2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
28 tls1_generate_master_secret,
29 tls1_change_cipher_state,
30 tls1_final_finish_mac,
31 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
32 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
34 tls1_export_keying_material,
36 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
37 tls_close_construct_packet,
41 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
45 tls1_generate_master_secret,
46 tls1_change_cipher_state,
47 tls1_final_finish_mac,
48 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
49 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
51 tls1_export_keying_material,
52 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
53 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
54 tls_close_construct_packet,
58 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
62 tls1_generate_master_secret,
63 tls1_change_cipher_state,
64 tls1_final_finish_mac,
65 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
66 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
68 tls1_export_keying_material,
69 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
70 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
71 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
72 tls_close_construct_packet,
76 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
79 tls13_setup_key_block,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
86 tls13_export_keying_material,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
89 tls_close_construct_packet,
93 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
106 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
112 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
114 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
118 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
123 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
124 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
126 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 * Table of curve information.
136 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
137 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0001}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
138 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0002}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
139 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0003}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
140 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0004}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
141 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0005}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
142 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0006}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
143 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0007}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
144 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0008}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
145 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0009}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
146 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000A}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
147 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000B}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
148 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000C}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
149 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000D}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
150 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000E}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
151 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x000F}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
152 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0010}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
153 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0011}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
154 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0012}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
155 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0013}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
156 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0014}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
157 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0015}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
158 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0016}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
159 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0017}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
160 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0018}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
161 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0019}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
162 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001A}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001B}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001C}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
165 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001D}, /* X25519 (29) */
166 {EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001E}, /* X448 (30) */
167 /* Security bit values for FFDHE groups are updated as per RFC 7919 */
168 {NID_ffdhe2048, 103, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0100}, /* ffdhe2048 (0x0100) */
169 {NID_ffdhe3072, 125, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0101}, /* ffdhe3072 (0x0101) */
170 {NID_ffdhe4096, 150, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0102}, /* ffdhe4096 (0x0102) */
171 {NID_ffdhe6144, 175, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0103}, /* ffdhe6144 (0x0103) */
172 {NID_ffdhe8192, 192, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0104}, /* ffdhe8192 (0x0104) */
175 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
176 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
181 /* The default curves */
182 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
183 29, /* X25519 (29) */
184 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
188 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
189 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
190 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
191 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
192 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
195 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
200 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
204 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 FFDHE group from RFC 8446 */
205 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
206 if (nid_list[i].group_id == group_id)
212 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
216 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
217 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
218 return nid_list[i].group_id;
224 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
225 * the number of groups supported.
227 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
231 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
232 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
233 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
234 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
235 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
238 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
239 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
243 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
244 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
249 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
250 *pgroups = supported_groups_default;
251 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default);
253 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
254 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
260 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int version)
262 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
264 if (version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
265 if ((ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_ONLY_FOR_TLS1_3) != 0)
271 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
272 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op)
274 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *cinfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(curve);
275 unsigned char ctmp[2];
279 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
280 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2)
283 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH
284 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_FFDHE)
287 ctmp[0] = curve >> 8;
288 ctmp[1] = curve & 0xff;
289 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)ctmp);
292 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
293 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
296 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
303 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
304 * if there is no match.
305 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
306 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
307 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
309 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
311 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
312 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
315 /* Can't do anything on client side */
319 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
321 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
322 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
324 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
326 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
327 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
328 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
329 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
330 /* Should never happen */
333 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
337 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
338 * otherwise peer decides.
340 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
341 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
342 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
344 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
345 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
348 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
349 uint16_t id = pref[i];
351 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
352 || !tls_curve_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
360 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
364 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
365 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
370 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
371 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
373 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
374 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
375 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
381 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
385 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
386 unsigned long idmask;
388 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
389 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
391 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
392 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
393 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
407 # define MAX_CURVELIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
411 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
414 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
416 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
422 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
424 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
426 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
428 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
429 if (nid == NID_undef)
430 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
431 if (nid == NID_undef)
432 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
433 if (nid == NID_undef)
435 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
436 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
438 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
442 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
443 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
447 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
451 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
453 /* Return group id of a key */
454 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
456 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
461 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
462 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp));
465 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
466 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
470 unsigned char comp_id;
473 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
474 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
476 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
477 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
479 /* Get required compression id */
480 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
481 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
482 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
484 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
489 int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
491 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
492 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
493 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
494 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
499 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
500 * supported (see RFC4492).
502 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL)
505 for (i = 0; i < s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len; i++) {
506 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
512 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
513 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
515 const uint16_t *groups;
521 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
522 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
523 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
525 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
526 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
528 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
529 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
532 /* Should never happen */
537 if (check_own_groups) {
538 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
539 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
540 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
544 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
547 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
551 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
552 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
555 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
556 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
557 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
558 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
562 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
565 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
569 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
571 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
572 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
573 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
575 *pformats = ecformats_default;
576 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
578 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
580 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
585 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
586 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
588 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
592 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
595 /* If not EC nothing to do */
596 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
598 /* Check compression */
599 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
601 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
603 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
606 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
609 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
612 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
617 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
618 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
619 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
620 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
621 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
623 return 0; /* Should never happen */
624 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
625 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
634 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
636 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
638 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
639 * is compatible with the client extensions.
641 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
643 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
645 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
647 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
649 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
652 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
653 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
654 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
655 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
662 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
667 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
669 /* Default sigalg schemes */
670 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
672 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
673 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
674 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
679 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
680 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
681 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
682 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
683 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
684 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
686 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
687 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
688 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
691 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
692 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
694 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
695 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
697 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
698 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
700 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
701 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
702 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
705 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
706 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
707 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
712 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
713 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
714 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
718 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
720 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
721 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
722 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
723 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
724 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
725 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
726 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
727 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
728 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
729 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
730 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
731 NID_undef, NID_undef},
732 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
733 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
734 NID_undef, NID_undef},
735 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
736 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
737 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
738 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
739 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
740 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
742 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
743 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
744 NID_undef, NID_undef},
745 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
746 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
747 NID_undef, NID_undef},
748 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
749 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
750 NID_undef, NID_undef},
751 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
752 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
753 NID_undef, NID_undef},
754 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
755 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
756 NID_undef, NID_undef},
757 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
758 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
759 NID_undef, NID_undef},
760 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
761 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
762 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
763 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
764 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
765 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
766 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
767 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
768 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
769 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
770 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
771 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
772 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
773 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
774 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
776 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
777 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
778 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
779 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
780 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
781 NID_undef, NID_undef},
782 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
783 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
784 NID_undef, NID_undef},
785 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
786 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
787 NID_undef, NID_undef},
788 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
789 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
790 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
792 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
793 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
794 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
795 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
796 NID_undef, NID_undef},
797 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
798 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
799 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
800 NID_undef, NID_undef},
801 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
802 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
803 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
804 NID_undef, NID_undef}
807 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
808 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
809 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
810 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
811 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
816 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
817 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
819 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
820 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
821 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
822 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
823 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
824 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
825 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
826 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
827 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
828 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
831 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
832 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
835 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
837 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
839 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
844 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
845 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
850 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
851 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
854 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
864 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
866 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
867 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
868 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
870 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
871 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA *rsa, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
877 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md) || md == NULL)
879 if (RSA_size(rsa) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
885 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
886 * is fixed by the certificate type.
888 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
894 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
895 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
896 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
898 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
905 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
907 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
910 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
912 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
919 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
922 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
924 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
925 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
927 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
931 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
933 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
934 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
937 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
939 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
941 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
944 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
948 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
951 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
955 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
956 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
957 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
958 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
960 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
961 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
964 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
965 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
970 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
971 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
972 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
974 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
975 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
976 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
977 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
978 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
979 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
981 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
982 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
988 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
989 * specified EC curve.
991 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
993 const uint16_t *sigs;
996 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
997 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
998 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1000 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1001 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1004 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1005 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs[i]);
1009 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1010 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1011 && curve == lu->curve)
1020 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1021 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1024 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1026 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1027 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1029 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1030 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
1031 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1033 /* Should never happen */
1036 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1037 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1038 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1039 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1040 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1043 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1044 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1045 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1047 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
1049 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1050 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1053 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1054 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1055 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1056 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1057 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1060 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1061 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1062 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1063 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1064 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1069 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1071 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1072 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1074 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1075 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1079 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1080 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1081 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
1082 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
1084 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1086 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1090 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1091 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1092 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1093 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1094 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1097 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1098 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1099 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1100 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1102 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1103 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1108 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1110 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1115 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1116 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1117 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1118 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1121 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1122 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1123 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1125 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1128 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
1129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1130 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1135 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1136 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1138 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1139 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1140 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1141 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
1142 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1144 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1148 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1149 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1153 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1155 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1157 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1161 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1163 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1165 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1170 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1171 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1172 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1174 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1177 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1179 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1181 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1182 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1183 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1184 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1185 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1188 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1189 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1190 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1191 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1193 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1194 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1195 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1196 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1197 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1204 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1205 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1206 * @c: cipher to check
1207 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1208 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1210 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1212 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1214 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1215 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1217 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1219 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1220 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1223 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1224 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1226 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1227 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1228 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1230 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1233 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1234 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1237 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1240 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1242 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1244 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1247 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1251 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1252 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1253 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1254 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1255 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1256 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1257 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1259 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1260 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1262 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1263 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1264 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1265 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1267 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1268 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1273 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1274 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1275 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1276 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1284 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1286 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1289 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1292 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1293 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1294 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1299 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1301 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1302 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1303 * point to the resulting session.
1305 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1309 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1312 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1315 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1316 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1319 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1320 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1322 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1323 if (!ticketext->present)
1324 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1326 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1328 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1329 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1333 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1335 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1336 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1337 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1338 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1341 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1342 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1343 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1344 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1345 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1346 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1348 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1349 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1350 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1351 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1352 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1353 * point to the resulting session.
1355 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1356 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1357 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1359 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1360 unsigned char *sdec;
1361 const unsigned char *p;
1362 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1363 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1365 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1366 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1367 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1368 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1370 if (eticklen == 0) {
1372 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1373 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1375 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1378 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1380 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1381 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1382 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1383 * calculate the master secret later.
1385 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1389 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1390 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1391 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1395 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1396 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1398 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1401 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1403 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1406 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1407 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1408 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1409 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1412 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1416 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1422 /* Check key name matches */
1423 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1424 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1425 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1428 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1429 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1430 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1431 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1432 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1433 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1434 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1437 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1441 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1444 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1446 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1450 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1452 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1453 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1457 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1458 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1459 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1460 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1464 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1465 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1468 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1469 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1470 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1471 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1472 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1473 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1474 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1476 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1479 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1481 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1487 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1491 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1493 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1495 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1499 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1500 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1501 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1505 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1506 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1509 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1511 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1516 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1518 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1521 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1522 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1525 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1526 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1527 * performs any action
1529 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1530 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1531 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1532 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1533 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1534 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1537 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1538 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1539 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1541 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1543 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1544 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1547 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1548 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1549 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1553 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
1554 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1555 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1556 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1557 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1561 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
1562 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
1563 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1564 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
1565 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1566 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
1567 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1569 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1573 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1577 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1579 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1580 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1581 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
1582 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1591 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1592 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1594 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1597 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1598 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
1600 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1601 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1603 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1604 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1605 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1606 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1607 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1610 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1611 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1614 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1615 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1616 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
1617 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1618 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1621 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1622 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1624 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1627 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1628 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1629 * ciphersuites enabled.
1632 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
1635 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1636 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
1637 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
1638 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1640 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1641 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
1642 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
1645 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST) != 0)
1653 if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
1655 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1656 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1657 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1658 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1659 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1660 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1664 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1665 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1669 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1671 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1672 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1673 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1675 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1678 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1679 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
1680 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1681 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1686 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1690 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1691 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1692 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1693 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1695 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1698 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1699 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1704 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1705 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1707 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1709 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1712 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1713 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1715 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1716 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1717 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1718 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1726 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1727 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1728 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1729 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1731 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1732 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1733 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1734 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1736 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1737 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1739 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1740 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1751 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1752 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1754 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1755 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1757 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1759 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1761 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1762 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1763 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1764 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1765 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1766 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1767 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1768 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1769 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1770 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1772 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1773 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1776 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1777 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1781 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1782 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1784 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1786 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1790 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1794 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1795 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1799 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1805 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1807 /* Invalid data length */
1808 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1813 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
1814 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1817 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1825 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1832 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
1834 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1835 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1837 /* Should never happen */
1838 if (s->cert == NULL)
1842 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
1843 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
1845 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1846 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1850 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1852 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1855 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
1858 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1861 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1864 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1865 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
1866 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1868 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1869 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1871 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1872 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1873 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1878 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1879 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1880 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1882 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1883 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1884 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1887 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1889 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1893 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1895 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1896 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1898 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1900 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1901 if (psignhash != NULL)
1902 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1904 return (int)numsigalgs;
1907 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1908 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1909 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1911 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1912 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1914 || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1915 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1917 shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1919 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1921 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1922 if (psignhash != NULL)
1923 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1925 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1927 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1928 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1931 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1932 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1936 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
1937 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1940 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1942 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1943 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1944 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1945 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1946 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1947 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1948 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1949 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1951 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1952 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1953 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1956 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1957 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1959 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1961 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1963 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1964 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1965 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1968 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1970 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1972 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1974 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1976 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1977 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
1978 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
1979 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
1980 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
1981 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
1985 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1987 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1988 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
1992 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1999 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2000 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2001 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2003 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2005 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2006 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2010 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2014 /* Reject duplicates */
2015 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2016 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2025 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2026 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2028 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2032 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2036 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2039 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2044 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2048 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2051 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2052 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2053 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2055 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2056 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2057 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2063 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2065 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2070 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2074 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2076 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2077 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2078 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2080 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2082 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2083 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2088 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2093 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2094 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2095 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2097 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2098 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2099 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2105 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2109 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2113 if (default_nid == -1)
2115 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2117 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2118 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
2119 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
2124 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2125 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2129 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2130 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2131 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2138 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2139 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2140 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2141 * attempting to use them.
2144 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2146 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2147 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2148 /* Strict mode flags */
2149 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2150 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2151 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2153 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2158 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2159 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2162 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2163 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2165 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2168 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2170 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2171 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2173 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2175 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2176 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2185 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2188 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2190 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2191 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2193 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2200 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2201 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2202 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2203 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2204 else if (!check_flags)
2209 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2210 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2212 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2215 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2216 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2218 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2222 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2223 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2226 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2227 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2228 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2232 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2233 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2236 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2237 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2238 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2241 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2242 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2243 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2246 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2247 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2248 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2257 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2258 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2260 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2262 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2263 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2264 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
2266 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2269 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2276 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2277 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
2281 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2282 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2283 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2284 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2286 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2293 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2294 else if (check_flags)
2295 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2297 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2298 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2299 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2300 else if (!check_flags)
2303 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2304 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2305 else if (strict_mode) {
2306 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2307 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2308 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2309 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2311 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2318 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2319 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2321 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2323 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2326 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2329 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2333 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2336 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2337 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2338 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2342 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2345 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2348 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2350 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2351 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2353 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2354 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2355 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2357 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2358 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2359 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2360 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2361 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2366 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2369 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2371 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2372 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2376 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2377 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2379 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2382 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2386 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2389 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2390 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2397 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2398 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2400 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2401 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2402 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2403 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2404 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2405 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2406 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2407 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2408 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2411 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2412 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2414 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2418 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2420 int dh_secbits = 80;
2421 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2422 return DH_get_1024_160();
2423 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2424 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2429 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2431 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2434 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2440 if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
2445 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2446 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2448 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2449 if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2457 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2458 return DH_get_2048_224();
2459 return DH_get_1024_160();
2463 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2466 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2469 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2470 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2471 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2472 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2474 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2477 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2479 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2482 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2484 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2485 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2486 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2487 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2489 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2491 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2492 if (nid == NID_undef)
2495 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2497 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2500 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2503 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2505 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2506 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2508 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2509 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2511 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2512 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2517 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2518 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2519 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2522 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2524 int rv, start_idx, i;
2526 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2531 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2535 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2536 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2537 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2545 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2546 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2549 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2551 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2552 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2554 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2556 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
2557 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
2558 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
2561 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2565 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2566 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2567 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2568 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2569 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2571 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
2573 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2574 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
2577 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override lu->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2580 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2582 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2583 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
2584 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
2586 || !X509_get_signature_info(s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509, &mdnid,
2589 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2590 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2591 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2592 * signing certificate.
2594 || mdnid != lu->hash
2595 || pknid != lu->sig)
2599 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey,
2603 else if (supported < 0)
2605 /* If it didn't report a mandatory NID, for whatever reasons,
2606 * just clear the error and allow all hashes to be used. */
2613 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey,
2617 else if (supported < 0)
2624 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2625 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2627 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2628 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2630 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2631 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2632 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2634 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
2636 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2639 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
2640 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2642 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2648 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2649 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2650 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2653 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2654 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2655 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2656 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2657 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2659 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2660 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL) || !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
2662 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2665 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2667 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2669 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
2674 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2675 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2678 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
2679 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
2684 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2687 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2688 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2692 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2693 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2695 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2698 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2700 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2704 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2705 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2706 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2707 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2714 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2717 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2718 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2721 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2724 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2726 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2727 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
2730 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2731 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
2733 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2734 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2735 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
2737 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
2740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2741 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2745 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2748 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2749 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2750 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2755 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2757 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2758 size_t sent_sigslen;
2760 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2764 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2768 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2769 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2770 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2771 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
2772 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
2775 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2778 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2779 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2780 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2785 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2789 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2795 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2796 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
2797 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
2798 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
2802 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
2804 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2805 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2807 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2811 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2815 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
2817 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2818 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2820 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2824 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2828 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
2830 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;