) {
2479 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2480 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2481 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2482 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2484 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2491 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2492 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2495 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2496 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2497 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2498 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2499 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2500 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2503 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2506 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2507 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2508 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2512 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2515 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2518 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2520 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2521 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2523 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2524 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2525 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2527 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2528 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2529 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2530 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2531 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2536 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2539 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2541 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2542 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2546 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2547 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2549 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2552 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2556 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2559 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2560 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2567 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2568 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2570 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2571 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2572 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2573 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2574 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2575 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2576 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2577 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2578 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2581 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2582 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2584 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2588 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2590 int dh_secbits = 80;
2591 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2592 return DH_get_1024_160();
2593 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2594 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2599 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2601 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2604 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2610 if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
2615 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2616 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2618 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2619 if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2627 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2628 return DH_get_2048_224();
2629 return DH_get_1024_160();
2633 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2636 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2639 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2640 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2641 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2642 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2644 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2647 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2649 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2652 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2654 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2655 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2656 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2657 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2659 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2661 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2662 if (nid == NID_undef)
2665 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2667 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2670 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2673 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2675 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2676 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2678 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2679 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2681 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2682 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2687 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2688 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2689 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2692 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2694 int rv, start_idx, i;
2696 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2701 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2705 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2706 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2707 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2715 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2716 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2719 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2721 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2722 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2724 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2726 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
2727 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
2728 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
2731 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2735 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
2736 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
2738 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
2740 static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
2743 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2744 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
2748 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
2749 * the answer is simply 'no'.
2752 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey, sig->hash);
2758 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
2759 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
2761 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2762 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
2764 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
2765 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
2770 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2771 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2772 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2773 * signing certificate.
2775 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
2782 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
2783 * a viable public key is permitted.
2789 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2790 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2791 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2792 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2793 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2795 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
2797 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2800 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2803 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
2804 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
2808 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
2809 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
2811 static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
2816 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
2819 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
2820 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
2823 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
2827 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
2828 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
2829 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
2831 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
2833 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2835 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2840 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
2841 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2842 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2844 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2845 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2846 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2847 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2848 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2850 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2851 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
2853 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
2854 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
2857 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
2858 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
2860 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2863 curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(tmppkey);
2864 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
2869 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2870 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2871 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
2877 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
2884 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2885 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2887 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2888 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2890 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2891 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2892 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2894 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
2896 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2899 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
2900 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2902 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2903 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
2907 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2908 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2912 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2913 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2915 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2918 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2920 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2924 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2927 evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
2932 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2935 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2936 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2939 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2942 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2944 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2945 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
2948 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2949 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
2951 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2952 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2953 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
2955 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
2958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2959 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2965 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
2966 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
2967 * we have to assume GOST support.
2969 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
2970 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2974 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2975 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2979 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2983 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
2986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2987 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2988 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2993 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2995 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2996 size_t sent_sigslen;
2998 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3002 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3006 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3007 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3008 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3009 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3010 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3013 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3016 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
3017 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3018 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3023 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3027 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3033 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3034 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3035 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3036 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3040 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3042 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3043 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
3045 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3049 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3053 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3055 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3056 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
3058 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3062 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3066 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3068 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3072 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3074 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3076 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3077 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3082 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3083 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3084 ret->old_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3085 if (ret->old_ctx == NULL)
3090 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", NULL);
3091 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
3096 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
3102 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3105 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
3106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3107 HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->old_ctx);
3113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3114 HMAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3116 return ctx->old_ctx;
3120 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3125 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3127 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
3129 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3130 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3131 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, key, len);
3132 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3133 if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx->ctx, params) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx))
3136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3137 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3138 return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->old_ctx, key, len,
3139 EVP_get_digestbyname(md), NULL);
3144 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3146 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3147 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3149 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3150 return HMAC_Update(ctx->old_ctx, data, len);
3155 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3158 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3159 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3161 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL) {
3164 if (HMAC_Final(ctx->old_ctx, md, &l) > 0) {
3174 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3176 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3177 return EVP_MAC_size(ctx->ctx);
3178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3179 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3180 return HMAC_size(ctx->old_ctx);