2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
42 tls_close_construct_packet,
46 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
59 tls_close_construct_packet,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
77 tls_close_construct_packet,
81 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
85 tls1_generate_master_secret,
86 tls1_change_cipher_state,
87 tls1_final_finish_mac,
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
94 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
95 tls_close_construct_packet,
99 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
116 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
118 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
122 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
128 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
140 * Table of curve information.
141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
144 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
176 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
182 /* The default curves */
183 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
190 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
227 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
232 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
234 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
238 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
240 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
244 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
247 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
248 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
266 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
267 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
269 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
271 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
272 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
278 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
282 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
287 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
291 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
292 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
295 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
296 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
306 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
311 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
314 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
317 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
319 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
320 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
324 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
327 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
330 const unsigned char *curves;
331 size_t num_curves, i;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
333 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
343 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
344 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
346 } else /* Should never happen */
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
351 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
352 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
365 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
367 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
368 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
379 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
383 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
400 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
401 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
407 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
409 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
411 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
413 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
417 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
419 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
420 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
424 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
437 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
438 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
440 unsigned char *clist, *p;
443 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
446 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
447 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
450 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
451 unsigned long idmask;
453 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
455 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
464 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
468 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
472 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
475 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
477 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
483 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
485 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
487 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
489 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
490 if (nid == NID_undef)
491 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
492 if (nid == NID_undef)
493 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
494 if (nid == NID_undef)
496 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
497 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
499 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
503 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
504 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
508 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
512 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
515 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
516 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
523 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
524 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
527 /* Determine curve ID */
528 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
529 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
530 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
534 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
536 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
538 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
539 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
541 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
542 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
544 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
550 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
551 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
552 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
554 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
555 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
558 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
559 * supported (see RFC4492).
561 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
562 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
563 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
564 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
565 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
568 if (i == num_formats)
573 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
574 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
575 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
577 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
579 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
580 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
581 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
582 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
583 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
587 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
588 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
593 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
600 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
604 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
606 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
607 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
608 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
610 *pformats = ecformats_default;
611 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
613 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
615 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
620 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
621 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
623 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
625 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
628 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
631 /* If not EC nothing to do */
632 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
634 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
638 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
641 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
645 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
646 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
648 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
654 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
655 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
656 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
657 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
658 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
660 return 0; /* Should never happen */
661 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
662 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
664 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
666 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
667 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
668 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
670 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
676 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
678 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
680 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
682 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
683 * is compatible with the client extensions.
685 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
687 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
690 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
693 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
694 unsigned char curve_id[2];
695 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
696 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
697 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
698 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
699 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
703 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
704 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
708 /* Need a shared curve */
709 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
713 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
717 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
722 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
725 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
726 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
729 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
730 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
732 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
735 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
736 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
738 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
742 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
744 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
747 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
748 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
752 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
753 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
759 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
766 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
767 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
771 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
774 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
778 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
779 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
780 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
781 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
783 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
784 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
787 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
788 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
792 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
793 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
794 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
795 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
796 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
797 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
798 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
800 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
801 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
806 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
807 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
809 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
810 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
812 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
813 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
814 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
815 /* Should never happen */
818 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
819 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
824 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
825 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
826 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
829 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
833 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
834 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
837 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
838 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
840 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
843 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
844 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
846 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
852 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
856 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
857 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
858 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
859 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
862 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
863 if (i == sent_sigslen
864 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
865 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
869 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
874 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
875 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
876 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
881 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
883 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
888 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
889 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
890 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
892 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
895 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
897 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
899 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
901 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
902 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
904 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
905 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
906 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
909 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
911 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
912 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
913 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
919 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
920 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
921 * @c: cipher to check
922 * @op: Security check that you want to do
924 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
926 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
928 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
929 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
931 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
933 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
934 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
936 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
937 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
940 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
943 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
945 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
947 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
950 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
952 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
953 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
963 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
964 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
965 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
966 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
967 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
970 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
972 PACKET extensions = *packet;
973 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
974 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
977 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
978 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
981 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
982 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
988 if (num_extensions <= 1)
991 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
992 if (extension_types == NULL) {
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
997 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
998 extensions = *packet;
999 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1001 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1002 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1003 /* This should not happen. */
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1009 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1013 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1014 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1015 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1016 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1021 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1025 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1028 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1030 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1032 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1033 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1036 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1038 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1039 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1040 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1041 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1049 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1050 if (s->renegotiate) {
1051 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1052 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1053 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1054 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1055 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1060 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1061 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1064 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1065 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1066 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1067 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1068 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1069 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1070 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1071 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1072 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1073 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1074 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1075 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1081 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1082 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1083 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1084 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1085 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1086 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1087 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1088 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1089 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1090 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1091 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1092 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1099 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1102 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1104 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1105 size_t num_curves, num_formats;
1108 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1110 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1111 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1112 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1113 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1114 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1120 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1122 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1123 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1128 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1129 /* Sub-packet for curves extension */
1130 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1131 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1135 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1136 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1137 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1138 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[0])
1139 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[1])) {
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1141 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1146 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1151 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1153 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1155 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1156 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1157 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1158 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1159 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1160 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1161 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1166 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1167 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1170 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1171 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1174 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1175 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1183 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1185 const unsigned char *salg;
1187 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1190 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1191 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1192 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1193 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1194 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1195 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1196 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1202 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1205 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1206 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1207 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1208 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1209 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1210 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1214 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1215 unsigned char *idbytes;
1219 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1220 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1222 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1223 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1224 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1229 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1230 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1234 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1235 unsigned char *extbytes;
1236 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1242 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1243 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1249 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1256 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1261 * 1: peer may send requests
1262 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1264 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1265 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1267 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1269 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1270 /* Sub-packet for Hearbeat extension */
1271 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1272 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1273 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1281 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1283 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1284 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1286 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1287 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1295 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1296 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1297 * (see longer comment below)
1299 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1300 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1301 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1302 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1303 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1304 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1305 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1306 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1310 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1313 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1314 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1315 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1318 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1319 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1320 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1321 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1322 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1326 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1327 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1328 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1329 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1334 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1335 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1336 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1337 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1343 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1344 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1345 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1350 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1351 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1352 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1359 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1360 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1361 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1368 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1369 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1375 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1376 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1377 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1380 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1381 unsigned char *padbytes;
1384 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1389 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1390 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1396 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1397 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1401 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1409 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1412 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1415 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1416 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1417 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1418 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1421 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1422 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1427 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1428 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1433 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1434 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1437 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1438 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1439 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1440 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1447 const unsigned char *plist;
1450 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1452 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1454 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1455 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1456 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1457 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1463 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1466 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1468 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1469 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1470 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1476 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1479 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1482 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1483 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1484 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1490 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1491 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1492 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1493 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1494 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1495 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1496 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1503 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1504 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1505 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1506 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1507 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1508 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1509 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1510 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1511 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1512 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1514 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1520 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1521 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1525 * 1: peer may send requests
1526 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1528 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1529 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1531 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1533 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1534 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1535 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1536 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1545 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1546 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1547 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1548 const unsigned char *npa;
1549 unsigned int npalen;
1552 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1554 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1555 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1556 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1557 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1561 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1565 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1570 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1572 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1573 * for other cases too.
1575 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1576 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1577 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1578 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1579 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1581 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1582 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1588 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1589 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1590 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1596 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1597 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1598 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1599 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1600 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1601 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1602 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1603 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1604 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1611 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1619 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1620 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1621 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1622 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1624 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1626 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1628 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1630 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1631 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1635 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1637 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1638 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1639 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1642 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1644 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1645 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1646 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1654 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1655 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1656 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1658 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1660 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1661 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1663 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1664 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1665 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1666 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1667 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1669 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1670 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1671 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1672 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1673 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1676 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1678 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1679 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1682 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1692 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1693 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1694 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1699 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1700 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1701 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1702 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1704 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1710 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1711 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1712 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1713 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1714 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1715 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1716 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1718 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1719 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1720 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1721 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1722 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1723 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1724 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1725 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1726 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1727 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1728 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1729 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1730 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1733 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1734 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1738 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1739 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1740 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1744 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1747 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1748 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1750 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1753 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1756 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1757 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1759 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1760 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1763 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1764 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1766 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1769 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1772 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1773 s->servername_done = 0;
1774 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1776 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1779 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1780 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1781 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1782 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1783 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1784 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1786 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1787 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1791 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1792 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1793 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1795 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1796 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1797 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1798 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1800 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1801 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1802 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1805 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1807 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1810 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1813 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1817 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1818 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1821 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1823 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1826 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1827 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1828 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1829 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1831 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1832 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1834 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1835 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1838 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1840 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1841 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1842 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1843 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1844 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1845 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1846 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1847 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1848 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1849 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1850 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1851 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1852 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1853 * the value of the Host: field.
1854 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1855 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1856 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1858 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1862 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1863 unsigned int servname_type;
1864 PACKET sni, hostname;
1866 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1867 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1868 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1873 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1874 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1875 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1877 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1878 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1879 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1881 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1882 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1884 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1885 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1886 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1891 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1892 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1896 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1897 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1901 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1902 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1906 s->servername_done = 1;
1909 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1910 * fall back to a full handshake.
1912 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1913 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1914 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1918 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1921 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1924 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1928 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1929 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1931 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1932 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1939 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1940 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1942 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
1943 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1948 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1949 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1951 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1952 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1956 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1957 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1959 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1960 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
1961 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1962 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1967 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1968 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
1970 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
1971 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1976 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1977 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1978 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1979 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
1980 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1981 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1983 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1986 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
1987 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
1989 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
1990 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
1991 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
1996 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
1997 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2001 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2002 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2003 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2007 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2008 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2009 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2010 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2011 (&extension, &responder_id_list))
2015 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2016 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2018 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2020 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2021 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2022 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2023 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2027 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2030 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2032 PACKET responder_id;
2033 const unsigned char *id_data;
2035 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2037 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2041 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2042 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2043 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2047 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2048 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2052 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2053 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2054 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2059 /* Read in request_extensions */
2060 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2063 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2064 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2065 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2066 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2067 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2068 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2069 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2070 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2071 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2079 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2081 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2085 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2086 unsigned int hbtype;
2088 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2089 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2090 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2094 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2095 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2097 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2098 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2099 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2102 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2107 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2108 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2109 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2111 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2114 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2115 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2116 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2117 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2118 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2119 * anything like that, but this might change).
2121 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2122 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2123 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2124 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2125 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2127 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2131 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2132 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2133 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2137 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2139 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2140 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2141 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2145 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac &&
2146 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
2147 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2149 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2150 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2154 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2155 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2156 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2157 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2158 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2161 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2162 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2167 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2169 * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
2171 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2177 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2179 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2180 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2181 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2183 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2188 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2189 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2190 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2191 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2196 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2199 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2200 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2201 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2204 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2213 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2214 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2215 * fill the length of the block.
2217 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2219 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2221 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2222 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2223 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2231 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2233 unsigned int length, type, size;
2234 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2235 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2238 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2240 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2242 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2243 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2245 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2246 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2249 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2251 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2253 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2256 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2257 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2261 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2262 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2266 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2267 const unsigned char *data;
2270 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2271 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2274 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2275 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2277 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2278 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2280 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2281 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2282 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2283 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2284 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2287 tlsext_servername = 1;
2289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2290 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2291 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2292 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2293 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2294 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2298 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2299 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2300 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2301 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2302 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2305 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2306 ecpointformatlist_length;
2307 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2308 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2309 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2310 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2316 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2318 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2319 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2320 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2321 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2323 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2326 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2327 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2330 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2331 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2333 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2336 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2337 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2340 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2341 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2345 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2346 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2347 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2349 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2350 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2351 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2352 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2353 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2354 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2356 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2358 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2359 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2360 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2363 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2368 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2369 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2370 unsigned char *selected;
2371 unsigned char selected_len;
2372 /* We must have requested it. */
2373 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2374 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2377 /* The data must be valid */
2378 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2379 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2382 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2385 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2386 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2387 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2391 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2392 * a single Serverhello
2394 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2395 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2396 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2397 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2400 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2401 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2402 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2406 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2408 /* We must have requested it. */
2409 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2410 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2414 * The extension data consists of:
2415 * uint16 list_length
2416 * uint8 proto_length;
2417 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2419 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2420 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2421 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2422 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2425 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2426 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2427 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2428 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2431 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2432 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2435 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2438 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2439 unsigned int hbtype;
2440 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2441 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2445 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2446 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2448 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2449 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2450 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2453 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2459 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2460 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2464 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2465 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2466 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2467 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2468 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2469 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2470 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2471 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2473 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2476 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2477 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2479 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2483 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2484 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2488 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2489 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2490 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2491 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2492 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2493 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2494 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2498 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2507 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2508 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2509 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2510 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2511 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2513 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2514 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2515 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2517 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2523 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2526 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2527 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2528 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2537 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2539 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2543 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2548 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2550 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2551 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2555 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2556 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2559 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2560 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2564 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2566 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2567 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2568 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2569 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2571 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2573 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2576 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2577 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2580 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2581 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2584 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2585 s->servername_done = 0;
2591 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2592 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2594 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2596 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2599 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2600 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2602 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2603 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2606 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2609 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2610 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2611 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2615 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2620 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2621 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2622 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2623 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2624 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2625 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2626 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2627 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2630 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2631 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2632 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2633 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2634 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2637 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2638 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2640 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2641 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2645 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2649 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2654 * Upon success, returns 1.
2655 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2657 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2659 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2662 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2663 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2664 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2665 * influence which certificate is sent
2667 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2669 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2670 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2671 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2672 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2674 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2675 * et al can pick it up.
2677 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2678 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2680 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2681 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2682 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2684 /* status request response should be sent */
2685 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2686 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2687 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2689 /* something bad happened */
2690 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2692 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2698 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2705 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2707 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2708 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2712 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2713 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2714 * must contain uncompressed.
2716 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2717 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2718 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2719 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2720 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2721 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2722 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2723 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2725 unsigned char *list;
2726 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2727 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2728 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2729 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2730 found_uncompressed = 1;
2734 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2736 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2740 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2741 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2743 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2745 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2746 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2747 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2748 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2750 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2752 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2755 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2756 * that we don't receive a status message
2758 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2759 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2760 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
2763 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2764 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2767 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2768 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2771 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2772 s->servername_done = 0;
2778 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2781 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2783 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2784 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2788 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2796 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2797 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2798 * need to be handled at the same time.
2800 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2803 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2804 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2805 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2806 * point to the resulting session.
2808 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2809 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2810 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2813 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2814 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2815 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2816 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2817 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2818 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2819 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2822 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2823 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2824 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2825 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2826 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2827 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2829 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2832 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2833 const PACKET *session_id,
2837 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2840 int have_ticket = 0;
2841 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2844 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2845 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2848 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2851 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2854 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2858 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2859 unsigned int type, size;
2861 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2862 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2863 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2867 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2871 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2873 const unsigned char *etick;
2875 /* Duplicate extension */
2876 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2884 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2887 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2891 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2893 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2894 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2895 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2896 * calculate the master secret later.
2901 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2902 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2906 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2907 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2909 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2910 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2913 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2916 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2917 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2920 default: /* fatal error */
2926 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2927 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2928 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2934 if (have_ticket == 0)
2941 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2943 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2944 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2945 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2946 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2947 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2948 * point to the resulting session.
2951 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2952 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2953 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2954 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2955 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2957 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2958 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2959 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2962 unsigned char *sdec;
2963 const unsigned char *p;
2964 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2965 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2966 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2967 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2968 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2970 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2971 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2974 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2979 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2980 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2981 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2992 /* Check key name matches */
2993 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
2994 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
2998 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2999 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3000 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3001 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3002 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3003 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3009 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3012 /* TODO(size_t) : convert me */
3013 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3017 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3019 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + (size_t)mlen) {
3024 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3025 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3026 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3029 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3030 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3031 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3034 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3035 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3036 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3037 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3038 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3039 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3040 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3044 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3045 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3050 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3054 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3058 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3059 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3060 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3064 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3065 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3074 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3078 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3079 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3083 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3090 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3091 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3092 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3093 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3094 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3095 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3096 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3097 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3098 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3099 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3102 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3103 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3104 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3105 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3106 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3107 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3108 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3111 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3114 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3115 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3121 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3124 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3125 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3126 return table[i].nid;
3131 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3137 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3140 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3143 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3149 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3151 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3158 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3161 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3162 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3163 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3164 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3165 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3166 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3167 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3168 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3169 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3170 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3171 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3172 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3175 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3181 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3182 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3183 return tls12_md_info + i;
3189 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3191 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3192 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3194 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3197 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3200 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3204 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3205 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3208 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3209 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3212 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3213 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3216 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3217 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3219 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3220 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3222 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3223 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3229 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3230 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3231 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3233 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3234 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3236 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3237 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3239 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3241 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3242 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3244 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3246 if (psignhash_nid) {
3247 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3248 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3249 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3253 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3254 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3256 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3257 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3258 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3260 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3261 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3263 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3264 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3268 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3269 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3273 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3275 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3276 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3277 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3279 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3280 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3281 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3283 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3284 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3285 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3286 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3287 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3288 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3293 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3294 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3299 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3300 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3307 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3309 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3311 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3314 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3315 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3319 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3320 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3321 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3322 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3329 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3330 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3331 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3332 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3334 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3335 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3336 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3337 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3338 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3340 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3341 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3344 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3345 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3346 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3348 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3358 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3359 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3361 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3362 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3364 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3366 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3368 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3369 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3370 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3371 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3372 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3373 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3374 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3375 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3376 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3377 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3379 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3380 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3383 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3384 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3388 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3389 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3391 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3393 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3396 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3400 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3401 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3405 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3407 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
3410 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3411 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3413 /* Should never happen */
3417 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3418 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3419 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3421 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3422 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3426 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3431 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3432 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3434 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3435 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3438 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3439 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3440 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3441 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3442 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3444 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3445 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3446 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3447 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3453 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3454 * the certificate for signing.
3456 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3458 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3459 * supported it stays as NULL.
3461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3462 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3463 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3465 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3466 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3467 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3468 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3472 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3473 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3476 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3477 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3478 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3479 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3480 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3481 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3482 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3483 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3489 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3490 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3491 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3493 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3498 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3505 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3507 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3510 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3511 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3512 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3514 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3515 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3519 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3521 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3523 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3525 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3527 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3528 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3531 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3535 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3538 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3540 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3541 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3542 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3543 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3544 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3545 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3547 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3548 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3549 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3553 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3555 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3558 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3561 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3563 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3565 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3567 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3575 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3576 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3578 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3581 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3582 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3585 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3586 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3591 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3592 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3594 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3598 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3602 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3605 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3607 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3612 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3613 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3615 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3616 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3617 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3619 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3626 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3627 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3628 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3630 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3631 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3632 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3638 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3642 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3646 if (default_nid == -1)
3648 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3650 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3651 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3652 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3657 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3658 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3662 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3663 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3664 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3671 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3672 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3673 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3674 * attempting to use them.
3677 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3679 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3680 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3681 /* Strict mode flags */
3682 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3683 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3684 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3686 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3691 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3692 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3695 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3696 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3698 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3701 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3703 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3704 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3706 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3708 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3709 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3715 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3718 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3720 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3721 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3723 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3730 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3731 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3732 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3733 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3734 else if (!check_flags)
3739 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3740 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3742 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3744 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3745 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3747 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3750 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3751 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3752 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3753 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3756 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3757 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3758 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3762 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3763 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3766 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3767 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3768 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3771 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3772 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3773 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3776 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3777 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3778 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3787 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3788 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3790 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3792 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3793 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3794 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3797 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3804 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3805 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3809 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3810 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3811 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3812 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3814 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3821 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3822 else if (check_flags)
3823 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3825 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3826 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3827 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3828 else if (!check_flags)
3831 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3832 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3833 else if (strict_mode) {
3834 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3835 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3836 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3837 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3839 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3846 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3847 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3849 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3851 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3854 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3857 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3861 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3865 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3867 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3868 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3870 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3871 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3872 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3876 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3879 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3881 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3883 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3884 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3886 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3887 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3888 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3890 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3891 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3892 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3893 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3894 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3899 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3902 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3904 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3905 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3909 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3910 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3911 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3912 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3913 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3915 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3918 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3922 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3925 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3926 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3933 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3934 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3936 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3937 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3938 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3939 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3940 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3941 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3942 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3945 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3946 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3948 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3952 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3954 int dh_secbits = 80;
3955 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3956 return DH_get_1024_160();
3957 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3958 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3963 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3964 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3967 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
3975 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3976 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3978 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3979 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
3987 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
3988 return DH_get_2048_224();
3989 return DH_get_1024_160();
3993 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3996 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
3999 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4000 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4001 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4002 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4004 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4007 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4009 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4012 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4014 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4015 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4016 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4017 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4019 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4020 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4022 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4023 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4026 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4028 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4031 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4034 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4036 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4037 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4039 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4040 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4042 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4043 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4048 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4049 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4050 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4053 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4055 int rv, start_idx, i;
4057 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4062 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4066 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4067 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4068 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);