2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 tls1_export_keying_material,
42 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
44 tls_close_construct_packet,
48 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
52 tls1_generate_master_secret,
53 tls1_change_cipher_state,
54 tls1_final_finish_mac,
55 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59 tls1_export_keying_material,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
61 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
62 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
63 tls_close_construct_packet,
67 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
71 tls1_generate_master_secret,
72 tls1_change_cipher_state,
73 tls1_final_finish_mac,
74 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
75 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
78 tls1_export_keying_material,
79 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
80 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
81 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
82 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
83 tls_close_construct_packet,
87 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
90 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
91 * http, the cache would over fill
100 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
104 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
106 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
110 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
113 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
114 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
116 s->version = s->method->version;
119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
122 int nid; /* Curve NID */
123 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
124 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
128 * Table of curve information.
129 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
130 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
132 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
133 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
134 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
135 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
136 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
137 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
138 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
139 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
140 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
141 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
142 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
143 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
144 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
145 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
146 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
147 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
148 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
149 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
150 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
151 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
152 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
153 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
154 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
155 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
156 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
157 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
158 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
159 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
160 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
161 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
164 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
165 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
166 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
167 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
170 /* The default curves */
171 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
172 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
173 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
174 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
175 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
178 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
179 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
180 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
181 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
182 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
183 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
184 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
185 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
188 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
189 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
191 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
192 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
193 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
194 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
195 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
196 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
197 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
198 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
199 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
200 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
201 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
202 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
203 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
204 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
205 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
206 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
207 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
208 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
209 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
210 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
211 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
212 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
215 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
216 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
217 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
220 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
222 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
223 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
224 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
226 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
228 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
232 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
235 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
236 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
243 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
245 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
246 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
247 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
248 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
249 * lists in the first place.
250 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
251 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
252 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
254 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
255 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
257 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
259 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
260 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
262 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
263 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
264 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
265 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
266 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
269 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
270 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
274 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
275 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
279 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
280 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
283 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
284 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
288 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
289 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
294 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
299 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
300 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
302 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
305 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
307 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
308 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
309 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
312 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
315 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
316 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
318 const unsigned char *curves;
319 size_t num_curves, i;
320 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
321 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
323 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
325 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
328 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
329 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
331 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
332 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
334 } else /* Should never happen */
337 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
339 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
340 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
341 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
347 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
348 * if there is no match.
349 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
350 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
351 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
353 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
355 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
356 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
358 /* Can't do anything on client side */
362 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
364 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
365 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
367 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
368 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
369 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
370 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
371 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
372 /* Should never happen */
375 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
379 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
380 * but s->options is a long...
382 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
383 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
385 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
386 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
387 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
388 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
389 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
392 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
395 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
397 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
398 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
399 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
401 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
405 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
406 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
407 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
408 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
409 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
412 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
413 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
421 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
425 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
426 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
428 unsigned char *clist, *p;
431 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
434 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
435 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
438 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
439 unsigned long idmask;
441 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
443 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
452 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
456 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
460 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
463 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
465 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
471 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
473 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
475 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
477 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
478 if (nid == NID_undef)
479 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
480 if (nid == NID_undef)
481 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
482 if (nid == NID_undef)
484 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
485 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
487 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
491 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
492 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
496 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
500 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
503 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
504 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
511 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
512 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
515 /* Determine curve ID */
516 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
517 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
518 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
522 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
524 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
526 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
527 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
529 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
530 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
532 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
538 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
539 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
540 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
542 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
543 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
546 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
547 * supported (see RFC4492).
549 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
550 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
551 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
552 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
553 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
556 if (i == num_formats)
561 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
562 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
563 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
565 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
567 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
568 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
569 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
570 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
571 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
575 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
576 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
581 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
588 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
592 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
594 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
595 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
596 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
598 *pformats = ecformats_default;
599 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
601 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
603 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
608 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
609 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
611 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
613 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
616 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
619 /* If not EC nothing to do */
620 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
622 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
626 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
629 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
633 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
634 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
636 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
642 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
643 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
644 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
645 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
646 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
648 return 0; /* Should never happen */
649 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
650 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
652 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
654 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
655 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
656 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
658 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
664 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
666 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
668 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
670 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
671 * is compatible with the client extensions.
673 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
675 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
678 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
681 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
682 unsigned char curve_id[2];
683 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
684 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
685 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
686 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
687 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
691 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
692 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
696 /* Need a shared curve */
697 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
701 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
705 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
710 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
713 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
714 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
717 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
718 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
720 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
723 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
724 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
726 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
730 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
732 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
735 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
736 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
737 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
738 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
740 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
741 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
742 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
743 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
744 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
745 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
747 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
748 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
749 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
754 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
755 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
756 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
759 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
762 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
766 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
767 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
768 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
769 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
771 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
772 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
775 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
776 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
780 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
781 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
782 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
783 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
784 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
785 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
786 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
788 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
789 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
794 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
795 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
797 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
798 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
800 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
801 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
802 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
803 /* Should never happen */
806 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
807 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
808 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
812 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
813 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
814 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
815 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
817 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
818 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
821 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
822 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
825 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
826 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
827 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
828 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
831 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
832 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
833 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
834 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
840 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
844 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
845 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
846 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
847 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
850 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
851 if (i == sent_sigslen
852 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
853 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
857 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
859 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
862 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
863 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
864 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
869 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
871 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
876 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
877 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
878 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
880 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
883 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
885 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
887 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
888 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
889 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
890 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
892 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
893 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
894 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
895 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
897 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
899 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
907 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
908 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
909 * @c: cipher to check
910 * @op: Security check that you want to do
912 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
914 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
916 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
917 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
919 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
921 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
922 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
924 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
925 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
928 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
931 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
933 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
935 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
938 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
940 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
941 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
951 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
952 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
953 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
954 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
955 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
958 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
960 PACKET extensions = *packet;
961 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
962 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
965 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
966 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
969 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
970 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
976 if (num_extensions <= 1)
979 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
980 if (extension_types == NULL) {
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
985 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
986 extensions = *packet;
987 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
989 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
990 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
991 /* This should not happen. */
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
997 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1001 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1002 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1003 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1004 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1009 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1013 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1015 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1016 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1018 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1020 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1021 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1023 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1024 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1026 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1027 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1028 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1029 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1037 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1038 if (s->renegotiate) {
1039 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1040 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1041 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1042 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1043 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1048 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1049 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1052 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1053 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1054 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1055 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1056 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1057 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1058 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1059 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1060 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1061 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1062 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1063 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1069 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1070 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1071 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1072 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1073 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1074 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1075 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1076 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1077 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1078 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1079 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1080 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1090 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1092 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1093 size_t num_curves, num_formats;
1096 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1098 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1099 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1100 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1101 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1102 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1108 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1110 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1111 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1116 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1117 /* Sub-packet for curves extension */
1118 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1119 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1123 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1124 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1125 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1126 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[0])
1127 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[1])) {
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1129 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1134 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1139 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1141 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1143 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1144 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1145 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1146 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1147 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1148 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1149 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1153 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1154 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1155 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1158 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1159 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1162 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1163 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1171 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1173 const unsigned char *salg;
1175 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1177 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1178 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1179 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1180 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1181 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1182 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1183 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1184 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1190 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1193 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1194 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1195 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1196 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1197 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1198 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1203 unsigned char *idbytes;
1207 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1208 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1210 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1211 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1212 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1217 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1218 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1222 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1223 unsigned char *extbytes;
1224 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1230 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1231 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1237 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1244 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1249 * 1: peer may send requests
1250 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1252 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1253 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1255 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1257 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1258 /* Sub-packet for Hearbeat extension */
1259 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1260 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1261 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1269 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1271 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1272 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1274 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1275 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1283 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1284 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1285 * (see longer comment below)
1287 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1288 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1289 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1290 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1291 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1292 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1293 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1294 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1298 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1301 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1302 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1303 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1306 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1307 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1308 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1309 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1310 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1314 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1315 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1316 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1317 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1322 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1323 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1324 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1325 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1331 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1332 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1333 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1339 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1345 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1347 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1354 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1355 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1361 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1362 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1363 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1366 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1367 unsigned char *padbytes;
1370 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1375 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1376 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1382 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1383 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1387 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1395 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1398 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1401 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1402 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1403 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1404 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1407 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1408 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1413 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1414 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1419 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1420 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1423 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1424 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1425 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1426 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1433 const unsigned char *plist;
1436 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1438 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1440 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1441 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1442 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1443 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1449 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1452 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1454 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1455 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1456 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1462 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1465 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1468 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1469 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1470 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1476 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1477 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1478 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1479 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1480 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1481 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1482 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1489 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1490 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1491 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1492 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1493 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1494 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1495 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1496 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1497 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1498 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1500 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1506 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1507 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1511 * 1: peer may send requests
1512 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1514 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1515 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1517 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1519 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1520 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1521 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1522 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1531 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1532 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1533 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1534 const unsigned char *npa;
1535 unsigned int npalen;
1538 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1540 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1541 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1542 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1543 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1547 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1551 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1556 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1558 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1559 * for other cases too.
1561 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1562 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1563 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1564 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1565 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1567 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1568 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1574 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1575 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1576 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1582 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1583 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1584 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1585 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1586 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1587 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1588 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1589 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1590 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1597 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1605 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1606 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1607 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1608 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1610 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1612 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1614 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1616 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1617 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1621 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1623 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1624 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1625 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1628 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1630 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1631 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1632 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1640 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1641 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1642 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1644 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1646 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1647 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1649 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1650 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1651 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1652 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1653 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1655 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1656 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1657 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1658 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1659 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1662 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1664 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1665 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1668 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1678 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1679 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1680 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1685 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1686 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1687 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1688 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1690 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1696 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1697 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1698 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1699 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1700 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1701 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1702 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1704 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1705 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1706 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1707 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1708 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1709 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1710 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1711 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1712 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1713 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1714 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1715 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1716 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1719 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1720 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1724 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1725 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1726 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1730 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1733 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1734 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1736 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1739 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1742 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1743 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1745 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1746 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1749 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1750 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1752 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1755 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1758 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1759 s->servername_done = 0;
1760 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1762 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1765 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1766 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1767 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1768 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1769 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1770 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1772 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1773 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1777 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1778 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1779 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1781 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1782 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1783 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1784 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1787 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1788 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1791 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1793 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1796 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1799 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1803 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1804 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1807 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1809 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1812 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1813 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1814 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1815 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1817 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1818 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1820 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1821 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1824 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1826 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1827 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1828 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1829 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1830 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1831 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1832 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1833 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1834 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1835 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1836 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1837 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1838 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1839 * the value of the Host: field.
1840 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1841 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1842 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1844 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1848 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1849 unsigned int servname_type;
1850 PACKET sni, hostname;
1852 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1853 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1854 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1859 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1860 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1861 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1863 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1864 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1865 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1867 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1868 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1870 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1871 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1872 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1877 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1878 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1882 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1883 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1887 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1888 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1892 s->servername_done = 1;
1895 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1896 * fall back to a full handshake.
1898 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1899 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1900 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1904 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1907 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1910 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1914 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1915 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1917 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1918 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1925 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1926 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1928 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
1929 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1934 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1935 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1937 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1938 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1942 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1943 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1945 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1946 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
1947 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1948 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1953 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1954 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
1956 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
1957 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1962 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1963 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1964 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1965 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
1966 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1967 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1969 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1972 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
1973 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
1975 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
1976 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
1977 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
1982 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
1983 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
1987 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
1988 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
1989 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1993 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1994 const unsigned char *ext_data;
1995 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
1996 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
1997 (&extension, &responder_id_list))
2001 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2002 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2004 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2006 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2007 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2008 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2009 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2013 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2016 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2018 PACKET responder_id;
2019 const unsigned char *id_data;
2021 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2023 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2027 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2028 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2029 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2033 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2034 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2038 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2039 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2040 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2045 /* Read in request_extensions */
2046 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2049 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2050 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2051 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2052 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2053 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2054 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2055 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2056 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2057 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2065 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2067 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2071 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2072 unsigned int hbtype;
2074 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2075 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2076 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2080 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2081 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2083 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2084 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2085 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2088 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2094 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2095 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2097 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2100 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2101 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2102 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2103 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2104 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2105 * anything like that, but this might change).
2107 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2108 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2109 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2110 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2111 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2113 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2117 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2118 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2119 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2123 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2125 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2126 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2127 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2131 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2132 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2134 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2135 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2139 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2140 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2141 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2142 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2143 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2146 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2147 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2152 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2154 * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
2156 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2162 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2164 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2165 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2166 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2168 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2173 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2174 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2175 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2176 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2181 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2184 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2185 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2186 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2189 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2198 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2199 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2200 * fill the length of the block.
2202 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2204 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2206 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2207 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2208 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2216 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2218 unsigned int length, type, size;
2219 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2220 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2223 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2225 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2227 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2228 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2230 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2231 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2234 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2236 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2238 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2241 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2242 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2246 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2247 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2251 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2252 const unsigned char *data;
2255 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2256 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2259 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2260 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2262 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2263 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2265 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2266 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2267 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2268 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2269 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2272 tlsext_servername = 1;
2274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2275 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2276 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2277 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2278 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2279 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2283 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2284 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2285 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2286 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2287 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2290 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2291 ecpointformatlist_length;
2292 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2293 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2294 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2295 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2301 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2303 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2304 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2305 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2306 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2308 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2311 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2312 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2315 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2316 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2318 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2321 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2322 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2325 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2326 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2330 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2331 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2332 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2334 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2335 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2336 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2337 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2338 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2339 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2341 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2343 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2344 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2345 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2348 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2353 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2354 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2355 unsigned char *selected;
2356 unsigned char selected_len;
2357 /* We must have requested it. */
2358 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2359 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2362 /* The data must be valid */
2363 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2364 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2367 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2370 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2371 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2372 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2376 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2377 * a single Serverhello
2379 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2380 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2381 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2382 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2385 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2386 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2387 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2391 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2393 /* We must have requested it. */
2394 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2395 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2399 * The extension data consists of:
2400 * uint16 list_length
2401 * uint8 proto_length;
2402 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2404 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2405 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2406 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2407 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2410 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2411 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2412 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2413 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2416 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2417 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2420 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2423 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2424 unsigned int hbtype;
2425 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2426 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2430 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2431 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2433 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2434 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2435 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2438 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2444 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2445 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2449 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2450 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2451 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2452 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2453 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2454 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2455 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2457 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2460 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2461 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2463 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2467 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2468 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2472 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2473 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2474 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2475 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2476 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2477 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2478 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2482 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2491 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2492 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2493 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2494 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2495 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2497 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2498 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2499 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2501 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2507 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2510 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2511 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2512 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2521 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2523 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2527 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2532 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2534 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2535 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2539 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2540 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2543 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2544 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2548 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2550 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2551 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2552 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2553 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2555 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2557 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2560 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2561 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2564 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2565 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2568 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2569 s->servername_done = 0;
2575 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2576 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2578 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2580 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2583 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2584 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2586 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2587 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2590 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2593 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2594 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2595 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2599 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2604 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2605 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2606 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2607 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2608 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2609 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2610 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2611 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2614 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2615 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2616 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2617 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2618 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2621 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2622 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2624 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2625 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2629 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2633 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2638 * Upon success, returns 1.
2639 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2641 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2643 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2646 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2647 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2648 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2649 * influence which certificate is sent
2651 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2653 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2654 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2655 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2656 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2658 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2659 * et al can pick it up.
2661 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2662 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2664 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2665 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2666 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2668 /* status request response should be sent */
2669 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2670 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2671 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2673 /* something bad happened */
2674 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2676 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2682 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2689 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2691 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2692 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2696 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2697 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2698 * must contain uncompressed.
2700 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2701 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2702 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2703 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2704 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2705 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2706 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2707 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2709 unsigned char *list;
2710 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2711 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2712 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2713 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2714 found_uncompressed = 1;
2718 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2720 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2724 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2725 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2727 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2729 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2730 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2731 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2732 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2734 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2736 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2739 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2740 * that we don't receive a status message
2742 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2743 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2744 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2747 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2748 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2751 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2752 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2755 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2756 s->servername_done = 0;
2762 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2765 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2767 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2768 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2772 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2780 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2781 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2782 * need to be handled at the same time.
2784 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2787 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2788 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2789 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2790 * point to the resulting session.
2792 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2793 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2794 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2797 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2798 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2799 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2800 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2801 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2802 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2803 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2806 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2807 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2808 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2809 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2810 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2811 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2813 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2816 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2817 const PACKET *session_id,
2821 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2824 int have_ticket = 0;
2825 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2828 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2829 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2832 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2835 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2838 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2842 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2843 unsigned int type, size;
2845 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2846 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2847 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2851 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2855 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2857 const unsigned char *etick;
2859 /* Duplicate extension */
2860 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2868 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2871 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2875 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2877 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2878 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2879 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2880 * calculate the master secret later.
2885 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2886 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2890 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2891 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2893 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2894 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2897 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2900 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2901 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2904 default: /* fatal error */
2910 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2911 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2912 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2918 if (have_ticket == 0)
2925 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2927 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2928 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2929 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2930 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2931 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2932 * point to the resulting session.
2935 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2936 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2937 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2938 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2939 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2941 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2942 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2943 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2946 unsigned char *sdec;
2947 const unsigned char *p;
2948 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2949 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2950 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2951 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2952 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2954 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2955 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2958 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2963 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2964 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2965 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2976 /* Check key name matches */
2977 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
2978 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
2982 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2983 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
2984 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
2985 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
2986 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
2987 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
2993 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
2996 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3000 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3002 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3007 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3008 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3009 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3012 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3013 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3014 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3017 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3018 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3019 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3020 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3021 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3022 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3023 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3027 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3028 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3033 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3037 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3041 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3042 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3043 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3047 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3048 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3057 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3061 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3062 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3066 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3073 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3074 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3075 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3076 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3077 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3078 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3079 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3080 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3081 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3082 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3085 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3086 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3087 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3088 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3089 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3090 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3091 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3094 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3097 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3098 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3104 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3107 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3108 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3109 return table[i].nid;
3114 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3120 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3123 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3126 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3132 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3134 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3141 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3144 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3145 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3146 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3147 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3148 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3149 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3150 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3151 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3152 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3153 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3154 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3155 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3158 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3164 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3165 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3166 return tls12_md_info + i;
3172 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3174 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3175 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3177 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3180 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3183 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3187 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3188 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3191 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3192 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3194 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3195 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3196 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3199 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3200 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3202 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3203 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3205 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3206 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3212 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3213 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3214 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3216 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3217 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3219 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3220 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3222 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3224 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3225 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3227 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3229 if (psignhash_nid) {
3230 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3231 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3232 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3236 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3237 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3239 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3240 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3241 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3243 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3244 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3246 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3247 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3251 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3252 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3256 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3258 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3259 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3260 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3262 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3263 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3264 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3266 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3267 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3268 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3270 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3271 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3276 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3277 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3282 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3283 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3290 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3292 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3294 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3297 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3298 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3302 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3303 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3304 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3305 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3312 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3313 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3314 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3315 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3317 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3318 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3319 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3320 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3321 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3323 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3324 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3327 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3328 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3329 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3331 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3341 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3342 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3344 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3345 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3347 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3349 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3351 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3352 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3353 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3354 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3355 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3356 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3357 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3358 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3359 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3360 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3362 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3363 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3366 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3367 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3371 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3372 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3374 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3376 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3379 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3383 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3384 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3388 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3390 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3393 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3394 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3396 /* Should never happen */
3400 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3401 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3402 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3404 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3405 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3409 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3414 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3415 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3417 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3418 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3421 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3422 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3423 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3424 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3425 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3427 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3428 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3429 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3430 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3436 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3437 * the certificate for signing.
3439 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3441 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3442 * supported it stays as NULL.
3444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3445 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3446 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3449 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3450 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3451 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3455 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3456 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3459 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3460 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3461 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3462 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3463 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3464 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3465 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3466 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3472 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3473 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3474 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3476 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3481 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3488 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3490 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3493 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3494 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3495 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3497 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3498 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3502 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3504 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3506 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3508 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3510 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3511 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3514 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3518 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3521 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3523 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3524 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3525 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3526 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3527 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3528 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3530 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3531 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3532 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3536 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3538 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3541 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3544 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3546 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3548 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3550 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3558 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3559 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3561 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3564 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3565 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3568 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3569 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3574 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3575 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3577 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3581 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3585 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3588 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3590 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3595 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3596 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3598 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3599 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3600 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3602 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3609 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3610 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3611 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3613 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3614 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3615 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3621 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3625 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3629 if (default_nid == -1)
3631 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3633 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3634 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3635 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3640 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3641 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3645 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3646 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3647 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3654 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3655 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3656 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3657 * attempting to use them.
3660 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3662 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3663 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3664 /* Strict mode flags */
3665 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3666 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3667 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3669 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3674 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3675 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3678 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3679 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3681 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3684 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3686 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3687 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3689 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3691 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3692 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3698 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3701 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3703 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3704 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3706 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3713 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3714 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3715 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3716 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3717 else if (!check_flags)
3722 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3723 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3725 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3727 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3728 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3730 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3733 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3734 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3735 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3736 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3739 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3740 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3741 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3745 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3746 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3749 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3750 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3751 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3754 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3755 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3756 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3759 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3760 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3761 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3770 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3771 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3773 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3775 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3776 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3777 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3780 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3787 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3788 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3792 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3793 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3794 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3795 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3797 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3804 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3805 else if (check_flags)
3806 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3808 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3809 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3810 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3811 else if (!check_flags)
3814 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3815 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3816 else if (strict_mode) {
3817 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3818 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3819 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3820 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3822 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3829 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3830 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3832 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3834 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3837 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3840 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3844 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3848 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3850 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3851 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3853 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3854 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3855 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3859 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3862 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3864 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3866 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3867 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3869 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3870 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3871 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3873 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3874 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3875 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3876 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3877 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3882 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3885 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3887 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3888 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3892 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3893 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3894 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3895 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3896 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3898 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3901 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3905 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3908 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3909 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3916 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3917 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3919 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3920 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3921 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3922 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3923 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3924 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3925 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3928 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3929 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3931 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3935 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3937 int dh_secbits = 80;
3938 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3939 return DH_get_1024_160();
3940 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3941 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3946 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3947 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3950 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
3958 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3959 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3961 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3962 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
3970 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
3971 return DH_get_2048_224();
3972 return DH_get_1024_160();
3976 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3979 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
3982 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3983 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3984 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3985 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3987 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
3990 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
3992 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
3995 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3997 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3998 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
3999 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4000 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4002 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4003 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4005 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4006 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4009 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4011 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4014 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4017 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4019 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4020 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4022 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4023 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4025 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4026 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4031 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4032 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4033 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4036 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4038 int rv, start_idx, i;
4040 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4045 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4049 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4050 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4051 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);