2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
117 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
118 # include <openssl/ec.h>
121 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
122 #include <openssl/rand.h>
123 #include "ssl_locl.h"
125 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
128 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
129 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
130 SSL_SESSION **psess);
131 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
132 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
135 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
138 tls1_setup_key_block,
139 tls1_generate_master_secret,
140 tls1_change_cipher_state,
141 tls1_final_finish_mac,
142 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
143 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
144 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
147 tls1_export_keying_material,
149 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
150 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
154 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
157 tls1_setup_key_block,
158 tls1_generate_master_secret,
159 tls1_change_cipher_state,
160 tls1_final_finish_mac,
161 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
162 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
163 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
166 tls1_export_keying_material,
167 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
168 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
169 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
173 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
176 tls1_setup_key_block,
177 tls1_generate_master_secret,
178 tls1_change_cipher_state,
179 tls1_final_finish_mac,
180 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
181 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
182 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
185 tls1_export_keying_material,
186 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
187 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
188 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
189 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
193 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
196 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
197 * http, the cache would over fill
199 return (60 * 60 * 2);
206 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
210 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
213 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
214 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
216 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
220 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
223 s->version = s->method->version;
226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
228 static int nid_list[] = {
229 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
230 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
231 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
232 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
235 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
236 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
237 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
238 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
239 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
240 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
241 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
243 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
244 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
245 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
246 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
247 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
248 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
249 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
250 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
251 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
252 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
253 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
254 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
255 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
256 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
259 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
265 /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
266 static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
267 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
268 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
269 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
270 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
273 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
274 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
275 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
276 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
277 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
278 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
279 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
280 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
281 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
288 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
289 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
291 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
292 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
293 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
294 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
295 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
296 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
297 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
298 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
299 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
300 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
301 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
302 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
303 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
304 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
307 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
308 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
310 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
311 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
312 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
313 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
314 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
315 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
316 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
317 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
318 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
319 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
320 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
321 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
322 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
324 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
325 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
329 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
330 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
331 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
335 /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
336 static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = {
337 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
338 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
339 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
341 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
342 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
343 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
344 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
346 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
347 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
348 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
349 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
351 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
352 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
353 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
354 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
355 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
356 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
358 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
359 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
360 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
361 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
362 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
364 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
365 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
366 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
367 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
368 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
369 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
371 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
372 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
373 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
377 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
379 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
380 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
381 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
383 return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
386 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
388 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
390 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
392 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
394 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
396 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
398 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
400 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
402 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
404 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
406 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
408 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
410 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
412 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
414 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
416 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
418 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
420 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
422 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
424 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
426 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
428 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
430 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
432 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
434 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
436 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
438 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
440 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
442 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
444 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
452 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
454 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
455 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
456 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
457 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
458 * lists in the first place.
459 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
460 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
461 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
463 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
464 const unsigned char **pcurves,
467 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
469 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
470 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
472 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
473 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
474 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
475 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
476 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
479 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
480 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
484 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
485 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
489 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
490 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
495 *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
496 pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
500 if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
501 *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
502 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
504 *pcurves = eccurves_all;
505 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
510 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
511 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
516 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
521 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
522 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
524 const unsigned char *curves;
525 size_t num_curves, i;
526 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
527 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
529 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
531 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
534 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
535 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
537 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
538 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
540 } else /* Should never happen */
543 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
545 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
546 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
553 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
554 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
555 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
556 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
558 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
560 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
561 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
563 /* Can't do anything on client side */
567 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
569 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
570 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
572 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
573 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
574 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
575 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
576 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
577 /* Should never happen */
580 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
584 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
585 * but s->options is a long...
587 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
588 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
590 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
591 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
592 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
593 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
595 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
598 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
601 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
603 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
604 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
605 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
607 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
611 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
612 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
613 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
614 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
616 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
617 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
625 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
629 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
630 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
632 unsigned char *clist, *p;
635 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
638 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
639 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
643 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
646 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
647 unsigned long idmask;
649 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
651 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
652 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) {
657 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
658 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]);
659 if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve))
660 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
662 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
666 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
669 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
679 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
683 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
687 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
690 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
692 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
698 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
700 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
702 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
704 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
705 if (nid == NID_undef)
706 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
707 if (nid == NID_undef)
708 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
709 if (nid == NID_undef)
711 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
712 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
714 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
718 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
719 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
724 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
728 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
731 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
732 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
737 const EC_METHOD *meth;
740 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
741 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
744 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
747 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
751 /* Determine curve ID */
752 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
753 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
754 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
757 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
766 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
768 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
770 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
772 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
774 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
779 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
780 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
781 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
783 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
784 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
787 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
788 * supported (see RFC4492).
790 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
791 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
792 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
793 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
794 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
797 if (i == num_formats)
802 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
803 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
804 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
806 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
808 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
809 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
810 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
811 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
812 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
816 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
817 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
822 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
829 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
833 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
835 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
836 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
837 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
839 *pformats = ecformats_default;
840 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
842 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
844 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
849 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
850 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
852 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
854 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
857 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
860 /* If not EC nothing to do */
861 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
865 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
870 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
873 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
877 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
878 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
880 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
886 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
887 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
888 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
889 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
890 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
892 return 0; /* Should never happen */
893 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
894 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
896 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
898 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
899 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
900 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
902 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
908 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
909 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
910 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
912 unsigned char curve_id[2];
913 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
914 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
915 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
916 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
920 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
923 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
924 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
925 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
926 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
927 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
928 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
932 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
933 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
935 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
936 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
938 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
940 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
943 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
945 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
951 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
952 /* Need a shared curve */
953 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
959 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
964 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
966 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
970 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
973 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
977 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
982 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
987 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
988 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
991 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
992 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
994 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
997 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
998 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
1000 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
1003 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1004 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
1007 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
1010 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
1011 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
1012 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
1013 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
1015 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
1016 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
1017 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
1018 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1020 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
1021 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1022 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
1024 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1025 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
1029 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1030 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1031 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1032 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1035 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
1038 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1041 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1042 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1043 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1044 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1045 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
1047 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1048 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1051 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1052 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
1056 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
1057 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
1058 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1059 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1060 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1061 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1062 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1064 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1065 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1070 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1071 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1073 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1074 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1076 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1077 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1078 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1079 /* Should never happen */
1082 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1083 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1087 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1088 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1089 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1090 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1091 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1093 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1097 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1098 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1101 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1102 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1104 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1107 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1108 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1110 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1116 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1120 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1121 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1122 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1123 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1126 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1127 if (i == sent_sigslen
1128 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1129 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1133 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1139 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1141 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1142 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1147 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1148 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1149 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1152 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1155 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1156 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1157 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1160 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1161 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1162 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1166 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1167 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2.
1169 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1170 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
1171 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
1172 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1173 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1177 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1178 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1182 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1183 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1190 * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1191 * signature algorithms.
1194 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1195 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1198 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1199 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1202 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1203 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1205 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1206 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1207 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1208 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1211 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1212 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1213 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1214 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1215 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1217 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1218 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1219 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1220 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1221 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1227 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1228 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1231 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1232 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1233 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1234 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1236 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1238 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1239 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1241 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1242 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1244 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1245 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1246 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1247 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1255 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1256 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1262 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1264 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1265 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1266 unsigned long size_str;
1270 * check for enough space.
1271 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1272 * 2 for servernamelist length
1273 * 1 for the hostname type
1274 * 2 for hostname length
1278 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1280 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1283 /* extension type and length */
1284 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1285 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1287 /* length of servername list */
1288 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1290 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1291 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1293 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1297 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1298 if (s->renegotiate) {
1301 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1306 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1309 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1312 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1319 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1320 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1321 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1322 * Client Hello message */
1324 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1325 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1331 * check for enough space.
1332 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1333 * 1 for the srp user identity
1334 * + srp user identity length
1336 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1339 /* fill in the extension */
1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1341 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1342 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1343 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1348 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1351 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1354 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1355 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1357 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1359 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1361 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1363 if (num_formats > 255) {
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1368 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1369 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1370 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1371 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1372 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1376 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1378 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1379 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1382 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1384 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1386 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1390 curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves;
1391 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1392 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1393 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1394 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len);
1395 ret += curves_list_len;
1397 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1399 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1401 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1402 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1403 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1404 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1405 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1406 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1407 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1409 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1410 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1411 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1414 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1415 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1418 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1421 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1423 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1426 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1432 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1434 const unsigned char *salg;
1435 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1436 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1438 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1439 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1441 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1444 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1445 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1446 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1448 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1450 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1453 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1456 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1461 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1463 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1467 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1468 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1469 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1475 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1476 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1482 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1484 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1485 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1487 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1488 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1490 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1491 /* save position of id len */
1492 unsigned char *q = ret;
1493 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1494 /* skip over id len */
1496 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1502 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1504 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1505 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1506 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1508 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1512 * 1: peer may send requests
1513 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1515 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1516 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1518 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1521 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1522 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1524 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1525 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1527 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1534 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1535 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1538 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1539 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1540 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1541 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1542 s->cert->alpn_sent = 1;
1544 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1545 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1548 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1550 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1553 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1556 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1563 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1564 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1565 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1569 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1570 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1571 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1574 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1575 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1577 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1578 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1581 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1583 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1584 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1590 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1592 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1597 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1600 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1604 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1605 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1608 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1609 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1610 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1611 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1613 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1614 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1615 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1616 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1617 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1618 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1621 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation
1623 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1628 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1630 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1631 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1632 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1635 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1639 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1642 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1647 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1650 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1653 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1660 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1662 const unsigned char *plist;
1665 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1669 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1671 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1673 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1675 if (plistlen > 255) {
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1680 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1681 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1682 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1683 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1688 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1691 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1693 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1694 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1696 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1700 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1701 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1703 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1706 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1707 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1708 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1710 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1712 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1715 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1718 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1723 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1724 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1727 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1729 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1732 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1735 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1743 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1744 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1745 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1746 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1747 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1748 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1749 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1750 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1751 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1752 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1754 if (limit - ret < 36)
1756 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1760 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1761 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1762 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1763 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1765 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1769 * 1: peer may send requests
1770 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1772 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1773 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1775 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1780 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1781 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1782 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1783 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1784 const unsigned char *npa;
1785 unsigned int npalen;
1788 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1790 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1791 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1792 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1794 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1796 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1798 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1802 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1805 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1806 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1807 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1809 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1811 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1815 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1819 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1822 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1826 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1828 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1829 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1830 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1835 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1836 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1837 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1838 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1840 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1841 const unsigned char *limit)
1843 unsigned short type, size;
1844 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1845 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1846 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1847 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1848 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1849 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1850 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1852 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1853 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1854 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1855 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1858 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1859 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1860 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1861 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1862 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1863 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1864 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1865 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1866 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1867 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1870 if (limit - data <= 2)
1874 if (limit - data < 4)
1879 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1882 if (limit - data < size)
1886 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1887 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1888 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1890 if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
1892 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1894 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1897 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1899 if (limit - data != (int)(len))
1901 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1905 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1907 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1910 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to save the ALPN extension in a
1911 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1912 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1913 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1916 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1917 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1926 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1927 * length-prefixed strings.
1929 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1938 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1939 proto_len = data[i];
1945 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1951 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL)
1952 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed);
1953 s->cert->alpn_proposed = OPENSSL_malloc(data_len);
1954 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed == NULL) {
1955 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1958 memcpy(s->cert->alpn_proposed, data, data_len);
1959 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = data_len;
1963 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1968 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1969 * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_*
1970 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1971 * returns 1 on success, 0 on failure: al/ret set only on failure
1973 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al)
1975 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1976 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1978 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1979 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1980 s->cert->alpn_proposed,
1981 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len,
1982 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1984 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1985 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1986 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1987 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1988 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1989 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1992 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1993 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1994 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1995 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1996 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2004 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2005 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
2007 unsigned short type;
2008 unsigned short size;
2010 unsigned char *data = *p;
2011 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2013 s->servername_done = 0;
2014 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2015 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2016 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2019 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2020 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2021 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2023 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
2024 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed) {
2025 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed);
2026 s->cert->alpn_proposed = NULL;
2028 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
2029 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2030 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2031 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2034 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2035 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2036 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit);
2037 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2039 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2040 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2041 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2042 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2044 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2045 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2046 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2047 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2051 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2056 if (limit - data < 2)
2061 if (limit - data != len)
2064 while (limit - data >= 4) {
2068 if (limit - data < size)
2071 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
2073 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2074 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2076 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2078 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2079 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2080 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2081 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2082 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2083 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2084 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2085 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2086 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2087 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2088 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2089 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2090 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2091 * the value of the Host: field.
2092 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2093 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2094 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2096 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2100 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2101 unsigned char *sdata;
2114 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2121 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2122 switch (servname_type) {
2123 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2125 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2128 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2129 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2132 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2133 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2134 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2137 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2138 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2139 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2140 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2141 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2142 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2145 s->servername_done = 1;
2148 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2149 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2150 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2151 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2165 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2166 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2167 if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1))
2169 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2171 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2173 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2174 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2176 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2181 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2182 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2183 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2184 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2186 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2187 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2190 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2191 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2192 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2194 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2195 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2196 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2197 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2200 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2201 ecpointformatlist_length;
2202 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2203 ecpointformatlist_length);
2207 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
2208 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2209 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2210 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2211 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2212 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2214 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2215 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2216 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2217 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2219 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2220 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2221 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2222 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
2226 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2229 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2230 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2231 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2232 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2235 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2236 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2237 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2238 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2242 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
2243 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2244 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2245 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2246 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2247 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2250 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2251 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2252 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2253 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2256 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2259 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2260 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2261 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2265 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2266 /* shouldn't really happen */
2267 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2270 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2271 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2272 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2274 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2275 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2276 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2277 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2282 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2283 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2284 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2285 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2287 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2290 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2291 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2293 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2294 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2296 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2300 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2302 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2304 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2309 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2311 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2312 const unsigned char *sdata;
2314 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2321 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2322 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2324 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2327 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2328 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2329 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2333 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2342 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2348 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2351 if (data != sdata) {
2352 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2355 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2356 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2357 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2362 /* Read in request_extensions */
2371 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2372 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2373 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2376 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2377 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2378 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2383 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2386 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2388 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2389 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2391 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2392 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2394 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2395 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2396 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2399 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2404 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2405 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2406 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2408 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2411 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2412 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2413 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2414 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2415 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2416 * anything like that, but this might change).
2418 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2419 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2420 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2421 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2422 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2424 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2428 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2429 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2430 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2434 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2435 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2436 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2437 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2438 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2446 /* Spurious data on the end */
2454 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2456 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2457 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2458 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2460 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2466 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2471 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data
2472 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking.
2475 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
2476 const unsigned char *data,
2477 const unsigned char *limit,
2480 unsigned short type, size, len;
2481 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
2482 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
2485 if (limit - data <= 2)
2489 if (limit - data < len)
2492 while (limit - data >= 4) {
2496 if (limit - data < size)
2498 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2507 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2508 unsigned char *limit)
2511 unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
2513 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled
2514 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically
2515 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
2516 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
2518 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, limit, &al) <= 0) {
2519 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2523 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2528 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2529 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, limit, &al) <= 0) {
2530 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2537 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2539 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2540 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2541 * fill the length of the block.
2543 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2545 unsigned int off = 0;
2558 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2559 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2561 unsigned short length;
2562 unsigned short type;
2563 unsigned short size;
2564 unsigned char *data = *p;
2565 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2566 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2568 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2569 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2571 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2573 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2574 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2575 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2577 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2578 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2579 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2582 if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
2586 if ((d + n) - data != length) {
2587 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2591 while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
2595 if ((d + n) - data < size)
2598 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2599 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2601 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2602 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2603 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2606 tlsext_servername = 1;
2608 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2609 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2610 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2611 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2613 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2614 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2618 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2619 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2620 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2621 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2622 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2623 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2626 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2627 ecpointformatlist_length;
2628 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2629 ecpointformatlist_length);
2633 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2634 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2635 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2636 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2637 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2640 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2642 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2643 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2644 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2645 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2647 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2650 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2652 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2655 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2657 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2658 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2659 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2662 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2665 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2666 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2667 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2671 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2672 /* shouldn't really happen */
2673 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2675 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2676 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2677 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2679 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2680 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2683 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2684 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2689 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2691 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2694 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2695 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2698 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2699 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2701 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2702 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2703 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2704 unsigned char *selected;
2705 unsigned char selected_len;
2707 /* We must have requested it. */
2708 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2709 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2712 /* The data must be valid */
2713 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2714 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2718 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2720 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2721 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2722 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2726 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2727 * a single Serverhello
2729 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2730 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2731 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2732 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2735 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2736 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2737 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2741 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2744 /* We must have requested it. */
2745 if (!s->cert->alpn_sent) {
2746 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2750 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2754 * The extension data consists of:
2755 * uint16 list_length
2756 * uint8 proto_length;
2757 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2762 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2763 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2767 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2768 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2771 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2772 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2773 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2774 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2775 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2778 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2779 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2782 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2783 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2785 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2787 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2788 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2790 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2791 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2793 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2794 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2795 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2798 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2803 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2804 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2805 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2810 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2811 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2813 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2819 if (data != d + n) {
2820 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2824 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2825 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2826 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2827 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2828 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2829 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2833 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2844 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2845 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2846 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2847 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2848 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2849 * initial connect only.
2851 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2852 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2853 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2855 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2862 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2865 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2869 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2870 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2872 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2877 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2878 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2879 /* shouldn't really happen */
2880 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2883 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2884 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2885 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2887 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2888 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2889 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2891 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2893 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2896 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
2897 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2902 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
2903 * server opaque PRF input
2905 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2906 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2910 s->cert->alpn_sent = 0;
2914 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2919 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2921 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2922 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2924 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2926 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2927 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2930 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2931 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2935 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2937 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2938 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2939 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2940 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2942 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2944 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2946 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2949 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we
2950 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this
2951 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early().
2956 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2957 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2959 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2961 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2962 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2967 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2968 /* shouldn't really happen */
2969 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2971 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2973 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2974 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2975 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
2976 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
2978 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF
2979 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input!
2982 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2983 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2984 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2986 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2987 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2988 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2990 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2991 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2992 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2995 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2996 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3000 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3002 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we
3003 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the
3006 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3007 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3014 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3015 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3018 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3019 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3022 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3023 s->servername_done = 0;
3029 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3033 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3034 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
3035 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3036 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3037 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3039 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3040 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
3041 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3042 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3045 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3046 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
3047 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3049 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3052 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3053 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3055 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3056 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3060 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3063 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3067 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3069 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3073 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
3074 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
3075 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
3076 * influence which certificate is sent
3078 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3080 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3081 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3082 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3083 if (certpkey == NULL) {
3084 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3088 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
3089 * et al can pick it up.
3091 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3092 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3094 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3095 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3096 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3098 /* status request response should be sent */
3099 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3100 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3101 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3103 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3105 /* something bad happened */
3106 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3107 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3108 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3112 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3114 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) {
3120 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3121 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3124 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3125 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3133 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3135 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3136 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3138 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3140 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3141 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3142 * must contain uncompressed.
3144 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3145 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3146 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3147 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3148 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3149 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3150 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
3151 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3152 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3154 unsigned char *list;
3155 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3156 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3157 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3158 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3159 found_uncompressed = 1;
3163 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3165 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3169 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3170 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3172 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3174 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3175 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3176 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3177 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3179 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3181 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3183 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3184 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
3186 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
3187 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
3188 * value from the server too.
3191 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3192 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3193 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3197 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
3198 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
3200 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3201 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
3202 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
3203 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3204 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3209 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3210 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3211 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3213 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
3216 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3217 && !(s->hit) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3220 * Call callback with resp == NULL and resplen == -1 so callback
3221 * knows there is no response
3223 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3225 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3226 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3229 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3230 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3235 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3236 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3239 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3240 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3243 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3244 s->servername_done = 0;
3250 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
3254 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3256 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
3257 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3261 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3269 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3270 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3271 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3273 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3274 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3275 * extension, if any.
3276 * len: the length of the session ID.
3277 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3278 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3279 * point to the resulting session.
3281 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3282 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3283 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3286 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3287 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3288 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3289 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3290 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3291 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3292 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3295 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3296 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3297 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3298 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3299 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3300 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3302 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3303 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3305 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3306 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3310 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3313 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3316 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3318 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3322 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3323 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3331 /* Skip past cipher list */
3337 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3343 /* Now at start of extensions */
3347 while (limit - p >= 4) {
3348 unsigned short type, size;
3351 if (limit - p < size)
3353 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3357 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3360 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3363 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3365 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3366 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3367 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3368 * calculate the master secret later.
3372 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3374 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3375 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3377 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3379 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3380 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3382 default: /* fatal error */
3392 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3394 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3395 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3396 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3397 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3398 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3399 * point to the resulting session.
3402 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3403 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3404 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3405 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3407 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3408 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3409 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3412 unsigned char *sdec;
3413 const unsigned char *p;
3414 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3415 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3418 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3420 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3421 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3422 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3423 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3424 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3425 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3434 /* Check key name matches */
3435 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3437 if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3438 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0
3439 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3440 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3446 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3449 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3453 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3454 if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) {
3455 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3456 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3461 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3462 if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3463 || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3466 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3467 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3468 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3471 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3472 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3473 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3474 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3475 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3477 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3478 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3482 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3483 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3488 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3491 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3495 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3496 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3497 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3501 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3502 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3511 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3515 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3516 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3520 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3527 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3528 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3529 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3530 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3531 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3532 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3533 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3536 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3537 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3538 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3539 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3542 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3545 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3546 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3552 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3555 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3556 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3557 return table[i].nid;
3562 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3568 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3569 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3572 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3575 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3576 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3580 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3582 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3583 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3586 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3589 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3590 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3591 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
3597 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3598 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3601 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3602 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3603 return EVP_sha224();
3605 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3606 return EVP_sha256();
3608 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3609 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3610 return EVP_sha384();
3612 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3613 return EVP_sha512();
3621 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3624 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3625 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3626 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3628 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3629 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3630 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3632 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3633 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3634 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3640 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3641 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3642 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3644 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3645 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3647 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3648 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3649 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3651 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3653 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3654 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3655 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3657 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3659 if (psignhash_nid) {
3660 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3661 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3663 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3667 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3668 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3669 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3670 const unsigned char *allow,
3673 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3674 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3675 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3676 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3677 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3679 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3681 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3682 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3685 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3686 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3687 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3689 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3699 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3700 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3702 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3703 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3705 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3707 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3708 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3709 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3710 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3711 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3713 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3714 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3715 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3716 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3717 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3718 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3719 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3721 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3722 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3725 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3726 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3730 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3731 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3733 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3735 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3738 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3742 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3743 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3747 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3749 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3752 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3753 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3755 /* Should never happen */
3759 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3760 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3761 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3762 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3764 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3765 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3769 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3775 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3776 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3779 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3780 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3782 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3783 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3785 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3787 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3789 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3791 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3792 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3793 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3794 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3795 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3796 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3797 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3798 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3804 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3805 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3806 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3807 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3808 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3809 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3810 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3811 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3812 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3813 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3814 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3820 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3821 * the certificate for signing.
3823 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3825 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3826 * supported it stays as NULL.
3828 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3829 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3830 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3832 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3833 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3834 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3835 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3838 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3839 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3840 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3846 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3847 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3848 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3850 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3855 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3862 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3864 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3867 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3868 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3869 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3871 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3872 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3876 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3878 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3880 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3882 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3884 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3885 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3888 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3889 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3891 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3892 unsigned short hbtype;
3893 unsigned int payload;
3894 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3896 if (s->msg_callback)
3897 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3898 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3899 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3901 /* Read type and payload length first */
3902 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3903 return 0; /* silently discard */
3906 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3907 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3910 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3911 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3915 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3916 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3918 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3923 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3924 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3926 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3928 /* Random padding */
3929 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3930 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3934 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3935 3 + payload + padding);
3937 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3938 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3939 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3940 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3942 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3946 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3950 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3951 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3955 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3957 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3964 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3966 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3968 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3969 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3971 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3972 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3973 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3978 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3979 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3984 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3985 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3991 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3992 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3994 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3997 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3998 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3999 * some random stuff.
4000 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4001 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4002 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4003 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4006 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4011 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4012 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4014 /* Sequence number */
4015 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4016 /* 16 random bytes */
4017 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
4018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4022 /* Random padding */
4023 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
4024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4028 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4030 if (s->msg_callback)
4031 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4032 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4033 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4035 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4045 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4049 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4052 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4054 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4057 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4060 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4062 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4064 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4066 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4074 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4075 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4076 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4077 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4078 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4079 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4083 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4084 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4085 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4086 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4089 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
4090 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4093 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4094 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4099 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
4100 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
4102 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4106 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4110 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4113 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
4116 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4121 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4122 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4124 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
4125 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4126 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4127 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4128 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4130 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4137 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4138 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4139 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4140 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4142 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4143 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4144 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4145 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4151 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4155 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4159 if (default_nid == -1)
4161 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4163 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4164 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4165 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4170 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4171 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4175 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4176 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
4177 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4184 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4185 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4186 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4187 * attempting to use them.
4190 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4192 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4193 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4194 /* Strict mode flags */
4195 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4196 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4197 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4199 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4204 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4205 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4207 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4208 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4210 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4213 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4215 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4217 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4219 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4220 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4223 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4224 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4225 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
4226 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
4227 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4228 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4235 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4238 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4239 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4240 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4242 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4249 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4250 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4251 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4252 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4253 else if (!check_flags)
4258 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4259 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4261 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4263 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4264 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4266 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4269 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4270 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4271 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4272 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4273 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4276 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4277 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4278 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4279 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4283 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4284 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4293 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4294 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4296 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4298 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4299 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4300 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4303 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4310 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4311 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4315 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4316 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4317 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4318 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4320 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4327 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4328 else if (check_flags)
4329 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4331 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4332 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4333 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4334 else if (!check_flags)
4337 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4338 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4339 else if (strict_mode) {
4340 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4341 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4342 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4343 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4345 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4352 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4353 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4357 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4360 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4363 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4368 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4369 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4370 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4371 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4372 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4376 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4380 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4382 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4383 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4385 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4386 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4387 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4391 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4394 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4396 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4398 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4399 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4401 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4402 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4403 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4405 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4406 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4407 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4408 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4409 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4414 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4417 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4419 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4420 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4424 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4425 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4426 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4427 else if (cpk->digest)
4428 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4430 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4433 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4437 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4438 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4440 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4441 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4448 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4449 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4451 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4452 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4453 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4454 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4455 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4456 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4459 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4460 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4462 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);