2 * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
28 tls1_generate_master_secret,
29 tls1_change_cipher_state,
30 tls1_final_finish_mac,
31 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
32 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
34 tls1_export_keying_material,
36 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
37 tls_close_construct_packet,
41 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
45 tls1_generate_master_secret,
46 tls1_change_cipher_state,
47 tls1_final_finish_mac,
48 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
49 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
51 tls1_export_keying_material,
52 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
53 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
54 tls_close_construct_packet,
58 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
62 tls1_generate_master_secret,
63 tls1_change_cipher_state,
64 tls1_final_finish_mac,
65 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
66 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
68 tls1_export_keying_material,
69 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
70 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
71 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
72 tls_close_construct_packet,
76 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
79 tls13_setup_key_block,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
86 tls13_export_keying_material,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
89 tls_close_construct_packet,
93 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
106 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
112 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
114 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
118 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
123 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
124 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
126 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
140 * Table of curve information.
141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
144 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
176 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
182 /* The default curves */
183 static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
184 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
190 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
195 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(uint16_t curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
197 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
198 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
199 if (curve_id < 1 || curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
201 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
203 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
207 uint16_t tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
210 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
211 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
218 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
220 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
221 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
222 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
223 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
224 * lists in the first place.
226 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const uint16_t **pcurves,
229 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
232 *pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
233 pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
235 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
236 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
237 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
238 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
239 pcurveslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
242 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
243 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
247 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
248 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
252 *pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
253 pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
256 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
257 pcurveslen = OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default);
261 *num_curves = pcurveslen;
265 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
266 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op)
268 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
269 unsigned char ctmp[2];
272 if (curve < 1 || curve > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
274 cinfo = &nid_list[curve - 1];
275 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
276 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
279 ctmp[0] = curve >> 8;
280 ctmp[1] = curve & 0xff;
281 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)ctmp);
284 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
285 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
287 const uint16_t *curves;
289 size_t num_curves, i;
290 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
291 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
293 curve_id = (p[1] << 8) | p[2];
294 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
296 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
297 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
298 if (curve_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
300 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
301 if (curve_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
303 } else /* Should never happen */
306 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
308 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++) {
309 if (curve_id == curves[i])
310 return tls_curve_allowed(s, curve_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
316 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
317 * if there is no match.
318 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
319 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
320 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
322 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
324 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
325 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
328 /* Can't do anything on client side */
332 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
334 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
335 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
339 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
340 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
341 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
342 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
343 /* Should never happen */
346 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
350 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
351 * but s->options is a long...
353 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
354 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
356 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
357 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
358 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
359 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
361 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
363 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
364 uint16_t id = pref[i];
366 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++) {
368 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
371 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
378 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
382 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
383 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
388 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
391 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
392 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist));
395 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
396 unsigned long idmask;
398 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
399 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
401 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
414 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
418 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
421 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
423 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
429 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
431 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
433 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
435 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
436 if (nid == NID_undef)
437 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
438 if (nid == NID_undef)
439 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
440 if (nid == NID_undef)
442 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
443 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
445 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
449 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
450 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
454 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
458 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
461 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
462 static int tls1_set_ec_id(uint16_t *pcurve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
469 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
470 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
473 /* Determine curve ID */
474 curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
475 *pcurve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curve_nid);
476 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
480 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
482 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
483 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
485 if ((nid_list[*pcurve_id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
486 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
488 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
494 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
495 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, uint16_t curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
497 const unsigned char *pformats;
498 const uint16_t *pcurves;
499 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
502 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
503 * supported (see RFC4492).
505 if (comp_id && s->session->ext.ecpointformats) {
506 pformats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
507 num_formats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len;
508 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
509 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
512 if (i == num_formats)
517 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
518 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
519 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
521 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
523 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
524 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
525 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
526 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
527 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
531 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++) {
532 if (pcurves[i] == curve_id)
537 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
544 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
548 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
550 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
551 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
552 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
554 *pformats = ecformats_default;
555 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
557 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
559 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
564 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
565 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
567 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
569 unsigned char comp_id;
573 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
576 /* If not EC nothing to do */
577 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
579 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(&curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
583 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
586 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : 0, &comp_id);
590 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
593 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
598 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
599 if (curve_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
600 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
601 else if (curve_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
602 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
604 return 0; /* Should never happen */
605 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
606 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
608 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
615 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
617 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
619 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
620 * is compatible with the client extensions.
622 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
624 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
627 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
630 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
633 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
634 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
635 curve_id = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
636 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
637 curve_id = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
640 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
641 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
645 /* Need a shared curve */
646 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
653 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
658 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
660 /* Default sigalg schemes */
661 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
663 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
664 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
665 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
666 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
669 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
670 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
671 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
673 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
674 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
678 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
679 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
681 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
682 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
684 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
685 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
687 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
688 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
689 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
694 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
695 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
696 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
700 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
702 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
703 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
704 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
705 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
706 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
707 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
708 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
709 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
710 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
711 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
712 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
713 NID_undef, NID_undef},
714 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
715 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
716 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
717 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
718 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
719 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
721 {"rsa_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
722 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
723 NID_undef, NID_undef},
724 {"rsa_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
725 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
726 NID_undef, NID_undef},
727 {"rsa_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
728 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
729 NID_undef, NID_undef},
730 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
731 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
732 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
733 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
734 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
735 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
736 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
737 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
738 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
739 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
740 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
741 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
742 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
743 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
744 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
746 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
747 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
748 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
749 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
750 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
751 NID_undef, NID_undef},
752 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
753 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
754 NID_undef, NID_undef},
755 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
756 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
757 NID_undef, NID_undef},
758 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
759 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
760 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
763 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
764 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
765 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
766 NID_undef, NID_undef},
767 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
768 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
769 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
770 NID_undef, NID_undef},
771 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
772 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
773 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
774 NID_undef, NID_undef}
777 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
778 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
779 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
780 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
781 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
786 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
787 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
789 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
790 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
791 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
792 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
793 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
794 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
795 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
796 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
797 0 /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
800 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
801 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
804 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
806 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
808 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
813 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
814 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
819 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
820 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
823 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
833 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
834 * is fixed by the certificate type.
836 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
842 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
843 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
844 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
846 if (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
852 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
855 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
857 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
858 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
860 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
864 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
866 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
867 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
870 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
872 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
874 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
877 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
881 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
884 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
888 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
889 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
890 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
891 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
893 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
894 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
897 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
898 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
903 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
904 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
905 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
907 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
908 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
909 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
910 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
911 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
912 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
914 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
915 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
920 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
921 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
924 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
926 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
927 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
929 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
930 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
931 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
933 /* Should never happen */
936 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
937 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
938 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
943 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
944 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
946 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
948 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
949 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
952 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
953 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
954 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
959 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
960 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
961 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
963 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
964 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
966 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
969 /* For TLS 1.3 check curve matches signature algorithm */
970 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
975 unsigned char comp_id;
978 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
979 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(&curve_id, &comp_id, ec))
981 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
985 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
986 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
987 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
988 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
990 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
994 * Suite B also requires P-256+SHA256 and P-384+SHA384:
995 * this matches the TLS 1.3 requirements so we can just
996 * check the curve is the expected TLS 1.3 value.
997 * If this fails an inappropriate digest is being used.
999 if (curve != lu->curve) {
1000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1001 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1006 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1011 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1012 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1013 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1014 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1017 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1018 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1019 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1023 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1029 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1030 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1032 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1033 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1034 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1035 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
1036 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1041 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1042 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1046 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1048 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1050 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1055 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1056 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1057 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1059 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1062 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1064 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1066 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1067 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1068 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1069 ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
1070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1071 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1072 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1073 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1074 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1076 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1077 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1078 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1079 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1080 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1086 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1087 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1088 * @c: cipher to check
1089 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1090 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1092 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1094 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1096 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1097 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1099 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1101 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1102 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1105 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1106 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1108 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1109 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1110 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1112 if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
1115 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1116 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1119 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1122 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1124 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1126 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1129 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1134 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1135 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1136 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1137 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1138 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1139 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1140 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1142 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1143 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1145 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1146 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1147 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1149 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1150 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1155 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1156 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1157 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1158 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1166 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1168 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1171 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1173 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1175 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1177 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1182 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1184 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1185 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1186 * point to the resulting session.
1188 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1189 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1190 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1193 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1194 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1195 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1196 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1197 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1198 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1199 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1202 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1203 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1204 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1205 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1206 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1207 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1209 TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1214 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1217 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1220 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1221 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1224 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1227 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1228 if (!ticketext->present)
1231 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1234 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1237 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1238 return TICKET_EMPTY;
1240 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1242 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1243 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1244 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1245 * calculate the master secret later.
1247 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1250 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1251 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1253 case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1254 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1255 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1257 case TICKET_SUCCESS:
1258 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1260 case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1261 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1262 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1265 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1270 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1272 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1273 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1274 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1275 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1276 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1277 * point to the resulting session.
1279 TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1280 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1281 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1284 unsigned char *sdec;
1285 const unsigned char *p;
1286 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1287 TICKET_RETURN ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1289 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1290 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1291 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
1292 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1294 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1295 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1297 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1298 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1300 ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1303 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1304 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1305 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1310 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1316 /* Check key name matches */
1317 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1318 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
1319 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1322 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
1323 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
1324 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1325 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1326 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
1328 + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
1333 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1336 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1340 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1342 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1343 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1347 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1348 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1349 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1352 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1353 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1354 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1355 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1357 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1358 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1359 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1360 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1361 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1362 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1363 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1364 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1366 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1368 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1369 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1371 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1374 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1378 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1382 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1383 if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) {
1384 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1385 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1388 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1389 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1390 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1394 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1395 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1398 return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1400 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1404 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1406 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1408 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1409 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1413 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1414 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1416 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1419 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1420 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
1422 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1423 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1425 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1426 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1427 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1428 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1429 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1431 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1432 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1434 if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
1436 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1437 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1438 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1439 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1440 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1441 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1445 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1446 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1450 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1452 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1453 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1454 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1456 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1459 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1460 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
1461 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1462 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1467 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1469 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1470 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1471 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1472 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1474 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1477 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1478 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1483 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1484 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1486 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1488 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1491 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1492 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1494 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1495 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1496 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1497 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1505 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1506 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1507 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1508 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1510 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1511 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1512 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1513 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1515 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1516 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1518 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1519 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1530 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1531 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1533 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1534 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1536 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1538 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1540 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1541 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1542 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1543 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1544 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1545 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1546 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1547 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1548 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1549 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1551 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1552 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1555 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1556 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1560 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1561 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1563 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1565 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs));
1568 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1572 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1573 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1577 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1583 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1585 /* Invalid data length */
1586 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1591 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf));
1594 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1602 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1609 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1611 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1612 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1614 /* Should never happen */
1615 if (s->cert == NULL)
1618 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1619 &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1624 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1626 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1629 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1632 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1635 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1638 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1639 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
1640 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1642 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1643 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1645 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1646 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1647 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1652 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1653 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1654 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1656 uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1657 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1658 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1661 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1663 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1667 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1669 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1670 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1672 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1674 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1675 if (psignhash != NULL)
1676 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1678 return (int)numsigalgs;
1681 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1682 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1683 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1685 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1686 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1688 || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1689 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1691 shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1693 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1695 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1696 if (psignhash != NULL)
1697 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1699 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1701 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1702 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1705 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1706 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1710 int sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1713 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1715 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1716 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1717 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1718 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1719 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1720 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1721 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1722 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1724 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1725 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1726 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1729 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1730 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1732 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1734 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1736 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1737 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1740 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1742 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1744 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1746 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1747 /* See if we have a match for TLS 1.3 names */
1749 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1751 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1753 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1764 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1765 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1768 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || (p != NULL && hash_alg == NID_undef))
1771 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
1772 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
1775 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
1776 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
1781 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1782 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1784 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1788 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1792 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1795 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1797 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
1802 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1803 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1805 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1807 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1808 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
1809 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
1811 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1813 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1814 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
1819 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1824 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1825 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1826 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1828 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1829 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1830 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1836 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
1840 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
1844 if (default_nid == -1)
1846 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
1848 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
1849 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
1850 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
1855 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1856 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
1860 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1861 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1862 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
1869 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1870 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1871 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1872 * attempting to use them.
1875 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
1877 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1878 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1879 /* Strict mode flags */
1880 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1881 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1882 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1884 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
1889 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
1890 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
1893 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
1894 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1896 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1899 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
1901 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
1902 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1904 pk = cpk->privatekey;
1906 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
1907 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1916 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
1919 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1921 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1922 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
1924 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
1931 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1932 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
1933 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
1934 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1935 else if (!check_flags)
1940 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1941 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1943 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
1946 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
1948 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1952 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1953 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
1956 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1957 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1958 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
1962 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1963 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
1966 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1967 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
1968 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
1971 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1972 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
1973 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
1976 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1977 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
1978 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
1987 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
1988 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
1990 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
1992 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
1993 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
1994 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
1996 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
1999 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2006 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2007 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
2011 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2012 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2013 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2014 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2016 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2023 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2024 else if (check_flags)
2025 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2027 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2028 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2029 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2030 else if (!check_flags)
2033 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2034 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2035 else if (strict_mode) {
2036 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2037 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2038 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2039 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2041 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2048 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2049 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2051 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2053 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2056 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2059 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2063 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2066 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2067 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2068 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2072 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2075 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2078 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names;
2080 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2081 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2083 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2084 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2085 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2087 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2088 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2089 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2090 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2091 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2096 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2099 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2101 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2102 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2106 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2107 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2109 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2112 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2116 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2119 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2120 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2127 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2128 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2130 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2131 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2132 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2133 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2134 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2135 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2136 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2137 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2140 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2141 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2143 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2147 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2149 int dh_secbits = 80;
2150 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2151 return DH_get_1024_160();
2152 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2153 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2158 if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
2160 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
2163 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2171 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2172 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2174 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2175 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2183 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2184 return DH_get_2048_224();
2185 return DH_get_1024_160();
2189 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2192 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2195 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2196 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2197 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2198 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2200 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2203 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2205 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2208 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2210 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2211 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2212 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2213 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2215 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2217 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2218 if (nid == NID_undef)
2221 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2223 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2226 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2229 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2231 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2232 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2234 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2235 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2237 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2238 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2243 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2244 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2245 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2248 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2250 int rv, start_idx, i;
2252 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2257 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2261 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2262 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2263 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2271 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2272 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2275 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2277 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2278 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2280 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2281 if (clu == NULL || !(clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth))
2284 /* If PSS and we have no PSS cert use RSA */
2285 if (sig_idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN && !ssl_has_cert(s, sig_idx))
2286 sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
2288 return s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2292 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2293 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2295 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error
2296 * and an appropriate error code is set and the TLS alert set in *al.
2298 * For clients al is set to NULL. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2299 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2300 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2302 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int *al)
2304 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2307 s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
2308 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2310 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2313 int curve = -1, skip_ec = 0;
2316 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2317 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2318 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2320 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2321 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2322 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2323 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2324 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2326 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
2328 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, lu->sig_idx)) {
2329 if (lu->sig_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
2330 || !ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_RSA))
2332 sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
2334 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2337 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2339 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2340 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec)
2341 != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
2344 if (skip_ec || (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve))
2352 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2355 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2357 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2361 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2362 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2364 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2367 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2368 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2373 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2375 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2376 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2383 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2386 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2387 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2390 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2393 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2395 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2396 if (cc_idx != sig_idx) {
2397 if (sig_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
2398 || cc_idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA)
2400 sig_idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA;
2403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2404 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2408 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2411 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2412 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2417 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2419 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2420 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
2422 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2425 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2430 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2431 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2432 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2433 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs)
2436 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2440 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2445 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2448 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2455 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2456 s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
2457 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2458 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;