2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
42 tls_close_construct_packet,
46 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
59 tls_close_construct_packet,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
77 tls_close_construct_packet,
81 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
84 tls13_setup_key_block,
85 tls13_generate_master_secret,
86 tls13_change_cipher_state,
87 tls13_final_finish_mac,
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
93 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
94 tls_close_construct_packet,
98 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
101 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
102 * http, the cache would over fill
104 return (60 * 60 * 2);
111 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
115 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
117 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
121 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
124 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
125 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
127 s->version = s->method->version;
130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
133 int nid; /* Curve NID */
134 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
135 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
139 * Table of curve information.
140 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
141 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
143 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
144 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
145 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
146 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
147 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
148 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
149 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
150 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
151 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
152 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
153 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
154 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
155 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
156 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
157 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
158 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
159 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
160 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
161 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
162 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
163 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
164 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
165 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
166 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
167 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
168 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
169 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
172 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
175 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
176 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
181 /* The default curves */
182 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
183 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
184 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
185 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
186 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
189 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
190 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
191 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
192 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
193 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
194 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
195 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
196 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
199 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
200 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
202 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
203 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
204 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
205 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
206 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
207 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
208 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
209 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
210 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
211 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
212 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
213 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
214 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
215 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
216 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
217 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
218 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
219 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
220 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
221 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
222 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
223 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
227 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
231 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
233 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
234 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
235 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
237 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
239 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
243 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
246 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
247 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
254 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
256 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
257 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
258 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
259 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
260 * lists in the first place.
261 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
262 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
263 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
265 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
266 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
268 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
270 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
271 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
273 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
274 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
275 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
276 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
277 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
280 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
281 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
285 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
286 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
290 *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
291 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
294 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
295 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
299 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
300 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
305 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
310 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
311 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
313 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
316 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
318 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
319 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
320 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
323 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
326 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
327 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
329 const unsigned char *curves;
330 size_t num_curves, i;
331 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
332 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
334 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
336 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
339 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
340 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
342 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
343 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
345 } else /* Should never happen */
348 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
350 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
351 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
352 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
358 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
359 * if there is no match.
360 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
361 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
362 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
364 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
366 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
367 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
369 /* Can't do anything on client side */
373 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
375 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
376 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
378 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
379 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
380 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
381 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
382 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
383 /* Should never happen */
386 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
390 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
391 * but s->options is a long...
393 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
394 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
396 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
397 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
398 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
399 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
400 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
403 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
406 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
408 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
409 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
410 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
412 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
416 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
417 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
418 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
419 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
420 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
423 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
424 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
432 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
436 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
437 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
439 unsigned char *glist, *p;
442 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
445 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
446 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
449 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
450 unsigned long idmask;
452 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
453 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
455 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
464 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
468 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
472 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
475 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
477 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
483 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
485 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
487 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
489 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
490 if (nid == NID_undef)
491 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
492 if (nid == NID_undef)
493 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
494 if (nid == NID_undef)
496 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
497 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
499 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
503 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
504 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
508 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
512 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
515 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
516 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
523 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
524 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
527 /* Determine curve ID */
528 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
529 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
530 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
534 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
536 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
538 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
539 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
541 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
542 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
544 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
550 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
551 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
552 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
554 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
555 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
558 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
559 * supported (see RFC4492).
561 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
562 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
563 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
564 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
565 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
568 if (i == num_formats)
573 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
574 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
575 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
577 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
579 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
580 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
581 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
582 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
583 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
587 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
588 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
593 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
600 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
604 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
606 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
607 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
608 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
610 *pformats = ecformats_default;
611 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
613 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
615 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
620 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
621 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
623 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
625 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
628 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
631 /* If not EC nothing to do */
632 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
634 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
638 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
641 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
645 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
646 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
648 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
654 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
655 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
656 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
657 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
658 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
660 return 0; /* Should never happen */
661 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
662 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
664 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
666 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
667 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
668 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
670 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
676 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
678 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
680 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
682 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
683 * is compatible with the client extensions.
685 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
687 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
690 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
693 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
694 unsigned char curve_id[2];
695 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
696 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
697 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
698 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
699 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
703 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
704 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
708 /* Need a shared curve */
709 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
713 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
717 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
722 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
725 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
726 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
729 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
730 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
732 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
735 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
736 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
738 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
742 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
744 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
747 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
748 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
752 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
753 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
759 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
766 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
767 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
771 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
774 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
778 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
779 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
780 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
781 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
783 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
784 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
787 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
788 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
792 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
793 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
794 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
795 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
796 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
797 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
798 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
800 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
801 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
806 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
807 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
809 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
810 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
812 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
813 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
814 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
815 /* Should never happen */
818 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
819 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
824 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
825 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
826 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
829 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
833 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
834 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
837 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
838 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
840 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
843 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
844 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
846 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
852 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
856 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
857 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
858 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
859 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
862 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
863 if (i == sent_sigslen
864 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
865 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
869 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
874 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
875 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
876 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
881 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
883 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
888 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
889 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
890 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
892 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
895 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
897 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
899 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
901 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
902 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
904 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
905 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
906 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
909 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
911 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
912 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
913 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
919 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
920 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
921 * @c: cipher to check
922 * @op: Security check that you want to do
924 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
926 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
928 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
929 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
931 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
933 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
934 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
936 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
937 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
940 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
943 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
945 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
947 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
950 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
952 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
953 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
963 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
964 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
965 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
966 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
967 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
970 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
972 PACKET extensions = *packet;
973 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
974 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
977 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
978 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
981 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
982 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
988 if (num_extensions <= 1)
991 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
992 if (extension_types == NULL) {
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
997 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
998 extensions = *packet;
999 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1001 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1002 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1003 /* This should not happen. */
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1009 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1013 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1014 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1015 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1016 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1021 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1025 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1028 const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
1029 size_t num_curves = 0;
1031 int min_version, max_version, reason;
1033 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1034 if ((s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_3_VERSION)
1035 || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1037 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1038 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1040 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1041 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1043 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1044 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1045 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1046 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1047 || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1054 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1055 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1061 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1062 if (s->renegotiate) {
1063 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1064 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1065 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1066 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1067 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1072 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1073 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1076 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1077 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1078 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1079 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1080 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1081 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1082 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1083 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1084 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1085 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1086 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1087 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1093 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1094 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1095 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1096 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1097 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1098 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1099 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1100 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1101 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1102 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1103 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1104 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1114 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1116 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurvestmp;
1120 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1122 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1123 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1124 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1125 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1126 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1132 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
1134 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
1135 pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
1136 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1140 pcurvestmp = pcurves;
1142 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1143 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1144 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1145 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1149 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1150 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
1151 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1152 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
1153 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1155 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1160 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1167 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1169 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1170 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1171 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1172 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1173 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1174 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1175 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1179 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1180 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1181 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1184 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1185 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1188 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1189 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1197 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1199 const unsigned char *salg;
1201 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1203 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1204 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1205 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1206 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1207 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1208 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1209 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1210 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1216 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1219 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1220 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1221 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1222 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1223 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1224 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1228 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1229 unsigned char *idbytes;
1233 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1234 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1236 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1237 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1238 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1243 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1244 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1248 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1249 unsigned char *extbytes;
1250 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1256 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1257 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1263 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1271 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1273 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1274 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1276 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1277 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1285 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1286 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1287 * (see longer comment below)
1289 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1290 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1291 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1292 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1293 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1294 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1295 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1296 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1300 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1303 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1304 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1305 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1308 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1309 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1310 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1311 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1312 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1316 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1317 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1318 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1319 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1324 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1325 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1326 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1327 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1333 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1334 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1335 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1340 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1341 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1342 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1349 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1350 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1351 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1358 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1359 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1364 reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
1370 /* TLS1.3 specific extensions */
1371 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1373 size_t i, sharessent = 0;
1375 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we add this extension for versions < TLS1.3? */
1376 /* supported_versions extension */
1377 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1378 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1379 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1385 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
1386 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
1389 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
1390 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
1391 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1392 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
1393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1394 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1397 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1402 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1408 /* key_share extension */
1409 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1410 /* Extension data sub-packet */
1411 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1412 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
1413 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1419 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
1420 * now, just send one
1422 for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1423 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1424 unsigned int curve_id = 0;
1425 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
1428 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1431 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1432 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1434 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1438 /* Generate a key for this key_share */
1439 curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
1440 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1441 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1446 /* Encode the public key. */
1447 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
1449 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1451 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1455 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
1456 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
1457 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1459 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1460 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1461 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1466 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
1467 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
1468 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
1470 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
1471 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
1473 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1475 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1482 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1483 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1484 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1487 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1488 unsigned char *padbytes;
1491 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1496 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1497 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1503 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1504 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1508 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1517 * Add the key_share extension.
1519 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1521 static int add_client_key_share_ext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1523 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1524 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1525 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1532 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1533 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1534 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1539 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1545 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1546 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1547 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1549 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1553 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1554 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1556 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1557 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1560 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1562 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1563 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1564 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1565 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1573 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1576 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1579 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1580 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1581 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1582 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1585 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1586 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1591 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1592 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1597 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1598 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1601 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1602 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1603 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1604 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1611 const unsigned char *plist;
1614 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1616 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1618 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1619 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1620 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1621 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1627 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1630 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1632 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1633 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1634 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1640 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1643 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1646 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1647 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1648 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1654 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1655 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1656 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1657 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1658 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1659 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1660 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1667 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1668 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1669 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1670 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1671 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1672 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1673 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1674 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1675 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1676 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1678 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1685 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1686 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1687 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1688 const unsigned char *npa;
1689 unsigned int npalen;
1692 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1694 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1695 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1696 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1697 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1701 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1706 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit && !add_client_key_share_ext(s, pkt, al))
1709 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1714 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1716 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1717 * for other cases too.
1719 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1720 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1721 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1722 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1723 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1725 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1726 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1732 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1733 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1734 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1740 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1741 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1742 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1743 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1744 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1745 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1746 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1747 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1748 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1749 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1755 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1763 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1764 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1765 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1766 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1768 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1770 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1772 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1774 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1775 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1779 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1781 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1782 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1783 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1786 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1788 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1789 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1790 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1798 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1799 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1800 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1802 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1804 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1805 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1807 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1808 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1809 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1810 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1811 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1813 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1814 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1815 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1816 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1817 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1820 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1821 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1822 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1823 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1826 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1836 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1837 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1838 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1843 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1844 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1845 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1846 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1848 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1854 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1855 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1856 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1857 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1858 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1859 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1860 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1862 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1863 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1864 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1865 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1866 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1867 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1868 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1869 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1870 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1871 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1872 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1873 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1874 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1877 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1878 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1880 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1882 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1883 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1884 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1888 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1891 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1892 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1894 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1897 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1901 * Process the supported_groups extension if present. Returns success if the
1902 * extension is absent, or if it has been successfully processed.
1904 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
1906 static int tls_process_supported_groups(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1909 PACKET supported_groups_list;
1910 RAW_EXTENSION *suppgroups = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
1911 hello->num_extensions,
1912 TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups);
1914 if (suppgroups == NULL)
1917 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1918 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&suppgroups->data,
1919 &supported_groups_list)
1920 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
1921 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
1926 && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
1927 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
1928 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
1936 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1937 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1938 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1939 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1941 static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
1942 const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups,
1947 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
1950 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
1951 unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
1953 if (group_id == share_id
1954 && (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups,
1955 SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
1960 /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */
1961 return i < num_groups;
1965 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
1966 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1967 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
1969 static int process_key_share_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1971 unsigned int group_id;
1972 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
1973 const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves;
1974 size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves;
1975 int group_nid, found = 0;
1976 unsigned int curve_flags;
1979 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
1980 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1985 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
1986 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1987 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
1988 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1992 /* Get our list of supported curves */
1993 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) {
1994 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1995 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
1996 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2000 /* Get the clients list of supported curves */
2001 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
2002 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2003 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2004 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2008 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
2009 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
2010 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
2011 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
2012 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2013 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2014 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2019 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
2020 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
2025 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
2026 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) {
2027 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2028 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2029 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2033 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
2034 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) {
2035 /* Share not suitable */
2039 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
2041 if (group_nid == 0) {
2042 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2043 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2044 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2048 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2049 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
2050 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2052 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
2053 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2054 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2058 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2060 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2061 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2063 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2064 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
2066 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2067 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2068 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2069 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2072 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2075 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
2077 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2078 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2079 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2080 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2092 * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
2093 * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
2094 * object as required.
2096 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
2097 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
2100 * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
2101 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
2103 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
2106 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2108 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2109 s->servername_done = 0;
2110 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2112 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2115 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2116 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2117 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
2118 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
2119 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
2120 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
2122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2123 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2124 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
2125 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2127 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2128 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
2129 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2130 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2133 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2134 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2137 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2140 * We process the supported_groups extension first so that is done before
2141 * we get to key_share which needs to use the information in it.
2143 if (!tls_process_supported_groups(s, hello)) {
2144 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2149 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
2150 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
2153 for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
2154 RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
2156 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2157 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
2158 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2159 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2160 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2162 if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2163 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
2164 &currext->data, al))
2166 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2167 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2170 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2172 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2173 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2174 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2175 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2176 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2177 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2178 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2179 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2180 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2181 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2182 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2183 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2184 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2185 * the value of the Host: field.
2186 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2187 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2188 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2190 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2194 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2195 unsigned int servname_type;
2196 PACKET sni, hostname;
2198 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
2199 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
2200 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
2205 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
2206 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
2207 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
2209 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
2210 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
2211 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2213 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2214 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2216 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2217 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2218 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2223 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2224 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2228 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2229 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2233 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2234 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2238 s->servername_done = 1;
2241 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2242 * fall back to a full handshake.
2244 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2245 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2246 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2250 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2253 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
2256 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2260 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2261 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2263 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2264 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2271 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2272 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2274 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
2275 &ec_point_format_list)
2276 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2281 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2282 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2284 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2285 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2290 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2291 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
2292 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2293 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2294 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
2295 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2296 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2297 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2298 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2301 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2302 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2304 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
2305 &supported_sig_algs)
2306 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2307 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2312 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2313 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2317 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2318 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
2319 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2323 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2324 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2325 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2326 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2327 (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
2331 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2332 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2334 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2336 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2337 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2338 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2339 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2343 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2346 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2348 PACKET responder_id;
2349 const unsigned char *id_data;
2351 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2353 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2357 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2358 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
2359 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2360 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2364 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2365 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2369 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2370 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2371 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2376 /* Read in request_extensions */
2377 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
2378 &currext->data, &exts))
2381 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2382 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2383 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2384 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2385 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2386 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2387 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2388 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2389 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2397 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2399 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2403 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
2404 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2406 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2409 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2410 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2411 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2412 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2413 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2414 * anything like that, but this might change).
2416 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2417 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2418 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2419 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2420 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2422 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2426 else if (currext->type
2427 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2428 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2429 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
2430 &currext->data, al))
2434 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2436 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2437 && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2438 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
2439 &currext->data, al))
2443 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2444 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
2445 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2446 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2447 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit
2448 && !process_key_share_ext(s, &currext->data, al)) {
2452 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2453 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
2457 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2458 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2459 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2460 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2461 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2464 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
2465 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2466 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
2471 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2473 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2474 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2475 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2477 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2482 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2483 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2484 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2485 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2490 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2493 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2494 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
2495 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2498 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2507 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2508 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2509 * fill the length of the block.
2511 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2513 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2515 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2516 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2517 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2525 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2527 unsigned int length, type, size;
2528 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2529 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2532 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2534 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2536 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2537 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2539 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2541 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2543 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2546 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2547 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2551 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2552 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2556 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2557 const unsigned char *data;
2560 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2561 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2564 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2565 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2567 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2568 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2570 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2571 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2572 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2573 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2574 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2577 tlsext_servername = 1;
2579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2580 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2581 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2582 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2583 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2584 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2588 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2589 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2590 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2591 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2592 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2595 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2596 ecpointformatlist_length;
2597 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2598 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2599 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2600 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2606 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2608 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2609 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2610 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2611 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2613 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2616 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2617 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2620 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2621 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2623 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2626 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2627 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2630 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2631 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2635 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2636 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2637 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2639 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2640 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2641 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2642 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2643 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2644 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2646 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2648 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2649 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2650 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2653 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2658 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2659 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2660 unsigned char *selected;
2661 unsigned char selected_len;
2662 /* We must have requested it. */
2663 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2664 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2667 /* The data must be valid */
2668 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2669 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2672 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2675 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2676 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2677 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2681 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2682 * a single Serverhello
2684 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2685 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2686 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2687 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2690 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2691 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2692 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2696 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2698 /* We must have requested it. */
2699 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2700 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2704 * The extension data consists of:
2705 * uint16 list_length
2706 * uint8 proto_length;
2707 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2709 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2710 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2711 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2712 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2715 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2716 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2717 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2718 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2721 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2722 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2725 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2728 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2729 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2733 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2734 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2735 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2736 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2737 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2738 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2739 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
2740 (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
2741 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2743 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2744 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2745 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2746 unsigned int group_id;
2748 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
2752 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2757 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &group_id)) {
2758 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2760 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2764 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
2766 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
2769 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2771 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2775 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &encoded_pt)
2776 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
2777 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2779 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2783 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
2785 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2789 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2790 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2791 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2796 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
2797 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2799 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2802 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2804 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2805 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2807 } else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2811 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2812 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2816 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2817 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2818 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2819 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2820 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2821 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2822 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2826 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2835 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2836 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2837 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2838 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2839 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2841 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2842 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2843 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2845 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2851 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2854 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2855 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2856 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2865 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2867 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2871 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2876 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2878 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2879 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2883 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2884 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2887 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2888 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2892 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2894 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2895 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2896 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2897 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2899 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2901 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2904 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2905 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2908 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2909 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2912 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2913 s->servername_done = 0;
2919 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2920 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2922 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2924 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2927 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2928 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2930 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2931 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2934 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2937 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2938 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2939 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2943 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2948 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2949 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2950 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2951 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2952 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2953 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2954 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2955 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2958 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2959 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2960 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2962 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2965 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2966 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2968 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2969 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2973 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2977 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2982 * Upon success, returns 1.
2983 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2985 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2987 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2990 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2991 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2992 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2993 * influence which certificate is sent
2995 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2997 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2998 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2999 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3000 if (certpkey != NULL) {
3002 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
3003 * et al can pick it up.
3005 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3006 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3008 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3009 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3010 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3012 /* status request response should be sent */
3013 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3014 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3015 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3017 /* something bad happened */
3018 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3020 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3026 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
3033 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3035 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3036 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3040 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3041 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3042 * must contain uncompressed.
3044 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3045 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3046 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3047 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3048 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3049 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3050 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3051 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3053 unsigned char *list;
3054 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3055 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3056 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3057 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3058 found_uncompressed = 1;
3062 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3064 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3068 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3069 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3071 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3073 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3074 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3075 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3076 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3078 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3080 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3083 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
3084 * that we don't receive a status message
3086 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3087 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3088 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
3091 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3092 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3095 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3096 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3099 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3100 s->servername_done = 0;
3106 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3109 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3111 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
3112 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3116 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3124 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
3125 * type and return it.
3127 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
3128 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
3129 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
3131 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
3133 RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
3138 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
3139 if (exts[loop].type == type)
3147 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
3149 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
3150 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3151 * point to the resulting session.
3153 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3154 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3155 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3158 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3159 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3160 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3161 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3162 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3163 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3164 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3167 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3168 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3169 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3170 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3171 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3172 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3174 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
3178 const unsigned char *etick;
3180 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
3183 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3186 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
3187 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3190 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
3193 ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3194 hello->num_extensions,
3195 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
3196 if (ticketext == NULL)
3199 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
3202 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3205 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3208 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3210 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3211 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3212 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3213 * calculate the master secret later.
3217 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
3218 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3221 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
3222 hello->session_id_len, ret);
3224 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3225 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3228 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3231 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3232 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3235 default: /* fatal error */
3241 * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
3242 * ClientHello and we can support it
3247 int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
3249 RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
3251 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3253 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION
3254 || s->version > TLS1_2_VERSION))
3257 emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3258 hello->num_extensions,
3259 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
3262 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
3263 * client doesn't support EMS.
3268 /* The extensions must always be empty */
3269 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
3272 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3278 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3280 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3281 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
3282 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3283 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3284 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3285 * point to the resulting session.
3288 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3289 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3290 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3291 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3292 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3294 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3295 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3296 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3299 unsigned char *sdec;
3300 const unsigned char *p;
3301 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
3303 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3304 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3305 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3306 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3308 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3309 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3312 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3317 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3318 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3319 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3330 /* Check key name matches */
3331 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3332 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3336 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3337 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3338 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3339 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3340 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3341 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3347 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3350 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3354 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3356 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3361 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3362 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3363 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3366 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3367 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3368 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3371 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3372 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3373 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3374 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3375 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3376 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
3377 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
3378 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3382 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
3383 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3388 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3392 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3396 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3397 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3398 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3402 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3403 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3412 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3416 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3417 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3421 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3428 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3429 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3430 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3431 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3432 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3433 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3434 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3435 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3436 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3437 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3440 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3441 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3442 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3443 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3444 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3445 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3446 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3449 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3452 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3453 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3459 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3462 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3463 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3464 return table[i].nid;
3469 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3475 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3478 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3481 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3487 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3489 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3496 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3499 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3500 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3501 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3502 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3503 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3504 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3505 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3506 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3507 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3508 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3509 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3510 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3513 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3519 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3520 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3521 return tls12_md_info + i;
3527 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3529 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3530 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3532 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3535 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3538 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3542 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3543 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3546 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3547 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3550 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3551 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3554 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3555 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3557 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3558 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3560 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3561 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3567 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3568 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3569 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3571 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3572 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3574 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3575 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3577 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3579 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3580 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3582 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3584 if (psignhash_nid) {
3585 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3586 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3587 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3591 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3592 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3594 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3595 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3596 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3598 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3599 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3601 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3602 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3606 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3607 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3611 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3613 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3614 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3615 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3617 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3618 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3619 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3621 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3622 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3623 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3625 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3626 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3631 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3632 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3637 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3638 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3645 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3647 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3649 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3652 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3653 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3657 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3658 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3659 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3660 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3667 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3668 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3669 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3670 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3672 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3673 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3674 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3675 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3676 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3678 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3679 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3682 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3683 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3684 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3686 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3696 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3697 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3699 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3700 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3702 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3704 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3706 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3707 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3708 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3709 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3710 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3711 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3712 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3713 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3714 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3715 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3717 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3718 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3721 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3722 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3726 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3727 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3729 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3731 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3734 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3738 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3739 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3743 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3745 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
3748 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3749 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3751 /* Should never happen */
3755 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3756 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3757 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3759 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3760 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3764 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3769 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3770 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3772 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3773 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3776 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3777 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3778 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3779 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3780 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3782 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3783 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3784 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3785 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3791 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3792 * the certificate for signing.
3794 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3796 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3797 * supported it stays as NULL.
3799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3800 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3801 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3804 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3805 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3806 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3810 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3811 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3814 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3815 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3816 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3817 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3818 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3819 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3820 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3821 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3827 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3828 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3829 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3831 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3832 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3833 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
3837 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3844 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3846 return (int)numsigalgs;
3849 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3850 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3851 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3853 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3854 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
3855 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
3859 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3861 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3863 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3865 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3867 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3868 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3871 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3875 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3878 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3880 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3881 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3882 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3883 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3884 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3885 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3887 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3888 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3889 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3893 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3895 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3898 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3901 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3903 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3905 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3907 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3915 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3916 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3918 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3921 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3922 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3925 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3926 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3931 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3932 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3934 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3938 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3942 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3945 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3947 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3952 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3953 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3955 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3956 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3957 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3959 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3966 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3967 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3968 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3970 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3971 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3972 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3978 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3982 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3986 if (default_nid == -1)
3988 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3990 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3991 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3992 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3997 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3998 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4002 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4003 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
4004 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4011 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4012 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4013 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4014 * attempting to use them.
4017 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4019 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4020 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4021 /* Strict mode flags */
4022 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4023 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4024 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4026 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4031 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4032 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4035 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4036 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4038 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4041 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
4043 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4044 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4046 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4048 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4049 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4055 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4058 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4060 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4061 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4063 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4070 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4071 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4072 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4073 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4074 else if (!check_flags)
4079 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4080 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4082 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4084 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4085 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
4087 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4090 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4091 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4092 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4093 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4096 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4097 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4098 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4102 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4103 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4106 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4107 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4108 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4111 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4112 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4113 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4116 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4117 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4118 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4127 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4128 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4130 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4132 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4133 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4134 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4137 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4144 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4145 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4149 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4150 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4151 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4152 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4154 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4161 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4162 else if (check_flags)
4163 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4165 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4166 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4167 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4168 else if (!check_flags)
4171 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4172 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4173 else if (strict_mode) {
4174 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4175 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4176 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4177 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4179 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4186 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4187 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4189 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
4191 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4194 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4197 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4201 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4205 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4207 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4208 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4210 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4211 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4212 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4216 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4219 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4221 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4223 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4224 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4226 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4227 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4228 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4230 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4231 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4232 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4233 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4234 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4239 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4242 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4244 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4245 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4249 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4250 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4251 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4252 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4253 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4255 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4258 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4262 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4265 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4266 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4273 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4274 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4276 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4277 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4278 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4279 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4280 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4281 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4282 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4285 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4286 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4288 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4291 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4292 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4294 int dh_secbits = 80;
4295 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4296 return DH_get_1024_160();
4297 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4298 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4303 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4304 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4307 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4315 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4316 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4318 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4319 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4327 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4328 return DH_get_2048_224();
4329 return DH_get_1024_160();
4333 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4336 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4339 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4340 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4341 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4342 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4344 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4347 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4349 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4352 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4354 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4355 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4356 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4357 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4359 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4360 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4362 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4363 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4366 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4368 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4371 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4374 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4376 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4377 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4379 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4380 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4382 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4383 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4388 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4389 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4390 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4393 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4395 int rv, start_idx, i;
4397 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4402 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4406 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4407 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4408 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);