2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
42 tls_close_construct_packet,
46 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
59 tls_close_construct_packet,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
77 tls_close_construct_packet,
81 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
85 tls1_generate_master_secret,
86 tls1_change_cipher_state,
87 tls1_final_finish_mac,
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
94 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
95 tls_close_construct_packet,
99 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
116 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
118 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
122 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
128 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
140 * Table of curve information.
141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
144 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
176 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
182 /* The default curves */
183 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
190 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
227 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
232 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
234 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
238 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
240 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
244 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
247 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
248 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
266 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
267 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
269 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
271 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
272 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
278 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
282 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
287 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
291 *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
292 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
295 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
296 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
306 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
311 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
314 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
317 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
319 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
320 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
324 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
327 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
330 const unsigned char *curves;
331 size_t num_curves, i;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
333 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
343 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
344 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
346 } else /* Should never happen */
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
351 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
352 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
365 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
367 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
368 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
379 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
383 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
400 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
401 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
407 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
409 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
411 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
413 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
417 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
419 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
420 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
424 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
437 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
438 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
440 unsigned char *glist, *p;
443 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
446 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
447 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
450 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
451 unsigned long idmask;
453 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
454 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
456 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
465 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
469 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
473 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
476 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
478 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
484 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
486 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
488 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
490 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
491 if (nid == NID_undef)
492 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
493 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
495 if (nid == NID_undef)
497 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
498 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
500 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
504 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
505 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
509 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
513 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
516 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
517 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
524 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
525 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
528 /* Determine curve ID */
529 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
530 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
531 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
535 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
537 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
539 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
540 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
542 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
543 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
545 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
551 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
552 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
553 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
555 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
556 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
559 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
560 * supported (see RFC4492).
562 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
563 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
564 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
565 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
566 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
569 if (i == num_formats)
574 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
575 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
576 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
578 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
580 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
581 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
582 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
583 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
584 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
588 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
589 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
594 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
601 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
605 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
607 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
608 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
609 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
611 *pformats = ecformats_default;
612 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
614 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
616 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
621 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
622 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
624 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
626 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
629 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
632 /* If not EC nothing to do */
633 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
635 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
639 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
642 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
646 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
647 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
649 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
655 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
656 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
657 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
658 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
659 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
661 return 0; /* Should never happen */
662 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
663 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
665 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
667 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
668 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
669 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
671 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
677 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
679 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
681 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
683 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
684 * is compatible with the client extensions.
686 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
688 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
691 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
694 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
695 unsigned char curve_id[2];
696 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
697 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
698 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
699 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
700 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
704 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
705 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
709 /* Need a shared curve */
710 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
714 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
718 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
723 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
726 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
727 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
730 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
731 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
736 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
737 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
739 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
743 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
745 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
748 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
751 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
753 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
758 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
762 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
769 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
772 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
775 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
779 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
781 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
782 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
784 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
785 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
788 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
789 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
793 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
794 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
795 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
796 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
797 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
798 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
799 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
801 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
802 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
807 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
808 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
810 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
811 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
813 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
814 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
815 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
816 /* Should never happen */
819 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
820 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
825 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
826 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
827 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
828 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
830 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
834 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
835 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
838 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
839 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
841 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
844 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
845 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
847 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
853 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
857 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
858 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
859 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
860 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
863 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
864 if (i == sent_sigslen
865 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
866 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
870 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
875 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
876 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
877 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
882 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
884 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
889 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
890 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
891 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
893 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
896 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
898 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
902 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
903 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
905 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
906 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
908 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
910 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
912 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
913 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
914 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
920 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
921 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
922 * @c: cipher to check
923 * @op: Security check that you want to do
925 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
927 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
929 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
930 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
932 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
934 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
935 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
938 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
941 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
944 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
946 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
948 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
951 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
953 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
954 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
964 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
965 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
966 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
967 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
968 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
971 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
973 PACKET extensions = *packet;
974 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
975 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
978 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
979 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
982 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
983 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
989 if (num_extensions <= 1)
992 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
993 if (extension_types == NULL) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
998 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
999 extensions = *packet;
1000 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1002 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1003 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1004 /* This should not happen. */
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1010 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1014 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1015 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1016 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1017 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1022 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1026 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1029 const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
1030 size_t num_curves = 0;
1033 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1034 if ((s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1035 || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1037 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1038 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1040 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1041 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1043 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1044 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1045 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1046 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1051 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1053 * TODO(TLS1.3): We always use ECC for TLSv1.3 at the moment. This will
1054 * change if we implement DH key shares
1059 if (s->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1060 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1066 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1067 if (s->renegotiate) {
1068 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1069 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1070 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1071 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1072 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1077 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1078 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1081 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1082 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1083 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1084 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1085 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1086 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1087 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1088 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1089 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1090 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1091 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1092 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1098 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1099 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1100 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1101 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1102 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1103 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1104 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1105 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1106 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1107 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1108 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1109 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1119 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1121 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurvestmp;
1125 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1127 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1128 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1129 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1130 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1131 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
1139 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
1140 pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
1141 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1145 pcurvestmp = pcurves;
1147 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1148 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1149 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1150 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1155 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
1156 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1157 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
1158 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1160 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1170 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1172 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1174 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1175 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1176 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1177 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1178 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1179 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1180 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1184 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1185 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1186 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1189 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1190 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1193 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1194 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1204 const unsigned char *salg;
1206 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1208 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1209 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1210 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1211 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1212 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1213 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1214 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1215 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1221 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1224 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1225 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1226 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1227 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1228 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1229 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1234 unsigned char *idbytes;
1238 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1239 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1241 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1242 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1243 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1248 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1249 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1254 unsigned char *extbytes;
1255 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1262 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1276 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1278 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1279 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1281 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1282 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1290 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1291 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1292 * (see longer comment below)
1294 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1295 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1296 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1297 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1298 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1299 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1300 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1301 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1305 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1308 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1309 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1310 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1313 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1314 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1315 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1316 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1317 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1321 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1322 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1323 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1324 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1329 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1330 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1331 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1332 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1339 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1340 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1345 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1347 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1354 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1355 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1356 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1363 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1364 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1369 /* TLS1.3 specific extensions */
1370 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1371 int min_version, max_version, reason, currv;
1372 size_t i, sharessent = 0;
1374 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we add this extension for versions < TLS1.3? */
1375 /* supported_versions extension */
1376 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1377 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1378 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1382 reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
1388 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
1389 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
1392 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
1393 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
1394 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1395 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1397 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1400 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1405 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1411 /* key_share extension */
1412 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1413 /* Extension data sub-packet */
1414 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1415 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
1416 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1422 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
1423 * now, just send one
1425 for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1426 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1427 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1428 unsigned int curve_id = 0;
1429 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
1432 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1433 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1439 /* Generate a key for this key_share */
1440 curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
1441 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1442 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1447 /* Encode the public key. */
1448 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
1450 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1452 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1456 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
1457 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
1458 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint,
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1461 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1462 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1463 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1468 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share
1469 * we're going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY
1470 * For now we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
1472 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
1473 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
1475 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1478 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1485 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1486 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1487 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1490 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1491 unsigned char *padbytes;
1494 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1499 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1500 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1506 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1507 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1511 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1519 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1522 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1525 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1526 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1527 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1528 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1531 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1532 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1537 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1538 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1543 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1544 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1547 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1548 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1549 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1550 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1557 const unsigned char *plist;
1560 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1562 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1564 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1565 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1566 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1567 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1573 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1576 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1578 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1579 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1580 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1586 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1589 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1592 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1593 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1594 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1601 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1602 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1603 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1604 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1605 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1606 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1613 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1614 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1615 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1616 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1617 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1618 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1619 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1620 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1621 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1622 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1624 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1631 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1632 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1633 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1634 const unsigned char *npa;
1635 unsigned int npalen;
1638 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1640 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1641 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1642 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1643 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1647 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1652 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1653 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1654 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1655 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
1657 ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1663 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1664 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1665 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1670 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1672 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1673 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1674 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1676 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1680 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1681 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1683 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1684 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1687 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1689 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1691 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1692 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1698 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1703 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1705 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1706 * for other cases too.
1708 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1709 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1710 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1711 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1712 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1714 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1715 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1721 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1722 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1723 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1729 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1730 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1731 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1732 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1733 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1734 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1735 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1736 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1737 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1744 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1752 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1753 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1754 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1755 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1757 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1759 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1761 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1763 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1764 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1768 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1770 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1771 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1772 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1775 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1777 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1778 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1779 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1787 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1788 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1789 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1791 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1793 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1794 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1796 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1797 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1798 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1799 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1800 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1802 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1803 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1804 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1805 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1806 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1809 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1811 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1812 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1815 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1825 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1826 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1827 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1832 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1833 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1834 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1835 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1837 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1843 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1844 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1845 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1846 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1847 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1848 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1849 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1851 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1852 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1853 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1854 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1855 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1856 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1857 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1858 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1859 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1860 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1861 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1862 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1863 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1866 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1867 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1869 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1871 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1872 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1873 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1877 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1880 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1881 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1883 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1886 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1889 * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
1890 * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
1891 * object as required.
1893 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1894 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1897 * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1898 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1900 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
1903 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1905 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1906 s->servername_done = 0;
1907 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1909 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1912 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1913 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1914 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1915 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1916 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1917 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1920 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1921 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
1922 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1924 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1925 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1926 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1927 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1930 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1931 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1934 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1937 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1938 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1941 for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
1942 RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
1944 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1945 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
1946 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
1947 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
1948 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1950 if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1951 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
1952 &currext->data, al))
1954 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1955 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1958 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1960 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1961 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1962 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1963 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1964 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1965 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1966 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1967 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1968 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1969 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1970 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1971 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1972 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1973 * the value of the Host: field.
1974 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1975 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1976 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1978 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1982 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1983 unsigned int servname_type;
1984 PACKET sni, hostname;
1986 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
1987 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1988 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1993 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1994 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1995 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1997 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1998 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1999 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2001 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2002 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2004 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2005 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2006 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2011 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2012 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2016 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2017 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2021 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2022 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2026 s->servername_done = 1;
2029 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2030 * fall back to a full handshake.
2032 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2033 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2034 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2037 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2038 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2041 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
2044 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2048 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2049 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2051 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2052 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2058 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2059 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2060 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2062 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
2063 &ec_point_format_list)
2064 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2069 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2070 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2072 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2073 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2077 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) {
2078 PACKET supported_groups_list;
2080 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
2081 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
2082 &supported_groups_list)
2083 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
2084 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
2089 if (!PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
2090 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
2092 session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
2093 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2098 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2099 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2100 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2101 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
2102 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2103 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2104 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2105 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2108 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2109 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2111 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
2112 &supported_sig_algs)
2113 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2114 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2119 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2120 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2124 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2125 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
2126 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2130 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2131 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2132 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2133 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2134 (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
2138 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2139 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2141 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2143 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2144 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2145 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2146 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2150 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2153 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2155 PACKET responder_id;
2156 const unsigned char *id_data;
2158 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2160 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2164 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2165 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
2166 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2167 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2171 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2172 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2176 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2177 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2178 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2183 /* Read in request_extensions */
2184 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
2185 &currext->data, &exts))
2188 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2189 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2190 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2191 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2192 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2193 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2194 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2195 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2196 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2204 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2206 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2210 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
2211 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2213 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2216 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2217 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2218 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2219 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2220 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2221 * anything like that, but this might change).
2223 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2224 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2225 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2226 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2227 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2229 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2233 else if (currext->type
2234 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2235 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2236 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
2237 &currext->data, al))
2241 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2243 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2244 && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2245 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
2246 &currext->data, al))
2250 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2251 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
2252 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2253 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2254 && s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2255 unsigned int group_id;
2256 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
2257 const unsigned char *curves;
2258 size_t num_curves, i;
2260 unsigned int curve_flags;
2263 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
2264 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2269 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &key_share_list)) {
2270 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2272 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2276 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
2277 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
2278 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list,
2280 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2282 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2286 /* Find a share that we can use */
2287 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) {
2288 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2290 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2293 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
2294 unsigned int share_id = (curves[0] << 8) | (curves[1]);
2295 if (group_id == share_id
2296 && tls_curve_allowed(s, curves,
2297 SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK)) {
2302 if (i == num_curves) {
2303 /* Share not suitable */
2307 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
2309 if (group_nid == 0) {
2310 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2312 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2316 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2317 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
2318 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2320 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
2321 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2326 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2328 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2329 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2331 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2332 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
2334 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2335 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2337 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2340 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2343 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
2345 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2346 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2347 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2348 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2355 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2356 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
2360 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2361 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2362 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2363 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2364 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2367 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
2368 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2369 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
2374 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2376 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2377 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2378 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2380 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2385 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2386 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2387 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2388 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2393 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2396 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2397 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
2398 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2401 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2410 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2411 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2412 * fill the length of the block.
2414 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2416 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2418 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2419 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2420 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2428 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2430 unsigned int length, type, size;
2431 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2432 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2435 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2437 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2439 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2440 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2442 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2444 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2446 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2449 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2450 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2454 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2455 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2459 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2460 const unsigned char *data;
2463 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2464 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2467 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2468 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2470 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2471 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2473 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2474 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2475 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2476 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2477 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2480 tlsext_servername = 1;
2482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2483 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2484 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2485 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2486 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2487 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2491 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2492 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2493 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2494 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2495 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2498 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2499 ecpointformatlist_length;
2500 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2501 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2502 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2503 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2509 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2511 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2512 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2513 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2514 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2516 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2519 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2520 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2523 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2524 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2526 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2529 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2530 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2533 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2534 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2538 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2539 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2540 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2542 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2543 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2544 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2545 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2546 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2547 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2549 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2551 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2552 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2553 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2556 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2561 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2562 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2563 unsigned char *selected;
2564 unsigned char selected_len;
2565 /* We must have requested it. */
2566 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2567 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2570 /* The data must be valid */
2571 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2572 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2575 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2578 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2579 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2580 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2584 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2585 * a single Serverhello
2587 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2588 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2589 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2590 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2593 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2594 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2595 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2599 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2601 /* We must have requested it. */
2602 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2603 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2607 * The extension data consists of:
2608 * uint16 list_length
2609 * uint8 proto_length;
2610 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2612 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2613 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2614 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2615 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2618 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2619 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2620 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2621 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2624 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2625 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2628 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2631 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2632 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2636 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2637 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2638 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2639 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2640 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2641 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2642 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
2643 (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->version < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
2644 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2646 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2647 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2648 && s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2649 unsigned int group_id;
2651 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
2655 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2660 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &group_id)) {
2661 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2663 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2667 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
2669 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
2672 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2674 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2678 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
2680 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2681 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2683 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2687 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2688 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2689 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2694 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
2695 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2697 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2700 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2702 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2703 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2705 } else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2709 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2710 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2714 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2715 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2716 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2717 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2718 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2719 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2720 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2724 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2733 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2734 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2735 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2736 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2737 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2739 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2740 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2741 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2743 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2749 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2752 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2753 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2754 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2763 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2765 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2769 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2774 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2776 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2777 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2781 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2782 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2785 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2786 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2790 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2792 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2793 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2794 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2795 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2797 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2799 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2802 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2803 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2806 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2807 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2810 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2811 s->servername_done = 0;
2817 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2818 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2820 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2821 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2822 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2825 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2826 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2828 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2829 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2832 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2835 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2836 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2837 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2841 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2846 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2847 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2848 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2849 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2850 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2851 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2852 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2853 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2856 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2857 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2858 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2860 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2863 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2864 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2866 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2867 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2871 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2875 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2880 * Upon success, returns 1.
2881 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2883 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2885 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2888 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2889 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2890 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2891 * influence which certificate is sent
2893 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2895 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2896 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2897 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2898 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2900 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2901 * et al can pick it up.
2903 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2904 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2906 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2907 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2908 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2910 /* status request response should be sent */
2911 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2912 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2913 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2915 /* something bad happened */
2916 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2918 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2924 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2931 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2933 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2934 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2938 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2939 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2940 * must contain uncompressed.
2942 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2943 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2944 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2945 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2946 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2947 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2948 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2949 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2951 unsigned char *list;
2952 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2953 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2954 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2955 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2956 found_uncompressed = 1;
2960 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2962 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2966 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2967 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2969 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2971 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2972 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2973 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2974 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2976 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2978 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2981 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2982 * that we don't receive a status message
2984 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2985 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2986 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
2989 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2990 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2993 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2994 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2997 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2998 s->servername_done = 0;
3004 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3007 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3009 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
3010 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3014 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3022 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
3023 * type and return it.
3025 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
3026 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
3027 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
3029 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
3031 RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
3036 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
3037 if (exts[loop].type == type)
3045 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
3047 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
3048 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3049 * point to the resulting session.
3051 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3052 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3053 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3056 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3057 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3058 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3059 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3060 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3061 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3062 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3065 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3066 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3067 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3068 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3069 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3070 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3072 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
3076 const unsigned char *etick;
3078 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
3081 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3084 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3087 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
3090 ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3091 hello->num_extensions,
3092 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
3093 if (ticketext == NULL)
3096 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
3099 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3102 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3105 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3107 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3108 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3109 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3110 * calculate the master secret later.
3114 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
3115 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3118 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
3119 hello->session_id_len, ret);
3121 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3122 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3125 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3128 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3129 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3132 default: /* fatal error */
3138 * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
3139 * ClientHello and we can support it
3144 int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
3146 RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
3148 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3150 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION
3151 || s->version > TLS1_2_VERSION))
3154 emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3155 hello->num_extensions,
3156 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
3159 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
3160 * client doesn't support EMS.
3165 /* The extensions must always be empty */
3166 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
3169 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3175 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3177 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3178 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
3179 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3180 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3181 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3182 * point to the resulting session.
3185 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3186 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3187 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3188 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3189 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3191 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3192 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3193 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3196 unsigned char *sdec;
3197 const unsigned char *p;
3198 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
3200 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3201 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3202 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3203 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3205 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3206 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3209 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3214 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3215 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3216 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3227 /* Check key name matches */
3228 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3229 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3233 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3234 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3235 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3236 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3237 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3238 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3244 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3247 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3251 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3253 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3258 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3259 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3260 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3263 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3264 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3265 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3268 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3269 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3270 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3271 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3272 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3273 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
3274 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
3275 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3279 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
3280 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3285 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3289 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3293 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3294 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3295 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3299 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3300 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3309 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3313 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3314 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3318 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3325 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3326 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3327 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3328 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3329 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3330 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3331 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3332 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3333 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3334 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3337 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3338 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3339 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3340 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3341 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3342 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3343 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3346 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3349 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3350 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3356 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3359 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3360 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3361 return table[i].nid;
3366 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3372 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3375 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3378 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3384 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3386 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3393 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3396 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3397 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3398 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3399 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3400 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3401 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3402 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3403 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3404 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3405 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3406 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3407 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3410 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3416 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3417 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3418 return tls12_md_info + i;
3424 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3426 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3427 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3429 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3432 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3435 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3439 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3440 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3442 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3443 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3444 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3447 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3448 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3451 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3452 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3454 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3455 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3457 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3458 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3464 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3465 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3466 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3468 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3469 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3471 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3472 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3474 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3476 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3477 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3479 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3481 if (psignhash_nid) {
3482 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3483 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3484 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3488 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3489 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3491 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3492 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3493 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3495 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3496 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3498 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3499 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3503 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3504 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3508 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3510 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3511 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3512 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3514 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3515 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3516 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3518 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3519 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3520 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3522 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3523 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3528 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3529 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3533 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3534 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3535 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3542 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3544 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3546 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3549 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3550 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3554 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3555 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3556 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3557 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3564 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3565 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3566 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3567 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3569 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3570 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3571 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3572 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3573 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3575 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3576 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3579 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3580 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3581 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3583 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3593 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3594 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3596 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3597 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3599 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3601 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3603 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3604 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3605 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3606 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3607 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3608 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3609 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3610 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3611 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3612 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3614 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3615 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3618 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3619 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3623 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3624 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3626 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3628 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3631 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3635 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3636 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3640 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3642 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
3645 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3646 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3648 /* Should never happen */
3652 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3653 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3654 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3656 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3657 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3661 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3666 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3667 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3669 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3670 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3673 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3674 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3675 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3676 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3677 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3679 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3680 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3681 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3682 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3688 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3689 * the certificate for signing.
3691 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3693 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3694 * supported it stays as NULL.
3696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3697 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3698 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3700 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3701 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3702 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3703 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3707 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3708 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3711 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3712 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3713 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3714 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3715 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3716 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3717 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3718 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3724 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3725 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3726 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3728 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3729 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3730 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
3734 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3741 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3743 return (int)numsigalgs;
3746 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3747 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3748 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3750 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3751 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
3752 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
3756 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3758 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3760 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3762 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3764 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3765 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3768 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3772 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3775 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3777 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3778 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3779 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3780 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3781 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3782 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3784 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3785 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3786 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3790 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3792 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3795 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3798 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3800 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3802 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3804 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3812 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3813 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3815 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3818 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3819 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3822 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3823 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3828 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3829 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3831 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3835 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3839 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3842 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3844 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3849 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3850 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3852 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3853 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3854 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3856 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3863 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3864 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3865 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3867 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3868 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3869 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3875 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3879 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3883 if (default_nid == -1)
3885 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3887 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3888 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3889 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3894 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3895 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3899 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3900 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3901 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3908 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3909 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3910 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3911 * attempting to use them.
3914 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3916 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3917 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3918 /* Strict mode flags */
3919 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3920 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3921 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3923 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3928 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3929 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3932 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3933 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3935 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3938 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
3940 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3941 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3943 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3945 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3946 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3952 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3955 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3957 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3958 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3960 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3967 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3968 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3969 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3970 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3971 else if (!check_flags)
3976 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3977 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3979 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3981 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3982 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3984 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3987 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3988 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3989 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3990 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3993 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3994 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3995 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3999 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4000 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4003 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4004 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4005 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4008 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4009 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4010 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4013 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4014 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4015 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4024 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4025 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4027 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4029 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4030 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4031 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4034 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4041 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4042 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4046 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4047 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4048 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4049 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4051 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4058 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4059 else if (check_flags)
4060 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4062 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4063 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4064 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4065 else if (!check_flags)
4068 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4069 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4070 else if (strict_mode) {
4071 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4072 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4073 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4074 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4076 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4083 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4084 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4086 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
4088 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4091 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4094 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4098 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4102 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4104 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4105 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4107 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4108 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4109 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4113 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4116 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4118 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4120 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4121 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4123 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4124 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4125 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4127 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4128 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4129 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4130 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4131 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4136 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4139 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4141 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4142 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4146 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4147 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4148 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4149 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4150 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4152 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4155 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4159 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4162 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4163 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4170 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4171 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4173 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4174 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4175 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4176 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4177 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4178 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4179 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4182 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4183 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4185 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4189 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4191 int dh_secbits = 80;
4192 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4193 return DH_get_1024_160();
4194 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4195 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4200 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4201 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4204 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4212 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4213 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4215 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4216 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4224 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4225 return DH_get_2048_224();
4226 return DH_get_1024_160();
4230 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4233 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4236 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4237 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4238 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4239 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4241 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4244 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4246 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4249 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4251 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4252 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4253 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4254 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4256 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4257 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4259 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4260 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4263 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4265 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4268 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4271 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4273 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4274 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4276 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4277 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4279 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4280 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4285 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4286 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4287 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4290 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4292 int rv, start_idx, i;
4294 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4299 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4303 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4304 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4305 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);