2 * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
28 tls1_generate_master_secret,
29 tls1_change_cipher_state,
30 tls1_final_finish_mac,
31 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
32 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
34 tls1_export_keying_material,
36 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
37 tls_close_construct_packet,
41 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
45 tls1_generate_master_secret,
46 tls1_change_cipher_state,
47 tls1_final_finish_mac,
48 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
49 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
51 tls1_export_keying_material,
52 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
53 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
54 tls_close_construct_packet,
58 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
62 tls1_generate_master_secret,
63 tls1_change_cipher_state,
64 tls1_final_finish_mac,
65 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
66 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
68 tls1_export_keying_material,
69 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
70 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
71 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
72 tls_close_construct_packet,
76 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
79 tls13_setup_key_block,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
86 tls13_export_keying_material,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
89 tls_close_construct_packet,
93 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
106 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
112 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
114 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
118 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
123 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
124 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
126 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 * Table of curve information.
135 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
136 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
138 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
139 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
140 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
141 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
142 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
143 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
144 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
145 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
146 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
147 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
148 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
149 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
150 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
151 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
152 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
153 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
154 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
155 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
156 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
157 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
158 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
159 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
160 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
161 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
162 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
163 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
166 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
167 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
170 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
171 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
173 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
176 /* The default curves */
177 static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
178 29, /* X25519 (29) */
179 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
180 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
181 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
184 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
189 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t curve_id)
191 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
192 if (curve_id < 1 || curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
194 return &nid_list[curve_id - 1];
197 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
200 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
201 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
208 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
210 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
211 * the length of |pcurves| is num_curves.
212 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
213 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
214 * lists in the first place.
216 void tls1_get_grouplist(SSL *s, int sess, const uint16_t **pcurves,
221 *pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
222 *pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
225 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
226 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
227 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
228 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
229 *pcurveslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
232 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
233 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
237 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
238 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 1;
243 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
244 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
245 *pcurveslen = OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default);
247 *pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
248 *pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
254 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
255 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op)
257 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *cinfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(curve);
258 unsigned char ctmp[2];
262 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
263 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
266 ctmp[0] = curve >> 8;
267 ctmp[1] = curve & 0xff;
268 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)ctmp);
271 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
272 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
275 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
281 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
282 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
284 const uint16_t *curves;
288 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
290 curve_id = (p[1] << 8) | p[2];
291 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
292 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
293 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
294 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
295 if (curve_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
297 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
298 if (curve_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
300 } else /* Should never happen */
303 tls1_get_grouplist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves);
304 if (!tls1_in_list(curve_id, curves, num_curves))
306 return tls_curve_allowed(s, curve_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
310 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
311 * if there is no match.
312 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
313 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
314 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
316 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
318 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
319 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
322 /* Can't do anything on client side */
326 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
328 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
329 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
331 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
333 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
334 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
335 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
336 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
337 /* Should never happen */
340 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
344 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_grouplist takes an int
345 * but s->options is a long...
347 tls1_get_grouplist(s,
348 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
350 tls1_get_grouplist(s,
351 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
354 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
355 uint16_t id = pref[i];
357 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
358 || !tls_curve_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
366 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
370 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
371 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
376 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
379 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
380 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist));
383 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
384 unsigned long idmask;
386 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
387 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
389 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
402 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
406 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
409 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
411 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
417 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
419 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
421 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
423 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
424 if (nid == NID_undef)
425 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
426 if (nid == NID_undef)
427 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
428 if (nid == NID_undef)
430 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
431 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
433 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
437 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
438 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
442 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
446 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
448 /* Return group id of a key */
449 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
451 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
456 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
457 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp));
460 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
461 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
465 unsigned char comp_id;
468 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
469 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
471 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
472 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
474 /* Get required compression id */
475 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
476 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
477 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
478 /* Compression not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
481 int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
483 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
484 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
485 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
486 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
491 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
492 * supported (see RFC4492).
494 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL)
497 for (i = 0; i < s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len; i++) {
498 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
504 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
505 static int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id)
507 const uint16_t *groups;
513 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
516 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
517 tls1_get_grouplist(s, 0, &groups, &groups_len);
518 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
521 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
525 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
526 tls1_get_grouplist(s, 1, &groups, &groups_len);
529 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
530 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
531 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
532 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
536 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
539 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
543 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
545 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
546 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
547 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
549 *pformats = ecformats_default;
550 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
552 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
554 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
559 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
560 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
562 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
566 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
569 /* If not EC nothing to do */
570 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
572 /* Check compression */
573 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
575 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
576 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id))
579 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
582 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
587 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
588 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
589 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
590 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
591 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
593 return 0; /* Should never happen */
594 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
595 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
604 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
606 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
608 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
609 * is compatible with the client extensions.
611 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
613 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
615 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
617 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
619 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
622 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
623 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256);
624 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
625 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384);
632 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
637 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
639 /* Default sigalg schemes */
640 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
642 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
643 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
644 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
645 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
648 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
649 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
650 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
652 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
653 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
654 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
657 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
658 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
660 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
661 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
663 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
664 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
666 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
667 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
668 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
673 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
674 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
679 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
681 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
682 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
683 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
684 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
685 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
686 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
687 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
688 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
689 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
690 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
691 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
692 NID_undef, NID_undef},
693 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
694 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
695 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
696 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
697 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
698 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
700 {"rsa_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
701 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
702 NID_undef, NID_undef},
703 {"rsa_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
704 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
705 NID_undef, NID_undef},
706 {"rsa_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
707 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
708 NID_undef, NID_undef},
709 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
710 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
711 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
712 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
713 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
714 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
715 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
716 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
717 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
718 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
719 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
720 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
721 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
722 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
723 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
725 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
726 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
727 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
728 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
729 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
730 NID_undef, NID_undef},
731 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
732 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
733 NID_undef, NID_undef},
734 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
735 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
736 NID_undef, NID_undef},
737 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
738 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
739 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
742 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
743 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
744 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
745 NID_undef, NID_undef},
746 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
747 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
748 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
749 NID_undef, NID_undef},
750 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
751 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
752 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
753 NID_undef, NID_undef}
756 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
757 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
758 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
759 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
760 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
765 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
766 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
768 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
769 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
770 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
771 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
772 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
773 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
774 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
775 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
776 0 /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
779 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
780 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
783 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
785 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
787 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
792 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
793 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
798 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
799 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
802 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
812 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
813 * is fixed by the certificate type.
815 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
821 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
822 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
823 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
825 if (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
831 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
834 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
836 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
837 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
839 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
843 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
845 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
846 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
849 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
851 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
853 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
856 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
860 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
863 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
867 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
868 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
869 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
870 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
872 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
873 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
876 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
877 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
882 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
883 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
884 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
886 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
887 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
888 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
889 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
890 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
891 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
893 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
894 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
899 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
900 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
903 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
905 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
906 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
908 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
909 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
910 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
912 /* Should never happen */
915 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
916 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
917 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
918 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
921 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
922 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
923 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
925 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
927 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
928 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
931 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
932 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
933 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
938 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
940 /* Check point compression is permitted */
941 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
943 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
947 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
948 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
949 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
950 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
952 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
957 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
958 /* Check curve matches extensions */
959 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey))) {
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
963 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
964 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
965 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
966 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
967 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
968 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
973 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
978 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
979 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
980 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
981 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
984 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
985 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
986 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
990 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
991 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
996 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
997 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
999 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1000 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1001 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1002 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
1003 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1008 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1009 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1013 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1015 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1017 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1022 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1023 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1024 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1026 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1029 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1031 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1033 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1034 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1035 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1036 ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
1037 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1038 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1039 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1040 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1041 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1043 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1045 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1046 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1047 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1053 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1054 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1055 * @c: cipher to check
1056 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1057 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1059 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1061 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1063 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1064 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1066 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1068 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1069 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1072 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1073 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1075 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1076 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1077 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1079 if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
1082 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1083 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1086 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1089 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1091 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1093 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1096 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1101 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1102 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1103 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1104 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1105 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1106 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1107 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1109 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1110 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1112 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1113 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1114 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1116 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1117 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1122 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1123 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1124 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1125 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1133 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1135 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1138 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1140 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1142 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1144 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1149 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1151 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1152 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1153 * point to the resulting session.
1155 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1156 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1157 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1160 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1161 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1162 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1163 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1164 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1165 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1166 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1169 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1170 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1171 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1172 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1173 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1174 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1176 TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1181 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1184 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1187 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1188 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1191 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1194 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1195 if (!ticketext->present)
1198 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1201 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1204 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1205 return TICKET_EMPTY;
1207 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1209 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1210 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1211 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1212 * calculate the master secret later.
1214 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1217 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1218 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1220 case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1221 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1222 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1224 case TICKET_SUCCESS:
1225 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1227 case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1228 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1229 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1232 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1237 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1239 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1240 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1241 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1242 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1243 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1244 * point to the resulting session.
1246 TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1247 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1248 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1251 unsigned char *sdec;
1252 const unsigned char *p;
1253 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1254 TICKET_RETURN ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1256 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1257 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1258 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
1259 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1261 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1262 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1264 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1265 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1267 ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1270 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1271 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1272 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1277 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1283 /* Check key name matches */
1284 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1285 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
1286 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1289 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
1290 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
1291 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1292 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1293 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
1295 + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
1300 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1303 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1307 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1309 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1310 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1314 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1315 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1316 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1319 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1320 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1321 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1322 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1324 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1325 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1326 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1327 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1328 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1329 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1330 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1331 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1333 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1335 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1336 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1338 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1341 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1345 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1349 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1350 if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) {
1351 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1352 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1355 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1356 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1357 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1361 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1362 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1365 return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1367 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1371 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1373 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1375 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1376 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1380 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1381 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1383 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1386 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1387 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
1389 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1390 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1392 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1393 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1394 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1395 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1396 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1398 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1399 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1401 if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
1403 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1404 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1405 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1406 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1407 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1408 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1412 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1413 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1417 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1419 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1420 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1421 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1423 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1426 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1427 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
1428 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1429 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1434 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1436 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1437 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1438 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1439 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1441 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1444 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1445 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1450 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1451 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1453 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1455 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1458 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1459 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1461 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1462 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1463 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1464 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1472 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1473 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1474 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1475 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1477 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1478 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1479 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1480 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1482 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1483 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1485 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1486 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1497 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1498 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1500 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1501 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1503 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1505 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1507 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1508 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1509 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1510 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1511 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1512 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1513 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1514 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1515 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1516 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1518 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1519 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1522 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1523 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1527 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1528 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1530 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1532 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs));
1535 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1539 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1540 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1544 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1550 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1552 /* Invalid data length */
1553 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1558 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf));
1561 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1569 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1576 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1578 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1579 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1581 /* Should never happen */
1582 if (s->cert == NULL)
1585 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1586 &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1591 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1593 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1596 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1599 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1602 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1605 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1606 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
1607 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1609 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1610 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1612 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1613 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1614 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1619 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1620 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1621 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1623 uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1624 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1625 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1628 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1630 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1634 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1636 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1637 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1639 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1641 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1642 if (psignhash != NULL)
1643 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1645 return (int)numsigalgs;
1648 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1649 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1650 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1652 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1653 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1655 || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1656 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1658 shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1660 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1662 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1663 if (psignhash != NULL)
1664 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1666 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1668 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1669 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1672 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1673 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1677 int sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1680 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1682 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1683 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1684 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1685 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1686 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1687 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1688 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1689 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1691 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1692 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1693 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1696 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1697 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1699 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1701 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1703 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1704 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1707 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1709 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1711 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1713 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1714 /* See if we have a match for TLS 1.3 names */
1716 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1718 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1720 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1731 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1732 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1735 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || (p != NULL && hash_alg == NID_undef))
1738 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
1739 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
1742 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
1743 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
1748 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1749 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1751 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1755 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1759 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1762 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1764 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
1769 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1770 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1772 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1774 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1775 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
1776 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
1778 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1780 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1781 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
1786 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1791 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1792 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1793 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1795 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1796 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1797 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1803 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
1807 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
1811 if (default_nid == -1)
1813 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
1815 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
1816 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
1817 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
1822 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1823 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
1827 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1828 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1829 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
1836 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1837 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1838 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1839 * attempting to use them.
1842 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
1844 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1845 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1846 /* Strict mode flags */
1847 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1848 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1849 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1851 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
1856 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
1857 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
1860 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
1861 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1863 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1866 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
1868 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
1869 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1871 pk = cpk->privatekey;
1873 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
1874 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1883 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
1886 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1888 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1889 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
1891 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
1898 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1899 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
1900 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
1901 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1902 else if (!check_flags)
1907 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1908 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1910 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
1913 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
1915 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1919 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1920 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
1923 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1924 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1925 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
1929 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1930 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
1933 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1934 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
1935 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
1938 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1939 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
1940 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
1943 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1944 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
1945 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
1954 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
1955 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
1957 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
1959 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
1960 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
1961 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
1963 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
1966 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
1973 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
1974 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
1978 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
1979 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
1980 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1981 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
1983 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
1990 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
1991 else if (check_flags)
1992 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
1994 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
1995 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
1996 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
1997 else if (!check_flags)
2000 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2001 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2002 else if (strict_mode) {
2003 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2004 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2005 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2006 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2008 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2015 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2016 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2018 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2020 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2023 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2026 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2030 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2033 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2034 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2035 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2039 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2042 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2045 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names;
2047 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2048 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2050 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2051 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2052 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2054 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2055 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2056 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2057 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2058 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2063 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2066 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2068 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2069 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2073 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2074 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2076 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2079 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2083 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2086 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2087 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2094 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2095 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2097 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2098 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2099 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2100 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2101 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2102 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2103 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2104 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2107 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2108 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2110 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2114 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2116 int dh_secbits = 80;
2117 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2118 return DH_get_1024_160();
2119 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2120 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2125 if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
2127 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
2130 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2138 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2139 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2141 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2142 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2150 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2151 return DH_get_2048_224();
2152 return DH_get_1024_160();
2156 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2159 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2162 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2163 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2164 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2165 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2167 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2170 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2172 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2175 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2177 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2178 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2179 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2180 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2182 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2184 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2185 if (nid == NID_undef)
2188 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2190 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2193 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2196 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2198 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2199 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2201 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2202 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2204 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2205 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2210 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2211 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2212 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2215 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2217 int rv, start_idx, i;
2219 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2224 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2228 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2229 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2230 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2238 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2239 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2242 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2244 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2245 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2247 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2248 if (clu == NULL || !(clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth))
2251 /* If PSS and we have no PSS cert use RSA */
2252 if (sig_idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN && !ssl_has_cert(s, sig_idx))
2253 sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
2255 return s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2259 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2260 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2262 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error
2263 * and an appropriate error code is set and the TLS alert set in *al.
2265 * For clients al is set to NULL. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2266 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2267 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2269 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int *al)
2271 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2274 s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
2275 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2277 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2280 int curve = -1, skip_ec = 0;
2283 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2284 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2285 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2287 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2288 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2289 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2290 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2291 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2293 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
2295 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, lu->sig_idx)) {
2296 if (lu->sig_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
2297 || !ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_RSA))
2299 sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
2301 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2304 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2306 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2307 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec)
2308 != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
2311 if (skip_ec || (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve))
2319 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2322 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2324 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2328 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2329 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2331 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2334 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2335 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2340 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2341 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2342 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2343 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2350 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2353 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2354 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2357 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2360 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2362 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2363 if (cc_idx != sig_idx) {
2364 if (sig_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
2365 || cc_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA)
2367 sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
2370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2371 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2375 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2378 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2384 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2386 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2387 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
2389 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2392 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2397 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2398 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2399 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2400 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs)
2403 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2407 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2412 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2415 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2422 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2423 s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
2424 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2425 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;