2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
122 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
123 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
124 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
130 tls1_setup_key_block,
131 tls1_generate_master_secret,
132 tls1_change_cipher_state,
133 tls1_final_finish_mac,
134 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
135 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
136 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
137 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
143 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
144 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
150 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
151 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
155 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
158 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
160 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
162 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
166 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
169 s->version = s->method->version;
172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
173 static int nid_list[] =
175 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
176 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
177 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
178 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
179 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
180 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
181 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
182 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
183 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
184 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
185 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
186 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
187 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
188 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
189 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
190 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
191 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
192 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
193 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
194 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
195 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
196 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
197 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
198 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
199 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
202 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
204 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
205 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
206 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
208 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
211 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
213 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
216 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
218 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
220 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
222 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
224 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
226 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
228 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
232 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
234 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
238 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
240 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
244 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
246 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
248 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
250 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
252 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
254 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
256 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
258 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
260 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
262 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
264 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
270 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
273 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
276 unsigned char *ret = p;
278 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
279 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
280 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
285 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
287 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
289 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
290 unsigned long size_str;
293 /* check for enough space.
294 4 for the servername type and entension length
295 2 for servernamelist length
296 1 for the hostname type
297 2 for hostname length
301 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
302 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
305 /* extension type and length */
306 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
309 /* length of servername list */
312 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
313 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
315 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
319 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
324 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
330 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
332 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
335 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
345 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
346 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
348 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
351 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
352 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
353 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
360 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
361 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
362 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
363 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
365 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
366 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
368 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
371 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
372 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
373 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
379 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
380 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
382 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
383 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
384 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
385 * resolves this to two bytes.
387 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
388 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
389 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
391 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
393 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
396 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
397 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
398 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
399 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
401 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
402 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
403 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
405 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
406 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
408 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
412 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
413 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
415 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
418 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
419 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
423 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
429 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
430 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
431 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
433 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
435 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
437 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
443 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
448 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
449 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
452 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
456 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
458 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
459 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
465 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
467 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
474 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
475 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
476 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
478 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
479 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
481 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
483 /* save position of id len */
484 unsigned char *q = ret;
485 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
486 /* skip over id len */
488 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
494 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
498 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
500 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
501 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
502 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
504 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
509 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
516 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
519 unsigned char *ret = p;
520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
521 int next_proto_neg_seen;
524 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
525 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
529 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
531 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
533 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
535 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
539 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
543 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
549 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
554 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
564 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
565 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
567 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
570 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
571 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
572 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
578 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
579 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
580 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
581 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
582 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
585 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
586 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
588 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
589 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
591 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
592 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
596 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
598 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
603 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
604 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
605 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
607 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
609 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
611 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
614 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
617 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
621 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
622 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
623 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
624 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
625 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
626 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
627 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
628 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
629 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
630 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
631 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
637 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
638 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
639 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
641 const unsigned char *npa;
645 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
646 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
648 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
649 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
651 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
653 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
658 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
665 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
670 unsigned char *data = *p;
671 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
673 s->servername_done = 0;
674 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
680 if (data > (d+n-len))
683 while (data <= (d+n-4))
688 if (data+size > (d+n))
691 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
693 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
694 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
695 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
696 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
698 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
699 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
700 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
701 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
702 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
703 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
704 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
705 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
706 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
707 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
708 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
709 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
710 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
711 the value of the Host: field.
712 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
713 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
714 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
715 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
719 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
721 unsigned char *sdata;
727 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
734 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
741 servname_type = *(sdata++);
747 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
750 if (s->servername_done == 0)
751 switch (servname_type)
753 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
756 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
758 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
761 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
763 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
766 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
768 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
771 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
772 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
773 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
774 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
775 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
776 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
779 s->servername_done = 1;
783 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
784 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
785 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
797 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
804 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
805 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
807 unsigned char *sdata = data;
808 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
810 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
812 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
817 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
819 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
820 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
822 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
823 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
825 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
828 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
829 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
832 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
833 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
834 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
835 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
836 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
839 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
840 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
842 unsigned char *sdata = data;
843 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
844 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
846 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
848 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
853 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
855 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
858 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
859 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
861 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
864 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
865 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
868 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
869 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
870 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
871 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
872 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
875 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
876 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
877 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
878 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
880 unsigned char *sdata = data;
884 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
887 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
888 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
890 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
894 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
895 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
896 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
897 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
899 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
900 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
902 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
907 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
909 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
910 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
912 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
916 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
918 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
920 renegotiate_seen = 1;
922 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
923 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
928 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
932 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
934 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
936 const unsigned char *sdata;
938 /* Read in responder_id_list */
943 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
952 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
960 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
965 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
969 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
974 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
975 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
978 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
979 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
980 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
982 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
983 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
986 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
987 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
989 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
990 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
995 /* Read in request_extensions */
998 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1005 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1011 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1012 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1014 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1015 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1017 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1022 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1026 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1029 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1030 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1032 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1035 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1036 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1037 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1038 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1039 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1040 * anything like that, but this might change).
1042 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1043 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1044 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1045 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1046 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1047 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1051 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1059 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1061 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1062 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1064 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1066 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1073 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1074 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1075 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1076 * the length of the block. */
1077 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1079 unsigned int off = 0;
1093 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1095 unsigned short length;
1096 unsigned short type;
1097 unsigned short size;
1098 unsigned char *data = *p;
1099 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1100 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1102 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1106 if (data+length != d+n)
1108 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1112 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1117 if (data+size > (d+n))
1120 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1121 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1122 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1124 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1126 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1128 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1131 tlsext_servername = 1;
1134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1135 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1136 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1138 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1139 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1141 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1143 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1146 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1147 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1148 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1150 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1153 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1154 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1156 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1157 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1158 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1159 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1160 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1163 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1165 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1167 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1168 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1170 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1173 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1176 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1179 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1181 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1182 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1183 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1185 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1189 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1192 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1193 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1195 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1199 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1200 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1201 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1202 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1204 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1206 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1208 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1213 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1214 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1216 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1217 * a status request message.
1219 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1221 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1224 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1225 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1228 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1230 unsigned char *selected;
1231 unsigned char selected_len;
1233 /* We must have requested it. */
1234 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
1236 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1239 /* The data must be valid */
1240 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1242 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1245 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1247 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1250 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1251 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1253 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1256 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1257 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1260 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1262 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1264 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1271 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1275 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1277 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1279 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1281 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1282 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1284 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1290 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1300 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1301 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1302 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1303 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1304 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1305 * absence on initial connect only.
1307 if (!renegotiate_seen
1308 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1309 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1311 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1313 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1321 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1324 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1325 * and elliptic curves we support.
1330 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1331 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1333 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1335 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1337 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1338 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1339 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1345 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1348 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1349 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1354 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1355 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1356 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1357 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1359 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1360 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1361 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2;
1362 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1364 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1368 for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
1369 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
1372 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1374 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1378 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1380 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1385 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1387 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1388 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1390 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1391 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1393 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1394 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1399 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1403 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1404 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1411 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1414 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1415 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1416 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1419 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1420 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1421 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1422 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1426 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1427 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1432 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1433 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1434 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1435 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1437 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1442 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1444 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1445 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1448 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1449 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1451 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1452 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1456 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1457 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1458 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1459 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1461 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1462 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1463 * the certificate has changed.
1465 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1468 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1471 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1472 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1473 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1475 /* status request response should be sent */
1476 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1477 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1478 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1480 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1482 /* something bad happened */
1483 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1484 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1485 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1490 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1492 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1494 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1495 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1496 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
1500 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1502 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1505 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1506 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1511 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1512 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1513 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1515 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1517 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1518 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1520 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1521 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1523 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1524 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1526 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1527 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1529 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1530 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1533 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1537 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1539 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1540 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1541 * abort the handshake.
1543 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1544 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1552 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1553 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1556 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1557 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1560 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1561 s->servername_done=0;
1567 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1569 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1570 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1573 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1574 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
1575 * it must contain uncompressed.
1577 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1578 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1579 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1580 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1581 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1583 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1585 unsigned char *list;
1586 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1587 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1588 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1590 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1592 found_uncompressed = 1;
1596 if (!found_uncompressed)
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1602 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1603 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1605 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1606 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1607 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1608 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1610 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1611 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
1613 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1614 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1616 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1618 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1619 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1622 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1623 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1624 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1625 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
1627 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1628 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1633 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
1636 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
1637 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1640 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
1641 * there is no response.
1643 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1645 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
1646 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
1648 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
1649 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1652 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
1653 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1657 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1658 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1664 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1665 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1668 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1669 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1672 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1673 s->servername_done=0;
1679 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
1680 * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
1681 * session ticket extension at the same time.
1684 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
1685 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
1687 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
1688 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
1691 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
1692 * to permit stateful resumption.
1694 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1697 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
1701 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
1702 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1709 /* Skip past cipher list */
1714 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
1719 /* Now at start of extensions */
1720 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
1723 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
1725 unsigned short type, size;
1728 if (p + size > limit)
1730 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1732 /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
1733 * trigger a full handshake
1735 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1737 /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
1738 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
1742 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1743 return 0; /* Cache miss */
1745 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1747 /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
1748 * generating the session from ticket now,
1749 * trigger abbreviated handshake based on
1750 * external mechanism to calculate the master
1754 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
1762 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
1763 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
1764 SSL_SESSION **psess)
1767 unsigned char *sdec;
1768 const unsigned char *p;
1769 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
1770 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1773 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
1774 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
1777 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1778 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
1779 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
1780 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
1782 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1783 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1794 /* Check key name matches */
1795 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
1797 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
1798 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
1799 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
1800 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
1802 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
1803 * integrity checks on ticket.
1805 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
1808 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1812 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1813 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
1814 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
1815 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
1816 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
1818 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1819 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1820 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1821 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1822 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1825 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1828 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
1829 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
1832 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1835 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1839 /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
1840 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
1841 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
1842 * as required by standard.
1845 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1846 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1848 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
1851 /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
1855 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;